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**The Wilsonian legacy in political science: Denna F. Fleming,
Frederick L. Schuman, and Quincy Wright**

Bucklin, Steven J., Ph.D.

The University of Iowa, 1993

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**THE WILSONIAN LEGACY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE:
DENNA F. FLEMING, FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, AND QUINCY WRIGHT**

b y

Steven J. Bucklin

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in History
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa**

May 1993

Thesis supervisor: Professor Lawrence E. Gelfand

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Graduate College
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

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PH.D. THESIS

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Steven J. Bucklin

has been approved by the Examining Committee
for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in History at the May 1993
graduation.

Thesis committee:

Kenneth E. Befford
Thesis supervisor

Edward W. Hamby
Member

James M. Lindsay
Member

James L. Hill
Member

Michael W. Harris
Member

To the memory of Stephen R. Ward, friend, historian, and mentor.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For a large part of the twentieth century, the role that the United States should undertake in the world community has been charged with controversy. Always dynamic, the concept of internationalism has been largely associated with the thought and rhetoric of President Woodrow Wilson. Even as we approach the end of this century, Wilson's vision remains the subject of critical appraisal. This project will consider the professional careers of three eminent political scientists--Denna F. Fleming, Frederick L. Schuman, and Quincy Wright--who became influential teachers, scholars, and publicists in the field of international politics. Through an examination of their careers, as reflected in their personal papers and publications, I seek to describe the evolution of Wilsonian internationalism.

Starting out during the 1920s as confirmed Wilsonian internationalists, the three scholars had careers that spanned a half century, from the 1920s to the 1970s. They received their advanced training at academic institutions where they were exposed to and influenced by the political culture of the American Midwest. All were pioneers in the development of the academic field of international politics during the decades which separated WWI and WWII. Through their scholarship and instruction, they continued to influence their field through the Second World War, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the events of the seventies.

Fleming, Schuman and Wright offered a complex analysis of world organization. They proposed theories for world organization which incorporated multiple perspectives and which emphasized power, progress, and economics. For them Frederick Jackson Turner's *requiem* had not closed the American frontier, but had instead moved it to another level. Far from being idealistic utopians, these individuals sought practical means to establish an effective structure for world organization, and of those practical means, power to coerce was the central one.

An integral assumption of these internationalists was that the application of reason could remedy the human condition. They sought to transpose the municipal government model to the level of international government. Planning and organization were for them the keys to a productive, peaceful society, and government was the primary agent to achieve that goal.

Wright and Fleming had both studied with James W. Garner at the University of Illinois, though a decade apart, and Wright later was a teacher of Schuman's at the University of Chicago. They accepted as a common denominator that the Anglo-Saxon tradition of evolutionary legal change was essential to the creation of an effective world organization. Law, if recognized and enforced on an international level, was able to adapt to the needs of the community.

These scholars were instrumental in the creation of the discipline of international politics, and Wilsonian internationalism had a profound effect on the teaching of international politics. So, too, did Garner's interpretation of international relations, which is clearly visible in the

works of Fleming, Schuman, and Wright.¹ Garner himself had studied under the tutelage of legal scholar John Bassett Moore.

Garner's legacy was his emphasis on the nature and methodology of political science. The discipline was a new one at the turn of the century, and not without critics, some of whom questioned the basic notion of a "science" of politics. Garner, like so many other political scientists, asserted throughout his career that objections to the concept of a science of politics were "without weight."² Clearly, his efforts and those of other political scientists to change the world would be more effective if their discipline attained the predictive power of a natural science.

Garner emphasized systematic inquiry as the prerequisite to science rather than constant results from experiments. So, for Garner, the fact that when combined, the variables with which political scientists worked often failed to yield predictable results, was not a signal weakness in describing the basic premise of a "science" of politics. Garner sought to expand the data base in the belief that predictable results could be achieved once the interactions of all the variables were understood. Wright, Schuman, and Fleming maintained faith that there was a "science" of politics; Wright and, to a lesser extent Fleming and Schuman, strove to apply Garner's methodology in their scholarship.

As a part of that methodology, they practiced a form of thought which I have labelled historical syllogism. Syllogistic thought may be represented by the formula $a=b, b=c, \text{ therefore } c=a$. It will become apparent to the reader that this does not entirely represent the historical process Fleming, Schuman and Wright followed. What is syllogistic, though, is the fact that

these academics insisted that the result of a combination of variables was predictably the same despite different social, economic, and political context. If, for example, in a multinational world system, country A engaged in an arms build-up, so, too, would country B, and the predictable result was the commencement of war between the two states. All three scholars insisted that the lessons of history, which they defined as the results of a combination of variables, were repeated. Part of this inquiry, then, will be an assessment of the impact this mode of thought had on the solutions they offered.

They inherited as well from Garner and other political scientists a burdensome style of writing. Text writers of the early twentieth century frequently adopted the form and content of many of the German political philosophers of the nineteenth century--Bluntschli, Jellinek, Treitschke, von Mohl--and the ensuing "stratospheric" level of monologue likely appealed to few people beyond the academy.³ It was a style that died hard in Quincy Wright's literary efforts, but Schuman and Fleming did much to popularize political science and international politics through the more simple, direct style of their texts. Frederick Schuman's *International Politics*, in its seventh edition at the time of his death in 1976, and one of the most widely adopted books for the discipline, demonstrates that style.

From Wilson these men inherited faith in political and cultural evolution. They viewed the League of Nations Covenant not as a monolith, but as an instrument to provide a basis for an evolving world political system which the U.S. might lead. Wilson's creation was not one intended to meet all the needs of a global system, but to provide the medium through

which the next world organization would evolve. The League and the United Nations were not failures, but transitional organizations designed to provide flexibility for future, more encompassing systems. Although League and U.N. policies frequently frustrated these supporters of world organization, nonetheless, they saw in the institutions the face of the future.

And Fleming, Schuman, and Wright expanded the focus of internationalism in an effort to ensure that future. Laws, especially those which sought to govern the conduct of states during time of war and the conduct of trade, had long occupied the foremost position in the inquiries and expositions of internationalists.⁴ Law continued to be foremost in the writings of these Wilsonians, but they wrote not just of laws applicable to war, but of laws to maintain peace, of constitutional law, and of the means to create a world opinion necessary to support an effective international law.

Collectively and individually, whatever the standard, these men made significant contributions to their discipline. Quincy Wright's theories contributed to the structure of world organization and interpretation of international law which arose after the Second World War; his students, among them Schuman, taught and served in public and private institutions throughout the country. Denna Fleming helped change the way scholars interpreted the Cold War, and both he and Wright served many years and in a variety of positions in the various guilds of political science. And Schuman's work on U.S.-Soviet relations influenced both public and

private sectors. These scholars were among the vanguard of their discipline.

They held in common the desire to organize the modern industrial world with management techniques which they thought were necessary in order to address the needs of the world and to avoid the tragedy of future aggression and war. They sought to impose order where they perceived none, and to achieve centralization of that order through a world institution. They had determined that for too long principles of *laissez-faire* sovereignty had governed the relationships between nations, even under the auspices of the League. Alterations in the balance of power acted as the "hidden hand," adjusting the relationships when necessary. And not unlike the critics of the free market who believed that the result of an unregulated market was periodic depression, these analysts held that the balance of power system resulted in periodic wars between the nations. Accordingly, they believed that the time had come for humans to regulate their affairs, to seek a new dynamic for international relations.

Wilsonian internationalism was that dynamic. It was a system predicated upon the idea of collective security as practiced by sovereign states and based on respect for law and opposition to armed aggression. Ideally, the collectivity, in this case the League of Nations, would meet all acts of aggression with a quick and determined response. Each sovereign member was obligated to provide assistance in those measures, whether military or economic, taken to deter and, if necessary to oppose, aggression. This was a plan appealing both in simplicity and directness of purpose, but

both were soon undermined in practice by the complexities of tradition and international relations.

As Fleming, Schuman, and Wright examined the practices of the League, it became clear to them that a fundamental problem in establishing an effective deterrent to aggression lay in its definition. League members were obligated under Article Ten to "respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League."⁵ But it was unclear as to whether an act of aggression required the use of military force; whether it must be accompanied by a declaration of war; whether economic policies could constitute external aggression; or if the provision of assistance to an armed rebellion constituted aggression. There had been clear rules governing international relations during a state of war set forth in a long record of international law, from Hugo Grotius to the Hague Peace Conferences, but how did that law relate to the new order of the League? These were questions whose answers were not readily discernible.

Another difficulty which these scholars perceived with the operation of Wilsonian internationalism was the practice that each sovereign nation state received equal voting rights in the League. Wilson had declared that a durable peace must be based upon an equality of rights among states; that the new order "must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak."⁶ Yet how could a nation like the United States acquiesce in and be convinced that an equality of interests existed between it and say, Egypt? How could any great power, or a combination of great powers, be made to

comply with the will of lesser states whose combined resources could not prevent the great power from resisting the decision of the League? Wilson believed the answer to be the power of law as an agent of persuasion, but in the case of the League there was no coercive power to enforce laws, other than those designed to deter aggression, in the event that nations refused to comply.

A third problem of Wilsonian internationalism as exemplified in the League which these political scientists identified was the flexible response the Covenant provided in the application of sanctions against an aggressor. Not all members were required to allocate troops for actions to be taken against aggressors.⁷ Collective security, therefore, offered a rationalization of what usually occurred in international relations during time of war or threat of war. Under Article Ten of the League of Nations Covenant, neutral nations could, for the most part, do what they had always done. So could Great Powers or those powers intimately involved in the conflict, due to the discretion they could apply to their type of commitment against the aggressor. Conceivably, too, international police actions could fall to the exclusive purview of the great powers, in which case the difference between the League and the Concert of Vienna of the 19th century would become moot. Or, the wealthy nations could hire mercenaries to do the fighting, potentially creating class and perhaps ethnic tensions within the League. Collective security as such would be little more than a euphemism for balance of power politics.

These men perceived the lack of universal membership and the fact that membership was non-binding to be another inadequacy of the League.

Article Seventeen of the Covenant addressed the issue of potential conflict between members and non-members, but it did not address the problems that might arise from efforts to enforce League legislation on such issues as the opium trade, "white" slavery, or new interpretations of international law which might come from the World Court or from practice.⁸ The League had not allowed Germany or Russia immediate membership, and it later found other countries like Brazil willing to withdraw from membership when its government chose such a course. Such a porous membership policy was unlikely to contribute to a stable world organization.

The problems discussed above were procedural and structural in nature. But Fleming, Schuman, and Wright perceived a spiritual problem in the Covenant of the League as well. This was an organization which counted among its primary purposes the expression of the organized force of world opinion, yet the individual had no direct vested interest in League operations. Nowhere in the League Covenant was there provision for universal human rights. There was no call to "hold certain truths to be self-evident," no declaration of individual rights and responsibilities, and no provision for individual recourse to the institutions of the League. When the Japanese government pressed Wilson on the issue of providing a statement of racial equality in the Covenant, he refused in order to preserve the cooperation of the colonial powers. So the League had few of the principles around which leaders could rally the masses to the barricades in time of distress.

Throughout the two decades of the League's existence, these inadequacies became increasingly visible and continued to undermine its

effectiveness. A solution to one of the problems was begun in the form of informal cooperation between nonmembers and the League, such as the League's relationship with the United States. But equally important were the nations bent on challenging the political *status quo* through aggressive acts. Japan and Italy refused to declare war on Manchuria and Ethiopia respectively, thereby clouding the issue of whether their attacks on those countries violated League sanctions against aggression; nations which were obligated to embargo war materials from aggressors refused to include fuel among the proscribed materials; and the principle of self-determination, basic to the Covenant's desire to protect the peace, was sacrificed again and again to expediency.

Fleming, Schuman, and Wright set themselves to the task of rectifying these problems. Although each differed somewhat in his prescriptions, they focused their energies on several reforms. First, they sought to limit national sovereignty, for they believed it had hindered League actions. This was to be accomplished either by granting the League, or after its collapse in 1940, a new world organization, military and economic powers sufficient to enforce its will; through a change in the representation of states in the world organization; and through the expansion of membership to include groups other than nation states. Second, they called for universal national membership, voluntarily or otherwise. Third, their proposals sought to refine the definition of aggression, and included the abolition of neutrality as an optional response to aggression. Finally, they sought the adoption of a platform of universal human rights, to include the extension of legal standing to individuals in the courts of the world

organization. These solutions represent an important strain of the evolution of Wilsonian internationalism.

These three men did not always agree in their interpretation of Wilsonianism, and in fact some of the policies they advocated might be interpreted as outside the school. Wright, Schuman, and Fleming, differed the most in their understanding of how to erect the new legal system or alter existing ones to meet the needs of internationalism. And in the long run, all three, like Wilson, found it necessary to compromise principle to the superior goal of world peace. Still, like Wilson, they sought to "organize world opinion" around international law; they endeavored to correct the anarchy of international relations; they were determined to provide progress to the "underdeveloped" world; the "open door" was an integral element of the economic thought; they shared a similar understanding of power politics; and they were dedicated to an activist role for the U.S. in world affairs. They valued progress, and believed that a peaceful international order, based on the implementation of the principles of internationalism as outlined in Wilson's Fourteen Points, the League, and the evolving system of Western international law, offered the best opportunity to achieve a durable peace. Yet in the end, each developed some serious concerns about the efficacy of Wilsonian internationalism.

When the fabric of international society collapsed once again in 1939, these men sought a new system to replace the one which had failed so miserably to keep the peace. The materials from which to craft a new world order were few: traditionally world order rested on power and the attempts to balance it, tempered somewhat by practices which the various

states had found to be mutually advantageous, hence the evolution of international customs and "laws." But the laws were only as effective as the sovereign states' will to enforce them. The failure of the League to meet the depredations of the militarist states of the twenties and thirties underscored the need to create a coercive power to enforce international law, one that had not only the physical power, but the moral sanction of public opinion as its foundation.

Of the many obstacles these Wilsonians faced in their efforts to create an effective world organization, they agreed that chief among them remained the sovereign nation-state. By definition, a sovereign nation's will was ultimate, subject to no higher law. Consequently, the test between sovereign states was power, for there was no higher law to govern their actions. The costs of such a "system" of international relations had long been known: peace maintained only through the balance of power, a balance which required periodic adjustments, commonly accomplished through war. The most recent of those periodic adjustments had wrecked a devastation upon its implementers beyond the powers of imagination; the one to come almost defied comprehension.

The challenge of organizing public opinion to favor limits on national sovereignty and to support a rudimentary world government was intimidating. In their own country the years between the two world wars reflected a public opinion that had decidedly favored withdrawing the U.S. from European politics; indeed some extremists sought to exclude American political involvement from Europe, Asia, and Africa all together. And these three political scholars sought to influence not just U.S. public opinion, but

that of the world, an even more daunting task. Colonial areas which sought independence would conceivably have little patience for internationalist concepts of mandate systems, or of the idea that "backward peoples" were not yet ready for independence or equal participation in a world system. Nationalism and anticolonialism were the dynamic forces in these areas, not internationalism. And, of course, access to the means to mold public opinion in the totalitarian states was extraordinarily limited.

Still, these men believed that, given the opportunity, people could be educated to acknowledge their moral duty. Once so educated, reasonable people would see the correctness of Wilson's prescriptions. And they hoped that Americans in particular would accept their responsibility in the task of organizing the world.

They hoped as well that Americans would improve their relations with the Soviet Union. Fleming was an early advocate of a policy that would have the U.S. deal with the Soviet Union "firmly," yet "require her to trust us as an equal."⁹ His sympathy for the Soviet perspective of world affairs caused the chancellor of Vanderbilt University, where Fleming spent most of his career, to brand him a communist sympathiser, an action that cost Fleming a position at the University of South Florida. He later became, according to Paul Conkin, "the darling of the "New Left" by the middle and late 1960s" for his pioneering revisionist work *The Cold War And Its Origins*.¹⁰

Schuman associated with causes and their leaders throughout his career which much of the media and most of the public would come to identify as "communist fronts" and "fellow travelers." So much so that some students

at Williams College called him "Red Fred." He also served as the chief foreign policy advisor to the Henry Wallace presidential campaign in 1948 and drafted appropriate planks of the Progressive Party platform.¹¹ A vocal critic of U.S. policy throughout the fifties and sixties, Schuman, too, advocated relaxed relations with the Soviet Union, and was a victim of the anti-communist campaigns of those years.

Wright's focus on Soviet-American relations was as a model to help understand how differing ideologies could peacefully coexist in an international organization. Peace and its benefits knew no ideological boundaries according to Wright. What is more, as confirmed evolutionaries, he and his two colleagues had faith that a process of convergence was taking place between the two rival faiths in favor of progress.

These men and their prescriptions, then, were an important element of the drive to world organization. This dissertation is organized around the following chapters: an introduction which defines the project; chapters two, three, and four provide an examination of the early careers and theories of Wright, Fleming, and Schuman to the end of World War II; chapters five and six bring together their post-war efforts to influence policy, their reactions to the policies that the U.S. pursued, and an evaluation of convergency theory; and chapter seven, which offers some conclusions. Throughout is an assessment of political science and international politics, and the impact of Wilsonian thought on the evolution of internationalism.

Notes

¹ See Garner's *International Law and the World War*, (New York, N.Y.: Longmans, 1920).

² James W. Garner, *Introduction to Political Science*, (New York, N.Y.: American Book Company, 1910), 17. George Catlin argued in *The Science and Methods of Politics*, (New York, N.Y.: Knopf, 1927), 112, that politics was a "science of prediction." Contemporaries emphasized differences between political science and history in order to justify an independent discipline. R. N. Gilchrist wrote in *Principles of Political Science*, (New York, N.Y.: Longmans, 1921), 12, that political science "goes further than history" in that it "selects, analyses and systematizes the facts of history in order to extract the permanent principles of political life." A. R. Lord concurred in his *Principles of Politics*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921). Charles Merriam, Schuman's and Wright's colleague at Chicago, echoed in *New Aspects of Politics*, (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1925), vii, the belief that his discipline was a science. He added to it an element of Taylorism. The primary objective of political science, he insisted, was to prevent "waste in political action."

³ Many contemporary authors employed a similar style. See fn 4.

⁴ See Garner's *International Law and the World War*, (New York, N.Y.: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920) or John Bassett Moore's *A Digest of International Law*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906). Or one could look to the writings of Hugo Grotius and Emmerich Vattel.

⁵ Woodrow Wilson, "An Address to the Third Plenary Session of the Peace Conference." In Arthur S. Link, ed., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966-, 55), 167.

⁶ Address of President Wilson to the Senate, 22 January 1917. In Link, 40, 536.

⁷ Article Sixteen. In Link, 55, 169.

⁸ Article Seventeen. In Link, 55, 170.

⁹ Memo to Bernard Baruch from D. F. Fleming, 15 May 1946, 3. This memo was sent to President Truman. See Daniel Yergin's *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 79.

¹⁰ Paul Conkin, *Gone With The Ivy: A Biography of Vanderbilt University* (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), 513.

11 See Curtis MacDougall's *Gideon's Army v. II: The Decision and the Organization* (New York, N.Y.: Marzani and Munzell, 1965).

CHAPTER II

QUINCY WRIGHT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Quincy Wright began his examination of internationalism when the word itself was not yet widely used. The language of balance of power, geopolitics, and *realpolitik* dominated much of the discourse that surrounded international relations in the early twentieth century. The concept of political equality among sovereign states was at the time unfamiliar to many of the world's peoples. Nations were believed to have a prerogative, if not a duty, to use their power for the aggrandizement of the nation-state. This notion was readily justified in a Social Darwinist/Aristotelian theory of hierarchies that neatly explained the imposition of policy of greater states upon lesser states. It was not an easy task to convince the great body of public opinion that an international organization premised on the political equality of all states within the organization was necessary or even desirable, let alone essential for social progress.

Yet it was to just such a task that Quincy Wright set himself. Wright began his studies of international behavior, organization, and politics while he was a student at Lombard College in Galesburg, Illinois in 1908. His choice of school was unusual, for Philip Quincy Wright, born in 1890, was a son of an eastern family whose roots were in Medford, Massachusetts. Wright's father, Philip Green Wright, taught economics at Harvard University, but had as well been a professor at Lombard College where his

specialty was the poetry of Carl Sandburg; his aunt was a teacher at Radcliffe College; and his great-grandfather Elizur Wright was an actuarialist instrumental in the development of modern life insurance practices.¹ Theirs was a family of not inconsiderable means, for the parents even purchased a house in Galesburg to accommodate their sons, Quincy and Sewall.

Quincy received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Lombard in 1912, and his Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy degrees from the University of Illinois in 1913 and 1915 respectively.² Although he had applied to other schools for admittance into their Ph.D. programs, Illinois offered him a four hundred-fifty dollar fellowship for the academic year 1914-1915 which may have proved decisive.³ Perhaps, too, the opportunity to study international relations with Professor James Garner, a leading internationalist and authority on international law, affected his decision to stay in Illinois. Regardless of the reasons, Wright remained and completed the doctorate.

From Illinois Wright went to the University of Pennsylvania on a research fellowship from 1915 to 1916; from 1916 to 1919 he taught at Harvard; in 1919 he joined the faculty of the political science department at the University of Minnesota; and in 1923 he accepted an offer from Charles Merriam to teach international law at the University of Chicago, where he remained until his retirement in 1956. After that, Wright accepted an *emeritus* appointment at the University of Virginia.⁴

During the years 1914-1915 events occurred that shocked the U.S. public into recognition that the war in Europe would not be limited to that

continent. German submarines advanced the war to new limits and British battleships interfered with the rights of neutrals to ship goods. What appeared in August 1914 to be a military conflict fought along traditional balance of power cleavages had rapidly escalated to a winner-take-all, loser-receive-nothing contest where both sides claimed the other would stop at nothing short of world domination or total defeat. The inability of traditional diplomacy to arrange a conclusion to the contest led many analysts to seek a new diplomacy, one that would provide a durable world order, a durable peace, and an effective arrangement of nations subject to international law.⁵

The war generated wide discussion about international law, especially a law which would guarantee neutral rights. Wright wrote frequently about neutrality and firmly embraced the historic rights of neutrals and impartial parties as defined in international law over the course of centuries. His reaction to German violations of neutral rights, though, was significantly greater than his reaction to British violations.⁶ His advocacy of neutral rights changed dramatically in the nineteen-twenties, but during the war years he continued to argue for the concept of neutrality.⁷

Changing concepts of neutrality as well as the long tradition of organized peace movements influenced a persistent demand in the U.S. and abroad for the creation of a "League to Enforce Peace," or a "Society of Nations," a community of nation-states committed to the maintenance of peace. In the U.S. these advocates knew no partisan boundaries and seemed to extend across the entire political spectrum. Quincy Wright was among the early advocates of such an organization. He wrote his father a lengthy

letter in commemoration of Bastille Day, 1917, in which he stated that "World government is certainly the thing needed."

Wright continued that letter with an assessment of the constitutional power of the Congress to call the militia to enforce the law as the analogue to the necessary scheme of an effective League to Enforce the Peace; of the practicality of a federated world organization; and of the need to ensure that agents of the new world federation would administer international law even if it conflicted with the laws of their own nation. He believed that this could be accomplished through an appellate process to a single world court for all cases of international law, such a court being the "*sine qua non*" of a world organization." Equally important to him was the principle that the individual, not just the state, must have standing in the courts of international law.

Wright also outlined the procedures and institutions he believed to be necessary to establish a world federation. These included a central administration with a "Collegiate executive," and an international law that would be supreme over national laws in the manner that U.S. constitutional law was supreme over state law. He concluded that "If this [international] law as at present existing were administered, *any state law to the contrary notwithstanding* in all cases, whoever were the parties, a world federal order would exist *today*." ⁸ These areas of concern and his prescriptions or remedies remained, with few exceptions, substantively unchanged during his career.

Wright's reputation as an analyst of international affairs and as an authority on international law was firmly established early in his career.

He had already published his dissertation in 1916 in the *University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences*; had published several articles in the *American Journal of International Law*; and in 1921 his first book, *The Control of American Foreign Relations*, received the American Philosophical Society's Henry M. Phillips Crowned Essay Award, which brought with it a sum of two-thousand dollars.⁹ Recognition came from many levels, then, but one that indicates that he had broadened his influence beyond academia came in the form of an appointment to the Naval Intelligence Office as a "special assistant on International Law."¹⁰ This was the beginning of several appointments to government service during his career. They provided Wright with the opportunity not only to directly affect policy, but to reach a wider audience with his message of a new world order.

By 1917 Wright had moved his partisan allegiances, changing from the Republican party to the Democratic party. The leadership of Woodrow Wilson and his plans for a just peace and a world order based on law provided the stimuli for this switch in affiliation. As with so many other citizens, Wright was caught up in the whirlwind of the League of Nations debate. He believed that the U.S. was obligated to lead in the pursuit of a new world order and as a consequence he came to support Wilson and the Democrats, especially as their position was revealed in the Fourteen Points Speech of January 1918. Wright believed Wilson to be a man of vision, but he saw as well what Arthur Link later noted to be Wilson's "chief contributions [of] synthesizing thought and ideals, [of] expressing them in

language that moved the hearts and influenced the votes of men, and [of] devising the practical means of putting these ideals to work."¹¹

Wright was never an uncritical Wilson disciple. He observed on 28 October 1918, in reference to the coming election, that the American people were united to win the war, but that there was disagreement among them as to the goals of victory. As a consequence, he believed U.S. voters would not vote for or against the war, but "for or against the ultimate political objects enunciated by the President." Wright's letter made clear his belief that citizens, especially the Republicans, should rally round the President.¹² But Wright soon came to believe that the president's unbending attitude about partisan disagreements was a serious liability.

He wrote his mother one year after the 1918 election that "balance of power, rabid imperialism and old time diplomacy" again dominated European politics. Because of that, Wright opposed what he characterized as Wilson's rigid stand against reservations, no matter how moderate they might be. Compromise was the art of the possible, and Wright thought one was necessary to the establishment of a new world order, and that such a compromise could be arranged.¹³ Wright believed as well that for Wilson to make the League a political issue in the presidential campaign of 1920 would be "disastrous."¹⁴

The basis of most opposition to U.S. entry in the League of Nations was a belief that Article X of the League Covenant superseded the constitutional authority of Congress to declare war and thus compromised national sovereignty.¹⁵ This was an issue Wright examined in detail. His best account is in an article entitled "Treaties and Constitutional Separation of

Powers in the United States," which was published in 1918. Wright's argument was that the power of the executive to negotiate treaties which required certain types of military action had been previously sustained and that the collective security aspects of the League did not result in a "delegation of power to declare war to the international commission."¹⁶ Wright cited the following as evidence to support his position: (1) that the 1903 Treaty with Panama, ratified and approved, provided that the U.S. guarantee and maintain Panamanian independence, which would require a declaration of war in certain circumstances; (2) that Congress accepted limits on the war power when it approved the Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo, the 1907 Hague Convention, and the Bryan Treaties, all of which prohibited war under specific conditions; and (3) that the use of force under such a "concert of Powers" would not necessarily require a Congressional declaration of war. He argued that the power to determine when to use armed force had long been recognized to be within the purview of executive authority and cited Lincoln's actions to suppress the Southern rebels to demonstrate that "force may be used to the greatest extent without a declaration of war by Congress."¹⁷

Wright concluded as well that if the subject matter of a treaty was appropriate for negotiation, did not conflict with the purposes of the Constitution, and did not violate any of its specific prohibitions, then once it was ratified it became a matter of what he referred to as a "constitutional understanding": that those departments of government whose approbation is necessary to ratification "are bound by their allegiance to the Constitution to perform the acts necessary to give it effect." He provided a

caveat in that he thought it wise to consider the opinion of those branches of government whose consent was necessary for the ratification of treaties prior to signing such agreements, but this was not, he declared, a legal necessity.¹⁸

By January of 1920, determined Congressional opposition to the League had prevented ratification of the Versailles Treaty, and Wright renewed his call upon the President to accept certain reservations. Wright observed the "remarkable" transformation of William Jennings Bryan, who had been "accused of radicalism and doctrinarism," but who was now an advocate of "reservations and opportunist compromise." Wright thought it possible that others might follow his lead.¹⁹ Wright also noted his disappointment with the way Wilson dismissed "his faithful servant" Robert Lansing, and Wright admitted to his aunt that he supported Herbert Hoover's campaign until Hoover came out for a "simon pure Republicanism."²⁰ After this, Wright switched his endorsement to James M. Cox and Franklin D. Roosevelt. He declared in a letter to William Howard Taft that the question of U.S. membership in the League was the most important question the nation faced, and that because American entry was practically certain with Cox and Roosevelt, while doubtful with Harding, Wright was preparing to vote for the Democratic ticket.²¹

Taft counseled him that Harding was the surest way for the U.S. to join the League, but as Wright noted to a friend, Taft was wrong about Harding being the shortest route to the League, but maybe right about his election being the shortest route for Taft to get to the Supreme Court.²² He had less subtle remarks reserved for George Harvey, the influential backroom

Republican operator, whom he referred to in the same letter as "that quadraped George Harvey, prancing on before, flopping his great ears and braying with the noise characteristic of his species." Wright believed that Harvey and his cohorts would destroy any chance the United States might have to join an effective League of Nations. Wright indicated, though, that despite Harvey, the Geneva meeting of the League Assembly, which Wright attended, was a great success.²³

Although Woodrow Wilson's role in preventing U.S. entry into the League disappointed him, Wright ultimately held Henry Cabot Lodge and the Republicans responsible for the defeat of the treaty.²⁴ Wright likened Lodge to Pope Gregory VII in that the Senator delighted in "making his enemies come to Canossa." The Senator's penchant was practiced to the misfortune of the Versailles Treaty as the Republicans were determined to "accept nothing but unconditional surrender." This unbending policy wrought disaster in that it compelled Wilson to retract from what Wright characterized as the President's conciliatory position announced in his January 26th letter to Senator Johnson.²⁵ Wright's loyalty to the League outweighed whatever reservations he may have felt about the methods Wilson employed to achieve Senate approval of the treaty.

This question of whether or not the Senate could subvert executive initiatives led Wright to produce *The Control of American Foreign Relations*, a work in which he defined his belief that the executive branch was solely vested with that authority. One of the constitutional "understandings" therefore was that Congress would acquiesce to executive initiatives.²⁶ Most important to his reasoning was his belief that "the

organs conducting foreign relations have their responsibilities defined by international law, while their powers are defined by constitutional law," so that in order to avoid confusion, a series of understandings developed (or must develop) in the experience of the U.S. government.²⁷

Wright approached the issue from an historical and analytical framework. He provided various precedents that suggested the unique position of the executive branch in its relation to foreign policy, and his prodigious citations cover the entirety of U.S. history. He was careful to include some of the arguments opponents had advanced and to address what he perceived to be their inadequacies.²⁸ He also documented several controversies that had arisen across the discourse of international law and he provided the reader with a cogent analysis, although like many attorneys/lawyers (and perhaps some historians), verbosity plagued him.²⁹

The feature of Wright's analysis that places him squarely as a Wilsonian in terms of constitutional analysis of the control of foreign relations was his belief in a strong executive who is representative of the people's will and unhindered by a strict construction of the Constitution, nor unimpeded by a meddling Senate.³⁰ Wright identified closely with the arguments Wilson articulated in his book *Congressional Government* and concluded, as did Wilson, that "the result of over a century of experience under the Constitution illustrates certain necessities in an adequate control of foreign affairs."³¹ Those necessities included an unhampered executive initiative in foreign affairs.

Foremost, though, among those necessities in Wright's mind was the development of constitutional understandings of the variety Professor E.V. Dicey enumerated in *The Law of the Constitution*.³² Earlier, Wright provided an interpretation of the preamble to the covenant of the League of Nations in "The Understandings of International Law" which concluded that the League, too, must have a flexibly interpreted constitution that allows its institutions to develop along the lines of the "understandings" that evolved under the English common law.³³ Wright envisioned similar understandings for the municipal system he so frequently evoked as his model for world organization: the U.S. federal government.

He compared the present condition of those understandings which had developed in the U.S. to those of the eighteenth century British constitution. In a passage which reveals certain of Wright's political sympathies, he described the constitution as a "jarring and jangling instrument" which created rocky conditions between the executive, its cabinet members, and the legislative branch. The institutions of the constitution were good, he wrote, but the "constitutional manners which will make them work like a well-ordered dinner party" had not yet been developed. "The crudity of Jefferson's pell mell banquet and Jackson's Peggy O'Neill cotillion," he concluded, characterized the relations of the departments of government.³⁴ The question, of course, was how to develop such understandings and it was here that Wright was less than effective, although certainly imaginative.

First, he recommended that Congress declare certain permanent policies that would not restrict executive methods, but would enunciate the general

ends toward which executive efforts should be directed. Second, he wished to ensure that the principles of international law, a body of law which had enabled democratic institutions, especially American institutions, to thrive, govern as much diplomatic activity as possible. Third, he declared that with respect to potential interdepartmental rivalries over treaty negotiations the government should cultivate tolerance, consideration, and respect toward "the exercise of powers which may collide with the powers of other departments."³⁵

In retrospect, the inadequacies of these first three remedies are obvious. First, the declaration of any permanent policy outside the very general rhetoric of national interest would be restrictive to say the least, and there are no guarantees that the executive and Congress would be in concert even after the declaration of such policies. Second, little diplomacy actually occurred outside recognized principles of international law and the only means to ensure that as much "diplomacy as possible" did come under those principles would be to establish an effective world order with sufficient police power to coerce the objects of its law to obey it. Third, to predicate interdepartmental relations on "toleration, consideration, and respect" betrayed Wright's naivete of governmental dynamics and the prerogatives claimed by the three branches, of the capacity or incapacity of political appointees in various departments, and assumed that there were indeed officials to whom such "virtues" would appeal in the operation of government.

Wright's fourth and fifth recommendations were better suited to achieve his goal of an effective and coordinated foreign policy. He

described the maintenance of "close informal relations between the agencies of the government having to do with foreign affairs." To do so, Wright would have enlarged the cabinet to include representatives of the legislative branch in order to "form a Cabinet capable of reaching decisions on foreign affairs likely to secure cooperation from all departments of the government and yet not too large for business."³⁶ Wright would have as well, but always at the executive's initiative, maintained direct relations through more frequent addresses and explanations of executive policy to the Senate, especially, and to congressional committees on foreign affairs.³⁷

To implement Wilson's interpretation of a strong executive, yet appease those individuals and groups who feared a too powerful executive, Wright concluded that his suggested constitutional understandings would not limit the President's power in foreign relations, nor impair the need to act expeditiously, but would provide the executive a general direction. And, he asserted, they would avoid or at least discourage Congressional opposition to treaties and other presidential initiatives in foreign affairs.³⁸

Wright's fifth and final prescription was to develop political traditions that threw "big men to the top." "The people and parties," Wright said, "must insist on men of experience and tried capacity as candidates."³⁹ Part of the remedy he suggested was to retain the expertise of former presidents and secretaries of state by establishing a tradition of electing them to the Senate after their executive service, but he offered no assessment of what to do in the event the men were deemed incompetent; another part of the remedy was to establish an "understanding" of a hierarchical system of

offices--governor to Senate to Vice-President to the Cabinet to the Presidency--as a means of preventing "dark horse" victories in presidential elections, but he offered no counter to the inherent threat that this type of system posed in the perpetuation of an elite.⁴⁰ He alluded to the Senate of ancient Rome as a model, unworried that even at its best the Roman Senate was an unresponsive, corrupt, and bloodthirsty body and that at its worst it was a tool of *imperatum*. And, too, how many presidents, after an exhausting one or two terms in office, would care to devote their next four years to the demands of the Senate? Certainly not Woodrow Wilson!

Wright used the vantage of expediency to argue for a strong executive, too. In "International Law in its Relation to Constitutional Law," Wright repeated much of what he wrote in *The Control of American Foreign Relations*, but he emphasized that legislative or electorate interference delayed and unnecessarily publicized treaties, whereas concentration of competency in executive hands assured rapidity and secrecy. He observed that constraints on the swift exercise of a power often made that power worthless.⁴¹ His assumptions were based upon attributing an intrinsic value to speed and secrecy, yet Wright mentioned none of the drawbacks to those virtues.

While the issue of executive control of foreign policy consumed much of his time, Wright continued to follow other developments that pertained to international law and organization. He was very interested in the issue of war crimes and the possible trials of war criminals. He saw great potential to bring international law to the forefront of world attention through

these actions. In an article entitled "The Legal Liability of the Kaiser," Wright wrote that liability under municipal law was limited to Germany. But he noted that questions of jurisdiction, sovereign immunities and extradition could be addressed best if a tribunal vested with international authority, upon the approval of the neutral and belligerent states, tried the *Kaiser*. International law would also best assure a just and expedient decision.⁴² The venue for such a trial would, of course, be the International Court of Justice. Wright saw as well in the trial and punishment of the *Kaiser* a precedent to deter future acts of aggression.

And Wright showed little sympathy for those who saw in the Versailles Treaty, especially the war guilt clause, a *diktat*. He wrote that the armistice, while preserving its military connotation, was really a capitulation and a preliminary treaty of peace. He asserted that the *amour propre* of the Germans demanded that the form of an armistice be preserved, but that the qualification that the international armistice commission would act under the sole authority of the allied military and naval Commanders in Chief determined the actual nature of the agreement.⁴³ The trial never materialized, and Wright's attention turned to other interests. But his opinion of the Versailles Treaty eventually changed.

Wright realized that the defeat of the Democrats in 1920 meant a delay in U.S. entry into the League. He turned his energies to efforts likely to facilitate U.S. cooperation with the League. His main vehicles continued to be academic and professional journals and he wrote prolifically in defense of the League and in explanation of its impact on international law. In

1921 he was given another opportunity to directly influence policy as a special expert to the Navy Department for international law at the Washington Conferences.⁴⁴ Granted, his position was not one of initiating policy, but through interpretation and counsel he did exercise a degree of influence over certain proceedings and policies.

His personal correspondence contains little reference to his experience at the conference, but he did produce a commentary, "The Washington Conference," about the treaty systems that evolved from the conference. He concluded that the Washington Conferences demonstrated once again, as did the negotiations at Versailles and in the League of Nations, that diplomacy is most likely to produce satisfactory results when conducted privately. Once agreements were reached, though, Wright believed they should be published.⁴⁵ Wright proclaimed that the Washington Conference was a success and compared the Four Power Treaty with Article X of the League Covenant and found their obligations to be similar. Given that there were no measures to enforce the obligations under any of the Washington Conference treaties, this is amazing. But despite his praise of the conferences, he emphasized that the Washington Conference system was no substitute for the League of Nations.⁴⁶

Another issue with which Wright grappled was that of creating machinery for peaceful change. This may well have been the most important contribution of his scholarship. The evolving mandate system of the League of Nations and Wright's treatment of it best represents this broader issue as he saw it during the twenties. If the League was to be successful, something more than a perpetuator of the *status quo*, it had to

develop means for peaceful change. As Elihu Root noted in a critique of the League, if Article X were perpetually enforced "it would be mischievous. Change and growth are the law of life" and Article X would "attempt to preserve for all time unchanged the [present] distribution of power."⁴⁷

Wright saw in the mandate system an opportunity for peaceful transitions of power and for the fulfillment of obligations which industrially and culturally advanced nations held for less advanced ones. "Backward" was the term he used most frequently in reference to mandated peoples, which reflected his perception about races and racial hierarchy.⁴⁸ In 1925, Wright received a Guggenheim Fellowship to study the mandatory system under the League of Nations.⁴⁹ The resulting book, published in 1930, is a paean to the League system and to the advances dependent peoples had made under mandatory tutelage.

Wright saw the mandate system as a means which enabled the dependencies to prepare themselves for independence. His research led to the publication of several articles about the subject in which he confirmed the right of Mandatory powers to be compensated for administrative costs and noted the continued progress people, usually people of color, made under the benevolent rule of Western nations.⁵⁰ In "The Government of Iraq," which typifies his thinking on this subject, Wright noted the virtues of British traditions for governing "backward" areas, especially when compared to the French in Syria.⁵¹ He concluded that there had been material progress in Iraq since 1921 and that heavy taxes "appeared" to have been spent wisely, while he doubted that "unreasonable profits" had gone to foreign governments or merchants. Iraqi art, literature, and

science, Wright continued, could not compare to Belgium's, Czechoslovakia's, or Norway's, so that Iraq's great hope was in continued British maternalism. Iraq, whose people Wright characterized as "adolescent," illustrated what was best about the League of Nations system of mandates.⁵²

His assessment is shockingly one-dimensional when one considers that the British had only seven years before at Amritsar, India, massacred nearly four hundred and wounded twelve hundred additional unarmed people; that the British were engaged in plotting the systematic plunder of the Middle East's and Iraq's one resource, oil, which was unrenowable; and that Iraq's cultural heritage was absolutely stellar when held to that of the countries to which Wright compared it. If asked whether they believed British rule to be essentially benevolent, many contemporary residents of Ireland, of India, or any other imperial possession or mandate of Great Britain's would likely have provided a very different answer from Wright's. Even as late as 1939, though, he wrote that the mandate system amplified the twentieth century trend against imperialism and that the mandate system augmented the twentieth century trend against imperialism and that the mandate system accorded with the current theory of international organization and self-determination. "Native rights," he concluded, "and the open door have been protected in the mandated territories." ⁵³

What is revealed as well are Wright's priorities for the mandates in his insistence upon maintenance of the "open door." This doctrine was an integral part of his prescription not just for mandates, but for the entire

world organization.⁵⁴ Although the only variety of mandate to be specifically subject to open door guarantees was the type B mandate, Wright insisted that this modified the original Wilson-Smuts idea.⁵⁵ In fact, the League was subject to great pressure from mandatories like Great Britain, whose leaders wished to maintain privileged trade relations within the commonwealth and later sterling areas, to prevent the open door from applying universally to all mandates. The only countries to push hard for universal adoption of the open door were Japan and the United States, and the impact their capital development had on "backward" areas was even by this time legendary among certain inhabitants of those areas.⁵⁶ Despite the probable intentions of the British, theirs was the best policy.

Throughout this discourse, Wright devoted too little attention to assessing the problems the open door caused in China and seemed oblivious to the detrimental impact that a strong capitalist society and its extension of trade might have on a more traditional society. This was especially true in mandated areas that had but one or two valuable resources. And although Wright was correct in his assessment that commercial discriminations in "backward areas often led to conflict in the past," so too did application of the open door.⁵⁷ Too often traditional societies found their labor devoted entirely to the production of the resource with export value and as a consequence became dependent on other countries for fundamental needs—food stuffs and clothing, among other items. When the resource was depleted, the "backward" area was left just about as "backward" as it was when the open door had been applied. And, if a mandate was to be accepted with "scrupulous good faith," then part of that good faith might include the

establishment of protective tariffs or export taxes with the revenues earmarked for infrastructure development, especially if one accepted the parent-child analogy so apparent in Wright's analysis.⁵⁸

Clearly, Wright's recognition of the value of third party adjudication for changing mandate status was his signal contribution to the argument for perpetuation of the system. He was aware of the inertia implicit in a dependency system, for on the occasion in the past that a people demonstrated competency for independence, the imperial power seldom realized or acknowledged the condition until faced with revolt. The mandate system, noted Wright, addressed this problem through the introduction of a "disinterested body . . . to examine the situation . . . from the native and world points of view, appraising particularly the evolution of a capacity for self-government."⁵⁹ Of course, as with so many other areas of Wright's plans, no mention is made of specific criteria to be applied to the determination of "a capacity for self-government," and the eurocentrism of the goals for the entire mandate system he accepted without demur.

Another essential element of Wright's continued effort to devise means for peaceful change was his conversion to the belief that neutrality was an anachronism in the modern world. Wright was convinced that technology continued to shrink the world to such an extent that the theoretical basis for neutrality was no longer plausible.⁶⁰ This was, as we shall see, a theme common to many internationalists. He also observed that neutral behavior served frequently to perpetuate aggression, or even reward it; at other times it seemed to serve no purpose at all.⁶¹ With the consequences of WWI

still present in the Western mind, it does not seem unusual that legal theorists would return to the works of Hugo Grotius (who abhorred neutrality) or Thomas Aquinas, who had refined Augustine's concept of "just war," in an effort to argue against neutrality as viable national policy. This issue reflected as well the then current debate among faculty members at the University of Chicago about relative and absolute moral values which Edward Purcell describes in *The Crisis of Democratic Theory* and in which Wright also participated.⁶²

Wright believed that to extend neutral rights on the assumption that they would assure peace was an egregious error.⁶³ Neutrality was antithetical to the basic assumption of collective security as Article X of the League Covenant defined it and Wright noted that the legal concept of neutrality as it had developed over the last century was not compatible with an organization of nations dedicated to non-violent solutions of international disputes.⁶⁴ Wright's examination of the possible effects of Senator Theodore Burton's resolution of 15 December 1927 revealed that if the United States of America adopted a policy which prohibited the exportation of the sinews of war to any nation engaged in war with another nation or nations, then the U.S. would be prevented from supplying arms to victims of aggressive acts.⁶⁵ Even the definition of "aggressor" was often no simple matter.

Wright also believed that U.S. economic investments precluded neutrality, and that in a world rapidly integrated on political, economic, and moral levels there would be a consonant "decrease in the rights and increase in the obligations of neutrals" which would make the policy of

neutrality more and more untenable.⁶⁶ States, he wrote, must recognize "a new status between war and neutrality [called] 'partiality.'"⁶⁷ All of his examinations lead one to believe that Wright accepted the Grotian concept of "just war," that he believed nations could readily discriminate between aggressors and their victims, and that he believed there existed a moral imperative for nations to do so. In 1941 he declared that during the last twenty-five years the policies of isolation, neutrality and impartiality had failed to prevent war or to keep war from escalating. Such a record demanded a departure from those failed policies.⁶⁸

Wright passionately believed that the Paris Peace Pact of 1928 would become a vehicle leading to the elimination of the historic definition of neutrality and he shared with Secretary of State Frank Kellogg the hope that the U.S. would abandon strict neutrality. His first written analysis of the Pact was "The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties." Here he wrote that "[t]he significance of the peace pact is in the field of politics and public opinion rather than in that of law If the [Pact is] effective, it will be because it presents a standard about which public opinion can organize, and the standard will in practice be the simple formula of the text, not the complex discussions of the notes."⁶⁹ He included as well an explanatory model based on municipal law in which he asserted that multilateral treaties were equivalent to statutes while bilateral treaties were equivalent to contracts. Statutes, he suggested, were less subject to interpretation because greater care was practiced in their legal phrasing.⁷⁰

The legal significance of the Peace Pact came to hold greater importance for Wright. In 1933 he claimed that "[t]he legal character of

the Pact seems to have stood the test of practice . . . and it is acquiring certain sanctions, although these sanctions may not be entirely adequate."⁷¹ He would have done well to remember his own admonition declared in a 1925 article entitled "The Outlawry of War" that "Laws which are flaunted do more harm than good for they break down respect for the law," although until 1933 the only severe test of the Pact had been the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.⁷² Wright concluded, though, that war and armed violence in international affairs was completely devoid of legal foundation, but the problem of making the international society mirror the proscriptions of law remained.⁷³

In a 1935 Public Policy Pamphlet entitled *The United States and Neutrality*, Wright emphasized that both the Pact and the Budapest Articles of Interpretation were means of war prevention, not the avoidance of war. He criticized the traditional concept of neutrality and provided a four-point policy which he believed would help maintain international stability at all times, not just in times of crisis.⁷⁴ The pamphlet was part of a series produced under the editorship of Harry Gideonse designed to address the problem that scholarly journals concentrated on issues which the public deemed peripheral, while popular magazines offered only superficial commentary.⁷⁵ Wright's contribution reflected his continued mission to reach as broad an audience as possible.

His critics, including George Sokolsky, noted specialist on the Far East, were less optimistic about the Paris Peace Pact. In a letter to Wright, Sokolosky criticized the article "The Meaning of the Pact of Paris," saying that Wright wanted peace "only if it is legal" and that Wright

would "condemn the whole human race to constant warfare" so long as the law was upheld.⁷⁶ This seemed a valid criticism, especially when Wright had written earlier in "When Does War Exist?," that a legal definition was necessary to prove violation of Article XII of the Covenant and necessary for the sanctions that Article XVI imposed and to prove violation of Article I of the Paris Peace Pact.⁷⁷ It appeared that Wright believed war could be legislated away without any coercive power to bind the objects of such legislation.

But Wright had also written in the same article that "Article II of the Pact may be violated even though legal war does not exist."⁷⁸ Nonetheless, he was ever mindful of the need, at least so far as those who believed that law was the essential ingredient to world order were concerned, to maintain the importance of the Pact as a precedent for sanctions against future aggressive acts. Wright suffered no illusion that the Pact would eliminate war, but it would allow for the prosecution of, or application of sanctions to, the aggressor in future situations. This conviction led him to claim that Japanese violations of their obligations under the Paris Peace Pact, the Nine Power Treaty, and the Hague Convention of 1907, justified the president to impose "negative reprisals" such as discriminatory measures against Japanese goods.⁷⁹

He invoked the Pact as well as a justification for the U.S. government's Executive Agreement with the government of Great Britain to supply that nation with destroyers in exchange for bases in 1940. He noted that most of the international community had recognized that Germany had "initiated hostilities in violation of its international obligations under the Pact of

Paris and other instruments." Because Germany was an initiator of aggressive war, it was not a lawful belligerent, and parties to international agreements with Germany were no longer obligated under international law to observe neutral obligations toward Germany and her allies as they had broken the dictum *pacta sunt servanda*.⁸⁰

Again, reference to the Pact may seem unnecessary to the untrained observer when considering action against Japan and Germany, but in a world organized around law it is essential. The need to establish the law as definitive may explain why Wright insisted that what existed from September 1939 on was not legally a state of war under the Pact of Paris but rather that "a condition existed during which violence by certain governments in violation of international obligations was being opposed by other governments acting in defense, or acting to give assistance to those defending themselves, or acting as a police force . . . as a universal *posse comitatus*."⁸¹ Perhaps only a lawyer could arrive at such a distinction.

Another interesting aspect of his view regarding peaceful change was revealed in his approach to appeasement, particularly as it emerged from the Munich Crisis of 1938. Writing in the *American Journal of International Law* in 1939, Wright demonstrated a willingness to utilize a strategy of appeasement. He cited precedents for Munich-type agreements and declared that even Wilson held the peace of the world "superior in importance to every question of political jurisdictional boundary."⁸² Yet because extra-legal threats of war forced the issues at Godesburg the Munich agreements, Wright wrote, were not likely to yield justice. Munich

was not a good example of what peaceful change represented to him because it was a *diktat*, not unlike, he now wrote, the Versailles Treaty.⁸³ So although Wright did not accept the procedural aspect of this appeasement, he held little against it in principle.

Wright was as determined to limit national sovereignty as he was to eliminate the legal status of neutrality. Frequently, opponents of the League used the issue of infringement of sovereign rights as a shibboleth to encourage nationalist-based fears among the public. Sovereignty was synonymous with national prestige, or so it was argued, and any limitation upon national sovereignty resulted in a concomitant loss of prestige. As with any other federal system, the answer to this was that certain powers would be left to the member states and certain powers to the central government. But although this solution may have seemed acceptable to the majority of U.S. citizens as it was applied to their national experience, an aroused public and certain of its leaders feared that some future world government might somehow defy the wishes of the U.S., a fear which continued to plague the efforts of people like Wright. It was an issue which Wright attempted to defuse with the device of regional groupings within the world organization.

Some limitation of national sovereignty was essential to the establishment of machinery for peaceful change. Wright observed in a letter to Edith Ware, then a fellow member of the Committee to Study the Organization of Peace (the CSOP was a scion of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and its director Nicholas Murray Butler) that he agreed with her that the League of Nations did not have adequate machinery to

provide for peaceful change. The reason for that situation was the lack of a world legislative authority, an authority which would require far greater sacrifices of national sovereignty than an organization designed exclusively for the prevention of aggression.

Peaceful change, said Wright, required effective legislation, especially if the changes contemplated were territorial boundaries or economic policies, two areas traditionally associated with the prerogative of sovereign nations. Policy matters such as these, he continued, had always produced sharp exchanges between revisionist and *status quo* states, with *status quo* states having little reason to accept a voluntary system of change. In order to effect meaningful change under peaceful conditions there would have to be an international legislative authority with the power to compel *status quo* states to accept change under appropriate circumstances, and to compel them to sacrifice certain advantages which they thought they possessed under a traditional interpretation of national sovereignty.⁸⁴

Wright's analysis revealed two crucial elements in his estimate of how to organize the world for peace. First, he addressed the issue that Elihu Root had so forcefully noted years before--that the nature of the League served first the interests of the *status quo*; second, he clearly indicated the need for some form of coercive power which would supersede the sovereignty of independent nations in specific situations in order to "compel [them] to sacrifice certain advantages."

These two ideas represented first the consistency and the evolution of his approach to the problem of organizing the world for peace and second,

a new area of emphasis. Wright had maintained from the beginning of his career that some limitations on national sovereignty were essential to organize the world for peace and had, at least since the thirties, emphasized the need for an effective international police force to be at the disposal of the League of Nations or its successor. To Wright, the League as it was embodied in 1919 was simply "the first step toward organizing the force of the whole to be used against a recalcitrant part."⁸⁵ The next step was to give the central body of world government requisite authority and power.

Wright had already begun a careful analysis of this question in 1927, the year before the Paris Pact was signed. It was the result of his participation in and direction of the University of Chicago's Causes of War Project, which lasted from 1927 to 1941 and culminated in the publication of his two volume monograph *A Study of War*.⁸⁶ Several of his students published works as a result of their contributions to this project.⁸⁷ Wright himself produced numerous articles and one other book devoted to the study of war during this fourteen year period and they reveal some of his most intricate thoughts.

War was foremost a legal condition to Wright. Conflict, aggression, military combat--all could and did exist outside the legal definition of war. But when a legal condition of war did exist it was the obligation of international law to regulate it.⁸⁸ And as he wrote more frequently on the subject, Wright emphasized that questions of responsibility for initiation of war were peripheral: the real question was why war and how to prevent it.⁸⁹

There were, he thought, three ways to outlaw war: change human nature; change the nature of the state; or change international society. Wright emphasized the third, although the accomplishment of the first two were incontrovertibly necessary to the third. He wrote that habit and custom provided strong sanctions for old laws but were of little value to new laws. Only if the submission of disputes to peaceful settlement became customary could custom sanction the outlawry of war.⁹⁰ The most viable means available for the establishment of the peaceful settlement of disputes was, according to Wright, a strong world political organization.

There are certain difficulties with Wright's assumptions. First, he assumed that most people would like to eliminate war and continue to live peacefully when historical experience defied such an assumption. To employ his own municipal analogy, if the people wanted war they would have war, just like people who wanted booze got booze despite an armed and determined police force during prohibition. Second, even if the majority of people favored the elimination of war, he ignored the existence of sociopaths within the world community. Even within his municipal model criminal behavior could not easily be eliminated; rather, it was regulated and contained, so why expect anything more on an international level? Third, what about the need for retribution or deterrence? How do you jail a nation? Finally, just because rule of law prevails does not mean that all of its subjects are satisfied with it; indeed, a large segment may see the law as oppressive or exploitative and violate it at every chance if the perceived benefits of crime outweigh any deterrent of possible punishment. Wright

relied too heavily upon the predicate of rational behavior, a problem he came to recognize as his examination of war progressed.

Wright's rationalism, though, led him to believe in the ability of science and technology to cure the ills of civilization. He embraced the scientific method and he tried to apply it in his search for means to eliminate war. He believed that applied science gave humanity the hope that it could effectively address the "calamities" which it had created.⁹¹ His attempt to establish a predictive model through the measurement of public opinion in a study he co-authored with James T. Russell, entitled "National Attitudes on the Far Eastern Controversy," was an early effort at just such a scientific application.⁹²

In this study the authors identified the methods and goals of international relations and they declared that state attitudes could and should be empirically measured. What followed was a very uncritical attempt to measure state attitude, but in the early thirties the state of opinion sampling was at a primitive stage, inadequately developed. Nonetheless, it seems fantastic that the authors believed that they were presenting "a method of measuring the attitude of one state toward another through newspaper sampling and judging."

If newspapers existed within a state, the authors maintained that at least one of them would likely represent the attitude of those who controlled the interests of the state.⁹³ Wright and Russell thought agencies could be developed along the lines of those which forecast business trends. These agencies would provide analyses based on the material culled from huge quantities of newspapers which would graph the changing attitudes of

states. The authors believed these graphs would prove to be worthy regulating devices if distributed to statesmen throughout the world. Danger spots would be not only readily identifiable as "matters of opinion," they asserted, "but as measurable quantities." If, in order to succeed in preventing war, the League must mobilize public opinion before an act of war, they reasoned that these analyses might provide the data necessary to effectively organize world opinion.⁹⁴

Serious difficulties can be attributed to the assumptions underlying this model--the existence of representative newspapers, biased judging, biased editing, the ability of the state to influence the content of any newspaper, regardless of its perspective, through false leaks or black propaganda, misquotes, typos, and a variety of other possibilities. Wright would later admit that his conclusions were "not based upon an adequate sampling of the press."⁹⁵ What was important, though, was his continued effort to organize world opinion through its manipulation. And political science would persevere in their efforts to map and otherwise measure public opinion over the next three decades. Wright was a pioneer in this important dimension of the study of international relations.

In his book *The Causes of War and Conditions of Peace*, which was a compilation of lectures delivered at the Graduate Institute of Higher International Studies at Geneva, Switzerland, in October and November of 1934, Wright addressed some of the previously mentioned criticisms. This is an important book, for it is in many respects a blue-print for what he considered to be the most important work of his life, *A Study of War*, a two volume, 1,552 page monograph, which received mixed reviews.⁹⁶ *The*

Causes of War represents an innovation for Wright. He changed his approach to the examination of the issue of war and its control, for the central question he asked moved now from "why war" to "how is peace organized?" "War," he wrote, "can less and less be treated from the historical, deterministic and predictive point of view. More and more we must consider it from the engineering, constructive and control point of view. We can less profitably be interested in the *causes of war*, more profitably in the *conditions of peace*."⁹⁷

Social control was the key element of Wright's prescription. What he wanted to identify were "those elements of the total situation during peace which we can effectively manipulate and which, if properly manipulated, will preserve the peace."⁹⁸ The conditions of peace, he thought, must include: the "renunciation by everyone of *intransigent* opposition to existing [conditions]" by which he meant "the renunciation of opposition to these [conditions] . . . not subject to restraint in the adaptation of means to ends"; "an organization of the world community adequate to restrain conflicts . . . so that violence will not accompany them"; "the realization in international relations of a system of law intolerant of violence except as a legally controlled instrument of execution"; and "the continuous application of peaceful techniques for preventing extreme departures from equilibrium among the material forces in the state system."⁹⁹

Wright's argument is steeped in respect for tradition in that he wished to assure only the "most gradual changes in the relative position of states with respect to armaments, status, influence and policy." Only the gradual change of social conditions could ensure peace.¹⁰⁰ Yet, there is something

very Orwellian which pervades his concept as well, especially when Wright began to think in terms of the necessity not just to control conflict but for controlled conflict.¹⁰¹

The essential element of Wright's prescription as revealed in this series of lectures is the maintenance of the balance of power. He drew much of his argument from the traditional peace movement program in that he believed that qualitative, quantitative, and moral disarmament were the most promising ingredients for maintaining equilibrium among the states.¹⁰² And that equilibrium, he wrote, was the prerequisite to the effective development of international law and the League of Nations.¹⁰³ Wright also seemed to foreshadow future U.S. policy in his remarks which concerned the impact of mutually assured destruction on the possibility of peace.¹⁰⁴

Wright offered a possible solution to the criticism that balance of power politics perpetuated the *status quo* and inevitably invited war: that through more "accurate measures of the changing situation [in] armament and industrial statistics, it is possible that disturbances could be observed before they had become serious. A council mainly of the great powers might with such data bring pressure by debate to rectify the balance."¹⁰⁵ This faith, of course, was a direct result of his research with Russell. Wright realized as well that the collection of accurate data must be ensured through efficient means of peacetime international inspection, or verification.¹⁰⁶

Wright addressed some of the criticisms levelled against the theories of world organization here as well. Foremost, he came to advocate a loose

confederation rather than a strong federal union of nations. The reasons that compelled him to abandon his reliance upon the U.S. model were several: first, the U.S. government had become too centralized and was now more than likely a unitary state; second, there existed no external enemy for a world federation, something Wright believed necessary to maintain cohesion among member states; third, there was the issue of nonuniformity of culture, something Wright insisted did not plague the smaller models of federation; fourth was the problem of representation in a system which would include 400 million Chinese and 1/2 million Nicaraguans; and finally there was the problem of application of sanctions over a global area as opposed to the smaller areas of the model federations.¹⁰⁷

His answer was a world organization loosely modeled after the confederations of the past and dependent on regional organizations within the greater body. Wright moved as well toward a stricter interpretation of the constitution of a world organization, for he believed that the purview of central government would have to be reduced and that guarantees of the autonomy of the members would have to be stipulated.¹⁰⁸ But he noted that none of his prescriptions would be completely effective unless the world organization was truly universal in its membership. And for that he was willing to pay a price.

Wright noted that the experience of the League in the Manchurian crisis and in the Chaco dispute had proven that the League could not deal with major crises unless all the powers, great and small, were members, especially those who were in the immediate vicinity of the

litigants/belligerents. Wright believed that even at the expense of amendments to the Covenant which eliminated formal obligations respecting sanctions but that incorporated the Pact of Paris, the League must become universal.¹⁰⁹

There remained the problem of developing both state and individual loyalty to the League and its institutions and Wright approached this directly. He thought it wise for the League to assume the World War I debts of member nations and to develop the mandates as League territories, and he cited the U.S. annexation of the Northwest territory in 1783 and assumption of state debts in 1791 as proof of the method's viability. He called, too, for the League to adopt symbols around which individual loyalty could be rallied through vigorous education and propaganda. To facilitate this the League must become, in Wright's opinion, the forum for "real, dramatic and obvious" conflict in order to maintain the people's interest, for "people," he wrote, "are interested in conflict."¹¹⁰

And if armed conflict or aggression occurred, a regional force should respond to the transgression. Wright believed that the time was distant when the League could constitute an armed force capable of policing the world; therefore, physical sanctions should be regional and Articles X and XVI of the Covenant should be amended to reflect such organizations. This, of course, would be a key element in the United Nations Charter. As well, Wright soon came to believe that to provide global effect any world organization would have to exercise a monopoly over military airpower.¹¹¹

Wright, too, assessed the problem of applying sanctions to states. He observed that to punish an entire state for the actions of its government

would likely bear the moral stigma of punishing the innocent as well as the guilty. Application of sanctions might, too, resemble the act or acts of war. And, of course, there was the lack of sufficient coercive power to enforce League sanctions without universal membership. The issue of sovereignty was significant here as well, for in a federal system which allowed a court of appeal to negate national law that was contrary to the laws of the international organization, member states might perceive a "dangerous encroachment upon [their] existing sovereignty" which could be used to provide justification for secession.¹¹²

For Wright, the solution was the application of universal moral sanctions. Only if all the powers were behind the immediate application of such sanctions would they be given the full test they deserved. "If," Wright observed, "that moral solidarity exists adequate methods can be devised [for the application of physical sanctions] even if not provided beforehand."¹¹³ It is important to remember that Wright was a gradualist and approached the concept of world organization from that perspective. Such organization was in an almost embryonic stage, so that to give such a world organization immediate and all-inclusive powers might be to doom it from inception.

These ideas, subject to some refinement, were Wright's manifesto for world organization. He had spent twenty years in the rigorous development of his theoretical approach. Now, in the dangerous and complex context of the mid-nineteen thirties, he began a consuming effort to put theory to practice. That effort centered on his involvement with the

Committee to Study the Organization of Peace and other organizations whose goals were an effective world organization.

The CSOP, as mentioned above, was the creation of Nicholas Murray Butler under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an organization which he directed.¹¹⁴ The CSOP was founded in 1939 and its membership included a wide variety of luminaries from the academic, public service, and business communities.¹¹⁵ A membership list from 1940 is appended which demonstrates the membership's diversity but also its exclusivity. Further investigation of the members' backgrounds may reveal some interesting conclusions.

The following are areas of special concern to the CSOP as found in a document entitled "Meeting Of Sub-Committee On Political International Organization." Although they are not inclusive, they are representative of the issues with which the CSOP continued to grapple during its history: regional areas, union and federal system, assigned to Quincy Wright; peaceful change, assigned to John Foster Dulles; peace enforcement, assigned to Clyde Eagleton; reduction and limitation of armaments, assigned to Allen Dulles; court and arbitral arrangements, assigned to Philip C. Jessup; minorities, assigned to Sarah Wambaugh; and colonial areas, assigned to Raymond Buell.¹¹⁶

Several themes emerged from this initial discussion, which was based on a series of nine questions Wright sent to the prospective discussants.¹¹⁷ Those which impress me as the most important are a commitment to the open door, to regional associations, and to recognition of the individual within the new world order. The discussants reiterated open door themes

throughout the meeting and they concluded that "unless reasonable commercial opportunities were assured for the states most dependent upon external markets and sources of raw materials" it would be very difficult to prevent future territorial aggressions.¹¹⁸ Their belief in the need for regional associations, such as a federation of Europe and a federation of Danubian powers was the first specific prescription expressed.¹¹⁹ And their commitment to peaceful change led a "substantial minority" of the discussants to advocate that individuals be granted international standing in the form of a specific international remedial procedure to be made available to individuals "after local remedies had been exhausted."¹²⁰ Although only a "substantial minority" solidly supported this extension of standing to the individual, the majority recognized that "the problem of peaceful change is a legislative problem, and that no international court of Equity or arbitral tribunal could solve the problem. Law can be changed only by a body so representative of public opinion that its enactments will conform to the prevailing sentiment of justice."¹²¹ This recognition required extension of individual rights in a representative system.

Wright's report on regional areas, union and federation was completed and distributed on 25 March 1940. Consistent with his style, he expanded the scope of his assignment and the result was a fifteen page document. An underlying theme remained his commitment to the open door, which was evident in his insistence that "freer trade assuring more opportunity and more wealth for all through division of labor" would help prevent war, and that a functional organization concerned with "problems of commerce, raw materials and markets is particularly important and should be developed

with such competence as to assure a moderate freedom of trade and access to raw materials for all nations" was essential to a world committed to peaceful change.¹²²

Wright further asserted that order would not necessarily perpetuate the *status quo*, nor would it eliminate controversy, nor would it even eliminate the use of force. If order did create the above conditions, Wright warned that there would be no progress and no variety to international affairs, and that self-defense and application of sanctions would be eliminated as well. What order would provide would be procedures for individuals, nations, and international institutions to settle disputes, to administer services, to create and enforce law, and to change even the procedures for dispute settlement when "justice requires and knowledge permits."¹²³ The CSOP adopted this assertion, in fact the entire document, virtually unchanged, and it appeared in an article entitled "Peace and Political Organization."¹²⁴

What followed in the original document, after ten pages of historical analysis, was Wright's conclusion "that effective world organization in the present stage of world history requires in addition to national and local governments, which should continue to have primary legal authority within the territory of the respective states, (a) certain universal principles and institutions, (b) certain regional organizations and (c) certain functional organizations."¹²⁵ The remaining four pages defined the specifics and I have appended them to the text: the following is an attempt to incapsulate the specifics and some of the problems that attend them.

Wright alleged that four problems endangered peace more so than any others. First of the four were state attempts to augment power at the expense of other states. This was so, he wrote, because many believed that the state existed first for itself. But the only remedy he offered for this condition was the admonition that policymakers and people alike accept the theory that "the State exists for the benefit of its people and of humanity."¹²⁶ But what if the state and its people subscribe to a messianic ideology? Aggression could then be justified as benefiting humanity. The second problem he recognized was that the search for self-sufficient national wealth was often the precursor to war. To remedy this he prescribed free trade to assure both "opportunity and wealth for all through division of labor."¹²⁷ This was rather nebulous as he made no mention of who or what would decide the division of labor, the share of resources, the share of profits, the share of costs, or other variables. Third, he suggested that national and international welfare policies be adopted in order to avert depression and unemployment which he believed led to "revolution and violence," but again, he failed to identify what types of welfare or the distribution of costs. And fourth, Wright argued that only properly developed legal procedures could address perceptions of or actual injustice, thus eliminating some of the fuel which fired "political and economic rivalries and social misery." But as any member of an underclass can attest, law and procedure can just as well perpetuate injustice.¹²⁸

Wright continued his analysis with an assessment of the impact of what he saw as the growing interdependence of states. Because states were increasingly interdependent, domestic legislation frequently affected

individuals and groups within other states. This external impact of domestic legislation required further international cooperation if violence were to be prevented. From this observation he concluded that peaceful change and collective security were irreducibly connected, and that a dynamic world order would "provide for both by varying the ease of altering the elements of its structure and procedure, according as they are essential to security or obstacles to necessary change."¹²⁹ It is easy to agree with the first assertion, but who or what would determine essentiality--the courts? the people the world legislature? This was to be left for the new world organization to contemplate.

He emphasized evolutionary political change when he asserted that the institutions which developed in the new world order would do so most effectively if they served essential interests and avoided radical breaches with tradition; these, he wrote, would last longer than revolutionary changes. To facilitate this objective, he insisted that "institutions to improve the organization of the world community should . . . be natural developments from those that already exist."¹³⁰ Far from being the radical futurists that some of their opponents labeled them, the CSOP here advocated a quintessentially conservative approach. Again, though, the problem was who or what would determine whether developments are "natural"? And what about the "natural" inertia of the bureaucracy necessary to such a world organization?

Wright broke with the Burkean dictum on tradition, though, in his discussion of the application of sanctions. He was aware that if a state possessed sufficient force to defend itself, that same force could be used to

flaunt the law. And there were no guarantees against lawlessness in an unorganized international system governed by balance of power. Therefore, in order to provide such guarantees, the new system of international sanctions had to have power greater than that of any single nation or any combination of nations which might attempt to break the law. The new international organization would have to attain such power immediately upon its creation, "all at once," or its sanctions could be "worse than useless."¹³¹ To make sanctions "sufficiently powerful all at once" would be revolutionary change and, in his own words, likely not to last. But how else to compel the great powers?

Wright called for all nations to be invited to sign a pact that would be incorporated in each national constitution (presuming they have a constitution!) to ensure that certain obligations be met: protection of basic human rights; limits on the use of armed force; economic fairness; that the Permanent Court of International Justice decide all cases not settled through diplomacy; standardized treatment of aggressors; and the support for and establishment of (a) a World Assembly representative of every considerable opinion group, (b) a World Council composed of Great Powers and important political regions, (c) a World Secretariat to study world problems and to provide those institutions with regulatory and substantive powers.¹³² The obvious problem was what to do if a nation or nations refused to sign? Unless the world organization was willing to force them to join, Wright admitted the defeat of any such organization as he declared universal membership and power "all at once" essential to its survival.

The CSOP continued to refine its objectives and its plans for accomplishing them during the war years. Dissent plagued the group as several members quit, presumably over policy disputes.¹³³ Wright was as well very concerned that the CSOP be careful to avoid association with "questionable" individuals or groups. Two cases in point are his attempt to distance the CSOP from Clark Eichelberger's League Of Nations Association and Wright's questioning of an International Student Service (ISS) letter that referred to the CSOP in a way which indicated the two were mutually supportive.

Wright, who had a long relationship with Eichelberger, implored him not to misunderstand Wright's position as to the relationship between the Association and the CSOP. He assured Eichelberger that in no way did the CSOP wish to minimize the importance of the work of the Association in connection with the Committee, nor to decrease that relationship." Wright's concern was to make the CSOP as "efficient as possible" in its efforts to create from a public opinion traditionally antagonistic to the concept of the League one which supported the principles of international organization. He noted that the CSOP was supported independently of the Association, and that the "result of its efforts are not in any way predetermined by the past program of the Association." It was evident that Wright thought the Association was tainted in the public mind with a lost cause, therefore he thought it desirable that the CSOP's independence from the Association "should be emphasized to the public as much as possible."¹³⁴ Eichelberger responded that "We are in no way going to make

the effort appear to the public as a sole League of Nations Association effort."¹³⁵

As for the ISS, Wright noted that its actions regarding the Hoover Finnish relief fund drive seemed destined to lead many people to believe that the International Student Service, like so many other student organizations, was sympathetic to communism. Wright thought every effort should be made to avoid such an impression. Wright then asked if the Committee authorized the ISS letter signed by Harper Poulson.¹³⁶

Clearly, then, internecine strife plagued the CSOP and groups that were, or wished to be, associated with it, but that strife did not deter the Committee from its work. The agenda remained to establish a working organization of the world's states that addressed the problems of the League and the problems of a changing world. Important in this phase of the Committee's work was emphasis on the need for a world organization committed to basic human rights, to free trade, and to collective security.

By 7 June 1941 the nucleus of the CSOP approach to world organization was outlined in a confidential document entitled "Outline of Program."¹³⁷ The document contains a proviso that indicates it was not prepared as an official statement of the CSOP program, but rather as a potential guide. Nonetheless, its contents became the basis of the CSOP program, which declared: "civil order and normal economic processes . . . an indispensable prerequisite to the establishment of a general peace; establishment of an effective system of international security." Further, the authors asserted that "a world order designed to promote stable economic progress, social justice, and cultural freedom for all national groups, races, and classes

willing to accept their proper responsibilities as members of a world community.¹³⁸ The proposal also called for effective military cooperation between the U.S. and the British Commonwealth and it justifies some of the charges that these individuals were interventionist in outlook and had already allied the U.S. with British interests.¹³⁹

After the U.S. entered the war, the CSOP called for a statement of U.S. war aims in order to avoid the public and private dissent that developed following U.S. entry into WWI. To that effect the CSOP issued the seven following detailed but revealing aims. First they asserted that the government of the United States was established to advance the welfare of its citizens and at the same time maintain "due regard for the welfare of citizens everywhere." Second, they declared that democratic liberalism had provided "political liberty," and must now provide "economic security" for the masses. Material and intellectual resources were, they insisted, sufficient to the task of equitable distribution. Third, they declared that industrialization had made it "impossible for any nation adequately to care for the welfare of its members by its own unaided efforts." Therefore, they reasoned that "commercial and intellectual intercourse between nations" would be best carried out "under proper rules of law, and with the protection of the community of nations."

Fourth, they observed that the nature of war had now become total, and the "necessity for continuous totalitarian preparation against war, even in peace-time," jeopardized the "very existence of democracy." In order to ensure stability and democracy, and make possible the "essential intercourse between nations," they declared that the use of force must be

"brought under control." Fifth, they called upon the United States to announce its guarantee of the creation and enforcement of an international system to "prevent the use of force between nations, to provide justice between them and to give opportunity for the further improvement of the welfare of individuals everywhere." Sixth, they assured all peoples the right to the form of government they desired as long as it conformed with the "rules of the community of nations." Finally, the United States was to announce its intent to join with other states in a "union of economic and military forces" to realize the first six goals, and for the "joint study and establishment of a permanent system of law and order between the nations of the world."¹⁴⁰ The relationship of the war aims to the traditional U.S. peace/internationalist movement is self-evident. They also underscore the continued commitment to economic principles consistent with the free enterprise system.¹⁴¹

Wright completed his *A Study of War* in 1941, directed the Conference of Teachers of International Law in 1942, was elected to the American Philosophical Society in 1943, served as a consultant to the State Department from 1943-44, was president of the American Association of University Professors from 1943-1945, chaired the International Relations Committee and was executive secretary of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation at the University of Chicago, and was secretary of the World Citizen's Association; still, he was able to concentrate his energies during the war on the mission of the CSOP.¹⁴²

By 1943 the CSOP had issued its third report and innumerable memoranda.¹⁴³ But Wright attempted to reach a much broader audience

than that which the Committee's journal of record, *International Conciliation*, afforded. In a flier sent to labor unions entitled "Prepare for Victory," Wright observed that the failure of world opinion to unite behind the enforcement of peace had brought the world to war once again. The lesson could not be misunderstood: the world must not wait for victory before examining its responsibilities. He asked U.S. labor unions to increase their interest and their role in post-war problems, and to help create a "constructive public opinion."¹⁴⁴ He requested the unions receiving this flyer to discuss the postwar world and to write the Midwest office of the CSOP for programs for discussion, but there is no indication of a response in his papers. As well, Wright participated in twenty-four radio broadcasts from 1939-1945, all of which were published, and whose participants included Eduard Benes, Bernard Pares, James Reston, Norman Thomas, and many others.¹⁴⁵ His speaking schedule included foreign policy associations, the World Citizens Association, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the American Political Science Association, and many other professional organizations to whom he addressed the need for world organization structured along the recommendations of the CSOP.

By 31 August 1944, after much debate and many memoranda, the CSOP recommended the following proposals to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference to prevent aggression: 1) that nations should pool their forces to prevent aggression; 2) that the Executive Council should be given the control of a newly created international air force; 3) that there should be an international general staff to serve the Executive Council in the

deployment of the military contingents each nation would contribute to the security force; 4) that the international organization should occupy strategic bases around the globe; 5) that the general international organization be superior to any regional security systems; 6) that the general international organization must conduct arms inspections; 7) that agreements to break off communications and trade in order to quarantine aggressor states supplement military measures to enforce peace.¹⁴⁶ With the exception of recommendations (2) and (4) the CSOP's program was an essential part of that which the Dumbarton Oaks Conference adopted.

Recommendation (2) became central to Wright's and the CSOP's vision of an effective new world order. Their subscription to the limited view that technology was shrinking the world and to the belief in the potential of military offense over defense led them to conclude that the airplane was the ultimate weapon of destruction.¹⁴⁷ If, they reasoned, that weapon could be monopolized its power would become deterrent rather than offensive. Wright pushed for the world organization to receive such a monopoly in every quarter available to him.¹⁴⁸

Wright anticipated the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations Organization Charter with hope. In response to Fred Schuman's article "The Dilemma of the Peace-Seekers," which was highly critical of the possibilities of Dumbarton Oaks, Wright declared that his former student did not allow sufficient examination of the possibilities for evolutionary change within political institutions.¹⁴⁹ Wright noted that although the international organization proposed at Dumbarton Oaks was superficially "a league of equals and in substance an alliance of great powers," he insisted

that the organization contained the promise of federalism. It was too early to tell what might develop from it and, ever the optimist, Wright reminded Schuman that although it took a civil war "to decide whether the United States was a league or a federation," Marshall and Webster had made great progress in the interpretation of the constitution which assured victory for federation. He thought that if great power solidarity could be maintained for a generation and at the same time those powers could be continually subjected to pressure, influence, and perhaps even the power of the lesser states, federalism might be the result.¹⁵⁰

Wright saw as significant the fact that the Dumbarton Oaks provisions for coercion were "not against states which commit aggression but against acts of aggression."¹⁵¹ This would allow governments or individuals to be tried for acts of aggression and perhaps free a subject people from the burden of collective guilt. He then recalled to Schuman a passage from Wright's *A Study of War* which addressed the possibility of moving from a league to a federation.¹⁵² As well, he noted that there was greater potential for the creation of a meaningful international police force in Dumbarton Oaks than in the League Covenant.

Finally, he reminded Schuman that the basic requirement for a direct relationship between individuals and the world organization was a sense of world citizenship. He envisioned universally accepted concepts of human rights and of crimes by individuals against international law as the basis for such a direct relationship. Education (or indoctrination) was the fundamental element in inculcating "a sense of world citizenship along with national citizenship in individual minds. Without the germs of such

sentiments," Wright concluded, "any legal arrangement however federalistic would not work."¹⁵³ It would not be too long until he wrote a text book devoted to just such an education.

It seemed to Wright in the spring of 1945 that the opportunity was at last at hand for the establishment of Wilsonian principles as the guidepost for world organization. He had witnessed and participated in a quarter century of debate over theory and practice that had mixed results. His years of study had led him to revise certain of his beliefs, most notably those surrounding the issue of neutrality, and to curb his youthful enthusiasm as evidenced in his letter to his father of 14 July 1917. His approach to the problems of international relations was now more sophisticated, more attuned to the nuances of psychology and sociology, more aware of the multiplicity of problems that faced a world organization.

Still, as has been amply demonstrated, his belief in the predictability of international relations and the variables that contributed to them led him in many instances to practice historical syllogism and in turn, to draw false conclusions from such an inaccurate application of mathematical process to the process of history. This is especially true in his search for an empirically demonstrable theory of international relations. Repeatedly, his unerring devotion to the belief in predictability limited his perspective, prevented him from seeing alternatives, and muted his theoretical approach.

Notes

- 1 Quincy Wright Collection: Philip Wright to Quincy Wright, 14 July 1917; Quincy Wright to Aunt Bessie, 29 December 1919; introduction to the Wright Papers, University of Chicago Libraries; Albert Lepawsky, ed., *The Search For World Order* (New York, N.Y.: Meredith, 1971), xx.
- 2 Wright's brother Sewall received a Ph. D. in mathematics the same year. Philip Wright (father) to QW, 28 May 1915, 6 June 1915, Box 18, folder 4.
- 3 QW to the Dean of Columbia Graduate School, 5 October 1913; letter from University of Illinois to QW, 8 April 1914.
- 4 Wright, Louise, *A Bibliography of Quincy Wright: 1890-1970*, (Pittsburgh, PA: The Clifford E. Barbour Library, 1974), 5; Charles Merriam to QW, 17 April 1923, Box 4, Folder 10, addenda 2..
- 5 On the failures of diplomacy, see Arthur Link, *Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies*, (Chicago, Il: Quadrangle Books, 1957), 46-51; 61-90.
- 6 It appears that the fact that Great Britain compensated for lost neutral property influenced Wright's position regarding the Germans. See QW, "The Destruction of Neutral Property on Enemy Vessels," *American Journal of International Law* (hereon *Am J Int'l L*) 11 (January 1917), 358-379.
- 7 For his changed position on neutrality, see QW, "The Future of Neutrality," *International Conciliation* 242 (September 1928), 1-98. Here QW writes that "neutrality in the sense used by the law during the past century is incompatible with a society of nations organized to prevent violence," 17.
- 8 QW to Father, 14 July 1917; for additional material on supremacy of international law over municipal law, see "Conflicts of International Law with National Laws and Ordinances," *Am J Int'l L* 11 (January 1917), 1-21; as for the need of an international law superior to national laws, see Wright's dissertation "The Enforcement of International through Municipal Law," *University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1916), 1-264. Wright used the municipal model throughout his career as the organizational basis for a federal world order.
- 9 Wright, *The Control of American Foreign Relations*, (New York, N.Y.: MacMillan Co., 1922).
- 10 Navy Department to QW, 28 June 1918, Bx 1, add 2.
- 11 Link, *Wilson the Diplomatist*, 92.

- 12 QW, document, "Issues of the Campaign," 28 October 1918, Bx 18, fol 7.
- 13 QW to Mother, 16 December 1919, Bx 2, add 2, fol 3. Wright's use of ratification here is somewhat fuzzy as he later indicates that the executive ratifies, the Senate provides only its advice and consent. See, too, QW to Rex, 19 December 1919, Bx 2, add 2, fol 1, for further criticism of Wilson's position.
- 14 QW to Rex, 19 December 1919, Bx 2, add 2, fol 1. For more of Wright's criticisms of Wilson see QW to Father, 18 January 1920, Bx 2, add 2, fol 3; QW to Prof. Wilson, 16 February 1920, Bx 2, add 2, fol 2; and QW to Father, 28 February 1920, Bx 2, add 2, fol 3.
- 15 See H.C. Lodge to QW, 25 February 1919, Bx 18, fol 8, for a discussion of the opposition's general fears.
- 16 QW, "Treaties and Constitutional Separation of Powers in the United States," *Am J Int'l Law* XII (January 1918), 72-76.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 76-77.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 93-95.
- 19 QW to Father, 18 January 1920, Bx 2, add 2, fol 3.
- 20 QW to Professor Wilson, 16 February 1920, Bx 2, add 2, fol 2; QW to Father, 28 February 1920, Bx 2, add 2, fol 3; QW to Aunt Edith, 2 July 1920, Bx 2, add 2, fol 2.
- 21 QW to W.H. Taft, 28 September 1920, Bx 3, add 2, fol 1; QW to "Pit," 31 October 1920, Bx 2, add 2, fol 8.
- 22 William H. Taft to QW, 10 September 1920; QW to Rex, 30 May 1921, Bx 2, add 2, fol 4.
- 23 *Ibid.*
- 24 For Wright's comments on Wilson's responsibility, see QW to Mother, 16 December 1919, Bx 2, add 2, fol 3; QW to Rex, 19 December 1919, Bx 2, add 2, fol 1; QW to Father, 18 January 1920, Bx 2, add 2, fol 3; QW to Denys Myers, Bx 1, add 2, fol 5.
- 25 QW to Myers, 24 March 1920, Bx 1, add 2, fol 5.
- 26 Quincy Wright, *The Control of American Foreign Relations*, (New York, N.Y.: MacMillan, 1922), 42.

27 *Ibid.*, ix, 7-9.

28 *Ibid.*, 6. Wright notes John Jay's argument against those who opposed treaties as the "supreme" law of the land. See also 361-365.

29 *Ibid.*

30 *Ibid.*, 25.

31 *Ibid.*, 366-68. Wright refers to Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics, 15th edition*, pp. 266, 273-274. Wright also cites "Corwin" following the quotation I provide but clearly the implication of the preceding text is that Wilson shared this conclusion. Arthur Link refers to *Constitutional Government in the United States*, pp. 77-78 to demonstrate that "Wilson believed that the president was a virtual sovereign, responsible only to public opinion and not to Congress, in the conduct of external affairs." As cited in Link, *Wilson The Diplomatist*, 132.

32 Dicey, E. V., *The Law of the Constitution*,

33 QW, "The Understandings of International Law," *Am J Int'l L* 14 (October 1920), 379, fn 45.

34 *Ibid.*, 369.

35 *Ibid.*, 370-371.

36 *Ibid.*, 371.

37 *Ibid.*, 371-72.

38 *Ibid.*, 372.

39 *Ibid.*, 373.

40 *Ibid.*

41 QW, "International Law in its Relation to Constitutional Law," *Am J Int'l L* 17 (April 1923), 234-44.

42 QW, "The Legal Liability of the Kaiser," *Am Pol Sci R* 13 (February 1919), 123, 128.

43 QW, "The Armistice," *Am Pol Sci R* 13 (February 1919), 132.

44 Navy Department to QW, 27 August 1921, Bx 3, add 2, fol 12. QW's pay was \$13.33 *per diem*, \$1200 for three months, Navy to QW, 31 August 1921, Bx 3, add 2, fol 12.

45 QW, "The Washington Conference," *Am Pol Sci R* 16 (May 1922), 286.

46 *Ibid.*, 290-297.

47 Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* (2 vols.; New York, 1938), II, 392-393, as cited in Link, *Wilson the Diplomatist*, 136.

48 QW, "Sovereignty of the Mandates," *Am J Int'l L* 17 (1923), 691-703; see also QW to Pitt 30 May 1921, Bx 2, add 2, fol 8, where QW uses racist language and stereotypes: "I have been busy as a nigger shinning up a greased pole"; QW, *Mandates Under The League Of Nations*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1930), 5, fn 3a; QW uses "race" in reference to ethnic groups, i.e., Switzerland has "three races," "The Palestinian Problem" *Pol Sci Qrtly* XLI (1926), 412. Wright went to great lengths to justify his use of "backward" in characterizing certain peoples, though: see *Mandates Under The League of Nations*, 582-84.

49 QW Correspondence, 29 May 1925, Bx 6, add 2 fol 5.

50 QW defined "three important types of backward areas--the Moslem, the Negro, and the Oceanic," each of which is noticeably non-Anglo. QW, *Mandates Under The League Of Nations*, 586.

51 QW, "The Government of Iraq," *Am Pol Sci R* 20 (1926), 747-751.

52 *Ibid.*, 768-769.

53 QW "The Mandates In 1938," *Am J Int'l L* 33 (April 1939), 341-342.

54 See QW document entitled "Meeting of Sub-Committee on Political International Organization," 27 December 1939, 2, which concludes that the new world organization should emphasize "the need of the United States for raw materials, markets and cultural inspiration from abroad, and the even greater need of other countries to have access to raw materials, markets and cultural institutions in the United States."

55 QW, *Mandates Under The League Of Nations*, 34, 260.

56 See Chester Lloyd Jones' *Guatemala: Past and Present*. (Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota Press, 1940) for a demonstration of the impact of the U.S. presence in a traditional society.

57 QW, *Mandates Under The League Of Nations*, 579.

- 58 *Ibid.*, 586. The quote is attributed to a story of Lord Olivier's in fn 16.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 585-6.
- 60 QW, "Lansing and Neutrality," *Southern Review* 2 (1936-37), 419-20.
- 61 See QW, "Amending or Developing the U.N. Charter," *Common Cause* v. 2 (June 1949), 410, where he writes that an "isolationist neutrality policy . . . encouraged aggression." Although this quote is ten years from the time above, but it reflects his sentiments during the thirties as well.
- 62 Purcell.
- 63 QW, "The Project of the American Institute of International Law on Maritime Neutrality," *Am J Int'l L* 21 (1927), 127-136.
- 64 QW, "The Future of Neutrality," *International Conciliation* 242 (September 1928), 17.
- 65 *Ibid.*, 13.
- 66 *Ibid.*, 17; 23.
- 67 *Ibid.*, 25.
- 68 QW, "The Lend-Lease Bill And International Law," *Am J Int'l L* 35 (April 1941), 313.
- 69 QW, "The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties," *Am J Int'l L* 23 (1929), 101-103.
- 70 *Ibid.* Wright also noted problems of "authorial intent," especially in reference to notes.
- 71 QW, "Meaning of the Pact of Paris," *Am J Int'l L* 27 (1933), 50.
- 72 QW, "The Outlawry of War," *Am J Int'l L* 29 (January 1925), 96.
- 73 *Ibid.*, 61.
- 74 QW, *The United States and Neutrality*, Public Policy Pamphlet 17, (Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press, 1935), 24-25.
- 75 *Ibid.*, ii.

- 76 Sokolsky to QW, 24 March 1933, Bx 23, add 1.
- 77 QW, "When Does War Exist?," *Am J Int'l L*, 26 (1932), 367.
- 78 *Ibid.*
- 79 QW, "Legal Status of Economic Sanctions," *Amerasia* 2 (February 1939), 570.
- 80 QW, "The Transfer of Destroyers To Great Britain," *Am J Int'l L* 34 (October 1940), 680-81.
- 81 QW "Political Conditions of the Period of Transition," *Int'l Conciliation* (April 1942), #379, 265.
- 82 QW, "The Munich Settlement and International Law," *Am J Int'l L* 33 (1939), 30.
- 83 *Ibid.*, 31.
- 84 QW to Edith Ware, 11 April 1940, Bx 5, fol 11, (2pp).
- 85 QW to Father, 14 July 1917, 2.
- 86 QW, *A Study of War*, (Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press, 1942).
- 87 See the appended a list of the authors and their works.
- 88 QW, "Changes in the Conception of War," *Am J Int'l L* 18 (1924), 757.
- 89 *Ibid.*, 765. "Historians, statesmen, moralists and propagandists continued to discuss the responsibility for and the justice of wars, but lawyers gave it up." See also "The Outlawry of War," 76, where Wright notes that "In so far as wars can not be attributed to the acts of responsible beings, it is nonsense to call them illegal. They indicate that nations need treatment which will modify [their behavior]."
- 90 QW, "The Outlawry of War," 77.
- 91 QW, *The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace*, (New York, N.Y.: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), 18-20.
- 92 QW and James Russel, "National Attitudes on the Far Eastern Controversy," *Am Pol Sci Rev* 27 (1933), 555-576.
- 93 *Ibid.*, 557.

- 94 *Ibid.*, 560.
- 95 QW, *The Causes of War and Conditions of Peace*, 112.
- 96 QW, *A Study of War*, (Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press, 1942).
- 97 *The Causes of War*, 48. Original emphasis.
- 98 *Ibid.*, 2.
- 99 *Ibid.*, 2-4.
- 100 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 101 *Ibid.*, 99. He develops this concept in *A Study of War*.
- 102 For moral disarmament see *The Causes of War and Conditions of Peace*, 63; for qualitative and quantitative disarmament see *Ibid.*, 71.
- 103 *Ibid.*, 65.
- 104 *Ibid.*, 53; 57-58.
- 105 *Ibid.*, 64-65.
- 106 *Ibid.*, 54-55.
- 107 *Ibid.*, 95-96.
- 108 *Ibid.*, 96-97.
- 109 *Ibid.*, 98.
- 110 *Ibid.*, 99.
- 111 *Ibid.*, 100. His reliance on air power is revealed in detail in his work with the CSOP.
- 112 *Ibid.*, 101-103.
- 113 *Ibid.*, 103.
- 114 This information on the lineage of the CSOP is found in a document in the QW papers dated 24 February 1940, box 5, fol 12, entitled "Tin Cans and Peace," #21. The document's editorial sponsors included Harry Elmer

Barnes, C. Harley Grattan, and Oswald Garrison Villard. The authors are highly critical of the CSOP approach which they label as "interventionist."

115 The founding date is inferred from a letter of 20 November 1944, Bx 5, fol 16, from Clark Eichelberger to QW.

116 QW Collection, Document "Meeting Of Sub-Committee On Political International Organization," 27 December 1939, Bx 5, fol 11, 11. Clyde Eagleton, Clark Eichelberger, Sarah Wambaugh, Quincy Wright, Samuel Guy Inman, Philip Jessup, James Shotwell, Allen Dulles, and Frederick Dunn attended this meeting.

117 QW Collection, Document, "Political International Organization," circa December 1939, Bx 5, fol 11, 1-3.

118 *Ibid.*, 5.

119 *Ibid.*, 1.

120 *Ibid.*, 2.

121 *Ibid.*, 8.

122 QW Collection Document "Proposals Respecting Political International Organization," 25 March 1940, Bx 5, fol 11, 2; 15.

123 *Ibid.*, 1.

124 QW, "Peace and Political Organization," Preliminary Report and Monographs, CSOP, *International Conciliation* (Apr 1941), 369, 454-467. This journal was the primary forum for the CSOP.

125 QW Collection, "Proposals Respecting International Organization," 11.

126 QW, "Peace and Political Organization," 454.

127 *Ibid.*, 455

128 *Ibid.*

129 *Ibid.*, 456.

130 *Ibid.*, 457.

131 *Ibid.*

- 132 *Ibid.*, 463-464.
- 133 QW Document, Bx 5, fol 13 (c.1940?), indicates that CSOP membership no longer includes Allen Dulles, Thomas W. Lamont, Frederick Schuman or Edith Ware.
- 134 QW to Clark Eichelberger, 5 December 1939, Bx 5, fol 11.
- 135 QW to Clark Eichelberger, 7 December 1939, Bx 5, fol 11.
- 136 QW to Clyde Eagleton, 11 March 1940, Bx 5, fol 12.
- 137 QW "Outline of Program," 7 June 1941, bx 5, fol 12.
- 138 *Ibid.*, 1-2, original emphasis.
- 139 *Ibid.*
- 140 QW "Statement of United States Aims called for by Commission to Study the Organization of Peace," undated, Bx 5, fol 13.
- 141 More evidence of Wright's commitment to free enterprise is to be found in his later article "The War and the Peace," *Ethics* LIII (October 1942), 64-68, in which he refers to as E.H. Carr's treatment of laissez-faire capitalism in *Condition of Peace* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1942) as "unduly critical."
- 142 Introduction to the QW Collection, 1-3.
- 143 QW "Human Rights and the World Order" *Int'l Conciliation* 389 (April '43), 238-62. Third Report of the CSOP.
- 144 QW Document "Prepare for Victory," 10 June 1942, Bx 5, fol 14.
- 145 See Louise Wright, *Bibliography*, 76-77, for broadcast titles and a complete list of participants.
- 146 QW "CSOP Statement," 31 August 1944, Bx 5, fol 16.
- 147 For their emphasis on the role of the offense in modern warfare, see QWA *Study of War*, 326; for their emphasis on the airplane's impact on the offensive, see *A Study of War*, 302, 809.

148 See QW "National Security and International Police," *Am J Int'l L* 37 (July '43), 499-505; QW "Responsibilities of the United States in the Post-War World," *Free World* 5 (January 1943), 35-41; QW "Peace Problems of Today and Yesterday," *Am Pol Sci Rev* 38 (June 1944), 512-521; QW "Security and World Organization," *Int'l Con* (June 1944) 396, 30-65; QW Statement on CSOP, 31 August 1944, Bx 5, fol 16; QW "An International Police Force," *New Europe* 4 (March 1944) 3, 16-17; QW "The International Regulation of the Air," and *Am Eco Rev* 35 (May 1945) 2, 243-48.

149 Frederick Schuman, "The Dilemma of the Peace-Seekers," *Am Pol Sci Rev* 36 (February 1945), 12-30.

150 QW to FLS, April 1945, Box 23, add 1.

151 The provisions are to be found in Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

152 The passage is to be found on 912 ff, and 1063-76.

153 QW to FLS, April 1945, Bx 23, add 1.

CHAPTER III

DENNA F. FLEMING AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

While Quincy Wright was fighting the battles of theory and policy, Denna Frank Fleming was learning the hard lessons of warfare on the battlefields of Flanders and France.¹ Fleming entered the "war to end all wars" as an enlisted soldier in the Army and was assigned to ordnance in December 1917. He trained for six weeks at the University of Oregon and an additional six weeks at Benecia Arsenal near San Francisco and then left for Fort Hancock Field, Georgia to await transfer to France.² Fleming trained as a machine gunner and became an instructor in the operation of the "Lewis gun" at an aircraft machine gun school in France for six months.³ He was stricken with the flu shortly after becoming a gunnery sergeant and upon his recovery he was detailed to ordnance duty where, among other responsibilities, he and his squad dug graves. The experiences of these six months determined much of the course of his adult life.

This journey, both intellectual and physical, greatly affected the young man who was, he wrote, "born in the bosom of isolationism in the heart of the Mississippi Valley" at Belle Ridge, a village outside of Paris, Illinois on 25 March 1893. Fleming had remained an isolationist Republican until 1917, when he came to believe that President Woodrow Wilson had done all he could to keep the U.S. out of the European conflict and that his country was no longer able to remain neutral in World War I.⁴ Fleming entered the

army with a diploma from Eastern Illinois Normal School earned in 1912, and a B.A. in political science earned in 1916 from the University of Illinois.

The senseless squander of World War One and the possibility that it could happen again left Fleming a determined Wilsonian. Fleming sought to relocate power in a new global community at the expense of independent national sovereignty. Among the many problems he faced, though, was the unknown quality of the new world organization. He would fight against the centralization of power in the legislative branch of the U.S. government which he believed was unresponsive to the people, yet he would rely upon the power of a new organization which held the potential to become the greatest of all institutions of centralized power.

This desire to relocate power was a phenomenon closely related to the agenda of the developing organized peace-movement, which sought disarmament, judicial arbitration, and open diplomacy as the instruments to assure peaceful international relations. The Lake Mohonk Conferences of the 1890's, the work of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, and of Norman Angell and other publicists of a new foreign policy had urgent meaning for many of those who had experienced the World War. It was a plea derived not only from opposition to the war, but from the context of nineteenth century populism's call for popular rule and early twentieth century progressivism's call for responsible government. The rhetoric for responsive international organization was seated deeply in the movement to extend the power of the people.

There was little demand for machine gun instructors in civilian life, but there was employment for teachers. Fleming had been a high school teacher and principal from 1912 to 1917 and he resumed these careers upon his return from the war. He found time as well to pursue a master's degree from the University of Illinois, which he received in 1920. This broadened his audience, something he valued highly as he was now deeply involved in the debate between Wilson and the Senate over the League issue. In 1922 he graduated from teaching high school students to educating college students at Monmouth College where he served as an assistant professor of social science, an associate professor, and eventually as chair of the department from 1924 to 1927.

In 1927 Fleming was granted an extended leave of absence in order to pursue a Ph. D. at the University of Illinois where he studied under the supervision of Professor James W. Garner. Garner was an influential educator and an advocate of Wilsonian internationalism. Among his former students was Quincy Wright. Garner's impact on both men was profound and helped to shape their world outlook: it was his devotion to law as the agent for world organization that shone through in his two most famous students' work.

As part of his Ph. D. program, Fleming enrolled at Columbia University in New York City in order to audit the lectures of James T. Shotwell, Arthur W. McMahon, and Joseph P. Chamberlain.⁵ These men were important peace activists and they, especially Shotwell, came to influence Fleming's future. Fleming was particularly interested in the Senate's defeat of the League of Nations, and he took partial manuscripts of two books, his

dissertation, *The Treaty Veto of the American Senate*, and *The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920*, to Shotwell for review in 1927.

Shotwell found them to be so promising that he forwarded them to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation. The manuscripts were greeted enthusiastically--so much so that Norman Davis, one of the foundation's board members, suggested to the Chancellor of Vanderbilt University, James H. Kirkland, that Fleming would make an admirable addition to the Vanderbilt History and Political Science faculty.⁶ But first Fleming had to defend his dissertation.

Fleming earned his Ph. D. in 1928, but his dissertation defense was difficult, for several of his committee members criticized what they characterized to be the polemical quality of his work, a charge that would be leveled against him in later years regarding other works.⁷ Despite the apprehensions of the committee, Fleming's defense was successful, and the committee's fears regarding the quality of the work seemed vitiated when Putnam published it in 1930 and found it necessary to run a second printing the same year.⁸ Fleming then applied to Vanderbilt University for a position in the Department of History and Political Science. In due course, he was appointed in 1928 and began a relationship which lasted thirty-three years. It was a long, mostly pleasant relationship that was unnecessarily marred at the time of his retirement.

Schools, then, were Fleming's first forums from which to preach to the virtues of Wilsonian internationalism. He focused his early career on what he considered the Senate's obstructionist role in defeating the Versailles Treaty and he wrote his dissertation in order to take his case to the public.⁹

Beyond his duties as a lecturer, he found time early in his career to write two other books that later became influential: *The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920* and *The United States and World Organization, 1920-1933*.¹⁰ In these books Fleming reiterated the belief, popular among Wilsonians, that the Senate alone bore responsibility for the incomplete attempt at world organization that followed World War One and that Henry Cabot Lodge and his followers had sabotaged the League for personal and partisan reasons.¹¹

The battle between Wilson and the Senate over the League defined Fleming's political agenda for the remainder of his career. There is a great deal of literature that examines the impact partisan politics and personalities had on the controversy over U.S. ratification of the Treaty of Versailles as well as literature which concentrates on institutional conflict. But the best literature synthesizes the interpretations of the causal forces behind the rift between the Senate and the Executive branches of government. Fleming's early work in some ways approximates such a synthesis in that he included both institutional and individual conflicts in his analysis.

He defined the problem of Senate interference in the making of treaties through historical analysis, and he carefully documented the precedents for Senate influence, including the role of individual Senators and Presidents. In later efforts to quantify the injustices of the Senate in regard to executive treaty-making, though, he indicated that "Four-fifths of all the treaties submitted to the Senate have been approved by it without any change whatsoever . . . Likewise, the failure of 62 treaties to be

approved by the Senate in any form has had serious consequences in not more than a fifth of the situations resulting." So an alternative conclusion would be that the Senate was, for the most part, a reasonable body which found few occasions to object to the unhampered power the executive branch wielded in making treaties.¹²

Fleming, like other political "scientists" of his generation, offered no scientific methodology to demonstrate the value of his prescriptions, nor did he base his predictions on such a methodology. Fleming did not, though, propose radical alternative models or offer a comparative analysis of the U.S. system with other systems; rather, he proposed minor modifications to the U.S. system, but they were modifications that would drastically reduce the Senate's influence. His unflagging admiration of Wilson skewed Fleming's interpretation of the evidence he presented and prevented him from reaching the objective conclusion he sought.

What is revealed in his book *The Treaty Veto of the American Senate* is not so much Fleming's disappointment with the system as his disappointment with certain Senate decisions, decisions that ignored the liberal agenda, his antagonism toward Henry Cabot Lodge, and his idolization of Woodrow Wilson. Fleming, like Wilson, believed that a parliamentary system would rectify this type of problem much quicker than did governments "where the theory rules that independent branches of the Government must watch and check or block each other."¹³ As for his disappointment with the Senate's actions, it seems that Fleming did not approve when opponents of the Peace Treaty and the League manipulated public opinion. He believed that these opponents had "resisted the demand

that we should take our high place in the League, gradually wore it down and had finally overcome it by arousing counter feelings of infinite number and variety." Yet, as a Wilsonian he believed that organized public opinion was essential to the cause of internationalism.¹⁴

Fleming described the Senate's role as "both irritating and unfair" and he accepted the analysis of the *Nation* which attacked the "growing tendency to make the management of our international relations subservient to the purposes of party politics--which is another way of saying, of growing indifference to national reputation."¹⁵ Fleming believed that the Senate had abjured the intent of the founding fathers and that it was now arrogating power in a day of increasingly important foreign affairs.¹⁶

Nothing demonstrated this, in Fleming's mind, more amply than what he considered to be Henry Cabot Lodge's perfidy in scuttling the League of Nations. After all, Lodge had defended the idea of a League. He had declared that despite the difficulties encountered when a politician advocated anything resembling an alliance, he believed that Washington's Farewell admonition should not be construed to prevent the U.S. from accepting responsibility, along with other "civilized" nations, of maintaining peace if the appropriate means for coordinating their actions were found.¹⁷ But after the war, Lodge became, in Fleming's view, a crass partisan who disregarded his earlier convictions regarding U.S. commitments to global responsibilities.

Fleming accepted the substance and the rhetoric of President Wilson's war address to Congress.¹⁸ Americans, Wilson declared, would fight for the

things they held dear: democracy, government which is responsive to its people, equality among nations, and the "universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free." And, said Wilson, Americans would consider it their privilege to sacrifice both blood and treasure for these principles, principles that shaped the creation of the nation and assured its peace and happiness. "God helping her," he urged, "she can do no other."¹⁹

Whether or not the U.S. really had some other recourse than intervention in 1917 continues to be debated. Fleming believed that German unrestricted submarine warfare, coupled with the intrinsic threat Prussian militarism posed to free and democratic societies, so jeopardized the national interest that it made neutrality untenable--that the U.S. and Wilson could indeed "do no other"--especially when the British provided compensation for the goods they seized.²⁰ Revisionist historians have maintained that U.S. entry into the war was an avoidable mistake that did not represent the nation's best interests. So called "realists" have argued just the opposite: that the only mistake made was the delay in entering the war. For this they condemn the ever present strain of moral-legalism in U.S. foreign policy. More recently, the "New Left" has argued that Wilson's decision can be seen only in terms of an attempt to preserve liberal capitalism

As for suggestions that Wilson should have accepted a compromise with the League's opponents, Fleming argued that to do so would have been a rejection of principle.²¹ This was less than effective given Wilson's willingness to compromise the principle of self-determination in the

service of world peace. Fleming observed that in Wilson's 14 Points Speech to Congress on 8 January 1918, the President specified that there must be a general association of nations governed by specific covenants so that "mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity" could be effected for great and small states alike," a most important aspect of post-war international organization. ²² Any compromise would likely result in a truncated league. Wilson's rhetoric led many to see him as a modern Diogenes, searching for the structure of peace, and to Fleming he seemed on the verge of finding it; to others, he was an idealistic Icarus whose quest was bound to end in disaster.

What Fleming would not admit was that people who opposed Wilson's League might do so because they believed that it did not represent the interests of the nation. In the long struggle to define the constitution, both the executive and the legislative branches traditionally avoided entangling alliances, sought to check the other's attempts to aggrandize their authority and power, and tried to rein in the masses to keep the country safe from the "dangers" of democracy. The Senate's charge to provide advice and to consent to, or dissent from, treaties was designed to protect the country from rash decisions *and* to protect elite interests against radical developments. It is possible many Senators accepted that charge seriously, for they believed the executive branch had strayed dangerously from established precedent.

Not only that, but Wilson refused to afford them the expected opportunity to shape national policy, for he did not include any Senators or ranking Republicans in the Peace Commission. Although he was under no

obligation to follow the precedent President McKinley had set when he included ranking Senators in the peace mission to Paris to conclude the Spanish-American War, Wilson should have prepared for the possibility that he would encounter opposition from Lodge in the Senate. Compromise in the service of world peace demanded such an approach.

Wilson erred when he failed to appoint a leading Republican, not just a Senator, to the Peace Commission.²³ His selections of Henry White, a career Republican diplomat, and Tasker Bliss have often been cited to prove Wilson's good will, but neither man held influence in elite Republican circles and, given the other delegates' relationships with Wilson, no one sat on the commission who wielded significant sway with the Republican Senate.²⁴

It is problematic whether Wilson's exclusion of ranking Republicans from the commission resulted in the Round Robin of 4 March 1919. It is entirely possible that nothing could have tempered that group's resolve to oppose the Treaty. Certainly, this is the interpretation Fleming forwarded. The caucus of Senate Republicans declared that without revision the Senate would not consent to the President's idea of the League. Wilson envisioned a League whose covenant bound its members to protect the peace, free trade, and territorial integrity of every member nation: contracting parties would conceivably act multilaterally against aggressor nations in order to protect one another's rights.

This was what the Senate opposition feared most for they thought this League obligation would circumvent Congressional power to declare war. But there were significant problems in this belief, for there was no

coercive device to force the contracting parties to action, the League would have no independent military force to add power to its authority, most League decisions would require a unanimous vote, and the member states reserved to themselves the right to take independent action in the event that they considered it "necessary for the maintenance of right and justice."²⁵ Although these factors vitiated the Reservationist arguments against the League, they also appeared to make the League a body without substance. But appearances were deceptive. A concert of great powers, many of whom were now dependent on the economic goodwill of the U.S. could, if united, force their policies on the world.

The Reservationists focused their arguments on the loss of sovereignty that they believed was both explicit and implicit throughout the Covenant. Their rhetoric was emotional and appealed greatly to the uninformed, but it was unsubstantiated. The League's sole authority rested in the moral suasion it exerted on international public opinion--again, there was no binding, coercive agent to enforce its rules and regulations, and the Reservationists, at least the discerning ones, knew this to be the case. It must be remembered that, with the exception of the Irreconcilables, most of the Reservationists wanted a League, but it had to be one that would protect the interests and prerogatives of the U.S. Some were unwilling to limit U.S. economic or territorial expansion, others feared that the U.S. would be forced to accept an unwanted mandate, and still others feared that the U. S. would be forced into a war not in its interest. What they all feared was an infringement on their nation's sovereign power. They were

unwilling to bind nations to a moral and legal responsibility similar to that which they held individuals accountable.

Fleming's description of the above events paid homage to the hoary story of President Washington's first experience with the Senate and its role of giving advice and consent over a proposed treaty in order to demonstrate "the friction inherent in the attempt to give two independent bodies power over treaties."²⁶ The Constitutional Convention wanted a limited role for the Senate, Fleming explained, and the Senate had immediately gone beyond that role: disputatious Senators like William Maclay in the eighteenth century or Henry Cabot Lodge in the twentieth, should not constrain the President.²⁷ "There are," wrote Fleming, "always likely to be lawyers in the Senate who can think of something that ought to be changed. There are always some who are of the opinion that the executive must be watched, or it will betray us."²⁸

Fleming believed that the "scrutiny of treaties" ought to be turned over to the House of Representatives, a body of individuals who relied more "upon good sense and less upon rigid legislative methods" than did the Senate in order to counter the overly "legalistic" tendency of the Senate.²⁹ This seems anomalous for a man who so highly valued "the reign of law."³⁰ Perhaps part of the explanation for this incongruity is the strong sense of populism his interpretation conveys. Internationalism in the twentieth century was presented as a "peoples" movement whose message was empowerment of the world's people in their affairs. His views express as well the peace movement's emphasis on a publicly governed foreign policy.

At this time, Fleming identified "the people" with the House of Representatives. His basis for this identification was his belief that there were fewer lawyers in the House, therefore its membership was less inclined to the litigious interpretive battles over constitutional law and more inclined to exercise common sense. He thought the limits of what he identified as a Senatorial mindset were serious. In what was an unintended self-parody of his own profession, he concluded that "Words mean everything to many of them."³¹ It was, of course, a naive belief to think that the House and its members were any less corruptible, any less partisan, or any closer to the people than was the Senate, but a broadening of congressional responsibility for treaties would at least on the surface better serve the cause of democracy.

Fleming transposed the populist's community ideology to what was now, in his view, the global community. His villains were the same as the populist's--lawyers, the wealthy interest groups, the robber barons--all those who would deny "progress" and expression of the public will. Fleming indicted multimillionaires like Henry Clay Frick, who George Harvey, a key figure himself in the defeat of the League, wrote "[believed] to his dying day that the Democratic Party never was, is not now and never will be fit to govern the United States," and Andrew W. Mellon for having contributed millions to defeat the League.³² And Fleming singled-out financiers Thomas W. Lamont and H. P. Davidson, along with Elihu Root, for having provided Lodge with a copy of the Versailles Treaty prior to official publication. Fleming charged jurists John Bassett Moore and Charles Evans Hughes with dereliction of duty.³³ But most of all the Senate, that isolated

group of lawyers and wealthy businessmen who clung to a superannuated sense of national sovereignty and to a reactionary foreign policy, received Fleming's ire.

Ironically, Fleming noted that the founding fathers themselves sought to prevent the popular will from exerting undue influence on the measured considerations necessary to conduct foreign policy, and to provide a check on a powerful executive branch. Because of this, and after much deliberation, the Constitution was designed to give the Senate (or a small minority thereof), a body of indirectly elected, influential officials, the power to stay the implementation of treaties.³⁴ This, of course, was the result of the "infamous" two-thirds rule, a rule that doubled the value of every vote against a treaty, and a rule Fleming believed should be abolished.³⁵ But even though the intent clearly had been to protect an ill-informed, sometimes rash public from unfortunate decisions and not merely to perpetuate the interests of the ruling class, such had also been the intent behind the indirect election of Senators, something which the public had seen fit to change.

Fleming described the role of the Senate in foreign policy and treaty ratification as the "irreparable" mistake of the Constitution.³⁶ After all, Fleming argued, the President was responsible to all the people and as such should be able to negotiate treaties without undue Senate interference.³⁷ This was a characteristic Wilsonian interpretation of the need for a strong executive. The Senate could not always be trusted to see the utility of a treaty outside the context of regional or party interests, and, in the event that it did not, Fleming concluded that the country should recognize that

instead of a new treaty it needed a new Senate.³⁸ An elite group of partisan senators, separated from the true interests of their constituents, often refused to pass measures that were for the good of the collectivity.

Instead, the Senators claimed that they checked the "authoritarian," "unrepresentative," and even "monarchical," occupants of the executive office and declared further that they, the Senators, were duty bound to protect the republic from mobocracy. According to Fleming, the Senate would oppose any transfer of power to the House, which those who truly believed in popular control of foreign policy would support, because the Senate sought to protect, despite its collective protests that the system served the interests of democracy, its institutional prerogative and retain its members' position of oligarchy in the creation of foreign policy.³⁹

Fleming provided as well the example of the Roman Republic which, according to his interpretation, fell "when the Senate [which had been entrusted with the power to make treaties] gathered executive, administrative, and legislative powers in its hands and ruled the state. The Empire followed."⁴⁰ The warning is not lost on even the least discerning reader, although Fleming's reading of Roman history is subject to a very different conclusion.⁴¹

Fleming also appealed to the reader's sense of progress and modernity in order to augment his argument. Organizational technique and technology, he declared, were rapidly shrinking the world.⁴² He noted that the temporizing of the Senate while it awaited assurances of "complete safety and perfect equality" in treaties caused the U.S. to lose ground in a world which continued to move rapidly ahead, a world in which an

international organization was developing means to settle disputes peacefully, and the U.S. was without significant input in the process.⁴³ A country that was too rigidly tied to the past was in jeopardy of being left behind, of missing the new organizational structure of international society.

Fleming thought this rigid traditionalism was one of the great tragedies of the old system. Why, he asked, must a nation of air travel and television be bound by the assumptions of men who lived in the days of sail and oxcart? In a day when the pace and scope of international events had increased greatly, why should a small group of anachronistic Senators be allowed to block progress?⁴⁴

Fleming realized that the Senate was not going to willingly divest itself of the right to influence foreign policymaking. He believed the Senators would prevent a constitutional amendment in the foreseeable future, but he noted that it had once been thought that the Senate would be immobile in its opposition to the popular election of its members. Taking small hope in this, though, he wrote that "The Senate resisted that reform until a long campaign compelled its submission. It will take even longer no doubt to lead the Senate to modify its power over treaties."⁴⁵

What, then, short of revolution, should the future course be for those who wished to change the system? The pressure of "organized public opinion" was a basic Wilsonian tenet, and Fleming turned to it to force the Senate into action. Citing the numerous constitutional developments which WWI and the peace had wrought, he suggested that the people opposed to change could be made to see the way of the future. He called attention to

the governments of the newly constituted countries of Europe as examples: Germany, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, and Yugoslavia had all rejected the U.S. structure for upper house involvement in the governance of foreign policy and treaymaking.⁴⁶ These governments had chosen the lower house to check foreign policymaking, which reaffirmed representative government and helped prevent elite control of the government.⁴⁷

As for Senate opposition to such a loss of power, Fleming attempted to lock the Senate with its own rhetoric. Senators from all parties had at one time or another proclaimed that nothing was less suited to the purposes of democracy than a small group of men, isolated from the people, who exercised power in their name. Especially vehement had been the protests of the opponents to the League about the impact of a few men in Geneva or the Hague sitting in judgment of U.S. policy. It would be difficult for Senators who had thwarted the treaty process to object to such a broadening of popular control as Fleming advocated. How could they, he wondered, "insist upon the right of a small group of Senators, varying in number from a dozen to thirty-three, to rule the foreign affairs of the American nation?"⁴⁸

Surely, he argued, the Senate, like our allies and enemies, could be persuaded that a system where a simple majority vote of *both* houses was required for consent to treaties was a progressive step and should be adopted. Fleming thought it would be very difficult for any reasonable person to oppose such a system.⁴⁹ Of course, the Senate did not (and still does not) employ reason as its sole criterion for decision-making, and even

if it did, given the perspective of some of its more influential members like Johnson and Borah, the Senate could "reasonably" assume that the precedents Fleming cited were meaningless or they could arrive at the conclusion opposite of Fleming's.

That the Senate would not likely heed his suggestions did not deter Fleming from continuing his critique. Nor did the Senate's rapid approval of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, an act that encouraged many idealists to believe that the Senate had seen the error of its ways in the League debate, for it was now willing to attach reservations in committee reports rather than directly to a treaty.⁵⁰ But Fleming was not such an idealist and the Senate's response to the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not portend any great changes in Fleming's estimation.

He warned that there were no provisions to enforce the treaty, no sanctions to be implemented against aggressors. Because the treaty required no commitment on the part of the U.S., the Senate had approved it. But if it had required action on the part of the U.S., Fleming assured the reader that "the amendments and reservations offered by the preservers of 'the traditional policies of the United States' and by the defenders of the Senate's power over treaties would doubtless have been many and varied."⁵¹

Among the issues that occupied Fleming before World War Two besides the Senate's role in treaty-making were attempts to gain U.S. entry into the World Court, the evolution of the League of Nations, and what he perceived to be the isolationist trend in American foreign policy.⁵² Fleming continued to pursue his studies of the League after he settled in Nashville,

and he sought further assistance in the form of a Penfield Traveling Scholarship from the University of Philadelphia. He received one in 1932 and another in 1938.⁵³ The scholarship enabled Fleming to live in Geneva and study the League of Nations in action. During his six months in Geneva he witnessed the "last phases of the Disarmament Conference and the [debates over] the Lytton report on the Manchurian war."⁵⁴ His research resulted in a third book, *The United States and World Organization, 1920-1933*.

In this book, Fleming developed the theme of what he saw as the major failure in American diplomacy since the defeat of the League: the pursuit of isolationism and neutrality. The work in many ways typifies the "progressive" interpretation of the twenties.⁵⁵ Fleming asked his readers to consider closely which leaders and policies had led to the destruction of what he called the "greatest promise ever held out to man"--the League of Nations. What leaders and policies had allowed destructive forces greater than any previously known to be unleashed? What were the consequences for the nation now that it had entrusted its security and well-being to the policies of neutrality and isolation?⁵⁶ Fleming held that the Republican leadership and their decade-long policy of "normalcy" were responsible for the precarious state of U.S. security. The men he charged were George Harvey, Frank B. Brandegee, Medill McCormick, and Henry C. Lodge, for they had orchestrated not just the League's defeat, but the candidacy and election of Warren G. Harding as well.⁵⁷

"Normalcy" was to Fleming a Republican conspiracy, a reaction to the visionary progressive leadership of Woodrow Wilson and the Democrats.

"Normalcy" was a policy designed to offset what Fleming called Wilson's "amazing program of [domestic] action." The new policy, too, represented class conflict in that it pitted the "older social forces of the North . . . [who] represent[ed] also the great industrial wealth of the country" against "Mr. Wilson, as the representative of the equally old social classes of the agrarian South and of the newer life to the West."⁵⁸ The old ruling classes and powerful economic groups found that Wilson's domestic program conflicted with their interests, and when they returned to power in 1921 they were determined to reverse Wilsonian reforms.⁵⁹

As for foreign policy, Fleming believed Wilson's rhetoric about a move toward open diplomacy, toward denying power to the old elites, or at least forcing them to share it. And Fleming believed this policy was popular. So popular that Harding could not afford to campaign without making appeals to the overwhelming public support for a League of Nations that was current during the 1920 election. Harding and his campaign managers, Fleming wrote, had misled the public by alternately condemning the League of Nations and promising to sponsor a new association of nations, or to rehabilitate the one in Geneva. The condemnations were necessary to appease the cabal of Republican senators who wanted to keep the U.S. out of any League but, according to Fleming, all indications within the Republican party led one to conclude that pro-League Republicans controlled party leadership. And this leadership urged the public to support Harding "as the way into the League."⁶⁰ It was, therefore, another Republican betrayal of public trust that led to Harding's victory, according

to Fleming, for the cabal had no intention of letting their candidate take the U.S. into the League.⁶¹

Again, Fleming pursued themes of populism versus elitism, of modernism versus traditionalism, of progress versus stagnation. And again he prescribed the same solution to the world's problems. There was, he wrote, "no substitute for the League of Nations strong enough to keep the peace, and . . . none can be invented."⁶² Order was as essential to the international system as it was to the local community, Fleming wrote, and he quoted Cordell Hull to lend authority to his beliefs. "The all-embracing preoccupation of all of us," Hull said, "may be summed up in one word—order. Order in international relations is just as vital as it is in the relations within a nation."⁶³

Fleming noted that the most crucial obstacle that world order faced was the relationship that the United States would have with the League. Presumably, the prospect of some *Pax Americana* left him unmoved. As long as the relationship between the League and the U.S. remained unsettled, he believed the international situation would continue to deteriorate.⁶⁴ With this in mind, Fleming expressed his disappointment at the Senate's defeat of U.S. entry into the World Court to President Roosevelt, asking him to throw his full power into a future effort to gain U.S. participation. He counseled the president that both his prestige and the future welfare of many nations depended on this outcome. His remarks also condemned William Randolph Hearst and Father Coughlin, both instrumental in the vote against U.S. membership in the World Court. Fleming thought it "intolerable" that William Randolph Hearst, "allied with

an importunate radio priest and a half dozen other violent individuals, should defeat the will of the nation, your leadership, and dominate our foreign policy."⁶⁵ Fleming entreated the president not to accept future congressional reservations to U. S. entry in the World Court. Fleming understood any opponents of such entry to be obstructionists dedicated to the maintenance of their privileged position in the world order.

Fleming considered his message concerning the need for U.S. cooperation in the new international organization so important that he could not afford to confine it to books and articles addressed to a scholarly audience. He had seen how effective the obstructionists' methods had been in "organizing the opinion of mankind," and he was convinced that "a large number of people" throughout the country were interested in his views of the issues of the day.⁶⁶ He began new projects in the thirties designed to broaden his audience and aid his effort to "organize" public opinion. Edith Osburn of the League of Nations Association asked him whether he would want to write columns for a commercial syndicate.⁶⁷ Fleming replied that he was very interested and had been seeking a wider audience for some time, and that he had written a total of two-hundred, twice-weekly front page columns for the *Nashville Tennessean* during the last year-and-a-half, and that public interest in them had continued to grow.⁶⁸ Although this particular opportunity for syndication did not materialize, he wrote another fifty articles for the local paper before he would be embroiled in what he called the "conservative-liberal tussle" going on inside the *Nashville Tennessean* which led to his resignation in 1937.⁶⁹

Soon after he left the paper, Fleming began a ten year association with radio station WSM in Nashville, during which time he broadcast 750 programs that were heard in 30 states and Canada.⁷⁰ He was very much involved in the radio and was concerned that a more liberal view be presented to the public that would counter the efforts of "the new radio kings," an obvious reference to Father Coughlin and to Huey Long's successors.⁷¹ Fleming provided his audience a range of topics that included pleas to accept the exchange of destroyers for naval bases, a dramatization of the takeover of Czechoslovakia, and one entitled "Is the Motion-Picture Industry a Warmonger?" Pervasive throughout was his belief in liberal democracy and in Wilsonian world organization. Fleming repeatedly reminded his audience that when the U.S. rejected the League of Nations the nation's leaders had made the gravest mistake in modern history. He referred to Woodrow Wilson as the first world statesman that the U.S. had produced, and lamented the fact that the people had betrayed Wilson's vision, a betrayal whose costs Fleming believed the U.S. was continuing to pay.⁷²

In the same year that he began his radio broadcasts, Fleming arrived at the conclusion that the sentiment for neutrality had peaked, and he expressed the hope that the U.S. would accept the commitments necessary for it to maintain world order.⁷³ In his renewed efforts on behalf of a system of collective security, Fleming attacked neutrality both as a concept and as legislation, especially the impact the Neutrality Acts would have on members of the League of Nations in the event they were compelled to use force to restrain an aggressor.⁷⁴ He now attacked what he referred to as

"the new explanation" of historical revisionists for U.S. entry into WWI. The revisionist critique, which according to Fleming was "unduly at variance with the facts," had been used to buttress the neutrality legislation of the thirties. It is ironic that a man whose work on the Cold War during the 1950s and 1960s would later be hailed as the genesis of revisionist interpretation of that event stood in the forefront of those attacking an earlier revisionism.

In his application to the Rockefeller Foundation for a research grant, he wrote that the debate over the question of U.S. neutrality had replaced the debate over U.S. entry into the League of Nations as the dominant controversy in foreign affairs. He noted that a "new, revised version" which purported to explain why the U.S. entered the "great war" now dominated U.S. foreign policy, but assured the Foundation that many people held the revisionist interpretation to be at odds with the facts. Because of this, he believed that a study was warranted to allow for greater understanding of the historical bases for the course of U.S. neutrality.⁷⁵ The Rockefeller Foundation rejected his request on grounds that his historical approach did not meet the criteria of those studies ordinarily included in their international relations program. Undaunted, Fleming challenged the Foundation's wisdom and cited his book *The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920* as an example of a history "that will almost certainly have some effect upon future policy."⁷⁶ He was not above singing his own praises.

Receipt of a second Penfield Traveling Scholarship in 1938 interrupted Fleming's radio career and enabled him to pursue his new project.

Vanderbilt not only matched the funds from the University of Pennsylvania, but provided expenses as well.⁷⁷ His third book, *The United States and World Organization, 1920-1933*, had just been published, the result of his first Penfield, and he set out to conduct research for the next. He spent the last months of 1938 in New York City and the first ones of 1939 in Great Britain, where he watched the League of Nations continue to crumble. Caught in the heady atmosphere of pending European disaster, his project was delayed, to say the least, until 1968 when Doubleday published his book *The Origins and Legacy of World War I*.⁷⁸

Fleming returned to Nashville with a sense of urgency, as he believed that Britain and Western Europe constituted the first line of defense of the United States and for civilization. In a radio talk aired on 22 May 1940, Fleming cited Walter Lippmann as an advocate of this premise. Lippmann, commenting on the probable scenario in the event of Allied collapse during the summer of 1940, said that "Faster than we can conceivably build the means of defense, the victorious aggressor states will occupy by force or by conspiracies the strategic outposts of our defensive system."⁷⁹

Until the U.S. entered the war, much of the substance for Fleming's addresses over WSM was devoted to condemnations of America Firsters, of Senators LaFollette and Wheeler, and especially of Charles Lindbergh, and in defense of Churchill, Roosevelt, and the Atlantic Community. But his views were not completely eurocentric: he was also aware of the stake the U.S. held in the Pacific. Fleming had condemned the actions of the Japanese in China since their seizure of Manchuria in 1931-1932, as did

most Wilsonians, but by 1939 his tactic was to awaken in the public a sense of China's importance to the future of U.S. interests.

Fleming was not deluded about the immediate potential that a Chinese consumer market held for the U.S., but he held visions of a gigantic future export market for U.S. goods in Asia. He wrote in an article for the *China Weekly Review* that "a vast demand for American goods has never developed [in China], and can never develop, until China is modernized under a stable, enlightened government."⁸⁰ And he declared further that it was easy to conclude superficially that "our present trade with China, or with the Far East, is not worth a war." Still, Fleming warned, "the Pacific is the region of the future [and] the United States . . . is compelled to be a Pacific power."⁸¹ Here was both an accurate prediction and an acute observation.

His views about China, though, were those of a nationalist, not an internationalist. He denied the existence of a *de facto* sphere of influence that Japan had created in the Far East, not just through such brutal means as evidenced in Manchuria in 1931 and throughout China in 1937, but through significant investments. Statistics Fleming cited demonstrated clearly that U.S. investment in China was, at \$242,000,000, only one-fifth of Japan's investment of \$1,137,000,000 as of 1931. They revealed, too, that U.S. trade with Japan was far more important than with China, as Japan imported twice the value in U.S. goods that the Chinese did, and that 43 percent of all U.S. trade in the Far East in 1935 was with Japan.⁸² It was possible to conclude that better relations with Japan should have been the focus of U.S. foreign policy, not the defense of China. Too, there was no

mention of the equally brutal, if less effective, methods of government of the Nationalist Chinese and their gross corruption. If Fleming believed Chiang Kai-shek's regime capable of establishing a "stable, enlightened" Chinese government, then the professor's optimism belied the available evidence.

What Fleming wanted was first to maintain the open door. He observed that it was "not for nothing" that the world's greatest nation had "invented" the means to span the globe in search of "the things we desire and require. Every continent and every clime needs the products of our industry, as we need theirs," so it was absolutely essential that Asia and the world remain freely accessible to American "inventiveness, initiative and ability."⁸³

Second, he wanted to defend China in order to have a stable neighbor to the West. The only way for that to happen, in his opinion, was for the U.S. to ensure that China won its "courageous fight for liberty," a strange liberty indeed, given the nature of the Nationalist regime.⁸⁴ What Fleming meant was victory in the struggle for independence from Japan. In an effort to ensure Chinese victory, Fleming called for the U.S. to raise tariffs on Japanese goods 25 percent, even in disregard of the Geneva Accords against punitive tariffs which the U.S. had signed and had not abrogated. And an aggressive position toward Japan was not what the State Department or the U.S. Navy then favored. Although Fleming most likely took heart when an embargo policy was adopted in 1941, that policy put the Japanese military into preparations for direct confrontation with the U.S. and made war between the two powers a foregone conclusion.⁸⁵

As the likelihood of direct U.S. participation in the war became apparent, Fleming used his forums as vehicles to arouse public opinion in support of the allies. Now almost fifty, he had seen world order collapse twice in his lifetime, along with countless bloody local and regional conflicts: he was now less concerned with the formalities of scholarship than with the need to arouse the public to its responsibilities for the future world order. Articles that he published during the war years often lacked evidentiary substance and relied instead on rhetoric and innuendo. Of course, themes he pursued varied little from those on which he had conducted extensive research during the course of publishing his books, perhaps in that sense justifying his polemic.⁸⁶

After twenty years, Fleming still seethed at the isolationist forces he held responsible for the duration of the First World War and for the inability of the U.S. to use its great power, moral and economic, to prevent the Second World War. In an article for *Current History* entitled "War Without Shooting," Fleming attacked those isolationists in the U.S. Senate, who he would later call the last vestiges of aristocracy in the U.S., as well as Herbert Hoover, who opposed aid to the Soviet Union; the Nazis; the Japanese; and the Italians.⁸⁷ This was standard fare, a characteristic polemic, of a supporter of the Atlantic Alliance. Two elements that stand above the other exhortations, though, are an appeal to the people of the U.S., couched in terms of an international Manifest Destiny, to accept international responsibilities, and his early sympathy for the Soviets that offered an important insight to Fleming's later interpretation of the origins of the Cold War. They were themes he repeated, not just the

following month in another article for *Current History* entitled "Roosevelt and Churchill Confer," but throughout the war and for the rest of his career.

Fleming apprehended in the U.S. public an unwillingness to make the sacrifice necessary to win the war against facism/national socialism/militarism. He feared that Americans were unwilling to give up their "Sunday gasoline," that the nation would return to the "orgies of Normalcy."⁸⁸ Congressional failure to extend periods of service for "selectees, national guardsmen, and reserve officers" for the duration of the emergency compounded his fears that the public was either unaware of or unwilling to accept the sacrifices necessary to win the war.⁸⁹

Fleming goaded his readers with an exhortation borrowed from Philander C. Knox, who observed: "If the time ever comes when we Americans are unwilling to fight to preserve the freedom we have inherited, those freedoms will be destroyed and taken from us by a stronger breed of men who retain the courage to fight for what they have and of what they want." Strength was thus equated with a willingness to fight. Fleming believed, too, that many Americans viewed themselves as a "privileged people, exempt from the pains of actual fighting for liberty." Duty, he wrote, was incumbent upon Americans, for it was the "functioning of American democracy that [was] decisive for the fate of all free nations including our own--and always will be so long as we allow international anarchy to rule the world."⁹⁰

As for the Soviet Union, Fleming referred to Hitler's aggression eastward as a mixed blessing. He wrote of Stalin's "wisdom" in exercising

control over the area that stretched from the Karelian Isthmus to Bessarabia after 1939. This may strike us today as a surprising appraisal from an internationalist, one who professed a respect for international law and the right of self-determination, but Fleming explained his appraisal in the language of *realpolitik*. Stalin's brutal policies from the 1930's onward could now be better appreciated, "for here was absorbed, well in front of the main Soviet defense, the first shock of the sudden and treacherous German attack."⁹¹

So much for Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Rumanian provinces of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. It seemed that Fleming was willing to sacrifice principle to expediency, to allow the end to justify the means. There was, too, a flair for brinkmanship in Fleming, as his remark of October 1941 that the President should "[keep] pace with whatever degree of shooting the Nazis and their allies wished to incur" indicated.⁹² But with the Soviet Union and its actions, here was an instance of a theorist who thought he had seen the future. Those countries and territories whose sovereignty had been so flippantly ignored were simply the first to succumb to the vanguard of the world state. Still, in an arena where international law lacked the coercive element necessary to enforce it, those who stood on principle were likely doomed to fall to the outlaw aggressor states.

In May of 1942 Fleming wrote that the world was on the path toward political unification--the only doubt that remained for him was the method used to bring about the unification.⁹³ He believed that the only hope for stable world government rested with a coalition led by the United States and

the Soviet Union as "the key members of a world union." But if the terms of peace divided the superpowers, Fleming saw a world headed for another cycle of balance of power politics culminating in a Third World War.⁹⁴ He recognized a split as the result of two possible courses of action, neither necessarily exclusive of the other. First, a Soviet policy of "excessive, as contrasted with extensive" expansion of Soviet territory might well alienate the U.S., and, second, that U.S. "attempts to preserve semi-Fascist regimes in Europe as a counterpoise to Sovietism" would undoubtedly destroy the hope of a stable and competent United Nations.⁹⁵

Fleming used the two emergent superpowers and their vulnerability as examples to underscore the need for strong, federated world government that would be given "just as little power as will keep the peace."⁹⁶ In a radio address broadcast over WSM on 21 September 1943, Fleming questioned whether any state maintained sovereignty in an absolute sense when nations as powerful as the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. could be forced to expend so great an amount of natural and human resources at the whims of aggressor states.

He questioned whether in an anarchical world (and he reiterated that there was no doubt that this was the political condition of the world), a world in which little was sacred, where even the worth of a nation's sovereignty was questionable, it was reasonable to continue to defy interference with sovereignty. He stated that he had accepted the idea that all international institutions must be reconciled with the dogma of national sovereignty for twenty years, but after this second collapse of civilization he could no longer accept that need. The completely sovereign nation, he

declared, had died before him.⁹⁷ Although this sounds like a lament, it was actually a celebration, for Fleming had long hoped for limits to be placed on national sovereignty. In a "rapidly shrinking world" there could be only one true sovereign, a world government, although he allowed that a federation of the type he envisioned would likely preserve the essentials of self-government for the many existing national societies.⁹⁸

The respect Fleming held for the great Russian war machine, which was far more capable than U.S. policymakers had expected, turned to antipathy because Russian military successes in turn created on the part of American isolationists renewed efforts to dissuade the American public from assuming their country's proper role in the war. "The sense of urgency was relaxed."⁹⁹ There was also a vocal portion of the Allied populations demanding that clear peace goals be defined. This was an issue close to a Wilsonian's heart, given the general dismay when the secret treaties were published during the last World War. Yet Fleming temporized on behalf of Roosevelt and Churchill who were, Fleming wrote, "Too busy coping with the results of Hitler-Mussolini meetings. They did not have, either, sufficient assurance of final victory to justify a peace program."¹⁰⁰ It was not until Russia's "magnificent" resistance to the Nazi invasion during the summer and fall of 1941 that the Allies could propose a peace plan, a plan that much pleased Fleming.

The Eight Point Peace Plan that Roosevelt and Churchill issued from their meeting in the North Atlantic in 1941 was a tribute to Wilson, according to Fleming. All eight points were drawn from the text of his Fourteen Point speech of 19 January 1918. And although the British and

American leaders did not state so explicitly, Fleming argued that a "league of nations . . . is implicit in every point, for without a great international authority to administer and defend the new settlement it would be written in sand--bloody sand."¹⁰¹ This he considered a triumph for Wilsonian internationalism, but as the war continued with U.S. belligerency, Fleming was ever wary of the threat of an isolationist cabal forming in the Senate. This possibility, especially imminent as the Allied victory became more certain, led Fleming to fear a repetition of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. He sought to avoid "another grand peace conference with a monumental peace treaty issuing from it" so as to reduce the opportunities a recalcitrant Senate might have to tinker with the treaty. Fleming supported as well the concept of unconditional surrender as announced at the Casablanca Conference of January 1943. The policy was especially attractive to him in that it advocated the annihilation of fascism, allowed for little direct Senate interference, and provided for the recognition and wholehearted support of "governments springing directly from the people."¹⁰²

Fleming's general endorsement of FDR's foreign policy, a strong independent policy that Fleming believed most Americans favored, never wavered. But the war absorbed the President's mental and physical energies to such an extent that even his most ardent followers must have wondered who would lead the executive branch once the four term president retired. Late in 1941 Fleming began referring to Vice-President Wallace as "one of the best informed men on economic matters in Washington."¹⁰³ Admiration for Wallace's economic abilities soon grew to

adoration of Wallace as being "one of the wisest men of our time."¹⁰⁴ Fleming's identification with the man who would in 1948 become the presidential candidate of the Progressive Party and a leading advocate of peaceful accomodation with the Soviet Union underscores Fleming's continued emphasis on "the people" rather than the political establishment as the basis of U.S. foreign policy. By the time of the 1948 campaign, though, Fleming became disillusioned with Wallace and his movement, perhaps because "the people's" influence in Wallace's campaign was less evident than that of the elite factions within it.

In a review article written at the end of the war, Fleming seemed unwilling to extendd the basic principle of self-determination to the people of defeated Germany and thereby betrayed a basic misunderstanding of the national socialist phenomena. Fleming joined other commentators in asuming that most Germans were "Pan Germans under the skin," and that they accepted the basic goals of Hitler's Reich, if not also the methods. In order to prevent a third German war, an "antidote for the lazy sentimentalism which may soon urge us to bring the boys home and let nature take its course in Germany" must be administered. Fleming agreed with Lord Vansittart's conclusions in *Bones of Contention*, one of the books Fleming was reviewing, that Germany must be decentralized and Prussian power permanently broken.¹⁰⁵ This prescription broke new ground away from the Wilsonian rhetoric of world order.

Indeed, Fleming showed a marked evolution in his thought during the war years. His concept of limited national sovereignty in order to allow for an effective League of Nations, had been transformed to one of complete

abrogation of national sovereignty.¹⁰⁶ So, too, had his concepts of the right to self-determination and of collective security. In a review of Emery Reves' *Anatomy of Peace*, Fleming observed that "he [Reves] demolishes self-determination and internationalism along with collective security. So long as nations remain, wars will come." And Fleming feared not only the international repercussions of unabated sovereignty, but the domestic ramifications as well. He believed that "fear of other sovereignties ha[d] driven Russian socialism to develop into a totalitarian state with an all powerful police force supressing civil liberties" and agreed with Reves that all existing governments were bound to evolve toward fascism.¹⁰⁷

For Fleming the solution was a world state. Progress demanded it. The world was shrinking: air travel and the atomic bomb weighed heavily in Fleming's mind and served notice to him that the time had come for a world state.¹⁰⁸ Fear of fascism drove him to this conclusion as well, although his emotions clouded somewhat his understanding of fascism. Despite this, though, he did understand that fascism was reactionary rather than motive. The three systems in which he divided the world--capitalist democracy, totalitarian socialism, and fascist "gangsterism"-- were not mutually exclusive: fascism posed an intrinsic threat to both the other systems, but in turn, Fleming saw no reason why capitalist democracies and socialist states could not coexist.¹⁰⁹

This thinking was especially evident in memoranda he wrote to Bernard Baruch.¹¹⁰ Fleming explained his relationship with Baruch years later in a letter to Professor Jordan A. Schwarz of Northern Illinois University. He wrote that he and Baruch shared a common respect for Wilson, and that

Baruch had read Fleming's books on the Wilson years. It was this which led Baruch to contact Fleming during World War Two and solicit his opinions as to how to organize the world for peace. Fleming visited Baruch's home in New York on several occasions to write position papers for the advisor to President Roosevelt. It was Baruch's intention, according to Fleming, to recommend the Vanderbilt professor as an advisor, but FDR's death intervened. Instead, Baruch asked Fleming "to join his group as an advisor to the Atomic Energy Section of the State Department" in 1946. At this time, Fleming observed that Baruch shared his fears that U.S. policy was moving the world in the direction of another war, but that he changed his mind in later years, perhaps due to the "wearing effects of the Cold War."¹¹¹

His relationship with Baruch led Fleming to pursue what would be the most important study of his career, a study that would change his professional status in many ways. He began a detailed, exhaustive examination of the state of U.S.-Soviet relations which culminated in the two volume book *The Cold War and Its Origins*, published in 1961.¹¹² The book heralded the New Left's revision of cold war historiography and Fleming became one of its gurus.¹¹³ His memos to Baruch spearheaded revisionism of the Cold War.

In a memo written soon after victory in Europe, Fleming assessed the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations. First, he assured Baruch that the U.S. needed Soviet aid in concluding the war with Japan. He was certain that the Russians would be willing partners, for they hated "the Japs cordially and we have no reason to believe that they will not do their share, if anything like the working relations of the Roosevelt period can be

preserved."¹¹⁴ (Fleming used the term "Japs" consistently, although he did not employ pejoratives for the other enemy. For them "German" was appropriate.)

As to the ultimate disposition of the Axis, Fleming urged that they be "crushed" completely. He expressed this desire not out of a sense of revenge, but from a realist's perspective. Germany and Japan, as fascist states, were "incompatible with any civilized concept of living." He wrote in terms of the inevitability of wars to the death between democracy and fascism, but observed that "no such final struggle between democratic capitalism and communist state socialism is necessary, for both systems maintain that they seek the largest good of society as a whole."¹¹⁵ There would be, he stated, "sharp competition between the two surviving systems for the favor of mankind, but that emphatically need not mean war."¹¹⁶ And, in what was his most telling observation, he declared that this world provided room enough for both systems and that the democratic west "need not fear that our way of life cannot prove its validity."

Several features of Fleming's theoretical approach to international organization are revealed in his memo to Baruch. First, as opposed to Quincy Wright, he did not calculate the reduction of the variables within the world balance of power system as inherently destabilizing. Instead, he foresaw the possibilities for what would later be called "peaceful coexistence." Secondly, he denied the ideological rigidity of the two defining systems. Although he stated that the two would not merge, he noted that both were evolving and he declared that an irreconcilable clash between them was not inevitable. Third, he believed that those

governments which threatened international order and civilization (defined "Western Civilization") must be destroyed. Fourth, he was determined to prevent states which exercised governmental systems of which he did not approve--fascist Argentina was his example--from admission to the U.N.¹¹⁷ Fleming professed a faith in his system and its ability to survive and thrive in a world of peaceful competition that was glaringly missing among many of the policymakers of the day who came to accept means that were anathema to the values of the West--covert operations, assassinations, blackmail, and unwarranted military intervention--in order to achieve their ends.

Fleming continued his memo with an assessment of how to approach relations with the Soviet Union. There was no possibility of successful cooperation with the Soviets unless the U.S. remembered "the long effort of the Western Democracies to isolate and ostracize Red Russia" and dealt with Russia "firmly" and required Russia "to trust us as an equal." With what was probably unintended understatement, Fleming then observed that "[t]hese two policies are hard to combine."¹¹⁸ He then described what would become the heart of the revisionist interpretation of the Cold War and his later book on its origins: that the Russians could look back on only a few years of hazardous cooperation with the West while viewing over twenty years during which time many Western leaders called for total destruction of the Bolshevik experiment.

Putting this into the context of national security interests, Fleming next explained why the Soviets were so determined to extend and exercise complete control over their sphere of influence. He observed that the

impact of the League of Nations' early policy of isolating the Soviet Union had been to create Soviet mistrust for the West, and Fleming feared that impact was being recreated over the admission of Argentina to the U.N.: a few more successful efforts to impose U.S. will in the U.N. would serve to give those Russians who believed cooperation was impossible the "upper hand."¹¹⁹ Presumably, they would be inclined to seek the realization of their perceived national interests at almost any cost and scuttle the potential of the U.N. for achieving compromise.

In way of illustrating this, Fleming pointed to the experience of Poland. He stated that the West could not insist upon the inclusion of any "real anti-Russian elements" in the new Polish government because the Russians would never accept them. Poland's powerful neighbor was determined to prevent any future German military adventures through Poland and the means to that end was to establish and maintain a Polish government friendly to the Soviet Union. And, if this alone proved ineffective in containing the threat of future German expansionism, the Soviets would have the option of "taking over Eastern Germany," and would be doubly assured of doing so if the West engaged the Soviets in a balance of power competition. Rumania and Hungary were subject to the same considerations.¹²⁰

The fact is that most policies Fleming advocated toward the Soviet Union were so constructed in the language of appeasement: the West had treated the Soviets harshly; they deserved their rightful place among the powers and if such status were not recognized they would seize it anyway; and, underlying it all was the fact that the territory they were to occupy or

which was to be contained within their sphere was overwhelmingly Slavic. Even though Fleming did not explicitly refer to race/ethnocentrism as a definitive element in the organization of the post-war world, it is clearly implicit in his plans. Just as racial concepts are often the unspoken assumptions of social and political values within a core ideology, so it was with the policy Fleming advocated. That he and other Wilsonians were willing to manipulate the generally held meaning of self-determination or sacrifice it altogether indicates as well a continued willingness to engage in power politics.

Fleming insisted, though, that the U.S. continually remind the Soviets at all stages of post-war organization that a coalition had gained victory in the war and that to be successful, there must be a coalition peace. He did not expect that the Soviets would be able to impose their economic system upon all the countries within their sphere, nor that they would be able to communize China, but only if the West provided the appropriate alternatives. What the West must never do, though, would be to "start playing with the remnants of fascism as a counterpoint to communism." Fleming could envision no "more deadly game."¹²¹

So the path to post-war peace was for Fleming "firm, tenacious cooperation with Soviet Russia."¹²² This seemed a reasonable approach, but reason is often deceptive, especially when the party to whose actions you apply the predictive device of reason acts upon different assumptions of what constitutes reasonable behavior. Nowhere in Fleming's blue-print is there consideration of what to do if the Soviets crossed the line of "reasonable" behavior. Nowhere is there a definition of what constitutes

"firm dealing" with the Soviets, nor is there any discussion of the means for making the Soviets "trust us as an equal." Although there were several insights which the passage of time has demonstrated to be valuable, they were not the product of sustained scientific analysis, nor of an empirically demonstrable method. They were the result of an informed opinion and little else.

In another memo to Baruch entitled "Whither Russia?" and dated 8 May 1945--V-E Day--Fleming posed the question "Is Russia headed for the imperialistic conquest of much of Europe and Asia?" His answer was that it depended upon the policy of the West. After a lengthy description of the many resources the Soviets possessed--political, ideological, demographic, material, and strategic--Fleming concluded that "[m]ost of what happens in Russia is beyond our control."¹²³ Because of that, it would be in the best interest of the West to ensure that the Russians were treated as partners in the U.N. and other international organizations. He believed that if so treated, the Russians would come to see "tangible benefits flow to them from working with us through the United Nations, through the Bretton Woods agreements and many others; they will see the advantages of cooperation and, it is to be hoped, lose some of their brashness."¹²⁴

This faith was based upon a possibly naive belief that marxists would react to stimuli in the same manner as would capitalists. A close examination of Soviet respect for treaty provisions, for international law, and for the values so many in the West held so dear, would reveal a propensity to use to the greatest possible extent any Western largesse to the greatest Soviet benefit without regard to binding, legalistic interpretations.

Still, the possibility of coopting a reluctant partner was not to be discounted until tried, for the alternative as Fleming saw it would be a "most calamitous balance of power arms race . . . which would vitiate most of our own hopes . . . to meet the needs of our people."¹²⁵ Much to his disappointment, the effort to cooperate with or peacefully coopt the Soviet Union was never attempted, and he would spend the rest of his career decrying the horrors of the Cold War.

Notes

¹ Fred Rennie to Denna F. Fleming (hereon referred to as DF), 11 October 1943, Box 3, the Denna F. Fleming Collection, the Jean and Alexander Heard Library, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn.

² Undated letter from W. E. "Bill" Berney to "Dear Friend", the Denna Frank Fleming Collection; Notes from Doris A. Fleming to Steven J. Bucklin, 23 January 1989, 3.

³ Fleming noted that the Lewis gun "sometimes shot backward instead of forward." Notes from Doris A. Fleming to Steven J. Bucklin, 23 January 1989, 4. Doris Fleming was a very lucid and interesting person. Her insights and efforts were invaluable to me as Fleming's papers are few for the period before the thirties.

⁴ DF to Mr. Schreiner, 11 February 1957, 1; DF, *The United States and World Organization, 1920-1933* (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1938), 16. Doris A. Fleming revealed that Denna had been a Republican to me in a telephone conversation on 12 February 1989.

⁵ Doris A. Fleming to Steven J. Bucklin, 23 January 1989, 5.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Doris Fleming wrote that his defense "was a hard battle." In a conversation with me on 12 February 1989 she used the term "polemical," although on page five of her notes of 23 January 1989, she writes that the committee criticized the dissertation as being "not academic enough, would not sell, etc., etc." As for later criticisms, see Paul Conkin's *Gone With The Ivy: A Biography of Vanderbilt University*, (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), or several of the reviews of Fleming's *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961). Fleming's dependence on newspapers, especially the *New York Times* and the *Nashville Tennessean* made his scholarship suspect in the eyes of his critics.

⁸ Notes from Doris Fleming to Steven J. Bucklin, 6.

⁹ DF to Sen. Elbert D. Thomas, 1 February 1935.

¹⁰ DF, *The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920* (New York, N.Y.: 1932) and *The United States and World Organization, 1920-1933* (New York, N.Y.: 1938).

¹¹ DF, *The United States and World Organization*, 17-22.

12 DF, "The Role of the Senate in Treaty-Making: A Survey of Four Decades," *The American Political Science Review* 28 (August 1934), 583.

13 DF, *The Treaty Veto of the American Senate*, (New York, N.Y.: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1930), 313.

14 *Ibid.*, 172.

15 *Ibid.*, 43; 62. This is just one example of Fleming's use of the liberal press to corroborate his opinion. What is noticeably lacking is reference to the other perspectives surrounding the issue of the Senate's role in policymaking. This could be the reason members of his committee found his dissertation to be polemical.

16 *Ibid.*, 272.

17 Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System*, (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1933, 1937), 252.

18 Presidential Address to Congress, 2 Apr 1917, Public Papers, V, 6-16, as found in Cronon, 337-348. As for the irony of his condemnation of German imperialism, few passages speak more poignantly than one in Wilson's "Fourteen Points Speech" in which he states "In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists." Cronon, 444.

19 *Ibid.*, 348.

20 Fleming, *The United States and World Organization, 1920-1933*, 8; 10.

21 Fleming, *The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920*, pp. 487-500; *The United States and World Organization, 1920-1933*, 30.

22 Address to Congress, 8 Jan 1918, Public Papers, V, 155-162, as cited in Cronon, 444.

23 Fleming argued in *The Treaty Veto of the American Senate* that Wilson was legally correct in not having senators accompany him to the Peace Conference, 31-32.

24 Alexander DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy, Vol. II: Global Power* (New York, N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, Third edition., 1978), 63.

25 "League of Nations Covenant," as cited in Cronon, 468-481. There are no provisions for a League military force in the Covenant and it is implied

throughout that any joint military action to be taken would be a cooperative effort presumably under a command structure like that of the Allies and Associated Powers during World War I; Article V; Article XV.

²⁶ DF, *The Treaty Veto*, 21.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 5-15.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 76. Fleming was not fond of lawyers. See for instance "The Role of the Senate in Treaty-Making: A Survey of Four Decades," *The American Political Science Review*, 596-597 or "Planning For The Post War World," 4 *Current History* (March 1943), 9.

²⁹ DF, *The Treaty Veto* , 291-292.

³⁰ Fleming dedicated *The U.S. and World Organization, 1920-1933* to "Those in every nation who have sought, and to those who in the future will seek, 'The reign of law based on the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.'"

³¹ DF, *The Treaty Veto*, 292.

³² Quincy Wright shared this view of Harvey. See QW to Rex, 30 May 1921, Quincy Wright Collection, Bx 2, addenda 2, folder 4.

³³ *The U.S. and the League of Nations*, 209-211. Fleming cites George Harvey, *Henry Clay Frick the Man* (New York, N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), 220-221; 324-326. On Hughes and Moore and their role in scuttling the League see *The U.S. and World Organization, 1920-1933*, 75-78; 248-249. Fleming refers to Elihu Root as the "chief attorney" for the Republican party, certainly a pejorative use of the term, *The U.S. and World Organization, 1920-1933*, 27.

³⁴ DF, *The Treaty Veto*, 11-14.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 111; 286-287; DF to Senator Elbert D. Thomas, Utah, 1 February 1935, 1.

³⁶ DF, *The Treaty Veto*, 292-293. Fleming attributed the phrase to Secretary of State John Hay.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 45. This, of course, does not take into consideration the role of the electoral college or the intent behind its creation.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 80; 83; 98; the *Boston Herald*, as quoted in Fleming, 99. Fleming was prone to cite the news media as evidence that the Senate was not "in tune" with the public interest. See pages 99-100 of *The Treaty Veto*..

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 290. The non-representative theme occurs frequently in Fleming's book. See 98, 270, 272, 282, 283, 286, 288, 292, 293, 305, and 311.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 311.

⁴¹ One could argue that it was the dispersal of power to the Tribal Assembly and the Tribunes of the People that led to the calamity of the social war, the civil war, and then the establishment of empire and dictatorship.

⁴² DF, *The Treaty Veto*, 289.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 276.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 282-283.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 283.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 295-297.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 298.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 300-301.

⁵⁰ Among those who placed great hope in the Paris Pact was Quincy Wright.

⁵¹ DF, *The Treaty Veto*, 268.

⁵² See Fleming's articles of the thirties, entitled "The Role of the Senate In Treaty-Making: A Survey Of Four Decades," *American Political Science Review* 28 (August 1934); "The Advice of the Senate in Treaty-Making," *Current History* 32 (April-September 1930); a response to the neutrality argument in *Congressional Digest* 15 (January 1936); "America's Stake in the Far East," *The China Weekly Review* 88 (20 May 1939), and those of the early forties including "War Without Shooting," 1 *Current History* (September 1941); "Roosevelt and Churchill Confer," *Current History* 1 (October 1941); "The Coming World Order, Closed Or Free," *The Journal of Politics* 4 (1942); "Planning For The Post War World," 4 *Current History* (March 1943); "America and the World Crisis," *Vital Speeches* 10 (15 October 1943); "Is Isolation Dead?," *Vital Speeches* 11 (1 December 1944), for his continued critique of neutrality and isolationism. He was also interested in the child labor laws and supported federal authority to address that problem. DF to J. Pardue, ed. *The Evening Tennessean*, 25 February 1937.

53 Document entitled "Data Concerning D. F. Fleming," undated (but prepared sometime post 1966), Fleming Collection; *The U.S. and World Organization, 1920-1933*, viii; notes from Doris Fleming to the author, 6.

54 DF, *The U.S. and World Organization, 1920-1933*, viii.

55 See for example Arthur Schlesinger, Sr.'s interpretations, or John D. Hick's *Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933* (New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1960).

56 DF, *The U.S. and World Organization, 1920-1933*, viii.

57 *Ibid.*, 34.

58 DF, *The U.S. and the League of Nations, 1918-1920*, 24.

59 *Ibid.*, 24; 46.

60 DF, *The U.S. and World Organization, 1920-1933*, 35.

61 *Ibid.*, 37-41.

62 *Ibid.*, 529.

63 *New York Times*, 23 October 1937, as found in Fleming, *The U.S. and World Organization*, 546.

64 *Ibid.*

65 DF to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1 February 1935.

66 DF to J. Pardue (editor *The Nashville Tennessean*), 25 February 1937. In a letter to Manley O. Hudson from DF dated 7 September 1935 written from Geneva, Fleming noted that "more Americans than any other nationality come to Geneva to visit the seat of the League of Nations."

67 Edith Osburn to DF, 11 March 1936.

68 DF to Edith Osburn, 16 March 1936.

69 DF to R. B. C. Howell, 14 October 1937; Doris Fleming attributes the problem to an antagonistic Senator McKellar who was upset with DF's beliefs. Notes from Doris Fleming, 7.

70 Document entitled "Data Concerning D. F. Fleming," Fleming Collection; Mrs. Fleming described the relationship as lasting from 1939-1947. WSM was a station with a powerful transmitter: Mrs. Fleming noted that she heard DF's programs in London, Ontario where she had gone for her father's funeral. Notes from Doris Fleming to Steven J. Bucklin, 8.

71 DF to Senator Elbert D. Thomas, 1 February 1935.

72 See notes from Doris Fleming to Steven J. Bucklin, 8; DF *While America Slept: A Contemporary Analysis of World Events From The Fall of France To Pearl Harbor*, (New York, N.Y.: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944), 212; 269. There are ample examples like these throughout the radio speeches he gave.

73 DF to Newton D. Baker, 19 May 1937.

74 DF, *Congressional Digest* 15 (January 1936), 30.

75 DF to Sydnor Walker, 15 January 1938. Fleming did not mention the Nye Committee's findings specifically in this letter, but it seems apparent that he was referring to them. In a letter of 26 February 1938 to the Dean of the Graduate School of the University of Pennsylvania, though, Fleming refers specifically to the revisionist works of C. Harley Grattan and Walter Mills.

76 DF to Sydnor Walker, 15 January 1938; Letter from Doris Fleming to Steven Bucklin, "Notes on D. F. Fleming," 7.

77 DF to Dr. William C. Binkley, 4 April 1938.

78 DF, *The Origins and Legacy of World War I*, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968).

79 Walter Lippmann, no citation provided, as found in DF, *While America Slept*, 21. Both Fleming and Schuman frequently cited Lippmann as an eminent authority on U. S. foreign policy. In fact, Fleming's radio speeches foreshadowed many of Lippmann's prescriptions in *American Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown, 1943

80 DF, "America's Stake in the Far East," *The China Weekly Review*, 88 (20 May 1939), 373; see, too, Fleming's "Roosevelt and Churchill Confer," 119, for a reference to the "correspondingly large trade" China was developing with the U.S.

81 DF, "America's Stake in the Far East," 373.

82 *Ibid.*

83 *Ibid.*, 374.

84 *Ibid.*, 375.

85 *Ibid.*, 375. An interesting twist on the embargo of fuel sales to Japan is that there never was one. Kendall Staggs notes in an as yet unpublished paper on the oil industry that what occurred in 1941 was a shift of responsibility for the issuance of permits for the purchase of fuels from the State Department to the Treasury Department, from Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles' purview to that of the more hawkish and anti-Japanese Henry Morgenthau, who failed to correct the media reports of an embargo.

86 Fleming's papers for the period 1939-1945 are sparse. One of the librarians at the Vanderbilt archives characterized the Fleming collection as having been "sanitized," but she did not elaborate.

87 The "last vestiges of aristocracy" is a reference to the U.S. Senate and is attributed to Fleming in a *Newsweek* review of his book *The United States and the World Court*, (New York, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1945), *Newsweek* (12 February 1945), 101; DF, "War Without Shooting,"; DF, "Roosevelt and Churchill Confer," 113-120.

88 DF, "Roosevelt and Churchill Confer," 117; "The Coming World Order, Closed Or Free," 251.

89 DF, "War Without Shooting," 35.

90 *Ibid.*, 38. Fleming did not provide a citation for the Knox quotation.

91 *Ibid.*, 35.

92 DF, "Roosevelt and Churchill Confer," 120.

93 DF, "The Coming World Order, Closed Or Free," 253

94 DF, "Planning For The Post-War World," 8.

95 *Ibid.*

96 *Ibid.*

97 DF, "America and the World Crisis," *Vital Speeches* 10 (15 October 1943), 7-8.

98 DF, "The Coming World Order, Closed Or Free," 253.

- 99 *Ibid.*
- 100 DF, "Roosevelt and Churchill Confer," 114.
- 101 *Ibid.*, 115.
- 102 DF, "Planning For The Post-War World," 8.
- 103 DF, "War Without Shooting," 33.
- 104 DF, "The Coming World Order: Closed Or Free?," 262.
- 105 DF, "After Victory What?." *Virginia Quarterly Review* 21 October 45, 602.
- 106 He first declared the need to "establish a new layer of government above the National States" and the death of the sovereign national state in "America and the World Crisis," 7-8.
- 107 DF, "After Victory What?," 604.
- 108 DF, *Ibid.*, 603; for aircraft, see DF, "Roosevelt and Churchill Confer," 116-117; "The Coming World Order, Closed or Free," 251; "Planning For The Post-War World," 8
- 109 DF to Bernard Baruch, Memo dated "Sunday Evening," 2.
- 110 "Confidential Memo for Mr. Baruch, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BIG THREE," 13 May 1946, 1-8 and a page entitled "Footnote on the Iron Curtain"; "Memorandum for Mr. Baruch, WHITHER RUSSIA?," 1-3; and a memorandum entitled "IS COMMUNISM 'JUST AS BAD AS FASCISM?'," 1-4; unsigned letter dated simply "Sunday Evening" addressed to "Dear Mr. Baruch," 1-6.
- 111 DF to Jordan A. Schwarz, 29 January 1974
- 112 DF, *The Cold War and Its Origins*, (New York, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961).
- 113 Fleming's scholarship was the subject of intense criticism. Despite that, Barton Bernstein told me in a 1990 conversation on the way to West Branch, Iowa, that the New Left was delighted to have a member of the "old school" in their camp.
- 114 DF to Baruch, Memo dated "Sunday evening," 1.
- 115 *Ibid.*, 2.

116 *Ibid.*, 3.

117 *Ibid.*

118 *Ibid.*

119 *Ibid.*, 4.

120 *Ibid.*

121 *Ibid.*, 5.

122 *Ibid.*, 6.

123 DF to Baruch, 8 May 1945, 1.

124 *Ibid.*, 2-3.

125 *Ibid.*, 3.

CHAPTER IV
FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN AND INTERNATIONALISM

Frederick Lewis Schuman represents the second generation of internationalists in this dissertation. Schuman devoted his career, which spanned half of the twentieth century, to the analysis of power politics, international relations and world organization. His contributions as author, scholar, and pedagogue influenced a generation of citizens, students, academics, and politicians, especially through the writing of a widely adopted text, *International Politics*, and they continue to offer insight to those who read international theory.¹

He was Quincy Wright's student at the University of Chicago and although his mentor's influence is readily apparent in Schuman's work, their theoretical approaches diverged significantly. As well, there exists in the correspondence between the two men and with others a sense of generational conflict, not unlike that which occurs in Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons*, although the roles are somewhat reversed in that the older generation here is devoted to science, the younger to a more Freudian explanation of human affairs.

From an early date, Schuman's interests gravitated toward U.S.-Soviet relations and he would contribute extensively to that historiography. But he never lost sight of human relations and how the state affects them. They were always the conduit between his reflections on events and his plea for sane international relations. He accepted a Freudian explanation of human

experience in that he believed that a more fundamental appeal than reason would be necessary to grab the public imagination. Wilsonian internationalism influenced these studies, but the model Schuman advocated for international order was a different version from the one Wilson had earlier envisioned.

Schuman did adhere to much of the Wilsonian model, in that he called for leaders and publics who understand the interdependence of political societies, who saw beyond narrow chauvanistic sovereignty and class distinctions. He was an ardent believer that an educated world public, one instilled with new myths, aware of agents of international cohesion, a public concerned with more than domesticity, was prerequisite to world order. And Schuman devoted most of his scholarship and a considerable portion of his personal life to this "mission of education." He desired not the "global village" of Marshall MacLuhan, but a "global cosmopolis." Still, that end could result from a MacLuhanesque "information revolution." But, if that world failed to materialize, Schuman had an alternative model that was far less liberal and decidedly less democratic than that of traditional Wilsonianism.

Schuman was born in Chicago on 22 February 1904. In 1920 he was accepted into the University of Chicago where he studied as an undergraduate, graduate scholar and fellow, and where he received a Ph.B. in 1924 and a Ph.D. three years later. By the twenties, the University of Chicago was among the foremost institutions of learning in the country. Edward A. Purcell, Jr. identifies it in *The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value* as "the intellectual center of

American academic life, especially in the rapidly growing social sciences," claiming further that during the twenties it had "emerged as the most influential center of the new political science."²

While a student at Chicago, Schuman studied with several very influential political scientists, including Charles E. Merriam, Harold Lasswell, Leonard White, and Quincy Wright. The relationship he developed with Quincy and Louise Wright became the most important. The Wrights were his mentors, confidants, and colleagues during his years at Chicago. Both were social activists whose agenda included domestic and international issues. As we have seen, Quincy Wright enjoyed a prominent reputation as a leading expert in international relations, and he exerted considerable influence on Schuman. But by the 1930s their relationship had become strained.

These political scientists were engaged in an attempt to create a science of politics. Schuman and Wright attempted to direct this science to the field of international relations. Such a discipline would have to offer not only the methodology of the natural sciences, but would have to offer the repeatedly predictable results of scientific experiment. To this end they devoted considerable effort with less than spectacular results. If sustained predictability of political phenomena was their goal, they failed miserably.

To many internationalists, and to Schuman in particular, U.S. foreign policy at this time was painfully unsophisticated, a quality evident in the refusal to join the League and in the nonrecognition policy applied to revolutionary regimes.³ The Bolshevik revolution, symbol of that nonrecognition policy, was a Manichaeian presence in the Western psyche

that generated both hope and fear. Many intellectuals saw in Bolshevik industrial planning a model for the U.S. and the world. Even Henry Ford found something to admire in the Soviet model.⁴ And many of the new political scientists believed that the ability to plan and apply policy effectively on a state or international level was one of the principle benefits of their new discipline.

But in other people there reposed nothing but hostility and a visceral hatred for this Russian experiment with scientific socialism, and for the impact science had on traditional values and practices. From 1917 onward, many U.S. citizens harbored fears and misgivings about the Russian revolution and its champions. Government and privately sponsored propaganda, especially the near hysteria generated during the Bolshevik phase of the revolution and the Allied intervention that followed, created much of this attitude. But perhaps because the revolution was so iconoclastic, because it so represented modernism and the disruption of traditional beliefs, it appeared to threaten the West in real terms as well.

Intellectual developments in the U.S. at the time of Schuman's higher education were intense, torn between the emerging urban community and the passing rural one. Stereotypes of the twenties, often based on exaggerated or partial truths, miss the nuance of the age, and the intellectual ferment certainly affected Schuman's outlook. The agenda for many politically active elites included great emphasis on science and planning, a discipline and a method that Schuman valued highly. The practitioners of social sciences experienced a sort of collective adolescence during the twenties, which their exuberant experimentalism and their

determination to be recognized as equals to the practitioners of natural sciences characterized. Several historians refined new interpretations of the past that influenced Schuman. Edward Eggleston's "New History" concept presented in his presidential address to the American Historical Association convention in 1900, elicited responses from Charles Beard, Vernon Louis Parrington and others who produced exciting challenges to earlier assumptions.⁵

The pioneering spirit inspired Schuman, too, and his dissertation, *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, reflected it. Public perceptions about the Bolsheviks and Russia notwithstanding, Schuman developed a lifelong affinity for the country and for the Marxist experiment that so epitomized the reverence for science. It was an almost romantic attachment that led him to write his dissertation. In that dissertation he challenged the then current historical interpretations and anticipated later revisionist and New Left studies, especially William Appleman William's *American Russian Relations, 1781-1947*.⁶ Quincy Wright wrote of the dissertation that "I feel that you have made a very real contribution and hope it may be translated into Russian."⁷

His first trip to the Soviet Union in 1928, which included a meeting with "Mrs. Kameneva, Melnichanski, Commissar of Labor Schmitt and Ossinsky (in the Kremlin)," "a most interesting half hour with Litvinoff," and a plane crash in Lithuania which left "both wheels, two prop blades, and one wing smashed," reinforced the romantic image he felt emanate from the country and its socialist experiment.⁸ It was on Litvinov's desk during his interview with the foreign minister that Schuman first saw a hard-bound

copy of his dissertation, then a book published by International Publishers. Litvinov praised it as a "valuable contribution."⁹

Though Schuman adamantly denied that he was either a Marxist or a socialist, the claim often stretched his credibility, for his sympathies were all too evident. Schuman perceived a rising conflict between capitalism and Marxism that was focused on the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in which these emerging super powers would determine the future. And he believed that the Soviet *Homo novo* would serve as the basis for the coming world order.

Schuman's *weltanschauung* reflected certain contemporary intellectual currents. One of these was an apprehension that the U.S. was sending mixed signals to the world. He feared that cultural confusion in the U.S. was being juxtaposed to an international political level.¹⁰ The world's newly unbound Prometheus, it seemed to him, was losing the initiative and had excluded itself from vital processes within the international community.

For Schuman, who sought to reshape the international community, the twenties had an urgent quality about them. He felt keenly the need to spread his message, for he believed in the necessity of an informed, persuaded public. He accepted an instructorship at the University of Chicago in 1926, a position he held until 1936 when he was promoted to an assistant professorship in political science. During the summer of 1929 Schuman was an instructor on the "midway," as he liked to refer to the University of Chicago, and he travelled to England and France with a grant to conduct research for Quincy Wright's *The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace*.¹¹ Schuman's research turned not only to the work for

Wright, but for what would be Schuman's second book, *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic*.¹²

Schuman followed the book on the French Republic with *International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System*.¹³ It became a standard text in many universities and colleges in the U.S. and by 1968 was in its seventh edition. He employed an historical approach to international politics, and this text established the "Schuman" style, a rather grandiloquent, yet insightful analysis that relied on several disciplines to substantiate his penchant for making predictions. His next book, *The Nazi Dictatorship: A Study in Social Pathology and the Politics of Fascism*, established both his national and international reputation.¹⁴

He conducted much of the research in what he referred to as "the madhouse of Hitler's Berlin" where Schuman watched the Nazis seize and consolidate power. But although he called it a madhouse, and although Hitler's methods were mostly opprobrious to Schuman, he saw value in the use of propaganda, the cultivation of new myths, and of the *volkgemeinschaft* policy. The book was published at a time when it was not altogether commonplace in certain Western circles to bash national socialism, and also very unpopular in the U.S. to advocate, as Schuman did, collective intervention to prevent the spread of fascism.¹⁵ Writing about the book long after its publication, Schuman said that it was "full of dire warnings. Like those sounded by others, his warnings were ignored by Western politicians, pressmen, and publics whose fear of Communism often nourished admiration for Fascism--with predictably disastrous consequences."¹⁶

Despite the self-serving nature of these remarks, Schuman's evaluation of the Nazis proved accurate. Even before *Nazi Dictatorship*, he wrote in *Current History* that Hitler's agenda sought to incorporate Austria, most of Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, and any other regions which could be appropriated to the advantage of the Pan-Germanic nation.¹⁷ As early as 29 October 1933, Schuman offered a cogent assessment of Hitler's future policy.¹⁸ Schuman accepted Hitler's stated intentions and demonstrated in the same article the *Führer's* consistency in public policy speeches that began as early as 1920.

In a letter written to Steven Cohen, a student who was writing a paper on academic freedom at Williams College where Schuman taught from 1936 to his retirement, Schuman recalled one of the incidents which led to his reputation as a "prophet" of the future. Schuman revealed that after 1935 he had predicted the inevitability of WWII. "Skeptics and smart-alecs wanted to know exactly when," he wrote, and he replied that "no one could make such a forecast, but that war would come between 1938 and 1940." He concluded in early 1938 that a "major international crisis might be expected on the second Saturday of March, 1938." This conclusion was based on a close examination of the historical record of Hitler, who frequently began his attacks on the weekends, several of them in March. Much to the surprise of the William's College community, Hitler's army invaded Austria on the morning of Schuman's prediction.¹⁹

Schuman's predictive success gave rise to a smugness about his ability as a seer, although his willingness to engage in predictions large and small was twofold: they sold books but, moreover, he was convinced that he was

right. This self-righteousness was a troublesome personal characteristic and the occasional recklessness it prompted was such that he often spoke without regard to the consequences.²⁰ But what is most important in the context of the creation of a science of politics is that none of his predictions was based on sustained scientific method. Indeed, few of his or any other political scientist's predictions would ever prove to be beyond the capacity of any person with a modicum of common sense and a sense of history.

Controversy surrounded his career, and maybe because of this he was in demand on the lecture circuit, where he commanded a substantial fee. Regardless of the reason, he had a constant forum from which to popularize his ideas.²¹ Schuman developed a certain radical mystique during the thirties that appealed to a large political minority and he capably exploited this popularity. His mystique resulted largely from his identification with leftist causes and his acceptance of the party line explanation of the great purge trials of the 1930's. He argued frequently that the guilty had been found to be guilty through due process and that the accused had, almost to a person, admitted their guilt. This position opened Schuman to accusations that he was a Stalinist, and he dealt poorly with his critics. Regardless of his protestations to the contrary, he was, according to contemporaries and later analysts, at the very least a fellow traveller.²²

Other circumstances contributed to this image as well: that the publisher of his dissertation, International Publishers, had been identified as "the leading publishing house of the Communist Party in the United

States"; that Schuman had endorsed the candidacy of Vladimir Janowicz, purportedly the Communist Party candidate for an alderman's seat in Chicago; that Schuman had sponsored a banquet for James Ford, the Communist Party's candidate for the vice-presidency in 1932; and that Schuman's name had been attached to several publications linked with subversive groups.²³ His image, then, was not undeserved in that he cultivated the radical left.

Schuman confronted reactionary and ultrapatriot charges in the Illinois Senate as a result of the "Dilling Accusations" in 1934. Mrs. Albert W. Dilling, whom Schuman identified as the author of *The Red Network*, was a radical anticommunist and Schuman's experience with her offers certain insights into his later conduct toward those who he believed were oblivious to the reactionary dangers in the U.S.²⁴ In her book, Mrs. Dilling placed Schuman, Eleanor Roosevelt, Newton Baker, Harold Ickes, Rexford Tugwell, Louis Brandeis, William C. Bullitt, William Borah, Gerald Nye, Burton Wheeler, Quincy Wright, and many, many others, on a list that purported to include "the most dangerous radicals and revolutionaries in the United States."²⁵ The list, though, was incomplete, for as it turned out Mrs. Dilling should have included herself among the "dangerous radicals" in the U.S.

On 17 July 1922 Mrs. Dilling and her mother, Mrs. Elizabeth Kirkpatrick conducted an armed raid on the home of Mrs. J. D. Clark, who, according to Mrs. Dilling, was competing for Mr. Dilling's affection. Brandishing guns and smashing windows, the two women burst into the Clark home and confronted Mrs. Clark with her alleged improprieties: Mrs. Clark called the

police. When Chicago's finest arrived they arrested the "Dilling Gang" on charges of concealed weapons and disorderly conduct.

But Mrs. Dilling's apparent zeal did not stop at private vendettas--she pursued her political opponents with equal fervor. Schuman noted that when he was scheduled to deliver a lecture in Kenilworth, Illinois on 26 March 1935, Mrs. Dilling canvassed the homes of prominent Kenilworth citizens. Upon being received into their homes, she distributed copies of a pamphlet linked to Schuman entitled "Culture and Crisis," denounced Schuman as a Communist, and demanded that he be refused permission to lecture in the city. On this occasion her goal eluded her.²⁶ In an effort to combat her tactics, Quincy Wright suggested that perhaps Schuman should collect information about Mrs. Dilling that would discredit her in the public mind. But he also warned that "an effort to organize a general campaign on this question might do more harm than good [as] it is usually undesirable to enter into competition with a skunk with a skunk's weapons."²⁷

Regardless of the quality of her weapons, the term unsuccessful applied only to her immediate efforts, for Mrs. Dilling's ardor was redeemed in the near future. Unfortunately for Schuman, the accusations, coupled with his previously suspect activities, took on an independent volition and became the basis for further burdens, including U.S. House UnAmerican Activities Committee investigations in 1943 and still more accusations during the McCarthy years.

The Dilling Accusations and Schuman's other political activities came to the attention of the University of Chicago's administration. Schuman

alleged that on 14 November 1934 the Hearst owned *Chicago Herald-Examiner* had misquoted him, and when Schuman pursued a correction, the paper's executives launched a vicious attack on him. By 16 March 1935 Hearst and his paper called for Schuman's dismissal, alleging that Schuman had mounted "a direct challenge to American institutions in the name of communism."²⁸ Schuman in turn charged that Hearst employed tactics that Göring, Goebbels, Rosenberg, and Hitler had refined.²⁹ It was not unusual for Hearst to attack academics and some in the university community may have deemed this a rite of passage, even a mark of having been in the thick of battle. On the surface it appears that this was the case with the university administration.

But it also seems that the pamphlet "Crisis and Culture" which Mrs. Dilling claimed implicated Schuman in subversive activities may have caused a minor sensation in the president's office. At least Schuman felt compelled to explain in detail his association with the pamphlet. He wrote to Robert M. Hutchins, the president of the university, that he had "foolishly" given permission for the publishers of the pamphlet to use his name as an endorsement without having first read the pamphlet. He claimed that it was only after its publication that he came to the knowledge that it was done so under the lead of "League of Professionals for Foster and Ford," and that there were fifty-one other names included, none of whom, he claimed, were avowed Communists or Communist party members. How he knew the latter to be true is curious indeed.³⁰

Schuman then noted that he had never belonged to the Communist or Socialist parties, "nor to any organizations even remotely affiliated with

them.³¹ He also explained that professional interest in "political attitudes and behavior among Chicago negroes" motivated his attendance at the dinner banquet for James Ford, black candidate for the vice-presidency in 1932. In his memorandum to the investigating committee he revealed that he had voted for Roosevelt and Garner in an effort to acquit himself of the reckless accusations of an individual whose emotional stability was questionable.³²

Given the political environment and the continuing "Red Scare" in the U.S., Schuman's problems, even if the evidence for his involvement was little more than fanciful or circumstantial, were nevertheless substantial.³³ After all, his dissertation, *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, challenged U.S. policy toward Russia and defended Marxist-Leninist revolutionary goals and methods.³⁴ And he had culled from it articles which provided the evidence his critics used to portray him as a "Communist sympathizer." Of all Schuman's publications, though, the one that most damaged his reputation was the article published in *The Southern Review* in 1937. Entitled *Leon Trotsky: Martyr or Renegade*, it was a polemic against Trotsky that relied heavily on innuendo, tautological arguments, and skewed logic.³⁵

Schuman's sympathies were apparent from the opening paragraph. In it, he emphasized Trotsky's middle class Jewish background, his late entry into the Bolshevik faction of the RSDLP, noted his two escapes from internal exile, which for some was indication of cooperation with the *Okhrana*, and referred to Lev Bronstein's revolutionary pseudonym in pejorative quotation marks, although he did not treat Ulyanov's or

Djugashvili's adopted names in the same fashion.³⁶ This was just a beginning.

Part of his analysis was accurate, especially his argument that those who interpreted Trotsky's and Stalin's problems as being simply the tempo with which each adopted the other's agenda were uncritically accepting appearances. He was less accurate when he attempted to establish which man had escalated the personality conflict into a violent contest of wills. Schuman explained the charges of both camps, yet he carefully outlined Trotsky's position with terms like "accusation," "contention," "concocted"; used exclamation points to emphasize Trotsky's supposedly outlandish charges; and referred to Trotsky's charges against Stalin in such a way as to accentuate the impression that Stalin had not committed the offenses.³⁷

His first sentences in setting forth the Stalinist position against Trotsky were filled with praise for the Kremlin's "impressive record of socialist achievement."³⁸ He employed pejorative quotation marks again, this time referring to the charges made against Stalin.³⁹ And although he used similar qualifying adjectives, he did so less frequently, and he more carefully explicated the specific charges, which led the careless reader to believe that there was more substance to Stalin's allegations than to those of Trotsky and his supporters. His method differed little from the notorious "Duck" test John Peurifoy, U.S. ambassador to Guatemala in 1954, employed to identify communists.⁴⁰ These were tactics Schuman later vehemently condemned.

Schuman declared that Trotsky at the least had betrayed his co-conspirators, who were tried and executed, and at most that he was a traitor

to his ideological convictions. The basis of his attack foreshadowed the *angst* of Rubashov in Arthur Koestler's *Darkness At Noon*.⁴¹ Schuman argued that there was no question about the validity of the confessions of the accused, writing that any notion that they were fabricated was simply implausible.⁴² He concluded that "Neither the cheers of sympathetic multitudes nor his [Trotsky's] own words of spiteful protest will silence the inner voice which tells him that he has erred and failed and betrayed himself. In a red haze of anger he passes into history, always self-defeated by his own follies."⁴³ Schuman then called for the "democratic West, for its own security, [to] dry its tears for fallen heroes and accept Moscow's hand."⁴⁴

Schuman would have fared much better if the article had faded into obscurity. It was poorly conceived and much worse, ineffectively argued. Advance proofs had been sent to several interested parties, though, so a controversy was virtually assured. Among those who wrote to the editor to support Schuman were Malcolm Cowley and Carlton Beals. Cowley was the editor of *The Nation* and Beals had been a member of the American Commission of Inquiry into the Trotsky case, but one who had resigned because he believed that the other commission members were not impartial.⁴⁵ Among those who attacked Schuman's position were Max Eastman, John Dewey, and James T. Farrell. Dewey took the high road, saying there was not room enough to answer the failings of Schuman's article, while Eastman and Farrell demonstrated a variety of factual errors that, given Schuman's reputation as an expert on Soviet affairs, were painfully embarrassing.

Most devastating, though, was an article in the fall issue of *The Southern Review* in which Sydney Hook responded to Schuman. Hook examined Schuman's logic and knowledge of jurisprudence, both of which Hook demonstrated to be inadequate. With a tempered yet caustic pen, Hook noted that "Even to the casual reader of Mr. Schuman's article certain glaring inconsistencies must strike the eye. Indeed, so glaring that they raise a number of questions about Mr. Schuman's capacity for objective analysis."⁴⁶ He then eviscerated Schuman's argument, if indeed that is what his harangue could be called. Methodically, Hook exposed the vacuous nature of Schuman's charges, indeed the speciousness of his entire article.

Schuman asserted that any commission, but specifically the Commission of Inquiry John Dewey headed, "if honest, can only report that the necessary data for a definite judgment are not available."⁴⁷ Yet, as Hook so aptly noted, Schuman believed himself to be outside that *caveat*: even though he admitted access to only a portion of the evidence available to the commission, he had nonetheless pronounced a verdict on Trotsky.⁴⁸ According to Schuman's own construction he himself had acted dishonestly.⁴⁹

Hook then challenged Schuman's contention that politics were beyond moral judgment "particularly in this case, because 'both Stalinism and Trotskyism, along with fascism, stand outside of the ethics of liberalism.'"⁵⁰ To this Hook provided the obvious answer that any action of interpretation has either an implicit or explicit value attached to it, i.e., that even those who declare that moral judgments are inappropriate are in fact making a moral judgment.⁵¹

Hook next attacked Schuman's characterization of Trotsky as a renegade. Noting that Schuman believed Trotskyism to be "a program of uncompromising class war, of repudiation of liberal 'bourgeois' democracy, of universal revolution, of the conversion of the Soviet State into a center of world-wide revolt and conflict," and that he believed Stalinism stood for "appeasement, for collaboration with liberalism, for order and peace in a world society threatened with destruction by war between classes and war between nations," Hook asked what the statement begged: "In what sense, then, is Trotsky a renegade? . . . If this be Trotskyism, then how can Trotsky be a renegade or a Fascist agent? And if Trotsky is a renegade or a Fascist agent, how can this be Trotskyism?"⁵²

Hook noted in his closing remarks that he had provided only a few examples of Schuman's flawed logic and that he could devote an entire essay to the others. Hook wondered how such blatantly confused logic "could escape the notice of an adult mind." Given Schuman's expertise and education, Hook could not escape the conclusion that a hidden agenda existed in Schuman's attack on Trotsky. He left the reader with the admonition that the public demand that individuals who purport to be political scientists be both competent and knowledgeable in their fields of inquiry, and that liberals be held to a high standard of "intellectual honesty and moral integrity [in their] values and methods."⁵³

Hook devoted the rest of his article to a passionate, deadly accurate response to the purge trials. He demonstrated the lineage of the great purges, tracing them to the Shakhty Trials of May 1928 and the Menshevik Trials of March 1931, and he demonstrated the similar methodologies and

strategies the state employed in all the trials to extract confessions.⁵⁴ It is a cogent, compelling account.

Schuman's reaction was almost as telling as his article. In a dismal retreat to *ad hominem* argument, Schuman failed to address any of Hook's criticisms. Instead, he berated his opponents as "political fanatics," and feigned humility in the face of "such power of logic, such devotion to veracity, such cleverness of reasoning, such objectivity of judgment . . . that no one . . . can presume to say them nay."⁵⁵ He had, of course, conveniently forgotten that it was they who were saying nay to him and that it was he who would not accept it. His petulance in the face of superior argument did not serve his cause. Here was a man who claimed to have been victimized, who stood, he said, falsely accused of communist sympathies. The key lies in whether or not the charges were false. If they were, then he was either incredibly naive to pursue such a poorly argued position, one that made him vulnerable to further victimization, or he was terribly confused. Or he too exuberantly pursued a new order that he believed would guarantee world peace.

The answer lies somewhere between victimization and advocacy. Schuman believed in the "Popular Front" as a defense against pan-fascism, a belief which served as further proof to some of his "travelling" companions. By 1935 he had come to believe that the League of Nations was "a grand alliance of liberalism and communism for mutual defense against fascism," that the League worked, that sanctions were an effective reality, all because of the unity which the common enemy of fascism provided the disparate nations represented at Geneva. He believed that if the League

stopped Mussolini, fascism would be dealt a "stunning" blow.⁵⁶ This was, of course, not far removed from the official party line in Moscow.

The young professor invested much faith in the "Popular Front," and when the U.S. failed to participate in it, he feared fascist success.⁵⁷ Given the inadequacy of League sanctions to hamper Mussolini's attack on Abyssinia, Hitler's juggernaut of diplomatic victories, and Japan's domination of China and the Far East, Schuman may have lost his professional objectivity. After all, he saw the struggle as a final one, with the victor to determine the future. For him, it was not the time to act with decorous attention to logic, but to join in common cause. And, as is explained below, he believed that liberalism and communism were ideologically compatible.⁵⁸ This might accurately explain some of his exchange with Hook.

Schuman was fortunate to emerge from this controversy relatively unscathed: such conduct does not always shatter a reputation and he had already been granted an assistant professorship. His rising reputation as a prolific author, prominent academic, and well-known public figure, not to mention the glowing recommendation he received from Quincy Wright, had brought Schuman an offer from historian Tyler Dennett of Williams College, formerly of the State Department, where he had aided Schuman with a portion of his dissertation research.⁵⁹ Williams is located in Williamstown, Massachusetts, in the central Berkshires. The town was a small Yankee community and the college, which admitted only men, had a reputation as a liberal institution. Schuman observed that Williams was not equal to Chicago in status or in intellectual diversity, but moved there in

the fall of 1936, where he made his career for the next thirty-two years. He was named Woodrow Wilson professor of government in 1938 and he quickly became a public figure on campus and in the community.⁶⁰

As the Schumans moved to Williamstown, developments in Europe continued to provoke internationalists and "isolationists" alike. The continent had experienced a diplomatic revolution when Hitler exposed the French security system for the fraud that it was. Polish, Belgian, Czechoslovakian, Yugoslavian, and Romanian policymakers reevaluated their countries' alignments with France, and other countries seemed to have little choice but to follow suit. In Spain, the Civil War demonstrated that U.S. neutrality legislation was ineffective. And all the while the League of Nations continued to flounder on the shoals of collective security, unequal to its charge to keep world peace. The Soviet Union, alone among the powerful nations, vigorously supported collective security at the time, but without success. Given Schuman's belief in collective security, it is not surprising that he defended the Soviet government.

The so-called "isolationists" in the U.S. claimed that continued refinement of neutrality legislation would best serve U.S. security interests. For Schuman, though, events in Europe required a more complex response. He wrote in the preface to the second edition of *The Nazi Dictatorship* that Hitler had won the first engagements of the next war "without firing a shot."⁶¹ The mirage of French hegemony was thus ended, along with the French defensive bloc. As well, he believed that the League system of collective security had "probably been dealt a fatal blow" when the British cabinet refused to honor Britain's Locarno Pact obligations and

apply sanctions against Germany. To Schuman, the only beneficiary of isolationism was fascist imperialism. What was needed was a renewed sense of Wilsonian universalism, but that was dead in the body politic of the U.S. "The forces of liberalism and peace," wrote Schuman, "have again abdicated before the Nazi menace."⁶²

Schuman believed that German revisionism was the greatest immediate threat to world security and that all the powers, great and less great together, should oppose it. Hitler's mission, according to Schuman, was to achieve equality with the victors of World War One, and that in order to realize that goal the Germans must recover all lost provinces, unite all German speaking peoples, restore overseas colonies, and gain adequate *lebensraum*. And, Schuman wrote, Hitler knew and depended on the fact that these goals could not be achieved through peaceful means.⁶³ Only through collective security could the West and the Soviets hope to prevent the fulfillment of Hitler's goals.

By 1941, Schuman refined in *Design For Power*⁶⁴ a theme that appeared earlier in *The Nazi Dictatorship* and one that became popular in later revisionist works: he declared that the West had pursued a policy calculated to encourage the *Drang nach Osten*.⁶⁵ Schuman charged that Chamberlain, Daladier, Halifax, and Weygand had conspired to use Hitler's war machine to destroy the Bolshevik government in Moscow.⁶⁶ As early as 1935 Schuman warned that neither Britain nor the U.S. could remain neutral if Russia were attacked after a French defeat. Further, he predicted that Japan would enter such a war with the dual aims of occupying Siberia

and forcing the U.S. from the Western Pacific.⁶⁷ His message was not well received.

There were many reasons why a prophet of war drew little response from the public or U.S. policymakers in 1935. Less than twenty years before, the U.S. had entered a European conflict, the last "war to end all wars," the war to "make the world safe for democracy." Yet when that war was concluded the U.S. repudiated the world order which its President and other peacemakers envisioned. A growing sentiment among policymakers and public alike rejected the commitments necessary to Wilsonian internationalism. As well, public doubt about the justification for U.S. entry in World War One had grown exponentially since 1917. By 1935 many people found the 1934 Nye Committee report on the arms industry's role in bringing the U.S. into the "Great War" deeply disturbing. A growing body of voters also listened to the anti-internationalist rhetoric that came from Father Coughlin, William Randolph Hearst, and even Will Rogers.⁶⁸ And, of course, a national hero, Charles Lindbergh, praised Hitler's new order in no uncertain terms.⁶⁹

There was, too, the Senate defeat in 1935 of U.S. entry into the World Court, which served continued notice that Wilsonian internationalism of any sort was still anathema to that elite body. There were so many opponents to international commitment that it appeared on the surface that there existed a consensus behind an isolationist foreign policy. And there was a vocal public minority that demanded real isolation, but it was unable to affect policy. To characterize the foreign policy of the thirties, though,

as isolationist is to deny the reality of policy, both domestic and foreign. Nonetheless, isolationism continued to influence the public.

For the above and other reasons, warnings from Schuman went unheeded. Immediate reaction to his prognostications notwithstanding, they did create interest in him as an international political and foreign affairs analyst, especially for German affairs. Besides the book *The Nazi Dictatorship*, Schuman had written several articles during the thirties on the Nazi threat, including "Nazi Dreams of World Power" in *Current History*, "Germany Prepares Fear" in *the New Republic*, "The Political Theory of German Fascism" in the *American Political Science Review*, and "The Third Reich's Road to War" and "The Conduct of German Foreign Affairs" in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*.⁷⁰

Although Schuman was rejected for military service in 1942 because of kidney stones, he remained singularly qualified for alternate government service. In 1942 he and his works came to the attention of Dr. Goodwin Watson, head of the Analysis Division of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS), who subsequently recommended Schuman for a position as Principal Political Analyst of the German Section of the Analysis Division at a salary of \$5,600 per annum. He began his duties on 21 October 1942.⁷¹

Schuman worked in the section that produced the "Weekly Review of Official Foreign Broadcasts," which published analyses of enemy radio propaganda and cable material. The section's clientele included the Departments of State, War, and Navy; the Lend-Lease Office; the Board of Economic Warfare; and the Office of Strategic Services. In addition, the German section published a second weekly, the "Central European Radio

Analysis," intended for parties interested in Nazi propaganda. These analyses were for in-house official use only and their production required access to classified material.⁷² Presumably, then, any person appointed to such a sensitive position would have been subjected to a rigorous security check and would have received confirmation only after receiving clearance. If this sort of method was in practice, and it is reasonable to assume that it was, then Schuman must have passed an initial inspection prior to taking his position with the FBIS. At least one governmental agency, after close scrutiny, must have found Schuman fit for his post, but this was not enough to ensure his tenure as a federal employee.

Schuman's relationship with many "radical" causes and the "Dilling Accusations" in particular were well known to at least two government agencies. Schuman was a subject in the Department of Treasury and Bureau of Internal Revenue investigation of his former colleague and student, Brita Hyde. Hyde, who worked in the Office of Civilian Defense, came under suspicion in 1941 when federal agents learned that she had studied sociology and anthropology at the University of Chicago, two disciplines that aroused fear among radical conservatives. She underwent interrogations about the "suspicious" circumstances that surrounded her engagement and marriage to an Army major (neither event was announced and she was not a native-born American, hence their suspicious character), the nature of sociology and anthropology, and the names of people with whom she lunched.

Hyde referred to the agents as "the Gestapo," and wrote Schuman that his name had appeared for years on her employment record, and that

because they had "evidently just received a report . . . that you are or were a very bad man," they wanted to know what effect he had had on her. Had he encouraged her to become a Communist? Had she collaborated with Schuman in writing the *Nazi Dictatorship*? In a conniving and leering manner, the "Gestapo" agent had asked her if her relationship with Schuman could be described as having been "his PRIVATE secretary? Did Prof. Schuman receive considerable newspaper publicity . . . was he a Communist? etc etc etc."⁷³

That Schuman was known to an important Federal investigative agency well before he was accepted as a Federal employee indicates at least four possibilities regarding his security clearance: either he was cleared and subsequently became a political target for his leftist views; or another agency that did not have the Treasury records had cleared him; or he had somehow slipped through the federal security system; or else someone sympathetic to his views had cleared him. The first is the most likely.

It was not just federal agencies, though, which branded Schuman: it seems even the *New York Times* editorial staff had him so neatly labelled that they no longer read his letters to the editor. On 29 August 1942 Schuman wrote to the *Times* in order to complain that Edwin A. Lyman had rejected a letter Schuman had written on 25 August 1942, which advocated Indian independence, on the grounds that "the Russian government" had been given more than adequate coverage.⁷⁴ Schuman was indignant at the implication of the rejection, which was, of course, that Lyman had dismissed his letter without having read it.

Schuman's life did not hang on the appointment and while he awaited his confirmation he continued to be an active speaker. By this time he had retained the Adult Education Council of Chicago and its representative, Charlotte Sander, to book his midwestern speaking engagements. He no longer considered any offers less than one hundred dollars; he preferred those for one hundred-fifty plus expenses.⁷⁵ He was very concerned that he not lecture on a charity basis. Toward the end of the war he wrote to his east coast agent, Roxanna Wells, that since "out of every dollar I receive for lectures, 38 cents goes to the U.S. Treasury for income tax and 27 cents goes for expenses . . . [I] will make no departures from a reasonable fee."⁷⁶ His message was important, but but he was not going to suffer from financial impecunity from the process of getting it to the people.

And Schuman spoke to the people frequently on such topics as "war aims, peace plans, and programs for a Free World Order" in an attempt to address the failures of the Versailles system. Schuman believed that in order to win the war the Allies must first win the peace. It was necessary to define the war goals in explicit terms in order to ensure that public rhetoric coincided with foreign policy, for in order to secure victory the U.S. had to be in a position to "tell ourselves and the world what we propose to do with our victory."⁷⁷

Schuman's solution was to create a world federation modeled after the U.S. federal system. It would limit national sovereignty and have as its legislative and jural object the individual as well as the state.⁷⁸ Without federalism as its basis, Schuman believed that any new international organization which allowed for free and willing participation would simply

be another Wilsonian League. But Schuman had little hope for his program, for he believed that another League would most likely result from postwar attempts at international organization and would prove to be as ineffective as the first.

Schuman championed Indian independence as well and, with Max Lerner, sent a telegram to President Roosevelt asking that the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China use their good offices as arbitrators in the dispute between the Indian Congress Party and the British government. They wrote that "To fail on the question of India is to fail on one of the crucial fronts of the war. It is also to fail on an issue that tests the capacity of the United Nations to work out post-war settlements."⁷⁹ Schuman wanted the arbitrators to recommend a United Nations tribunal as the instrument to establish "within the next three months, a provisional government of an independent India, linked in war and peace alike to the British Commonwealth and the United Nations as a free and equal partner."⁸⁰ This was central to the way he interpreted the Atlantic Charter and its pledge to provide self-determination for all peoples. He was as fervent about the Indian situation as he was about anything else, perhaps because it represented a chance to establish peace through a system of international cooperation, perhaps because he saw the war as one of liberation for the colonies who had for so long labored under the yoke of European imperialism.⁸¹

A busy schedule was just what Schuman needed while not being able to serve the Allied cause either on active duty or, as yet, in a civilian capacity. He was, after all, a man who keenly sensed what he thought the world

needed and he wanted to help create the new world order.⁸² He continued his search for government work, and explored possibilities with Nelson Rockefeller at the Office of Inter-American Affairs, which included a meeting with both Rockefeller and Henry Wallace, and opportunities with the New York office of the Office of War Information.⁸³ Neither agency retained him, so when he learned that he had been confirmed for the position with the FBIS he was quite pleased. Unfortunately for him, his excitement was short-lived.

On 30 March 1943, just five months into his work, Schuman was called before a hearing of the Special Subcommittee of the Special Committee to Investigate UnAmerican Activities. The Dies Committee already had a reputation among politicians for crediting the incredible and for pandering to unfounded public fears, and the Kerr subcommittee equalled the reputation of its progenitor. William E. Leuchtenburg wrote in *Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940* that Texas Democrat Martin Dies "permitted witnesses to make unsupported charges of the most fantastic character, and rarely accorded the accused the right to reply."⁸⁴ Leuchtenburg concluded that "The antics of witnesses before the Dies Committee, and the yahooism of some of its members, influenced a whole generation of Americans to dismiss any alarm about a communist conspiracy as ludicrous."⁸⁵ The Kerr subcommittee employed the same tactics. Unfortunately for Schuman, the generation to which Leuchtenburg referred was still a generation away: when Schuman testified before the committee it had been active only five years and the communist threat continued to haunt many Americans.

Schuman came to the committee's attention when, on 1 February 1943 on the House floor, Dies charged him and thirty-eight other federal employees with being "irresponsible, unrepresentative, radical, and crackpot."⁸⁶ Dies demanded that the House refuse to appropriate money for these employees' salaries. Schuman's past problems with the Illinois Senate and the Hearst press resurfaced, and given the committee's reputation, he was almost certain to be reprimanded or discharged at the least.

Past and present behavior was used to establish guilt as was innuendo, association, and intimidation. To be sure, there existed the exigencies of war, but martial law did not rule the day and personal liberties had not been proscribed. But this was Congress, not a court of law. The committee attempted to deprive individuals and groups of their rights of free speech and association through threats and bluster. It was chaired by Joe Starnes--other members in attendance were Herman Eberharter, Noah Mason, and Karl Mundt. Robert Stripling advised the committee and Dr. J. B. Matthews was its research director. Charles Denny, General Counsel for the Federal Communications Commission was present as an observer.⁸⁷

Schuman had foreseen the possibility of a public confrontation well before it occurred. In a letter to Dr. Watson he wrote that he was aware of what had happened to other liberals who had gone to Washington to serve the war effort and who had vigorously opposed fascism and nazism and who had advocated close cooperation with the Soviet Union against the common enemy. Schuman indicated that he was "no less open to attack than these men" and concluded that it would be fruitless to accept a position from

which he was likely to be discharged.⁸⁸ Apparently Watson believed that the charges of subversion against Schuman were groundless, for he approved Schuman's appointment, as did Harold Graves, Jr. and Dr. Robert Leigh, Administrative Chief of the FBIS and the head of the FBIS respectively.⁸⁹ But the fact that the committee had targeted Watson, too, tempered his approval.⁹⁰

Dr. Matthews conducted much of the questioning. He was a self-professed "fellow traveller" during the thirties, now an apostate. A zealous convert, Matthews pursued his targets and those who questioned his professionalism, his ethics, and his integrity, with relish. The charges against Schuman were no different than those of the Dilling Affair: that International Publishers was a communist front, that he endorsed a "communist" candidate for Chicago alderman, the Ford banquet, the pamphlet "Culture and Crisis," *et al.*, were resurrected in order to villify Schuman once again. And once again he refuted the charges with a combination of documentation and sworn testimony.

Schuman declared that as an unpublished author in 1928 he had no reason to question the political background of what was on the surface a reputable publishing house.⁹¹ Quincy Wright provided a letter to John Kerr in which he stated that Schuman had offered the dissertation to Macmillan, to Scribner's and Harper's and that the University of Chicago Press had agreed to publish the dissertation but only with a heavy subsidy; consequently, it appeared that International Publishers was the publisher of last resort.⁹² Schuman noted that he had endorsed Vladimir Janowicz as a former graduate student, not a budding communist. As for the Ford

banquet, Schuman claimed a professional interest in a Communist and a black candidacy. Said Schuman, "The banquet I sponsored, not Mr. Ford."⁹³ He explained the circumstances surrounding his endorsement of the pamphlet "Culture and Crisis" exactly as he had reported it to Robert Hutchins: that he had agreed to lend his name to the pamphlet carelessly after its publishers misrepresented it to him.⁹⁴

These were reasonable explanations, ones that would have satisfied any court of law, but Schuman was not on trial and as such he did not have the full benefit of the law. The evidence presented against him was circumstantial and laden with innuendo, and the 105 pages of testimony and exhibits clearly indicated that he deserved to be exonerated. Regardless, Dr. Matthews ended the hearing with the statement that Schuman's "orientation is decidedly pro-Communist," which implied that Schuman was unfit for federal service, and, of course, attached a spectre to his continued employment in the private sector as well.

Nonetheless, in what was a most unexpected decision, the committee ruled that there was "not sufficient evidence to support a recommendation of unfitness" regarding Schuman.⁹⁵ Schuman certainly did not expect this outcome, for when he heard that a hearing was scheduled he turned in his resignation.⁹⁶ Goodwin Watson refused it. Schuman, now more confident in his tenure, requested several leaves through October so that he could lecture. The request went unanswered for the committee had declared Watson unfit for government service on 21 April and Schuman's duties with the FBIS ended that same month when the new director accepted his resignation.⁹⁷

Even though Schuman was not unprepared for this event, certainly he felt betrayed, frustrated, and rejected as a result of it. Although his leave of absence from Williams College had been extended to accommodate his government service, he now returned to Massachusetts to resume his academic duties, and he did so vigorously. The following summer he was a visiting professor at Cornell University and was by that time very much reacclimated to the academic environment. He continued his lectures and writings for an ever-widening public audience and he published many articles in several journals and magazines throughout the war, including *The American Political Science Review*, *Current History*, *Antioch Review*, *The Nation*, and *The New Republic*, and prepared the manuscript for a new book, *Soviet Politics: At Home and Abroad* (New York, 1946).⁹⁸ His lectures were more and more frequent, scheduled in such diverse places as Des Moines and Long Island, and at each stop he promoted the United Nations and prepared the public for his vision of the new international order.

That order was predicated on an institution for international organization that Schuman hoped would differ structurally and theoretically from the old League of Nations. He presented these views in the first edition of *International Politics* (1933), in which he criticized the League and its inability to enforce collective security. He also criticized Woodrow Wilson, who Schuman perceived in terms of the former President's "facility at phrase-making," and whose ideas of a "league of honor, a partnership of opinion" as an agent to enforce peace Schuman had come to deem naive and unscientific.⁹⁹

In many respects Schuman viewed the Versailles system as an instrument to maintain, if not the old order, then its close replica, for those who sought to use it still operated on the assumptions of the old diplomacy. It was in the U.S., Schuman said, that traditional attitudes were most deeply entrenched. He believed that the United States had the greatest interest in a world-society because a continuation of international anarchy stood to prevent the order and stability U.S. leaders saw as essential to the spread of free enterprise and democracy. Yet he protested that despite its paramount interest, the U.S., more than any other great nation, remained reluctant to play the role necessary to the creation of an effective world organization. The U.S., more than any other great nation, remained "committed to the ancient ways which offer so little hope for the salvaging of a sick acquisitive civilization composed of self-seeking communities."¹⁰⁰

The next year Schuman declared that the U.S. must reassess the "attitudes, values, ideologies, symbolisms, and mythologies of the ruling classes of the nation-states" and commit to a policy of "transformation . . . transvaluation . . . [and] revolution." It was imperative that the U.S., as the only one of the "bourgeois Great Powers" not in the League, lead the way.¹⁰¹ Schuman had reservations about the League and international organization, but he believed that if the world's peoples and nations failed to reorganize in accordance with his prescribed model, then the League could still serve as an alternative to ethnic nationalism, that its institutions could become the new traditions, the new shibboleths, the new symbols of a world consciousness. The problem with this, though, was that he saw the world situation in immediate terms, yet the transformations he advocated

took time, more time than he believed the western state system had before catastrophe struck. What was lacking was the power, coercive power, to enforce unity upon "the recalcitrant States of the world society."¹⁰²

Yet Schuman had no ready solution for this problem. He noted that Machiavelli, in the *Discourse on Livy*, recognized the same dilemma in that "we cannot change our opinions and sentiments so frequently as the times vary: first, because we cannot easily oppose ourselves to what we have been accustomed to desire; secondly, that, having repeatedly been prosperous in one way, we cannot easily persuade ourselves that we shall be equally so in another."¹⁰³ The public and its leaders, especially the upper classes, would be unwilling to accept a new system when the old system provided tangible benefits.

Maintenance, or controlled change, of power plagued international security and peace as well. Balance of power was the key ingredient to world peace under the League system, but there did not yet exist a peaceful alteration method that was universally employed. Most nations had found it necessary to fulfill their security needs through national armaments and military alliances; international security guarantees were meaningless given a nonexistent binding force, moral or physical, to which all parties could appeal. Schuman wrote that the problem with guaranteeing international security was that there existed no "collectively organized, coercive authority in the existing structure of international government to restrain lawbreakers and preserve order."¹⁰⁴

This is the basis of all arguments against international legal systems: that unlike national law, there is no instrument to coerce the objects of

international laws to conform to the norms those laws prescribe. The argument is found in the debate between Hobbes and Locke and their advocates: are social contracts entered into out of necessity or out of utility? Do all members of a system recognize common interests or is there an inherent need for a *Leviathan*? The debate between those who demanded a League with superstate powers, especially a strong military institution, and those who believed that the collective nations could and would act rationally without extraordinary force, focused on the Hobbes/Locke argument.

Schuman regarded this debate and the form it took over the League of Nations in the context of the application of sanctions. He believed now that the sanctions system of the Covenant was untenable. Self-interest motivated states, and the further a conflict is from the borders of a state, the less likely the people and leaders of that state are to perceive the resolution of that conflict as vital to their interests. Despite the Wilsonian premise that all conflicts everywhere are the business of everyone, few states would be willing to sacrifice either the blood or money necessary to make sanctions effective against aggressor states.¹⁰⁵

Schuman concluded that no nation was willing to allow an international body to compromise its sovereignty. And yet the system he advocated revolved around just such a circumstance. No meaningful security could be established without the means for adjusting the *status quo* peacefully and the only way that Schuman could envision for this to occur without world dictatorship involved dominant states conceding sovereignty, concessions he indicated they would not willingly make.

Not only that, but his system provided the states no formula to ensure that such a concession would be in their interests.¹⁰⁶ Assuming there existed no supranational force to guarantee that sanctions would be applied universally in the event that they were necessary to stop an aggressor, there was little reason to believe that any sanctions a League of Nations could provide had the slightest chance of success.

As of 1933, Schuman had not offered a viable solution, but he did offer a clear analysis. His chapters, with titles such as "Neo-mercantilism and the Struggle for Commodity Markets," "Dollar Diplomacy and the Struggle for Investment Markets," "Imperialism Old and New," "The Crisis of Capitalism," and "The Revolt of the Subject Peoples," reflect the basis of Schuman's interpretive framework. He believed that the problem central to the twentieth century was uncontrolled acquisitive capitalism combined with power diplomacy, profits, and prestige: any solution, then, rested on a satisfactory conclusion of class antagonisms.¹⁰⁷

Schuman believed that the two major sources of friction and conflict that confronted modern society were "the divergent and seemingly irreconcilable interests of those who own wealth, manage industry, and reap the profits of business, and of those who own nothing but labor power and who work for wages." Society knew only one method to unite the classes and that was to appeal to a common identification with the state. Love of and loyalty to nation superseded that of class bonds. Nationalism was the great unifying agent of the twentieth century. Policies of aggrandizement appealed to elements of all classes, and although they benefitted the ruling classes far more than the working classes, they were

perceived as benefitting the nation.¹⁰⁸ Schuman believed that such policies, when successfully pursued, alleviated social unrest within a domestic context, but that such policies in an international context led to war.

This was an interesting thesis in that it laid the blame for wars directly on those who profited from them: on the capitalists, the financiers, the munitions-makers, and by inference, even on the working class.

Schuman's theory depended upon a syllogistic process in which war disrupted the world economy, which in turn generated labor unrest, which then brought about conditions favorable to fascism, which then further exacerbated world tensions. The cycle had to be broken, he thought, for it led to "irremediable disaster for the whole social and political structure of the world society."¹⁰⁹ But how to break the cycle?

In 1933 Schuman offered only vague nostrums that required the "organized application of social intelligence on a world-wide scale for the purpose of easing tensions, preventing conflict, and integrating divergent class and national interests into a new synthesis of values adequate for the political reformation of the world society."¹¹⁰ Ironically, his solution was to transfer those values that created nationalism in sovereign states to a universal level; not unlike the Bolsheviks, who despised bureaucracy but found it absolutely essential to maintain their revolution, Schuman found nationalistic myths and conformity essential for his world order.

Despite his insistence upon the need for symbols which appealed to the emotions, he retained his commitment to reason as the solution to international dilemmas. His faith in reason was an integral element of his

faith in scientific planning. Economic planning and international organization suggested to Schuman "the requisite roads to salvation." Both required "the organization of technical knowledge and socially directed intelligence for the rational solution of the [world's] problems." Both required that reason be substituted for "emotion, superstition, and blind faith in outworn formulas."¹¹¹

But Schuman recognized certain cultural limitations to the promise of reason. After all, reason operated in an environment which current "superstitions and mythologies" limited. Common interests had to be acknowledged on an international scale which would "prevail over selfish class loyalties and ancient tribal allegiances" or reason would be ineffective. He reiterated his belief that the institutions of capitalism prevented, or at the least made very difficult, the establishment of a genuine consensus of interests between the classes.

On an international scale, he believed that the institutions of the Great Powers served an analogous function to those of capitalism. They were, he wrote, "formidable obstacles [to] a true world community." Without the "social and psychological bases of cooperation and coordination," world organization was likely to flounder. Schuman remained skeptical as to whether or not "consciously directed effort" could manufacture such bases of cooperation and coordination, but he warned that "the crisis of the world society is rapidly reaching high tide and that solutions must be devised soon, or they will be useless."¹¹²

His analysis suffered in that it was incomplete: reason and science cannot work in the prevailing system of totems and myths, therefore, new

totems and myths must be created, and as the reader is not told that they will be generated spontaneously, one must assume that "devising" solutions (meaning to conceptualize and plan new totems and myths) requires rational thought. But reason remained Schuman's touchstone.¹¹³ And the West, he reasoned, must either conclude that the capitalist system leads to destruction and change it voluntarily, or face a not-so-distant future where, after the wreckage of a horrendous war, economic planning and an international communist system along the Soviet line would emerge. If the West did not meet this challenge, the world could slip into "a long and barbarous abyss." And regardless of which path the West chose, he believed that the old order was doomed, implying that the intelligent choice, the rational choice, would be to actively pursue a new order designed along the Soviet model.¹¹⁴

By 1936, Schuman confronted the conflict between his professed liberalism and his championship of Marxist socialism. In an article written for the *Southern Review* entitled "Liberalism and Communism Reconsidered," he declared liberalism and communism to consist of fundamentally reconcilable values and objectives. "Democracy," he observed, "as a mass faith (as distinct from a political device temporarily utilized by the *haute bourgeoisie*) is not at all ideologically incompatible with communism." Marxism, after all, was a product of liberalism, and both systems trusted "in Reason and the Common Man."¹¹⁵ He argued that the Bolsheviks were forced "reluctantly" to adopt "nondemocratic forms of political power in order to remove economic and social inequalities and

injustices" and that the leaders "hoped" one day to restore political democracy (noticeably absent is any direct evidence for this opinion).¹¹⁶

At last, he declared that both liberals and communists (he used communist and bolshevik interchangeably) were "dedicated to freedom, to tolerance, to the pragmatic discovery of truth through experimentation and free discussion in the market place . . . and . . . to the application of reason to human affairs." He buttressed his argument with citations from Sydney and Beatrice Webb's *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*¹¹⁷ as evidence that liberalism and communism were closely intertwined for, after all, the Webbs had "devoted their long lives to the implementation of democratic ideals."¹¹⁸ And the Webbs "unequivocally describe[d] the Soviet system as a democracy."¹¹⁹ The syllogism served his thesis well, but it was not necessarily representative of the facts.

Schuman drew upon the Webb's book and his own studies to reach several uncritical conclusions regarding the Soviet State.¹²⁰ The arguments with those conclusions are obvious, but what was truly interesting were his conclusions regarding the differences between the two ideologies. Schuman wrote that liberals were inclined to believe that "Reason," if properly applied, could solve all human problems, and he acknowledged that assumption as being partially valid. But the communists had seen beyond idealistic reason and recognized that "emotions, mysticism, and mythology," not reason, not economic self-interest, moved human masses. They, like fascists, recognized that "nonlogical symbols of warmly felt collective experience" could be used to manipulate humans to a desired action.¹²¹ The Communists had proven that "consciously directed

effort" could manufacture "the social and psychological bases of cooperation and coordination."¹²²

This continued his earlier critique of liberalism's inability to manipulate science and organized intelligence, but the two rhetorics so evident in his earlier work, power and reason, although they remained superficially antagonistic, were now melded. Schuman emphasized power and its implications, and through an analysis of power and its nuances he reduced the conflict in his earlier thought.

Much like light, whose motion both waves and particles characterize, Schuman found that power contains rational and irrational elements. "No great mass movement," he wrote, "no profound revolution, no transvaluation of values is possible without the psychological equivalents of religious supernaturalism."¹²³ And liberalism, he declared, had lost its vital myths. Schuman realized that where old shibboleths were lacking, the public must be induced to value new ones, that those people in control must be willing to wield unrestricted power to reshape society. And he had as evidence to buttress this belief the success of *gleichschaltung* in Germany and the First Five Year Plan in the Soviet Union. Even if these phenomena played upon existing value systems, i.e., the very same "destructive and suicidal" nationalism that Schuman condemned, they demonstrated that determined governing elites, through planning and "organized social intelligence," could manipulate public myths with state power.

The European war led Schuman to advocate the use of power in unencumbered terms. In a letter to the editor of *the Nation*, he considered

a "new" form for future government: "Caesarism." Schuman held this term to mean "a world order in a world imperium in which government will cease to govern nation-states and local land plots and begin to govern the world as an economic and social unity." He was careful to explain that he did not attribute to this new form of government the despotism usually associated with the term "Caesarism." Instead, Schuman constructed the term to mean "the supremacy of politics" over anything else. In this new social structure would be leaders who were willing to lead, governments that truly governed, and a society that believed in and supported mass values. A new social militancy--"totalitarian' in scope and efficacy if not in purpose"--must consume the public.¹²⁴

And, as observed previously, these were lessons Schuman had learned from the fascists and bolsheviks. "All these forms of power," he wrote, "and tools of action are common to fascism and to any effective socialism. . . . These are the prerequisites of survival in the twentieth century. . . . If the ends of democracy are to be served, democrats must learn at once to do what must be done."¹²⁵ He believed that any new political organization would have to be focused on "a new economy ruled by a self-conscious, respected, and purposeful political élite wielding authority in areas far wider than the nations or even the 'great powers' of today."¹²⁶ This was a strong remedy, one that might kill the patient, yet it was Schuman's prescription. How he believed such a prescription would serve the "ends of democracy" is difficult to ascertain. It is certain, though, that passages like the one above served to demonstrate the charges of his critics that he valued power above all else.

His arguments in the thirties impelled one to believe that the only available solution to the problem of international organization was a social revolution in the West or a political agent that could enforce its will upon the globe; by 1941 this theme had been refined. Although Schuman professed to believe that peace was the only medium in which the common liberal and communist values could survive, and that only a liberal/communist collaboration against fascism could obtain lasting peace, he also believed that he had seen the future and that a "militant social-mindedness" characterized it; that the West would have to adopt totalitarian means to achieve freedom. He believed that the collaboration between Moscow and the West could result in "a further liberalization of communism and a resurgence of liberalism as a living faith, revived and enriched, paradoxically, by Moscow's example."¹²⁷ This was the message of the convergency theory that gained credence in certain circles during the nineteen-fifties. But if the West refused to accept Moscow's proffered hand, it would "perish in bloody chaos."¹²⁸

Schuman believed that World War Two validated his prediction, but his fears were resurrected with the onset of the Cold War and the Truman Doctrine. His views remained influential within a segment of the community who wrote about and made U.S. policy during the war. The postwar era provided him with the opportunity to direct foreign policy issues for a major political party. It also gave him new personal direction and trials.

In many ways, then, Schuman refocused his theories after the second world war. But when he offered his ideas anew after the war he did so as a

branded man. The hearings before the various state and federal committees, the continued uncritical apologies he made for Soviet policies, his fence-riding on Western values and principles, and his unswerving embrace of *machtpolitik*, had taken from him the respect of certain of his professional colleagues.

Even his mentor, Quincy Wright, moved to distance himself from the maverik professor. Writing to Leonard White, Wright praised Schuman as "a teacher and popular writer [who] made introductory courses . . . more interesting to students than anyone ever to have taught them, and who had a capacity to absorb great quantities of material and [write] clearly, even brilliantly, about them." Yet, he was not the type Wright favored for permanent faculty. Wright doubted whether Schuman could "ever be outstanding as a research man." "Perhaps," Wright mused, "his research capacity has been interfered with by his tremendous ease in popular writing." But despite the reason, Wright's "prime interest" was to recruit scholars "who can press forward the frontiers of research," qualities he thought absent in "people whose prime ability is teaching and popular writing."¹²⁹ He wrote this on the same day that he sent Schuman congratulations on the publication of *Soviet Politics: At Home and Abroad*, which he claimed was "exciting both as to content and . . . presentation."¹³⁰

Notes

- ¹ Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System* (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1933).
- ² Edward A. Purcell, Jr., *The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value* (Louisville, Ky: University of Kentucky Press, 1973), 3; 17. Purcell cites a survey from Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus (New York, 1964), 66, that asked political scientists who had had "the greatest impact on the profession before 1945, [and] the top three places went to Charles E. Merriam, Harold D. Lasswell, and Leonard White--all at [the University of] Chicago." Purcell, 17.
- ³ Schuman (hereon referred to as FS) wrote that "A successful and far-sighted foreign policy is impossible for the United States so long as the persistence of isolationism and provincialism paralyzes . . . the president and the State Department." *American Journal of Sociology*, 37 (May 1932), 887; as for U.S. recognition policy, see the above article, 84, and with specific reference to the Soviet Union, see "Benighted Diplomacy," *The Nation* 134 (18 May 1932), 563-564, in which FS wrote that the "Hoover Administration, in Russian matters as in others, is more Bourbon than the Bourbons."
- ⁴ Milton Cantor, *The Divided Left: American Radicalism, 1900-1975* (New York, N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 1978), 73.
- ⁵ Robert Skotheim, *American Intellectual Histories and Historians* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), 61-62.
- ⁶ William Apleman Williams, *American Russian Relations, 1781-1947* (New York, N.Y.: Rinehart, 1971). FS requested an introduction for his book from Senator William Borah, who supported normalized relations with the Soviet Union. Borah declined because of time constraints. FS Collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming, Number 7824, Box 12, William E. Borah to FS, 21 March 1928.
- ⁷ Quincy Wright (hereon referred to as QW) to FS, 21 July 1928, QW Collection, Bx 8, addenda 2, folder 9; in another letter to FS, Wright praised Schuman's judgment and research for his thesis as "excellent." QW to FLS, 9 October 1926, QW Collection, Bx 9, add 2, fol 8.
- ⁸ FS to QW, 21 August 1928, Bx 23, add 1, the Quincy Wright Collection, University of Chicago.
- ⁹ FS to Scott Nearing, 8 February 1972, 1.
- ¹⁰ FS, "American Foreign Policy," *American Journal of Sociology*, 37 (May 1932), 888.

¹¹ Quincy Wright, *The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace*, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1935).

¹² Schuman, *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic* (New York, N.Y.: AMS, 1931).

¹³ Schuman, *International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System* (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1933).

¹⁴ Schuman, *The Nazi Dictatorship: A Study in Social Pathology and the Politics of Fascism* (New York, N.Y.: A. A. Knopf, 1934,1935).

¹⁵ Schuman's book raised the ire of the "Association of German Veterans of the World War" whose members protested it to the University of Chicago Board of Trustees, 14 December 1935, FS Collection, Bx 12.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ FS, "Nazi Dreams of World Power," *Current History*, 39 (February 1934), 537. Schuman displayed an uncanny appreciation of the consequences, current and future, of the Nazi seizure of power in "Germany Prepares Fear," *The Nation* 77 (7 February 1934), 353-355, "The Political Theory of German Fascism," *American Political Science Review* 28 (April 1934), 210-232, and "The Third Reich's Road to War," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 175 (September 1934), 33-43.

¹⁸ FS to QW, 29 October 1933, QW Collection, Bx 2, Add 1.

¹⁹ FS to Steven Cohen, Schuman Collection, 17 April 1971.

²⁰ Doris Fleming observed that "Mr. Schuman was somewhat careless in his remarks" during a telephone conversation she had with me on 12 February 1989; other instances are available throughout his correspondence with Quincy Wright.

²¹ By 1942 Schuman received \$150 per engagement, sometimes plus expenses; by 1946 it was double that amount. FS to Charlotte Sander, 19 May 1942; FS to Charlotte Sander, 1 January 1947.

²² See "Frederick L. Schuman: A Case History" *the Partisan Review* 7 (1940), 143-151; Frank Warren *Liberals and Communism: The "Red Decade" Revisited*, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1966), 4; William O'Neill *A Better World-- The Great Schism: Stalinism and the American Intellectuals* (New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 27-29. O'Neill dislikes Schuman's power politics (27-28), yet O'Neill asserts that "diatribes against power politics make no sense (95)." See also David Cauter *The Fellow -*

Travellers: Intellectual Friends of Communism, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973,1988), 146; 290.

23 U.S. House of Representatives, 78 Congress 1943, Senate Library, Vol. 1035, Special Subcommittee of Special Committee to investigate UnAmerican Activities, "Investigation of UnAmerican Propaganda Activities in the United States," Testimony of Frederick L. Schuman, Principal Political Analyst, FCC, 3095; 3115; 3118; 3105-3106 (Hereon referred to as FS HUAC Testimony).

24 Mrs. Albert W. Dilling, *The Red Network*, (privately published in Chicago, 1934).

25 FS Collection, Memorandum to the Illinois Senate Committee Investigating Subversive Activities in Colleges and Universities, 13 May 1935, 1; QW Collection, Paul Douglas to QW, 1935, Bx 18, fol 8, 1-2.

26 "Culture and Crisis"; Memo to the Illinois Senate Committee, 2-3.

27 QW to Paul Douglas, 14 June 1935, Bx 18, fol 13, QW Collection.

28 Editorial, *Chicago Herald-Examiner*, 16 March 1935, as quoted in "Public Enemy Number One, *The Nation* , 140, (24 April 1935), 480-481.

29 *The Nation*, 140, (24 April 1935), 481.

30 FS to Robert Hutchins, 12 April 1935, 1. This confirms Mrs. Fleming's assessment of his carelessness.

31 *Ibid.* The fact that he did not belong to the party or any affiliated organizations did not indicate that he was not sympathetic; indeed, it was an important party tactic to keep those whom it found useful from joining. Nonetheless, Schuman was cleared of subversive activities on two occasions during which he gave testimony under oath.

32 *Ibid.*

33 These charges influenced Quincy Wright's recommendations of Schuman. Wright's original recommendation read: "I have seldom had a student of such marked ability and believe that he has an enviable career ahead of him as a research worker. His teaching has also been of the highest quality and I am happy to recommend him without qualification." Undated letter of Recommendation, QW Collection, Bx 9, add 2, fol 8. In QW to Dean Fred C. Woodward of the University of Chicago, 9 March 1927, Bx 9, add 2, Wright referred to Schuman as "the best student I have had for some time . . . I highly recommend him for [a scholarship]." See also letters of 28 October 1932, 2 December 1932, Bx 23, add 1, and QW to Tyler Dennett, 8 July

1926, Bx 7, add 2, fol 2. Prior to the events of 1932-1935, Wright recommended Schuman as "one of the very best of our younger men," "[he] has an enviable career ahead of him as a research worker,' and that he recommended himn "without qualification." QW to Don Young, 28 October 1932, Bx 23, add 1; Letter of Recommendation, Bx 9, add 2, fol 8. Yet in a 6 July 1937 letter to Charles Merriam, Wright did not support Schuman's request to be appointed Wallgreen professor at the University of Chicago. By 1946 his recommendations of Schuman included very negative assessments. See QW to Leonard White, 5 March 1946.

34 Schuman, *Amercan Policy Toward Russia Since 1917* (New York, N.Y.: International Publishers, 1928).

35 FS, "Leon Trotsky: Martyr or Renegade?," *The Southern Review* 3 (1937), 51-74; 411-414.

36 *Ibid.*, 51.

37 *Ibid.*, 52-57.

38 *Ibid.*, 58.

39 *Ibid.*, 59.

40 Peurifoy's formula for identifying communists--"if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it must be a duck"--was a classic statement of syllogism. See Richard Immerman's *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1982).

41 Arthur Koestler, *Darkness At Noon*, (New York, N.Y.: MacMillan, 1941).

42 FS, "Trotsky," 67.

43 *Ibid.*, 74. This is essentially what Maurice Merleau-Ponty posits in his *Humanism and Terror* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1969), and is an integral part of the self-doubt that Arthur Koestler's Rubashov experiences in *Darkness At Noon*.

44 *Ibid.*

45 "Correspondence," *The Southern Review* 3 (1937), 203-207. Beals declared that Trotsky could be found neither guilty nor innocent with the available evidence.

46 Sydney Hook, "Liberalism and the Case of Leon Trotsky," *The Southern Review* 3 (1937), 268.

47 FS, Correspondence, 70.

48 In reference to Trotsky's and the Moscow defendant's guilt, Schuman wrote "The writer's own conclusion on these questions is that, despite lacunae and discrepancies, the available testimony points unmistakably to the guilt of the accused and to the sincerity and substantial accuracy of the confessions . . . [t] here was a treasonable conspiracy." *Ibid.*, 64.

49 Hook, "Liberalism," 269.

50 *Ibid.*

51 *Ibid.*, 270.

52 *Ibid.*

53 *Ibid.*, 272.

54 *Ibid.*, 273-282.

55 FS, "Correspondence," 414.

56 FS, "Neutrality or Sanctions," *New Republic*, 85 (25 December 1935), 200.

57 *Ibid.*

58 FS, "Liberalism and Communism Reconsidered," *Southern Review*, 2 (1936), 326-338.

59 QW to Tyler Dennett, 8 July 1926, Bx 7 add 2, fol 2.

60 Among those who disagreed with his position on the Soviet Union he was known as "Red Fred." See *Partisan Review*.

61 FS, *The Nazi Dictatorship: A Study in Social Pathology and the Politics of Fascism*, (New York, N.Y.: A.A. Knopf, 1935, 1936).

62 *Ibid.*, vi.

63 *Ibid.*, 127-128; 357.

64 FS, *Design for Power: The Struggle for the World*, (New York, N.Y.:

A. A. Knopf, 1942.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 488; see also FS, "The Great Conspiracy," *New Republic* 96 (26 October 1938), 325-326; "The Tory Dialectic: I," *New Republic* 97 (28 December 1938), 219-222; "The Tory Dialectic: II," *New Republic* 97 (4 January 1939), 253-255; "Toward the New Munich," *New Republic* 99 (31 May 1939), 91-93.

⁶⁶ FS, *Design For Power*, 166-171.

⁶⁷ FS, *Nazi Dictatorship*, 504.

⁶⁸ William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940* (New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1963), 216.

⁶⁹ In a speech of 13 October 1939, Linbergh declared that "It is the European race we must preserve; political progress will follow. Racial strength is vital; politics is a luxury. If the white race is ever seriously threatened, it may be time for us to take our part in its protection, to fight side by side with the English, French, and Germans, but not with one against the other for our mutual destruction." D. F. Fleming, *While America Slept* (New York, N.Y.: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, Inc.), 1944, 20.

⁷⁰ FS, "Nazi Dreams of World Power," *Current History* 39 (February 1934), 535-541; "Germany Prepares Fear," *The New Republic* 77 (7 February 1934), 353-355; "The Political Theory of German Fascism," *American Political Science Review* 28 (April 1934), 210-232; "The Third Reich's Road to War" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 175 (September 1934), 33-43; "The Conduct of German Foreign Affairs" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 176 (November 1934), 187-221.

⁷¹ FS, HUAC Testimony, 3089-3091.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 3089-3090.

⁷³ Brita Hyde to FS, 17 July 1941, 1-2.

⁷⁴ FS to Editor of *New York Times*, 29 August 1942, Bx 13.

⁷⁵ FS to Charlotte Sander, 19 May 1942, 1-2.

⁷⁶ FS to Roxanna Wells, 22 June 1945. The only exceptions he was willing to make were for churches and colleges, and then only occasionally.

⁷⁷ FS to Jack Shand, 17 July 1942, 1.

78 FS, "Might and Right at San Francisco," *The Nation* 160 (28 April 1945), 480.

79 FS to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 11 August 1942.

80 FS to Editor of *The Boston Herald* (12 August 1942), 2.

81 He even tried to enlist the aid of Henry and Clare Booth Luce, with whom he had had previous correspondence, in order to publicize his views. FS to Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce, 12 August 1942.

82 Schuman managed to retain his sense of humor and perspective through it all. He told his mother that "Uncle Sam prefers to win (or lose) the war without my help. FS to "Dearest Mom," 16 July 1942, 2.

83 FS to "Dearest Mom," 16 July 1942.

84 William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940* (New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1963), 280

85 *Ibid.*, 280-281.

86 FS, " 'Bill of Attainder' In the Seventy-Eighth Congress," *American Political Science Review* 37 (October 1943), 819.

87 FS, HUAC Testimony, 3087.

88 *Ibid.*, 3092.

89 *Ibid.*, 3091.

90 FS, "Bill of Attainder," 37 (October 1943), 823.

91 FS, HUAC Testimony, 3095-3096.

92 QW to John H. Kerr, 16 April 1943, QW Collection, Bx 23, add 1.

93 FS, HUAC Testimony, 3115-3118.

94 *Ibid.*, 3104-3105; FS to Robert Hutchins, 12 April 1935, 1.

95 FS, "Bill of Attainder," 823.

96 FS to Goodwin Watson, 1 Feb 1943.

97 FS, "Bill of Attainder," 823.

⁹⁸ FS, *Soviet Politics: At Home and Abroad*, (New York, N.Y.: A. A. Knopf, 1946).

⁹⁹ FS, *International Politics: An Introduction to the Western State System* (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1933), 254-257.

¹⁰⁰ FS, "American Foreign Policy," *American Journal of Sociology* 7 (May 1932), 888.

¹⁰¹ FS, *International Politics*, 802; 821.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 842.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 845

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 717.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 720-721.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 853.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 849.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 847.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 847-848.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 848.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ The then current debate between the neo-Aristotelians and the Scientific Naturalists at the University of Chicago influenced him, and although he later claimed it had not, he had combined elements of both arguments in that debate. See Purcell, 3.

¹¹⁴ FS, *International Politics*, 849.

¹¹⁵ FS, "Liberalism and Communism Reconsidered," *Southern Review* 2 (1936), 327.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 328.

117 Sydney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*, (New York, N.Y.: Longmans, 1935).

118 FS, "Liberalism and Communism Reconsidered," 328. The Webb's book, he wrote, was a "model" of scholarship without "pedantry" and without significant omissions. See 329-330.

119 *Ibid.*, 331. Frank Warren's book *Liberals and Communism* employs a similar analysis and similar language to that presented here. See pages 109-110. Our interpretations differ.

120 He concluded that authority in the Soviet Union flowed from the people to the leaders and that the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" was not a dictatorship because "the communists act not for themselves, but for the whole body of organized workers and collective peasants"; that there was a wide degree of freedom of discussion, criticism, and responsibility to the electorate within the party; that there were "genuinely representative elections"; and that the Soviet economic system had "increased production at a phenomenal rate, abolished unemployment, eliminated slumps and booms, and expanded consumer demand more rapidly than productive capacity (this last is an accomplishment?) *Ibid.*, 332-333

121 *Ibid.*, 335.

122 FS, *International Politics*, 848.

123 FS, "Liberalism and Communism Reconsidered," 336.

124 FS, "Addenda to 'Who Owns the Future,'" *The Nation* 152 (11 January 1941), 111.

125 *Ibid.*

126 *Ibid.*

127 FS, *Liberalism and Communism Reconsidered*, 338.

128 *Ibid.*

129 QW to Leonard White, 5 March 1946, QW Collection, Bx 23, add 1.

130 QW to FS, 5 March 1946, QW Collection, Bx 23, add 1.

CHAPTER V

POSTWAR STRATEGIES: A NEW WORLD ORDER

April 1945 brought victory not just for the Allies in the European theater, but brought as well a growing sense of victory for many internationalists. The San Francisco Conference established the Charter of the United Nations, although many of the details had previously been decided (and were no longer subject to debate) at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The United States was now firmly encamped in the promised land of international organization and it seemed only a matter of smoothing the transitional phase in order to replace a system of anarchical international relations with one governed by the rule of law, one that would impose limits on national sovereignty.

But what the United Nations Charter provided instead was a system committed to respect the sovereign equality of all nations; one state, one vote (somewhat modified in the cases of Belorussia and the Ukraine); and to maintain the balance of power through the cooperation of the permanent members of the Security Council. These were essential elements of the peace the new organization sought to obtain. Hope, though, lay in the protean character of the new organization; that it could become an effective organization, perhaps even the nucleus of a world government, through the proper manipulation of world opinion, and through the evolution and enforcement of international law.

For Quincy Wright, the U.N. Charter corrected the most glaring weaknesses of the earlier League Covenant. Speaking in 1955 to the

Turkish Institute of International Law at Istanbul and at Ankara in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Charter's adoption, Wright observed that the old international law had undergone radical change. A system which had once "recognized the sovereign state to the exclusion of almost everything else" no longer recognized war as a legal means to ends, and no longer recognized neutrality as a legal condition in the face of aggressive behavior.¹ The world system now gave the individual standing, recognized the "public interest of the world society in many transactions," and had established the "jural personality of international organizations with rights and powers embodying that public interest."

A concomitant to these developments was a reduced emphasis on the state in international law while individuals and the new world organization gained prominence. Wright cautioned that this reflected the legal situation, but that some states, which exercised efficient control over "thought, economy, and military action," could be "more independent, powerful, and dangerous than ever."² "Is it possible," he asked, "that the new principles of international law can be realized in practice?"³ His invariable answer was "yes," although he recognized the need for continued development of the U.N. at the expense of national sovereignty. And as will be seen, there were many developments that tempered his positive outlook.

Wright had placed great faith in the deterrent power of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the newly developed legal concept of war. International law no longer recognized belligerents in a war as equals with certain appurtenant rights; rather, it enjoined all nations to identify the

aggressor and deny that state traditional rights and privileges associated with conditions of peace.⁴ This was the position of the members of the U.N. and as such committed them to the recognition that aggressive warfare was now an illegal activity without sanction.

Still, though, Wright considered the United Nations to be a "transitional organization."⁵ He criticized the privileged position of the great powers in the U.N., and he observed that the experience with the Briand-Kellogg Pact, although valuable, emphasized that "unsanctioned declarations of moral purpose are likely to be violated."⁶ The value of the Pact was as precedent for international law and its impact upon public opinion. Similarly, the U.N. was not the answer to world organization, but the beginning of the answer.

From Wright's perspective, the U.N. as it existed in 1946 was a hybrid of many different political systems. It was at once something of an empire with the five great powers exercising control as a unit. It resembled a world federation with the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council at the center. And it contained the qualities of "an ethical system depending upon the self restraint of states in respecting the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, nonintervention in domestic matters, abstention from aggression, and pacific settlement set forth in the first chapter of the Charter."⁷ The democracies, he believed, should strive toward a U.N. that comprised a federal world order in which the U.N. would exercise jurisdiction over individuals as well as states.⁸

To this end, Wright believed that the Nuremberg Trials, on which he served as technical adviser to U.S. counsel Francis Biddle, had established beyond doubt that one of the reasons previous international law had been ineffectual in the political sphere was because its rules had been directed at states and not at individual persons. Wright observed that the process of building precedent upon precedent in international criminal proceedings should "give greater weight to the very important principle that individuals have a direct relationship to the world community."⁹

In order to limit national sovereignty, Wright believed that a regularly enforced world criminal law applied to individuals would necessarily limit national sovereignty and serve to "change the foundation of the international community from a balance of power among sovereign states to a universal federation" which would directly control individuals the world over on matters within the jurisdiction of international law."¹⁰ Key to this observation, though, was, in Wright's own words, that "some national states . . . appear in fact more independent, powerful, and dangerous than ever."¹¹ As well, Wright focused only on criminal law, making no reference to the potential of a world civil law and its potential to strengthen the individual in the world community.

Another approach to limiting state sovereignty was to strengthen the judicial arm of the world organization in its ability to review international agreements. Wright had long agitated for universal jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice. To this effect he offered testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 27 January 1960 on Senate Resolution 94, which Hubert Humphrey had sponsored, that would require

the U.S. to accept jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal matters which involved a breach of treaty or international obligations, and on matters of international law. In other words, the resolution sought to remove the Connally reservation of 1946 which allowed the U.S. to determine whether a case was within its domestic jurisdiction and thus withdraw such a case from the International Court's jurisdiction.

Wright argued that it would be in the interest of the U.S. to strengthen the rule of law in international relations (in fact, he said, all democracies should be so inclined); that the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court without reservation would be a decisive move in this direction and would not impair any important interest of the U.S.¹² But Wright did not favor the Humphrey resolution, for it included a provision allowing the U.S. the right to exercise self-judgment in the case of multilateral treaties. Actually, Wright wanted to go further than the Humphrey resolution, for he advocated the elimination of any qualifying proviso to the Court's jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction could, in Wright's estimation, serve only to strengthen international organization and the rule of law. ¹³

But as the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, engaged in Cold War diplomacy during the years after 1945, Wright's grand design was severely thwarted. Wright had not anticipated this turn of events which so inhibited the degree of cooperation necessary for his planned expansion of international organization. A paradox developed in that the two superpowers were "more independent, powerful, and

dangerous than ever" and were the states most capable of thwarting international law and organization. Yet they were also the states whose cooperation was essential to make international law and organization effective. The conflicting coalitions of power--Nato and the Warsaw Pact--so divided the communist and capitalist worlds that they adopted the creed that other states were either for or against their coalition, with no middle ground possible. World order was not in sight as Wright supposed.

By 1949, growing hostilities between communist and capitalist countries threatened the expectations Wright held for the U.N. In a letter to Clark Eichelberger, then the leader of the private American Association for the United Nations, Wright lamented a growing realization that the U.N. was inadequate for its task. Still, he believed that the United Nations was the only nearly universal political forum within which the Soviet Union and the United States could maintain a dialogue about world problems, and as such, it was the only institution capable of providing the nucleus for a "world regime of law." This was the primary reason Wright demanded that the U.N. be strengthened, first through a "more active and insistent public opinion" and second, through an increase in the U.N.'s "institutional capacity to act effectively."¹⁴

It was not just the strained relations between the former wartime allies that threatened the new world order. A rapidly expanding technology and the "ever shrinking world" it created also contributed to the same end.¹⁵ No matter what were the centers of power, if sovereign states continued to control weapons of mass destruction like the nuclear bomb coupled with delivery systems like the jet airplane, the threat to world society remained,

according to many internationalists, in a system outside the control of international law and organization. These were critical assumptions which Wright, Schuman and Fleming held, and they informed much of their post-war scholarship.

As Wright contemplated the unfolding political cosmos, he saw the historical process itself becoming a threat to world stability. Foreshadowing Alvin Toffler's thesis in *Future Shock*, Wright declared that what he perceived as a vastly augmented pace of history was equally significant to the technological shrinking of the world. To Wright, new scholarship in all fields of study was exercising greater and more rapid impact than ever before. In its wake, ancient customs were breaking down, seeds of doubt were cast along with seeds of hope, new debates between radicals and conservatives developed, and new methods and goals evolved jointly with new confusion and strife.

All this and more contributed to a condition of political flux within the foundations of social institutions, and Wright feared that this flux made predictions of the future less than reliable. He feared as well that flux made the education of students more difficult, for teachers could no longer rely on time-tried traditions, nor could they prepare students for a world with which they were unacquainted and could not even discern.¹⁶ Here, then, was a voice of anxiety, no matter what decorous words of hope he dangled from it.

For many years, Wright had been concerned about the threat the technology of air travel posed to society.¹⁷ From his first airplane ride in 1920, this twentieth century mode of transportation fascinated Wright.¹⁸

He saw the airplane as the technological equal of gunpowder or the printing press of an earlier era in its impact on the human condition.¹⁹

Militarily, he dwelled on its destructive potential and saw it strictly as an offensive weapon; as a civilian he was anxious about its dynamic relation to the shrinking world paradigm to which he and others subscribed.

Especially when the airplane was coupled with the destructive power of the nuclear bomb, Wright had visions of apocalypse that prevented him from seeing any but that scenario in the event of another war.²⁰ As he stated in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1949, "The race in atomic weapons and armaments of all kinds is on and experience suggests . . . that such a race will eventuate in war. . . . Disaster seems as inevitable as in a Greek tragedy."²¹ Wright then called on the association to advocate a more powerful U.N.

Again, Wright seemed to be a prisoner of limited historical analysis.²² Because "experience suggests" that new weapons and armaments races led to war in the past does not make inevitable that they will do so in the future. Perhaps the strongest example of this is the limited use of chemical weapons during WWII. It is not a given that technological innovation leads irrevocably to its use in future warfare.

Wright could as well have looked at the consequences of Allied bombardment of Germany to see that a determined enemy could continue effectively to prosecute war in the face of such awesome destruction from the air. It was a lesson lost not only on Wright, but on the strategists who would plot the course of the U.S. air war in Vietnam. Granted, the coupling of the nuclear bomb with airborne delivery systems posed an altogether

new type of threat, but it was the policy of the U.S. not to initiate strategic nuclear warfare even during the years when it enjoyed a monopoly of the bomb, a policy adhered to in spite of great pressures to use strategic and/or tactical nuclear weapons during the intervention in Korea, and to a lesser extent during the conflict in Vietnam. There is also a contradiction in Wright's belief in rational behavior when it comes to the possibility of educating the public to the need for world organization and his fatalistic belief that humans will opt to use irrational weapons in pursuit of policy.

Wright claimed as well that under new conditions of warfare, especially with the advent of airpower, there would be incentives for ambitious rulers to unleash military aggression in the expectation of rapid benefits. Because of this, the role of "balancer in a balance of power world would be extremely expensive and the opportunities for prosperity and progress in such a world would be limited."²³ He expressed fears about the potential for a "garrison state" and what it could do to the freedoms the West valued so highly.

Wright's prescription was to place at the disposal of the United Nations sufficient force to support international law, to include an international airforce and other auxiliary military components. He cited the Committee to Study the Organization of Peace (C.S.O.P.) studies to suggest that a suitable distribution of air bases under the control of an international government could prevent aggression and maintain justice and world order.²⁴ Wright believed that the U.N. should have as well its own security force and a monopoly over nuclear research and production of nuclear capabilities. In the Fifth Report of the C.S.O.P. he declared that the current U.N. machinery

was sufficient to control atomic energy, to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, and to reduce conventional weapons. Security, he concluded, was attainable within the framework of the U.N.²⁵

But security for whom? Nearly one-third of the world population was not represented in the U.N. during the 1950s, including the populations of China, Tibet, Japan, the Germanies, and the Koreas. What would be the response of these peoples to a world organization granted the military power to impose its special interpretation of international law on the rest of the world? Given the U.N.'s dependence on individual contributions for budget maintenance, the largest of which came from Western powers, it seemed reasonable to assume that the U.N. could quite likely be little more than a trumpet of Western imperialism. This fear found expression in the Bandung Conference of twenty-nine Asian and African states in 1955 and the resultant declaration of the Five Principles of Bandung, which Wright supported. These included: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; nonaggression; noninterference in internal affairs of nations; equality of nations and races; and peaceful coexistence.²⁶

Wright's prescription for the control of nuclear energy was evident when he and the C.S.O.P. subscribed to the Baruch Plan, which sought to establish international control and verification of nuclear development. But Wright warned that even though Baruch's plan to control atomic energy was "an excellent plan," still "it was 'made in America,' and because of that the Soviets did not accept it."²⁷ Due to the continued gulf between the former allies, the need for the U.N. to control such extraordinary weapons and technology became even more immediate, but as Wright would

later note in reference to the Baruch Plan, "States are, however, extremely reluctant to limit in any way their industrial development."²⁸

There had been much debate surrounding the issue of the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council, a power thought to prevent the U.N. from assuming its proper effectiveness, during and after the San Francisco Conference. Wright and the C.S.O.P. subscribed to the interpretation that the veto did restrict U.N. action, but they were convinced that amending the Charter to rid it of the veto was impossible in the near future. They did not perceive this as an insurmountable obstacle, though, because they believed that amendment of the veto power was not necessary for the development of an effective program of security and disarmament.²⁹ Wright saw the evolution of the General Assembly, especially in light of its Uniting for Peace Resolution, which was passed on 3 November 1950 during the Korean War after the Soviets had returned to the Security Council, as a sign that the veto-bound Security Council might indeed be by-passed.

That resolution was an augur of a new, more effective U.N., as it provided an alternative procedure in the event of a stalemated Security Council. The resolution empowered the General Assembly to make recommendations on any situation that threatened the peace if a majority of the Assembly decided that because of a veto the Security Council would be unable to function.³⁰ Here was a direct effort to circumscribe the unanimity clause that had weakened the Security Council. Wright claimed that the Uniting for Peace Resolution demonstrated that the unanimity of the great powers was not essential to the effectiveness of the U.N., that

unanimity was not one of the principles of the Charter, that unanimity was not essential to the function of other organs of the U.N., and that the members had developed viable alternative methods to accomplish U.N. tasks "when the Security Council veto stood in the way of achieving the purposes and . . . principles set forth in the Charter."³¹ Still, the veto power was something Wright anxiously sought to eliminate.³²

The final recommendations of the C.S.O.P. provided that the U.N. be authorized to form an adequate armed force of its own to include an international airforce; award of strategic bases and narrow waterways to the U.N.; arms regulations to include nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and conventional weapons; adoption of the Nuremberg Charter as basis of an international criminal code; and elimination of the veto in the future.³³ The C.S.O.P. concluded that the U.N. was capable of meeting its task and called for renewed U.S. commitment to the U.N. and for a world public opinion in support of U.N. They closed with the exhortation that every effort short of appeasement should be made to reach an overall agreement with the Soviet Union.³⁴ This remained the position of the C.S.O.P. at least until Wright's death in 1970.

Of course their assumption was that either the U.N. be granted a monopoly over airpower or else all nations must agree to limit their airpower to less than the U.N. force. There was no precedent for such a system, and certainly no means to coerce the great powers to accept such limitation. Wright and the C.S.O.P. had failed to see any use but a strategic one for nuclear weapons; in theory, they could be used tactically and in a limited capacity, a possibility Wright and the C.S.O.P. either rejected or

which escaped their analysis and thus limited their vision of future war to nuclear annihilation. Wright and the C.S.O.P. relied solely on the persuasive power of reason to accomplish their agenda, which perhaps explains in part why their suggestions were not always implemented, because others could claim just as reasonably that nuclear weapons could be used without the destruction of the world or, even more compellingly, that their mere existence and threat of use served to protect the peace.

Missing from all their prescriptions, procedural and structural, is any emphasis on the position of the executive within the U.N. This is unusual, for Wright was a Wilsonian who emphasized the need for a strong executive, a constant in his approach to government, as demonstrated in his first book, his opposition to the Bricker Amendment, and his interpretation of executive power under the U.S. constitution to deploy and use military force.³⁵ This omission is evident from the first recommendations of the C.S.O.P. and in all of Wright's examinations of the U.N. Perhaps he feared that charismatic leadership was necessary to create a strong executive in a world body, or perhaps they thought the public was not prepared to accept such a position, or perhaps they knew the great powers would object to a strong executive. Nonetheless, it would have been appropriate for them to address the issue.

It was the Cold War, though, more than any other complex of events or institutional weaknesses that seemed to limit the potential of the U.N. Wright greatly feared that what he perceived as the coming bipolar distribution of power was inherently unstable and placed the world in great jeopardy of yet another war. Wright noted in 1946 that although the

world was "not yet committed to a two-power structure"--he cited the independent positions of Britain and France, the potential for China to engage in power politics, and the fact that some of the less powerful states had "successfully resisted absorption in the sphere of any superpower" as the basis of his observation--yet he believed that the conditions were "less favorable to a stable equilibrium than they were in the nineteenth century or even in the interwar period." Wright believed that to remedy this situation there would have to be either the addition of several other superpowers to offset the Soviet Union and the United States, or world organization would have to be empowered to prevent catastrophe. As he wrote in the *Yale Law Journal*, "In principle it is difficult to see how an equilibrium between only two centers of power can be stable. In general, the stability of a political equilibrium increases with the number of relatively equal states contributing to that equilibrium." 36

Although the Security Council in theory created five nearly equal legal powers within the U.N. structure, in practice those powers differed greatly in their ability to influence world peace. And there was the ever present threat that the superpowers could act outside the agency of the U.N., as their military and economic strength could not be contained should they choose to use either for unilateral purposes. Wright's prescriptions as described above would have created a world organization either superior in military capability or equal to even the greatest superpower, so that even if one or another great power attempted to breach international law the U.N. could either effectively address the challenge on its own or act as the traditional stabilizing influence when the balance of power was

asynchronous. This both the world public and the great powers were unwilling to do.

This emphasis on coercive power is an interesting development in Wright's thought. He was a man who fervently believed in the power of reason and who had expressed optimism in the ability of humanity to recognize the necessity of world organization without being forced to accept it through imposition. Yet the experience of the League of Nations and the unwillingness of the nation states to allow international law to be completely effective proved to him that for law to be effective it must have behind it the power to coerce those who are its objects.³⁷

One of the most effective means of coercing individuals is the power to tax them. Wright believed that for the U.N. to become equal to its task, it must be provided with an independent income. He was aware that the general public would perhaps not welcome such an increase of the U.N.'s ability to so directly influence their lives, so he sought an initial source of income which would establish a precedent for future revenues. He wrote that a first step might include ceding the sea bed and desert and arctic regions to the U.N. which could then profit from future exploitation of resources, and he developed an historical argument to demonstrate how other centralizing organizations came eventually to levy taxes on individuals.³⁸

Not only that, but his emphasis on the need to make individuals jurally competent in the international legal system demonstrates that he believed it was impossible to sustain the necessary public opinion for world organization without that organization having full power to coerce the

individual as well as the state. He sensed that the need to create a strong world organization was immediate following the allied victory in Europe, for public opinion in favor of such a world organization would, he believed, rapidly subside after the Axis powers were vanquished.

As early as 1943, Wright observed that Gallup and other polls indicated that people were increasingly sympathetic to the Wilsonian agenda of international organization as the means to secure world peace. People were at last willing, he thought, to sacrifice elements of military, economic, and legal sovereignty to a world organization strong enough to maintain peace in order that the sovereignty residual to the nation states could be directed toward non-military pursuits.³⁹ But Wright tempered this optimism with the observation that enthusiasm would wane at war's end. It was therefore imperative for the public in America and the world to be "educated to a more fundamental appreciation" of world organization than that which occurred during and following the First World War.⁴⁰

Of course, some central questions remained, including: who would constitute "the public" and what system of government should be adopted for the world organization which that public would be educated to support? Who would be qualified to vote in this new world order? Who would hold positions of power and influence? Wright considered himself a democrat, but to him voting was "not the essence of democracy." It was "merely" one method by which the public's will could be measured. "Democracy," he wrote, "is government by public opinion."⁴¹ And public opinion could be unscrupulously manipulated. He feared that popular voting might lead to despotism and noted that "Despots have frequently

risen to power through plebiscites." As a consequence, he believed there must be "suitable safeguards" surrounding the voting process.⁴²

What those safeguards were he did not specify, but in a prize-winning essay written for a contest which the Institute for Social Research in Oslo organized around the theme "On the Relevance of Scientific Research to the Peaceful Solution of International Conflict," Wright made known his fear of the unsophisticated voter.⁴³ First he emphasized the importance of all media, including the fine arts, in the effort to propagandize the people of the world to accept certain universal values as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But then Wright declared that as important as general literacy might be for long-term peace, care had to be exercised that previously isolated peoples would not be subjected to too rapid progress in learning to read. Progress in educating such peoples might, he wrote, "contribute more to violence than to peace, because they may read and believe new ideas, unadapted to the traditional patterns of behavior, or interested propagandas of revolution [therefore] education and the extension of facilities of mass communication into new areas [must] be closely related to the content of the ideas communicated."⁴⁴ He then perfunctorily acknowledged that the "problem of confining such communication to ideas adapted to the needs of the group without invading the human right to freedom of communication presents difficulties."⁴⁵

Care must be exercised as well to avoid presentism in making the following assertion, but it is evident that most of the "previously isolated peoples" would be people of color. The analogy of the Southern planter who kept his slaves illiterate in order to better control them is a natural

one for this situation, although the question of intent arises. Wright's intent was benevolent, with only the best interests of the "isolated peoples" at heart. But who was making the decision? Who determined their state of preparedness? Who determined what the best interests were?

Wright stated, too, that WW II war aims of the U.N. included the "abolition of racial exclusiveness," and that the democracies wanted to apply democracy to race relations, and that democracy abhorred the credo of racial elitism. Yet he made no mention of the overt racism that both Great Britain and the U.S. practiced/countenanced in both their imperial holdings and within their metropolitan society.⁴⁶ A substantial portion of the world public was not allowed to participate in supposedly democratic forms of government because of their skin color, yet Wright made little issue of that in his published writings.

And he questioned whether or not poor and illiterate people even valued freedom. Such people, he wrote, did not find freedom to be an "effective symbol." They were, he asserted, more interested in equality and welfare. This strips the dignity of intellect and principle from many who participated in the world's most important revolutions for liberty and credits only the elite with the establishment of the civil liberties Wright valued. Although he allowed that the poor and illiterate might be interested in freedom, he maintained that such interest was contingent upon the achievement of equality and higher standards of living: only then would "personal freedom mean much."⁴⁷ He was even willing to entertain the notion that "submission to the discipline of communism" would be good for "the very poor people of Asia and Africa" in order to

develop rapidly their economy and standards of living, after which they might come to value freedom.⁴⁸ Presumably he held the same to be true of the poor ethnic peoples of central and eastern Europe and of Latin America.

Wright was ambiguous about the role of women in the new world order as well. In a letter to Edward Bernays, Wright stated that he believed in the principle of equal opportunity in business, professions and politics for women, but he also held that the biological and functional differences of men and women would result in a much lower proportion of women in politics, in government, in the professions and in business than that of men. In his estimation, though, such functional differentiation should not be the result of legal discrimination; rather, it should be the result of inclination.⁴⁹ Although this likely was considered an "enlightened" view in many circles of the day, it betrays his belief that women were biologically inferior to men, at least as far as their capacity to operate in the public sphere was concerned.

The irony here is undeniable. A man who would remake the world knows he is dependent on an organized world opinion to achieve his goal. But humans of all intellectual capacity, of all colors, of each gender, of different ideology constitute that world opinion. Yet in Wright's calculations inequalities due to race, gender, and education were readily acknowledged.

These remarks of Wright's provide continued substantiation of the paternalistic elitism referred to in the introduction and earlier chapters. Surely, no one who understands the nuances of foreign policy and of

international relations would seriously advocate that they be conducted under the immediate scrutiny of a direct participatory democracy, but foreign policy is only one part of a united peoples' agenda. Wright demanded an organized world opinion and yet his theories would deny equal standing to its majority. Wright had created for himself something of a dilemma in that he was dependent on an organized world opinion and yet he was unconvinced of the majority's ability to function properly within that opinion.

Perhaps the public's rapid exit from the lane of internationalism, if indeed Wright was correct in believing that the public travelled in that direction, to that of support for the Cold War policies of the U.S. reinforced this contempt for the public's capacity to "do the right thing." Wright's fear of popular democracy was of long standing, at least as far back as his remarks in a 1920 article about the "crudity of Jefferson's pell mell banquet and Jackson's Peggy O'Neill cotillion."⁵⁰ Wright noted that "By 1949 American opinion had fallen away from the determination to make the United Nations work manifested in 1946, had accepted a bipolar world of power politics, and seemed ready to support any policy designed to give the United States and its allies a military edge over the Soviet Union and its allies," and these were opinions he did not endorse.⁵¹ This was especially apparent in his opposition to containment theory as he understood it.

Wright believed that the two big errors of post-WW II U.S. policy were to call "Kremlin imperialism" communism, and to call the policy of preventing Kremlin expansion "containment."⁵² The imposition of these terms on the description of the world political situation, Wright thought,

led the U.S. into a Kremlin trap: the U.S. accepted the Kremlin thesis that the Kremlin spoke for and led all communists; therefore, given the Kremlin's ideological commitment to the overthrow of the capitalist world, all communists were necessarily the enemies of the capitalist world. Such a framework prevented the U.S. and its policymakers from exploiting future Titos. It was only as an instrument of Kremlin imperialism that the West should fear communism, not as an indigenous manifestation of self-determination by a sovereign state. "I doubt," wrote Wright, "whether we know how much of the communism in Asia and Africa is Kremlin inspired and how much is a local reaction against the sense of unequal treatment and conditions of low economic standards."⁵³

Wright maintained as well that the U.S. did not possess sufficient resources to contain the Soviet Union along all its frontiers. Plausibly, the U.S. could "provide an adequate force so that if a war should occur, the Soviet Union would inevitably be defeated," but the best way to an adequate defense, he believed, was through a strong U.N. with a genuine police force.⁵⁴ Containment doctrine was, said Wright, the product of a "Maginot mentality."⁵⁵ And, as has been noted, Wright feared the costs and potential for increased tensions that attended containment. He perceived the basic question to be whether the West could build a power so overwhelming that the Soviets would find that victory in any confrontation was "hopeless" and thus "gradually fade into their orbit," or whether the West should concentrate on the development of "a more stable equilibrium" than it now possessed through a strengthened United Nations. He believed that

although the first alternative was desirable if possible, it increased greatly the risks of World War III.⁵⁶

By 1961 Wright had concluded that the pursuit of containment had caused the U.S. power position relative to the Soviet Union to decline, militarily and economically, as well as undermining America's reputation in the underdeveloped world.⁵⁷ Wright also criticized the position Henry Wallace and his supporters advocated toward Russia in 1948 as borderline appeasement, so the question is what policy did Wright perceive as the best for world peace and for world organization?⁵⁸ He wrote "We must keep our powder dry, but we must avoid . . . action which would increase Soviet anxieties."⁵⁹ Much of the reason that underlay his approach of quiet preparedness, of prudence, or of straddling fences, is to be found in his acceptance of convergency theory.

In what might be a classic, although simple, statement of the implications of convergency theory, Wright declared that the "evils of both socialism and capitalism are so manifest that the search for . . . mixed economies has proceeded."⁶⁰ He argued for continued adherence to U.N. procedures and popular education to arrive at a more complex solution than simple "black and white" solutions that radical socialists or capitalists advocated. Wright predicted in 1956 that in the next twenty years the Soviets would gain on the U.S. in military potential, assuming political stability; that relaxations occurring in the Soviet Union with respect to civil liberties and economic opportunities might lead to an improvement in Soviet morale; that the Soviet bloc would decentralize; and that cooperative elements should increase.⁶¹

The key to bringing about such convergence would be to avoid tensions that lead to war. Wright was most concerned that intense competition for resources and for ideological supremacy between the superpowers could well lead to such tensions. The U.S. policy of containment and the Soviet response to it threatened to destroy the evolution of the U.N. and that of world organization. Wright was especially anxious about the development of regionalism, because he saw in its post-WWII development the creation of a bipolar system that inherently threatened to upset the peace.

Wright criticized the growing trend of regional defense strategies in a letter to Walter Lippmann, with whom Wright had an enduring correspondence and friendship. Wright informed Lippmann that he had read his book on U.S. war aims, and agreed with much of it, but thought it "over-emphasize[d] regionalism and under-emphasize[d] universalism in the constitution of a world order which can give reasonable stability."⁶² Wright and the C.S.O.P. had emphasized the subordination of regional security systems to the general international organization in the fifth of their seven-step recommendation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, but it had become obvious to them that the regional security systems of the post-WW II era were designed to act independently of the U.N.⁶³

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exacerbated his fears that the U.N. would not (or could not) regulate regional organizations. Wright believed that the formation of NATO had increased tensions in the world, and had perhaps contributed to what he believed was the Soviet inspired invasion of South Korea. He feared as well that the extension of the North Atlantic Pact into a federal union might serve to further

increase tensions, and perhaps precipitate hostilities.⁶⁴ To Wright, the implication was clear: the Soviets perceived NATO as an organization outside the U.N. and the impact of world opinion and thus a threat directed at Soviet interests.

Wright feared as well that in order to be effective, NATO would have to incorporate German forces, something he was unwilling to advocate at the time. He believed that the use of German forces would provoke the Soviet Union and that Germany would not cooperate unless it received a *quid pro quo* on the eastern frontier. He observed that dependence on German forces in a defense plan would likely make NATO an instrument for German policy to reunite Germany and recover the eastern provinces from Poland, and he believed it would be premature to consider incorporating German forces in the NATO structure until Europe and the West had achieved comparable strength with the Soviet Union.⁶⁵ After Western strength had been reestablished, he was prepared to support the creation of a neutralized German buffer state as the best solution to the problem Germany posed for the international community. Wright agreed with what he said was General Eisenhower's willingness to drop the idea of using German forces for the present, but Wright also entertained the possibility that a situation could develop that required Western Germany to be coordinated within the North Atlantic Pact.⁶⁶

With regards to NATO, Wright feared that the U.S. could find itself in the position of financing the imperial policies of the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain in Asia. That is precisely what happened in the case of France and its prosecution of the war in Indochina. The U.S. found itself

supplying the bulk of the funds for that war with no, or insignificant, input to the policies that governed the conduct of the war, because of the perceived need to maintain unity within NATO. Wright believed such a policy for the U.S. would prove disastrous. Asian states might come to believe that the U.S. had abandoned interest in their security to maintain NATO. Because of this possibility, Wright favored a U.S. policy that retained American influence in Asia, and one that was not burdened with the legacy of European imperialism. This would, he believed, be the best policy to prevent the expansion of communism in Asia as well.⁶⁷ It may seem somewhat incongruous that Wright should favor an "independent" course for U.S. policy toward Asia, but it seems likely that Wright's use of "independent" was always qualified by recognition of U.S. paramount obligations to the U.N. and international law.

Wright was not opposed to regionalism *per se*. He opposed regionalism that would be outside the U.N. umbrella. In what was almost a manifesto, Wright wrote a letter to John Foster Dulles, former member of the C.S.O.P. and then with the State Department, in which Wright commented extensively on the evolution of regionalism. Wright noted that Dulles had written a report entitled "Peaceful Change" for the C.S.O.P. in April 1941 in which the future Secretary of State had noted the possibility that a postwar world organization might allow for the development of great regional associations that would be as "exclusive and resistant to change" as any nation.⁶⁸

Wright observed that the U.N. had given greater scope to regional arrangements than had the League of Nations, and that there had been

proposals to federate some of these great regions. But he likewise recognized a trend toward the bipolarization of the allies and wards of the United States against those of the Soviet Union. Because Wright was convinced that in a balance of power system the larger the number of great powers, the more stable the balance, he feared that a bipolar regionalization would eventually produce great instability, and weaken the United Nations.⁶⁹

Wright agreed with certain suggestions which John Foster Dulles had made in his Detroit address of November 1951, entitled "Can We Stop Russian Imperialism," especially the creation of a "great punishing power of the free nations." Wright observed, though, that in a bipolar world of two competing ideologies, it must be made clear that such a punishing power would be used exclusively in response to unprovoked aggression. The problem he was unable to solve, though, was how to convince the Soviet Union that this was how such a punishing power would be used. The Soviet Union, once such an overwhelming punishing power was created, might believe that its intent was an offensive threat to the Soviet bloc and take preemptive action.⁷⁰

To avoid such a sequence of events, Wright believed that the U.N. should exercise sovereign control over the application of the punishing power. He believed that it had been demonstrated that the U.N. could take effective action despite the threat of vetos, and that the diversity of its membership would serve as a brake on the urge to use such force for aggression. What remained to be seen, Wright wrote, was whether the organization of the United Nations could be developed sufficiently so that it could control such

overwhelming force solely to stop aggression and never to initiate it, in the view of the division between free countries and the Soviet countries?⁷¹

Although his prescriptions demonstrated a genuine concern for Soviet apprehensions, Wright was anything but sympathetic to the Soviet cause. As he continued the letter to Dulles, Wright applauded Dulles's suggestion that the free nations must embark on a political counteroffensive against the Soviet bloc. He believed that the example of Josip Broz Tito, who had led Yugoslavia independently of the Kremlin, could be used to undermine the notion of a monolithic Communism which served Kremlin imperialism. This example also served to notify the nationalities which were subjected to Soviet leadership that they might be able to retain communism or socialism or whatever domestic system they wanted after they freed themselves from the Kremlin yoke.

Wright concluded that such theoretical considerations gave value to the C.S.O.P., for "it could think in long-run terms without direct responsibility for an immediate situation." Wright pondered whether the U.S. should adopt as one of its primary foreign policy objectives the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Such dissolution as Wright contemplated would allow for the creation of at least three great regional organizations from the remains of the old empire: the Soviet Union itself, the countries of Eastern Europe, and China.⁷²

To reduce further the danger bipolarization presented for a world system based on balance of power politics, Wright suggested that if such a breakup occurred, the free world should then contemplate a contemporaneous breakup of the North Atlantic

system into three regional arrangements: Western Europe, the Inter-American system, and the British Commonwealth. As a third goal, he suggested that another great regional arrangement in the Near and Middle East might be created through an expansion of the Arab League. Wright concluded that if such regions were organized for their own defense the political equilibrium of the world might be stabilized. As an added benefit, he thought that through the regional influence in the United Nations, that organization could better assure that dominant 'punishing power' would be used only to answer unprovoked aggression.⁷³

Dulles replied tersely that the U.N. should be relieved of "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and looked upon primarily as the 'town meeting of the world' As things are today, the United Nations professes to be both a universal organization and a security organization and, in fact, it does not do either job adequately because it tries ineffectually to do both."⁷⁴

This must have been a great disappointment for Wright, who likely hoped that Dulles would remain sympathetic to the internationalist cause. Wright responded that "I should be afraid that a town meeting of the world unrelated to power to give affect to opinion would become irresponsible, diffuse, and uninteresting. The world press and world interest would hardly continue paying attention to such an organization."⁷⁵ He had unknowingly described the U.N. of the future.

Although Wright continued to express his views in correspondence to Dulles, the letter of 6 February 1952 was the last substantive reply from Dulles. The timbre of these letters indicate that although Wright was

critical of Dulles' tactics, he was to a degree sympathetic with the cause of the cold warriors.⁷⁶ It was, of course, circumstantial that his redefinition of neutrality now served their cause, but Wright's opposition to the Soviet regime was such that, although his commitment to the U.N. and international law prevented his outright endorsement of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, he was in the camp of the cold warriors.

The letter to Dulles further demonstrated Wright's belief that a bipolar world was inherently unstable and that regionalization as it had transpired since WW II was a deterrent to an effective U.N. He feared that regional groupings outside the organization of the U.N. (or if within it under Articles 51 and 52, then still wielding nearly complete autonomy) might allow for the disregard of international law, and Wright believed such regional organizations allowed for what was essentially unilateral intervention. What he seemed not to recognize was that it was in some ways the failure of the U.N. to act effectively, especially the Security Council, that had led to the creation of NATO, a regional and virtually autonomous organization.

Wright desired a general treaty that would designate military contingents for U.N. use, which would accept Assembly recommendations on a 2/3 vote for cease-fire, and provide for use of the contingents in areas subject to regional defense agreements. Such a treaty would, he wrote, "reduce the need for such discriminatory and provocative special alliances as NATO, Warsaw, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact."⁷⁷ In later years, U.S. intervention in Vietnam, in Lebanon, and in the Dominican Republic, Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and French, British,

and Israeli intervention in the Suez seemed to prove that his fears of regionalization gone amuck, and of continued unilateral or bilateral aggressive actions, were well founded.

Wright believed that U.S. intervention in Korea, though, was justifiable in that it was U.N. sanctioned. And because the U.N. sponsored the intervention, it was necessary that the U.N. be successful, for if it was not it could face destruction. Wright told Clark Eichelberger that to withdraw from and abandon the Koreans could destroy the U.N. He looked to the failures of the League of Nations in Manchuria and Ethiopia as evidence that international organizations cannot engage in an operation of collective security and fail to accomplish its goals without also jeopardizing future credibility. Wright emphasized that "We must insist upon carrying out United Nations resolutions concerning Korean unification, elections and rehabilitation."⁷⁸

Wright continued the letter with the following recommendations: that an impartial U.N. commission should implement elections and rehabilitation in Korea, and that the members of the commission could include Chinese Communists and/or Soviet representative; a multilateral withdrawal of troops to include a guarantee that they will not return and that the U.N. commission be allowed to function freely; and that the possibility of such guarantees was probable due to the proximity of U.N. air forces and naval forces in Japan and the surrounding area which would offset the proximity of Communist Chinese forces in Manchuria.⁷⁹

The Korean intervention brought as well increased pressure on internationalists to address the situation of Chinese representation in the

U.N. Wright examined this issue in the 5 December 1950 letter to Eichelberger. He was highly critical of the nonrecognition policy of the U.S., of the leadership of the Republican party, of General MacArthur, and of Senator Joseph McCarthy, all of whom Wright believed followed a course doomed to failure. Instead of pursuing a Wilsonian policy of nonrecognition of a morally distasteful government, the U.S. should have, in Wright's estimation, accepted the Chinese Communist government in Peking as the *de facto* government and the government entitled to represent China in the U.N. As a *quid pro quo* for the voluntary removal of Chinese forces from Korea Wright was willing to admit the Communist government to the United Nations, recognize Formosa as a part of China and allow the Communist government to occupy it, and to withdraw all support from the Nationalists.⁸⁰

Then, in a passage that reveals his strategic grasp of the geopolitics of the day and that furthered his idea of possible friction within the "monolithic" communist region that he had referred to in his letter to Dulles, Wright emphasized again the potential for a rift in Sino-Soviet relations. He may have subscribed to the bipolar model of the world, but he knew that Moscow could not direct every policy within its "sphere." He wrote that aside from the need to support such a position for the PRC in the United Nations, there existed a "purely political" reason: that failure to do so would serve the cause of the Kremlin policymakers.

He believed that Soviet officials had surreptitiously fostered the U.S. led movement to prevent recognition of the PRC because they were aware of the potential for discord "between even a Communist China and the Soviet

Union in regard to Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet and other areas" of historic dispute between the two countries. He also thought it possible that the Soviets wished to "divert Western military force to a hopeless struggle in China in order to free [Soviet] hands for taking over Western Europe."⁸¹ Soviet imperialism, in Wright's view, might provide the mechanism to divide the communist world. In retrospect, this was a remarkably accurate foresight.⁸²

His concluding remarks to Eichelberger also revealed a new realism in his approach to world organization. As an analogy, he offered the "bribe" paid to Franco after the Allied landing in North Africa to justify dealing with ideological enemies. This was a policy many liberals had criticized because of Franco's collusion with Hitler and Mussolini. Nonetheless, Wright observed that the policy had worked well in 1943 and declared that had we first negotiated with the People's Republic of China, which represented the most serious threat to a successful operation, before initiating the operation in Korea we might have avoided Chinese entrance into the war. Wright laid the blame for this failure on what he labelled "the unthinking opposition in this country to everything Communist" and the actions of the Senate in the winter of 1949.

Those mistakes now came to haunt the U.S. and Wright believed that everything possible must be done to rectify the situation through the United Nations.⁸³ Wright maintained that "implementation of collective security is of the utmost importance but that in the present state of the world it implies that a legalistic position of operating against aggressors must always be accompanied by a realistic political recognition of the

actual power position."⁸⁴ As much as he abhorred power politics, he remained aware of the limitations of international law within a system in which just such politics prevailed.

Wright had developed, too, a new appreciation for the potential of the underdeveloped nations and the sense of nationalism within them to contribute to a stable or unstable world order, and of the potential for an unsophisticated U.S. foreign policy to aggravate extant problems in those areas. In an article entitled "America 1975 Series: The U.S. Position in the World," Wright declared that the U.S. was squandering its "great and deserved reputation" by maintaining racial discrimination at home and favoring colonial powers over peoples seeking self-determination.⁸⁵

Clearly, Wright believed that support for the colonial regimes was outside the interest of the U.S., of the U.N. and of peace. The tug-of-war between the Soviet and Western poles for influence in the developing world seems to have tempered his earlier position on the need to prepare people for independence. Two of these areas on which he focused his analysis were the Congo and Vietnam.

Wright saw the U.N. involvement in the Congo during the summer of 1960 as a positive development toward the fulfillment of the potential of the world organization to resolve conflict. In an article entitled "Legal Aspects of the Congo Situation," Wright observed that the situation in the Congo had more than local or regional importance: it was important to the organization of the world community on several levels. First, the U.N. had capably demonstrated its ability to wield effectively armed forces under its own command to maintain peace. Second, the U.N. had asserted a positive

role in assisting newly independent states in the development of stable governments. Third, the crisis contributed to the solution of several difficult legal problems which the U.N. had faced. And fourth, a new and significant role for the unaligned States was evolving, a role in which they could assert an important voice in solving the political problems the U.N. faced within the context of the Cold War between the major powers.⁸⁶

After he provided a long history of the Congo problem, Wright concluded with regard to independent U.N. military forces that a permanent force of individual enlistees would be preferable to national contingents and would be permissible under the Charter. An apportionment consistent with the "regular schedule of apportionments" should finance the force, not voluntary contributions, and to withhold contributions would be "a clear breach of Charter obligations."⁸⁷

In Wright's estimation, the situation in the Congo represented a new era for the U.N. and demonstrated that even neutral states like Sweden and India could and would take action to ensure the peace. No matter the diminished scale upon which the U.N. operated in the Congo, it gave long-term hope that the world organization could someday wield power in order to promote international peace. In the short term, the U.N. response showed as well that the world organization could and should be entrusted to effectively resolve future such conflicts in disputed political arenas, especially given the possibility of superpower confrontation and its impact on the world.

Certainly Wright had in mind U.S. support of the French and of the Diem regime in Vietnam when he wrote both the article on the Congo and the

article for the "America 1975 series" in 1956.⁸⁸ The ever enlarging role of the U.S. in Vietnam was a source of concern for many, especially those who wanted to discourage such unilateral action. The possibility that such intervention could result in a confrontation of the superpowers was great, given the nature of the ideological conflict of the day, and as a consequence, rules that governed intervention needed to be clear and enforceable.

At issue over U.S. intervention in Vietnam first, though, was the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*--that treaties must (or ought) to be observed--in reference to the Geneva Conference and the subsequent Cease-fire Resolution of 1954. The U.S. was not a party to either, but the treaties had created a norm of international law that all states were obligated to recognize. Wright noted that the formalities for suspending a treaty were not followed by either Hanoi or Saigon, but as in his article "Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation," Wright declared that there was no justification for U.S./Saigon charges that the North Vietnamese breached any of the provisions of the treaties or cease-fire.⁸⁹

Wright argued as well that Vietnam was one state and therefore the hostilities constituted civil strife, which in turn provided no international legal justification for U.S. involvement, at least not on the grounds the U.S. claimed, nor for any other foreign or collective intervention, unless such civil strife threatened world peace.⁹⁰ He revealed the rationale for this argument in a letter to Richard A. Falk of 5 April 1963.

Now a noted scholar of international law, Falk had written Wright for his opinion on counter-intervention and civil strife. Wright concluded

that counter-intervention was likely to "widen domestic strife into international war, [or] maintain the *status quo*, [which] may deny the right of self-determination and hamper human progress."⁹¹ Therefore, counter-intervention should be avoided, and Wright offered several measures as a basis for international response to civil strife. He maintained that there must be a clear definition of subversive intervention and that efforts to prevent it should be channeled through the U.N.; that an effort must be made to educate people to value ideological tolerance and to value genuine self-determination of peoples; and that states should accept the principle of non-intervention in civil strife (here he specifically attacked both the Communist doctrine of supporting wars of liberation and the free world doctrine of support to democratic revolutions within Communist countries).⁹²

Wright then defined situations in which intervention in civil strife was permissible. States retained the right to intervene in collective defense against an armed attack. If civil strife were the consequence of such an armed attack, Wright would approve of intervention if it were at the request of the recognized government, even if that government had been forced into exile. The U.N. could as well intervene in certain situations, although Wright counseled against such intervention as a general rule. Wright advocated U.N. intervention only if the civil strife threatened international peace. Such a threat would usually inhere in a situation that outside subversive intervention or armed attack initiated, or if the civil strife involved gross violations of human rights that shocked the collective conscience of humankind. Even under these circumstances, the

intervention should be confined to the "rectification of these conditions and to assistance of genuine self-determination."⁹³

Wright concluded that in situations where legitimate governments had been ousted through aggression or subversive intervention, non-recognition should be used as a sanction if it was likely to promote genuine self-determination. He cautioned, though, that non-recognition not be used as a means to prevent accord with *de facto* governments and states which had exercised control and provided stability for a considerable period of time.

Wright would modify this policy of recognition only with the application of the "fruits of aggression" principle. This, too, could be modified, even if aggression and/or intervention had caused the change, if the affected population acquiesced to the government for a considerable period. Under such circumstances, the U.N., not the separate states, should recognize the government. Here he suggested, with a reference to Hirsch Lauterpacht, that the principle "*jus ex injuria non oritur*" must be balanced by the principle "*ex factis jus oritur*." ⁹⁴

Of course, even Wright's experience with legal definitions did not prevent him from falling into some of the traps he sought to remedy. What constituted "genuine" as opposed to sham self-determination? What criteria are applied to determine whether civil strife is "mainly" the consequence of armed attack? What constituted an "actual" threat to international peace? What factors made it possible to promote "genuine" self-determination? And is acquiescence synonymous with independent, democratic choice? It was not unusual just for Wright, but for many

academics, to raise as many questions as they sought to answer with their prescriptions.

Wright had not always been opposed to counter-intervention, whether legal or not. In a letter to Charles S. Bacon written in 1947, Wright had concluded from a United Nations Commission report that the freedom of the Greek people to determine their own form of government would be greatly diminished unless measures were taken to prevent or oppose intervention from the north. He realized that the effort to prevent outside intervention might lead to U.S. intervention, but hoped that U.S. actions in Greece would benefit the Greeks in the development of their economy and the establishment of "a government on democratic (Wright crossed out "democratic") principles they favor."⁹⁵ It seems that he now questioned the ability of counter-intervention to produce desired results within the context of the Cold War.

Generally, though, Wright was disposed to use a litmus test to assess interventions. In regard to the 1958 U.S. intervention in Lebanon, he wrote that the U.N. Charter recognized three justifications for intervention: 1) the right of individual or collective self-defense; 2) on the authority of the U.N. or other competent international body; and 3) at the invitation of a state in pursuance of its sovereignty against all aggressor states.⁹⁶ Wright concluded that the U.S. intervention in Lebanon was not justified on any of the above grounds, and that if the test of international law were applied, the United States would find it difficult to justify its intervention.⁹⁷

As has become obvious, there were many reasons for Wright to oppose U.S. intervention in Vietnam, but he did not oppose it on the grounds of executive abuse of authority as did so many critics of the intervention. This was consistent with his long-standing interpretation of executive control of the armed forces.⁹⁸ He believed the executive had the constitutional power to commit U.S. forces and claimed that both precedent and Supreme Court decisions supported extensive executive power to deploy armed forces in order to protect U.S. territory or citizens. Only the Congressional option to withhold appropriations could limit these broad constitutional powers, but he noted that Congress had voted funds and approved the use of force.⁹⁹ It was the manner in which the executive pursued that intervention which Wright regarded to be illegal, not the actual commitment of forces. The bombing of North Vietnam demonstrated this clearly for it was, according to Wright, a clear violation of international law.¹⁰⁰

Wright had concluded that U.S. policymakers were engaged in a blind pursuit of imperialism.¹⁰¹ Blind, because Wright thought the American people failed to see "the difference between imperialism and internationalism." Because of this failure they had supported unilateral actions that obstructed the duties and obligations the U.S. took upon itself as a signator to the U.N. Charter.¹⁰²

Wright's reputation in the community of international lawyers and scholars led Senator Wayne Morse to request his testimony at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on a resolution that the United States should submit the Vietnam war issue to the United Nations. He then

indicated that, in light of Wright's long career and reputation, it would be very helpful if he testified before the committee.¹⁰³ Wright testified on 26, 27 Oct 1967, and that testimony revealed an early glimpse of the perspective many of the opponents of the war levelled against it.

Of course, Wright's emphasis, given the nature of the resolution, was the positive role the U.N. could play in a settlement of the conflict, but he also emphasized the destructive repercussions of the war on the U.S. national interest.¹⁰⁴ After introductory remarks and an analysis of U.S. obligations under Article 2, paragraph 3 of the U.N. Charter to use the U.N. in pursuit of peace, Wright described the historical context of the struggle Ho Chi Minh and his supporters had fought against the various interventionist forces in Vietnam. Wright recognized Ho as a nationalist, perhaps even more so than a communist, and observed that his determination to unite and maintain an independent Vietnam would be directed at any power that threatened those aims, capitalist or communist.¹⁰⁵ In Wright's opinion, Ho was Vietnam's Abraham Lincoln in that both men were dedicated to union, and that sentiment was likely to prevail over any effort to prevent it.¹⁰⁶

As for the U.S. position in Vietnam, Wright accurately perceived that policymakers in Washington, at least the majority of them, believed that if the U.S. only exerted a little more pressure, if it only utilized its great power more effectively, then the enemy would be brought to the negotiation table.¹⁰⁷ This would be the position of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in their pursuit of an "honorable peace" some two years later.¹⁰⁸ This position was untenable, said Wright, and he offered as evidence to support

his assessment an analysis of forty-five conflicts which had occurred since 1914 and a "general study of history."¹⁰⁹ Although he was essentially correct, his analysis was not the result of scientific methodology, but of a close, and certainly subjective, reading of history.

Wright had concluded that U.S. policy in Vietnam was irreconcilable with U.S. obligations under the United Nations Charter, and was in conflict with the general principle of international law which forbade intervention in the internal affairs of another country.¹¹⁰ Wright noted that the U.S. claim that the Geneva Accords created two independent states was not substantiated, and that the State Department's effort to justify U.S. intervention on the basis of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was spurious in that the organization was created after the Geneva Accords and was an obvious attempt to circumscribe their intent.¹¹¹ Wright hoped that a vigorous debate of the conflict in front of the U.N. might generate a consensus of world opinion that would enable the U.N. to effectively resolve the conflict.¹¹²

There were several levels of intervention that Wright addressed besides those that involved the commitment of military forces on a large scale: covert operations, U-2 overflights, and dissemination of propaganda all came under his scrutiny. Although Wright had long encouraged the dissemination of information beyond the "iron curtain," he was not in favor of what he considered to be blatant propaganda.¹¹³ In a letter to Edward Bernays, who was at the time chair of the National Committee for an Adequate Overseas U.S. Information Program, Wright was generally supportive of the aims of the Committee, but he insisted that "we develop an

information program, not a propaganda program."¹¹⁴ Given the audience, this was not unlike telling a preacher that one can seek converts with fire, but not with brimstone.

Wright believed the U.S. should be a sort of beacon on the hill and not resort to public criticisms of other states or other ideologies; that it should employ 'due diligence' to prevent individuals who resided in the U.S. from engaging in actions that constituted international crimes; and that the U.S. should take the high ground even if other states employ "subversive propaganda and infiltration."¹¹⁵ He later condemned the Joint Resolution and Presidential Proclamation of "Captive Nations Week" of July 1959 as being designed to "encourage and incite revolt by the people in those states against the governments recognized by the United States."¹¹⁶ This, he wrote, was a violation of international law.

As for the U-2 overflights and the downing of Francis Gary Powers, Wright wrote that the U.S. had violated international law and had aggravated the offense when it lied about it, but that the U.S. was not guilty of aggression. Indeed, the U.S. had, according to Wright, "considerable moral, if not legal, justification on grounds of self-preservation and the extensive Soviet espionage activities."¹¹⁷ Wright lamented the political consequences because world tensions were escalated as the summit between Khrushchev and Eisenhower was cancelled. He noted as well Khrushchev's difficulties with Kremlin hardliners and questioned the decision making process that allowed U-2 flights so close to the summit meeting, given their possible consequences if discovered and publicized.¹¹⁸

Wright was anything but quiescent in his assessment of U.S. involvement with Cuba after the *Fidelistas* won control of the Cuban government. He wrote little about the Bay of Pigs fiasco, but he was adamant in his opposition to the Kennedy administration's response to Soviet placement of nuclear missiles on the island. Wright argued that the Cubans had the right under international law to establish defensive weapons in the face of a belligerent/bellicose U.S. administration and public.

As could be expected, he denounced the unilateral nature of the U.S. decision to blockade Cuba and praised Khrushchev's restraint. His legal argument rested upon the fact that the U.S. did not live up to its obligations to respect freedom of the seas; that it failed to submit threats to peace to the U.N. before taking unilateral action; that it did not refrain from use or threat of use of force except under circumstances of self-defense after armed attack; that it acted without the authority of the U.N.; and that it did not have the consent of the state against which the force was to be used.¹¹⁹

The willingness of U.S. policymakers to "go to the brink of nuclear war" was, he claimed, in total disregard of the international legal obligations of the U.S.¹²⁰ And in response to arguments about the communist "invasion" of the Western hemisphere, he declared that the nature of the Cuban government was up to the Cuban people. This is one element about self-determination that is lacking in Wright's analysis: how can it be guaranteed under oppressive regimes? He seemed to forget that not everyone is willing to lose their life to be free. Or perhaps he accepted Rousseau's dictum that a people gets the government it deserves.

The apparent cause of the various interventions of the 1950s and 1960s appeared to Wright to be something more than just competition between two ideologies, although that was the primary cause. It was dangerous, he thought, to attribute any one motivation to the foreign policy of any nation. In a letter to Walter Lippmann, Wright agreed that it was difficult to judge the real intentions of a nation, and that although many believed that Russia was "guided entirely by expansionist motivations, entirely by fear of attack, or entirely by Communist ideology," the influence of these and other factors was relative to changing circumstances.¹²¹ Wright had stated in a previous letter to Lippmann that it was safe to assume that the Soviet government has alternative policies, one of which was to "establish normal relations and develop mutually beneficial trade."¹²²

These convictions about Soviet behavior remained substantially unchanged for the rest of his life. In the article "International Conflict and the United Nations," he alluded sympathetically to the evolving New Left approach to understanding Soviet communism. U.S. policymakers, Wright believed, could benefit from a study of the extent to which the convictions of Soviet policymakers that intervention was a defensive necessity determined their aggressiveness, or whether they were reacting spontaneously to acts which they interpreted as hostile. Too often, and without sufficient evidence, U.S. policymakers assumed that Soviet actions were inherent characteristics of the Soviet state and/or that the ambition to dominate and convert the world motivated its leaders.¹²³

There is little doubt as to Wright's sympathies in the confrontation between Marxism and democratic capitalism. He believed that among

democracy's many advantages over communism were the former's respect for human liberty, and that under conditions of peace, democracy can advance materially, socially, and intellectually with greater speed than any other form of society.¹²⁴ But he was equally adamant that the U.N. should adopt a neutral role in the contest between democracy and totalitarianism. What he sought was, as John Kennedy put it, a "world safe for diversity," for a world safe for democracy, in the phrase of Wilson, did not necessarily imply a democratic world.¹²⁵

The United Nations must be ideologically neutral to prevent it from perpetuating the *status quo* in the face of needed change. Wright asserted that because the U.N. represented all ideologies, it must provide an opportunity for all ideologies to expand by legitimate means in order to maintain stability. Those means would include what Wright referred to as "genuine self-determination of peoples and legitimate transnational communication."¹²⁶ He concluded that if an ideology expanded through legitimate methods, "this would be evidence that it deserves to expand according to Jefferson's idea of the testing of ideas in a free forum of opinion."¹²⁷ Of course the U.N.'s advocacy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights tempered any such neutral position, for presumably a people could, through self-determination and legitimate means, abandon the democratic principles Wright and the U.N. Charter held so dear.

Wright's beliefs here are an extension of his principle that conflict is necessary to sustain public interest and to create progress. He believed that the dynamic of inconsistent opinions was an essential element of human progress.¹²⁸ In a document marked confidential and entitled

"Improvement of Relations With Russia," Wright declared that there was even cause to hope in the universal nature of Marxist ideology. The confidence of Marxists that communism would ultimately and inevitably triumph in the world should give the West a great sense of relief because that belief kept the Soviets from experiencing a sense of urgency to spread their program across the world. He compared the confidence of the Marxists to the decline of confidence he believed was infecting Western democracy, and concluded that should the advocates of liberal democracy recapture the confidence they once held their cause would triumph the long run. Wright observed that this optimism, with no sense of urgency compelling it to act, had made it possible for the competing religious ideologies of Christianity and Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, to "co-exist in the world with comparative tranquility for long periods of time."¹²⁹

And not unlike the ideologies of Islam or Christianity, Wright observed that Marxism may not have been the monolithic entity that the administrations portrayed it to be. He noted the dual nature of the myth of monolithic communism in that both the West and the Kremlin perpetuated it. It would be wise if the West rejected the Soviet thesis that all communist states follow the Kremlin lead, for they might then discover "that states other than Tito's Yugoslavia have within them strong nationalist roots and resist [the] Kremlin."¹³⁰ Perhaps, too, nonaligned states like Nehru's India, which wished to become satellites of neither the Kremlin nor the U.S., might "in time establish third, fourth, and fifth forces in the world," which would have the effect of stabilizing a bipolar system.¹³¹ This portrays

Wright's continued adherence to what was basically a balance of power system, despite his continued protests to the contrary, for maintaining stability and order.

This framework of conflict and progress led Wright to advocate the concept of peaceful coexistence. He had little doubt as to the outcome of the peaceful confrontation between the two ideologies intended to coexist: in his mind, democracy would always prevail over the long term. But Wright greatly feared the consequences of a prolonged ideological conflict. Ideological wars were historically insoluble, he believed, and he provided as evidence the wars from the seventh to the seventeenth centuries between Christians and Muslims, and those between Catholics and Protestants from the sixteenth through the seventeenth centuries. In neither instance was one side able to overcome the other, and Wright believed that the best means of resolution would be to adopt the formula of the Treaty of Westphalia: each country would be free to adopt its own ideology with the only constraints being adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹³²

Wright intended, if not to replace them, to offer a counterbalance to the ideologies of capitalism and communism with an ideology of internationalism. In his article "International Law and Ideologies," he wrote that he sought accommodation, "a middle way," between Western capitalism and Kremlin socialism. Wright observed that international law recognized a state's right to deal with ideological problems without external interference but noted, too, that both technology and the development of international standards of human rights had qualified that freedom of

action.¹³³ What he might have added was that a new ideology of internationalism and tolerance was being offered in the place of the two prominent world ideologies.

In some ways modern internationalism had been both a response to the unbridled nationalism of the nineteenth century and an evolutionary form of nationalism. Even though the fascists and national socialists, whom George Mosse described in *Nationalism and Sexuality* as caricatures of bourgeoisie respectability and devotion to the state, had been utterly defeated, many of the extreme aspects of nationalism as those two groups had developed it (as well as Stalin's use of nationalism in the Soviet Union) had been successfully incorporated in Allied propaganda.¹³⁴ It was ironic, then, that even one of nationalism's most ardent critics called for the adoption of certain of its most cohesive elements to strengthen the new world organization. This appears to be a constant in the theories and writings of Wright, Schuman, and Fleming.

Wright correctly placed great value on symbols, myths, metaphors, and shibboleths as agents of cohesion. He sought to provide such agents for the U.N. and to inculcate a sense of loyalty to them amongst world opinion. The blue and white flag of the U.N., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a world governed by law, the decisions of the International Court of Justice, the effort to place the individual within the jural sphere of the world organization, and many other actions, should all be construed as efforts to shape a new ideology. But neither he nor other theorists were able to provide the new organization with the myths and traditions of unity. There was no "Germania," no "Britannia," no "Marianne," no "Uncle Sam" to

appeal to gender identities; no legendary or charismatic heroes or heroines; no folk music or literature or dances; no *volk*, no chosen people; in short, no sense of common identity or objects of common identification that had great emotional appeal. Cold reason did not ignite the passionate devotion of the masses, nor even of the elites.

The attempt to give the individual standing in the world organization was a most important effort to circumscribe this glaring absence of devotional objects. In this nascent ideology, such an action would serve a dual purpose: individuals would be the direct objects of international law and they would also have recourse to appeal to international law to provide a minimum protection to nationals against state infractions of universal rights. Individuals would look to the world organization as the ultimate protector of their rights. This had been an element of Wright's thinking for many years.¹³⁵

Given the gravity of the problems confronting the world, where did Wright place his faith for the creation of the new world order? The most obvious answer is that he placed it in his fellow academics, in internationalists, and in institutions like the U.N. But Wright was more sophisticated than that. His belief in the need to educate and organize a world public opinion was persistent, and one of the best methods available to him to reach a large and influential audience was teaching. Given his belief in the transient nature of public opinion, he carried an urgent sense to create a sustained commitment, especially among his own students and those who would read his text in other classrooms, to a universal value

system that would support world organization at the expense of nationalism.

Not unlike other moral relativists, there is a paradox in his position that morals are relative and the realization that there is a need for universal values. Wright recognized this when he wrote that "Recognition of the objective relativity of truth is not incompatible with recognition of a practical expediency in social life of treating certain propositions 'as if' absolutely true. Commitment by every member of a group to the absolute truth of certain propositions may be the best means for assuring the satisfaction of certain [group] expectations."¹³⁶ This demonstrated his practical evaluation of the argument between the advocates of absolute versus relative truth. He concluded that "if absolute truths exist, they do so in the order of certain societies or universes of discourse, not in the order of nature."¹³⁷ Given his ideas about science, there is an incongruity here in his estimation of the order of nature.

In his recommendations to U.N.E.S.C.O. for a prioritization for research on the problem of peaceful adjustment of tensions, he placed second on his list of seven priorities: "Problems of world citizenship and nationalism, the foci of loyalty, identification and interest."¹³⁸ He wrote his text book, *The Study of International Relations*, with this in mind. Although filled with "state of the art" concepts (the creation of a "science" of "international relations") and theories ("field" theory of international behavior), more than anything else, it was a civics primer for the world citizen.

In chapter seven, entitled "Educational and Research Objectives," Wright noted "at least four objectives" in the teaching, researching, and

writing of international relations: "improvement of citizenship, improvement of leadership, development of professional competence, and increase of human knowledge."¹³⁹ Had those objectives been met?

According to Wright the answer was a resounding "no!"

He believed that American undergraduate education had failed miserably in preparing students for the needs of international organization. He observed with displeasure the fact that education in a liberal democracy had for the last half century undergone three rapid shifts in its advocacy of first isolationism, then international organization, and then power politics as the "central theme of American foreign policy." Where educators had failed was in not addressing what Wright called the "roots of the subject," one of which he suggested was social psychology. If they had, he concluded, perhaps such rapid and confusing shifts would not have occurred.¹⁴⁰

The task of the international relations teacher, as Wright saw it, was to provide continuity through the establishment of respect for "the equality of man, not in ability or intelligence or power, but in possession of a common human nature which makes understanding of differences possible, and in the right to common human opportunity without which society cannot rest upon general consent." This, he said, was in the best tradition of men like John Milton, John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.¹⁴¹ Again, this emphasis on human rights seemed to be the new standard of Wilsonian universalism.

The ultimate touchstone for his evaluation of the success of the international relations academy was whether or not it prepared its students to accept the responsibilities of a continually shrinking world and the "acceleration of history consequent upon the rapid communication of information and ideas, propaganda, and military threats throughout the world."¹⁴² Wright assumed that if the students did not take away from the course a devotion to the principles of a world organized around peaceful change (that most elusive dynamic), the teacher had failed. And consistent with his evaluation of absolute truths being relative to the values of a given society, Wright declared that "If one accepts the liberal view that freedom of opinion promotes knowledge of the truth and that knowledge of the truth promotes moral and civic virtue, there is certainly a case for giving more emphasis to international affairs in education today than there was in periods when men's lives were less affected by happenings in distant parts of the world."¹⁴³

His other great hope remained in the ability of science and applied reason to remedy the human condition. Although he wrote several times in the later part of his career that there were limits to what social and natural sciences could do in the way of predicting the future in order to sustain peace, the nature of his ideology fought such qualifications to the very end of his life. Characteristic of this tension in his thought is a passage in his text, *The Study of International Relations*. Wright insisted that the technological shrinking of the world had diminished "the internal stability of most states and their external independence," which made the task of reliably predicting consequences of actions based on political knowledge

progressively more difficult. But he then declared that "science has often been able to solve such difficulties by making observations at a wholly different level of magnitude."

Perhaps with a certain insight to chaos theory, Wright theorized the possibility of a "statistical regularity" which could be deduced or observed "[b]y further analyzing the parts, or further expanding the concept of the whole."¹⁴⁴ Wright believed, then, that although difficult, the accurate prediction of complex human behavior was not beyond the capacity of science. Institutionally imposed norms helped create expectations of behavior which made prediction possible for one who understood the institutionalized patterns.¹⁴⁵ In a representative demonstration of his ultimate belief that political science could predict the future, Wright developed a formula that employed scientific method in the service of predictive analysis.

In his article "The Escalation of International Conflict," Wright suggested a method through which he proposed to judge the "probability that international conflicts will escalate or terminate rapidly," which he tested through its application to several post-1914 conflicts.¹⁴⁶ His formula, developed from that of Lewis F. Richardson's as found in his *Arms and Insecurity*, is:

$$\begin{aligned} dx/dt &= (N_x + F_y) - (C_x + W_x) + \\ &\quad (P_x - P_y) - (V_x - V_y) \\ dy/dt &= (N_y + F_x) - (C_y + W_y) + \\ &\quad (P_y - P_x) - (V_y - V_x) \end{aligned}$$

where N=national interest, F=forces available, C=costs of hostilities and preparations, W=world pressures for peace, P=potential military forces, and V=vulnerability to destruction.¹⁴⁷

Aside from the absolute absurdity of the notion that one could quantify such variables, the tests Wright applied were *ex post facto* when the true measure of scientific method is to predict an event before it occurs. Wright admitted that his conclusions were "subject to criticism because of the lack of objectivity in these measurements," but he did not question the validity of the method.¹⁴⁸ Common sense would dictate the dismissal of the whole article as quackery if not for his sincere desire for peace. It says something about political science that this was even published, as well as about the desperate nature of the search for peace and modern order.

On the basis of this formula, Wright concluded that "Hostilities in Vietnam are likely to escalate for a time, but eventually South Vietnam and the United States will win unless mounting national and world opinion brings about a cease-fire, or unless entry of the Soviet Union or China, or both, initiates World War III."¹⁴⁹ Given all the qualifications, had he lived he might have claimed in 1973 that his formula worked.

Notes

¹ Wright (hereon QW) hedged somewhat on his definition of neutrality. In a letter to Margaret Olson of the Committee to Study the Organization of Peace, he wrote that "I think we should attempt to develop . . . neutralized zones subject, of course, to the overriding principle of the Charter that aggression anywhere is to be opposed by all members of the United Nations including the states in such a zone." QW to Olson, 30 October 1950, Quincy Wright Collection. Of course, such a qualification eliminates the meaning of "neutral."

² QW, *Contemporary International Law: A Balance Sheet* (New York, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), 24.

³ *Ibid.* For further discussion of his concept of the "new" international law see his prize winning essay "Criteria For Judging The Relevance Of Researches On The Problems Of Peace," in *Research For Peace* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1954), 34.

⁴ QW, "The Outlawry of War and the Law of War," *Am J Int'l L* 47 (July 1953), 365-76.

⁵ QW, "Making the United Nations Work," *Rev of Politics* 8 (October 1946), 528.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 529

⁷ QW, "Accomplishments and Expectations of World Organization," *Yale Law Journal* LV (August 1946), as found in QW, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*, (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1954), 74-75.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 76-77. Wright did not want a federal system that excluded any nation; he maintained the need for universality of membership.

⁹ QW, "The Nuremberg Trial," *Annals Am Acad Pol Soc Sci* 246 (July 1946), 79-80. QW was technical adviser to Francis Biddle during the early weeks of the trial.

¹⁰ QW, "The Law of the Nuremberg Trial" *Am J Int'l L* 41 (January 1947), 47.

¹¹ QW, *Contemporary International Law*, 24.

¹² U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 86th Congress, 1960, 111-112.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 114.

14 QW to Clark Eichelberger, 11 January 1949, Box 6, folder 1.

15 See the introduction to this dissertation for discussion of the "shrinking world" paradigm.

16 QW, *Contemporary International Law*, 5-6.

17 He first mentioned this fear in the article "Responsibilities of the United States in the Post-War World," *Free World* 5 (January 1943), 35-41. Subsequent articles are QW, "National Security and International Police," *Am J Int'l L* 37 (July 1943), 499-505; "Peace Problems of Today and Yesterday," *Am Pol Sci Rev* 38 (June 1944), 512-521; "Security and World Organization," *Int'l Conciliation* 396 (June 1944), 30-65; "An International Police Force" *New Europe* 4 (March 1944), 16-17; "The International Regulation of the Air," *Am Eco Rev* 35 (May 1945), 243-48; "Aviation and World Politics," *Air Affairs* 1 (September 1946), 97-108; "Comment," *Air Affairs* 1 (December 1946), 242-245; "The Effect of the Atomic Bomb on World Politics," *Air Affairs* 1 (March 1947), 383-399; "Security Through the United Nations," Fifth Report of the CSOP, *Int'l Conciliation* 432 (June 1947), 423-447; "Political Consequences of the Soviet Atom Bomb," *Air Affairs* 3 (Spring 1950), 414-28. In his correspondence there is mention of the threat as well. See QW, "CSOP 7 step recommendation to Dumbarton Oaks," 31 August 1944, Bx 5, fol 16; QW to E. M. Earle, IAS Princeton, regarding Meade's *The Influence of Air Power Upon History*, 22 November 1946, Bx 19, fol 19.

18 QW to "Dear Ellen," 31 May 1920, Bx 1, addenda 2.

19 QW, "Aviation and World Politics," *Air Affairs* 1 (September 1946), 107.

20 See QW, "Comment," *Air Affairs* 1 (December 1946), 242-245; "The Effect of the Atomic Bomb on World Politics," *Air Affairs* 1 (March 1947), 383-399; QW to E. M. Earle, IAS Princeton, regarding Meade's *The Influence of Air Power Upon History*, 22 November 1946, Bx 19, fol 19; "The U.N. Charter and the Prevention of War," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 3 (February 1947), 57-58,61; "Political Consequences of the Soviet Atom Bomb," *Air Affairs* 3 (Spring 1950), 414-28.

21 QW, "Political Science and World Stabilization," *Am Pol Sci Rev* 44 (March 1950), 1-2. Presidential Address given at 45th annual meeting 28 December 1949.

22 For earlier examples of his misuse of historical analysis, see 36 and 38 of the previous chapter on Wright.

23 QW, "Responsibilities of the United States in the Post-War World," *Free World* 5 (January 1943), 35-41.

24 QW, "Aviation and World Politics." *Air Affairs* 1 (September 1946), 104.

25 QW, "Security Through the United Nations," *Int'l Conciliation* 432 (June 1947), 426.

26 QW, William M. Evan, and Morton Deutsch, eds., *Preventing World War III: Some Proposals* (New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1962), 415.

27 QW, "Constitution Making As Process," *Common Cause* 1 (February 1948), 285.

28 QW, *The Role of International Law in the Elimination of War*, (New York, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1961), 65.

29 *Ibid.*, 432.

30 For his assessment of the Uniting For Peace Resolution, see his testimony before the U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Senate Congressional Resolution 44*, 90th Congress, 26, 27 Oct, 1967, to urge the President to request an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council, or failing that, of the General Assembly, to consider how to end the Vietnam Conflict.

31 QW, *International Law and the United Nations* (Bombay, India: Asia Publishing House, 1960), 23. This volume is based on lectures he gave in 1956 at the Inter American Academy of Comparative and International Law in Havana, Cuba.

32 QW, "Constitution Making As Process," 286.

33 *Ibid.*, 433-447.

34 *Ibid.*, 448.

35 See *The Control of American Foreign Relations*; on the Bricker Amendment see QW, "The Economic and Political Conditions of World Stability," *J Econ History* 13 (Fall 1953), 376 and QW Correspondence 1953, Bx 19, file 12; and on executive power see QW, "Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Situation," *Am J Int'l L.* 60 (October 1966), 750-769.

36 QW, "Accomplishments and Expectations of World Organization," *Yale Law Journal*, LV (August 1946), as found in QW, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations* (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1954), 75. He later accepted the bipolar interpretation of the world's power blocs. For more on the inherent instability of a bipolar system, see,

for instance, his essay "Criteria For Judging The Relevance Of Researches On The Problems Of Peace," 26.

37 For his belief that the observance of international law was dependent on reason, see QW, "Criteria For Judging The Relevance Of Researches On The Problems Of Peace," 24; for his belief that coercion may be necessary see the same article, 33.

38 QW, "The Mode of Financing Unions of States as a Measure of Their Degree of Integration," *Int'l Org* 2 (Winter 1957), 30-40. Interest in U.N. responsibility for deep sea bed exploitation continues. See the Declaration of Santo Domingo, June 9, 1972, Specialized Conference of Caribbean Countries Concerning the Problems of the Sea as found in Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, and Anthony A. D'Amato, *International Law and World Order: A Problem-Oriented Coursebook* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1980), 848.

39 QW, "Responsibilities of the United States in the Post-War World," *Free World* 5 (January 1943), 35-36.

40 *Ibid.*, 36.

41 QW, "Democracy and Power," *Free World* 5 (May 1943), 396.

42 *Ibid.*, 399.

43 See Wright's remarks in chapter one regarding the Jacksonian extension of the franchise as further proof of his elitist approach.

44 QW, "Criteria For Judging The Relevance Of Researches On The Problems Of Peace," 38.

45 *Ibid.*

46 *Ibid.*, 395.

47 QW to John Foster Dulles, 9 February 1953, Bx 13, add 1, 4.

48 QW to Gaylord Freeman, Jr., 13 July 1961, Bx 3, add 1, 2.

49 QW to Edward Bernays, 5 March 1946, Bx 19, fol 9.

50 QW, "The Understandings of International Law," *Am J Int'l L* 14 (October 1920), 369.

51 QW, *The Study of International Relations*, (New York, N.Y.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), 71.

- 52 QW to Dulles, 9 February 1953, Bx 13, add 1, 1.
- 53 *Ibid.*
- 54 QW to Eichelberger, 23 February 1949, Bx 6, fol 1.
- 55 QW, "American Policy Toward Russia," *World Politics* 2 (Summer 1950), 477.
- 56 QW to Dana Backus, 11 December 52, Bx 6, fol 5.
- 57 QW, Testimony, 86th Congress, 112; QW "Western Diplomacy Since 1945," *Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci* 336 (July 1961), 144.
- 58 QW, "On the Application of Intelligence to World Affairs," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 4 (August 1948), 252.
- 59 QW, "American Policy Toward Russia," 480.
- 60 QW, "On the Application of Intelligence to World Affairs," 250.
- 61 QW, "America 1975 Series: The U.S. Position in the World," *Challenge* 5 (December 1956), 13-17.
- 62 QW to Walter Lippmann, 18 July 1944, Bx 18, add 1. Their relationship extended to their spouses and it was Wright who presented Lippmann on 11 November 1955 when the University of Chicago conferred an honorary doctorate on him. See QW to Walter Lippmann, Bx 18, add 1.
- 63 QW, Statement, 31 August 1944, Bx 5, fol 16.
- 64 QW to Livingston Hartley (Atlantic Union Committee), 27 October 1950, Bx 4, add 1, fol H(4).
- 65 QW to Dana C. Backus, Board of Directors, American Association for the United Nations, 2 May 1951, Bx 6, fol 4.
- 66 *Ibid.*; QW to Margaret Olson (CSOP), 30 October 1950, Bx 6, fol 2.
- 67 QW to Lippmann, 11 February 1949, Bx 18, add 1, 1-2.
- 68 QW to Dulles, 28 January 1952, Bx 6, fol 5.
- 69 See *A Study of War* for Wright's beliefs on stability within a balance of power system; QW to Dulles, 28 January 1952.

70 QW to Dulles, 28 January 1952.

71 On effective U.N. action, see fn 29 of this chapter; QW to Dulles, 28 January 1952.

72 Wright did not foresee the impact of fundamentalist Islam and the potential for a fourth regional body comprised of the Central Asian Islamic Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan apparent after the actual collapse of the Soviet Union.

73 QW to Dulles, 28 January 1952

74 Dulles to QW, 6 February 1952, Bx 13, add 1.

75 QW to Dulles, 11 February 1952, Bx 13, add 1.

76 See QW to Dulles, 9 February 1953, Bx 13, add 1; QW to Dulles, 23 February 1953, Bx 13, add 1; QW to Dulles, 8 January 1957, Bx 2, add 1 fol D(2); QW to Dulles, 16 July 1957, Bx 2, add 1, fol D(2).

77 QW, "How Can UN Be Strengthened?," *For Pol Assoc Bulletin* 36 (15 February 1957), 87.

78 QW to Eichelberger, 5 December 1950, Bx 6, fol 3, 2. This indicates a changed assessment of the League's performance in the Manchurian crisis. Wright praised the League's devotion to procedure in his article "Manchurian Crisis," *Am Pol Sci R* 26 (1932), 45-76.

79 QW to Eichelberger, 5 December 1950, 2.

80 *Ibid.*, 3.

81 *Ibid.* He was aware that such a policy would have to be pursued with caution as it was bound to be unpopular with the U.S. public due to the efforts of the friends of Nationalist China. A judicious campaign to create an informed public opinion, he believed, might remedy that situation.

82 Wright addressed the issue of recognition and how it served the Soviet Union's interests as well in the following: "Some Thoughts About Recognition," *Am J Int'l L* 44 (July 1950), 548-59; "The Chinese Recognition Problem," *A J Int'l L* 49 (July 1955), 320-38; "The Status of Communist China," *J Int'l Aff* 11 (Summer 1957), 171-86; "Non-Recognition of China and International Tensions," *Current History* 34 (March 1958), 152-57; QW to Walter Bingham, 22 September 1955, Bx 1, add 1, fol B; QW to Stanley Hornbeck, 23 August 1956, Bx 4, add 1, fol H(2).

83 QW to Eichelberger, 5 December 1950, 3.

84 *Ibid.*

85 QW, "America 1975 Series: The U.S. Position in the World," *Challenge* 5 (December 1956), 13-17. This is one of QW's first attacks on racial discrimination to appear in print.

86 QW, "Legal Aspects of the Congo Situation," *Int'l Studies* 4 (July 1962), 1.

87 *Ibid.*, 21.

88 QW, "America 1975 Series," 13-17.

89 QW, "The Termination and Suspension of Treaties," *Am J Int'l L* 61 (October 1967), 1002

90 QW, "Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation," *Am J Int'l L* 60 (October 1966), 757-759; 762.

91 QW to Richard A. Falk, 5 April 1963, Bx 14, add 1, 3.

92 *Ibid.*

93 *Ibid.*

94 *Ibid.*, 3-4.

95 QW to Charles S. Bacon, 20 June 1947, Bx 1, add 1, fol B.

96 QW, "United States Intervention In The Lebanon," *Am J Int'l L* 53 (January 1959), 114-15.

97 *Ibid.*, 125.

98 See QW, *The Control of American Foreign Policy*.

99 QW, "Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation," 768.

100 *Ibid.*, 762.

101 QW to Jeremy, 3 April 1968.

102 QW to Walter, 28 November 1966, 1-2.

- 103 Senator Wayne Morse to QW, 11 September 1967; 17 October 1967.
- 104 U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Senate Congressional Resolution 44*, 90th Congress, 26, 27 October, 1967, 124-125.
- 105 *Ibid.*, 115.
- 106 *Ibid.*, 117; 122.
- 107 *Ibid.*, 124.
- 108 See George Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, (New York, N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1979), 217; 220.
- 109 QW, Testimony, 123-4. The forty-five case studies he referred to were from his research for the article "The Escalation of International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 9 (December 65), 434-449.
- 110 QW, Testimony, 128.
- 111 *Ibid.*, 135-136; 128.
- 112 *Ibid.*, 125.
- 113 On his support for State Department Informational Services in Foreign Countries see QW to Senator Scott Lucas, 1 May 1947, Bx 19, fol 10; on the need to present "American civilization and American policies to the Soviet bloc," see QW to Everett Dirksen, 16 May 1947, Bx 19, fol 10.
- 114 QW to Edward Bernays, 13 April 1956, Bx 11, add 1.
- 115 QW, "International Law and Ideologies," *Am J Int'l L* 48 (October 1954), 626.
- 116 QW, "Subversive Intervention," *Am J Int'l L* 54 (July 1960), 533.
- 117 QW, "Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," *Am J Int'l L* 54 (October 1960), 853.
- 118 *Ibid.*, 853-854.
- 119 QW, "The Cuban Quarantine," *Am J Int'l L* 57 (July 1963), 563.
- 120 QW, "Power Politics or a Rule of Law?," *New Republic* 147 (29 December 62), 11-12.

121 QW to Lippmann, 29 January 1948, Bx 18, add 1. In a previous letter from Lippmann to QW of 23 January 1948, Bx 18, add 1, Lippmann suggested a parallel between Marxist ideology and Islamic fundamentalism with which Wright agreed.

122 QW to Lippmann, 20 January 1948, Bx 19, fol 11.

123 QW, "International Conflict and the United Nations," *World Politics* 10 (Autumn 1957), 40.

124 QW, Testimony, 86th Congress, 112.

125 QW to George Ball, 27 May 1970, Bx 1, add 1, 2.

126 QW to Richard Falk, 5 April 63, Bx 14, add 1, Falk Folder.

127 *Ibid.*.

128 QW, "The Nature of Conflict," *Wes Pol Sci Q* 4 (June 1951), 196.

129 QW, Confidential Draft. "Improvement of Relations With Russia," 31 March 1950, Bx 6, fol 2, 18.

130 QW, "The Nature of Conflict," 209.

131 *Ibid.*

132 QW to Dulles, 9 February 1953, Bx 13, add 1, 2.

133 QW, "International Law and Ideologies," 625.

134 George Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe*, (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

135 QW to Sarah Wambaugh, 5 February 1940, Bx 5, fol 11; *A Study of War*.

136 QW, *The Study of International Relations*, 17.

137 *Ibid.*, 18.

138 QW, "Criteria For Judging The Relevance Of Researches On The Problems Of Peace," 83. The subheadings were as follows: (a) Education, information and propaganda concerning the United Nations, the specialized agencies and other institutions and symbols of the world

community; (b) Human rights, social justice, and international crimes; (c) Nationalism and internationalism; (d) Self determination of peoples and development of underdeveloped areas; (e) Representation of groups and interests in international organizations. 83-84.

139 QW, *The Study of International Relations*, 65.

140 *Ibid.*, 72. Wright held that research within the disciplines of social psychology, cultural anthropology, and sociology, should be given priority in the development of a science of international relations for they were the "least dependent upon historically limited assumptions." See QW, "Criteria For Judging The Relevance Of Researches On The Problems Of Peace," 29.

141 QW, "Criteria For Judging The Relevance Of Researches On The Problems Of Peace," 67.

142 *Ibid.*, 67-68.

143 *Ibid.*, 67.

144 QW, *The Study of International Relations*, 115-116.

145 QW, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*, 5.

146 QW, "The Escalation of International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 9 (December 1965), 434.

147 *Ibid.*, 435.

148 *Ibid.*, 437.

149 *Ibid.*, 440.

CHAPTER VI

INTERNATIONALISM AND THE COLD WAR

Frederick Schuman greeted the San Francisco Conference with much skepticism. He had not seen in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, nor did he expect to see in those which resulted from this Conference, the hope for world organization and peace that Quincy Wright saw. Instead, Schuman saw Allies who had at war's end failed to adhere to the tenets of the Atlantic Charter and who were now scrambling to restore the *status quo ante bellum*. Rather than provide self-determination for all peoples, the allies were striving to retain most of the vestiges of the colonial and imperial systems of the past. Schuman had pressed vigorously for Indian independence during the war and for the release of other peoples from the grips of European exploitation. He called on the United States and the new world organization to adopt a policy of support for independence movements, support which was in his estimation painfully absent.

But it was not just the Allies who sought to restore the *status quo*: so, apparently, did the internationalists. In a blistering attack on Wilsonian assumptions as they appeared in the League of Nations Covenant and in the proposed Charter for the United Nations, Schuman the Apostate declared that "When in the chronicles of wasted time the historians of the future mournfully dissect the reasons for the failure of this latest scheme to keep the peace, they will discover that many of the reasons were plainly elucidated long before the United Nations was ever dreamed of."¹

Schuman observed that the theory of collective security remained essentially unchanged from League of Nations to United Nations; indeed, since its earliest inception. Never had the thesis of collective security been stated so clearly than as Wilson stated it in the League Covenant, observed Schuman, but clarity of expression did not provide any better chance for its realization. In Schuman's estimation, the critical errors of the concept of collective security among states were as follows: 1) that it relied upon the false idea of sovereign equality among states; 2) that it perpetuated a "false analogy between the members of a national society and the members of the 'society' of nations"; 3) and that the "formula of the coercion of states by states" was a fallacy.² This was an interesting *volte face* coming as it did from one of collective security's most vocal advocates in the 1930s.

Schuman provided compelling evidence to support his contention that the concept of sovereign equals among states was a fiction best not to be entertained. It was, he said, the incarnation of a myth, albeit a myth capable of shaping the actions of humanity.³ In what was an unusual homily for Schuman, he asked the reader to entertain the story of the squirrel who was given a certificate which stated that it was as big as any elephant: despite the certificate, the squirrel was still smaller than any elephant, and the squirrel knew it and so did all the elephants.⁴ Further, Schuman noted the obvious: that no two states were in fact equal, and that no two states could be made legally equal in a world system which defined state rather than individual rights. The United Nations, predicated on the premise of sovereign equality, was building its enterprise upon *the* symbol of past maladies.⁵

To support his second assertion, Schuman noted that to sustain the analogy there would have to be at the least several thousands, if not millions, of states, all of nearly equal size and power, and all of which shared symbols and practices to effectively bind them to a common culture in order to organize the community of states along the lines the CSOP proposed. The prerequisites for this model were unobtainable and therefore, it was a falsely applied analogy.

As for the fallacy of the "formula of the coercion of states by states," Schuman used the lessons of history to support his interpretation. There was, he maintained, no instance in human experience to demonstrate that law could be effectively enforced or peace successfully maintained through the exertion of economic and military pressures by an association of states upon another state or states. Every league and confederation predicated on this premise failed, and the reason, said Schuman, was not mysterious.

In order to coerce a *state* one must inevitably punish innocent people. Those innocent people, he continued, identified emotionally with local and national symbols of loyalty and not with the symbols of any extranational league, association, or confederation to which their state belonged. When a *state* is coerced, its leaders find it easy to rally support from among the innocent (and the not so innocent as well) against the coercive power, while the enforcers face the difficult or even impossible task of creating a consensus to support their cause. Mussolini, said Schuman, realized in 1935 that in international relations the "psychological cards" favored the law-breaker instead of the law-enforcer, as opposed to the situation which

prevailed between individuals in a "national community." Schuman concluded that the "invariable consequence" was the failure of the effort to coerce the law-breaker or "war between the coercers and the coerced."⁶

Quincy Wright had criticized Schuman for these positions, criticisms with which Schuman declared he had no serious quarrel. But he in turn criticized Wright, whom Schuman feared had misled the American public with labels and expectations that reality did not warrant. He was not convinced that Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco Conference would lead to what Wright called "a league of equals in name and an alliance of Great Powers in substance" any more than had the Paris Peace Conference.⁷

Schuman agreed with Wright that an alliance was indispensable, and he observed that the "various pacts between Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and, very soon, Poland" made it a fact. But what was lacking in this alliance, according to Schuman, was the participation of two integral elements: the U.S. and China. And he doubted whether their participation could be assured "merely through the assumption of general commitments of collective security."⁸

Schuman was equally dubious as to Wright's belief that Dumbarton Oaks and the San Francisco Conference contained "germs of federalism." Schuman discovered no such germs in his examination because of the emphasis on sovereign equality. As well, he took to task Wright's assessment of the U.S. Civil War as the critical factor in deciding whether the United States was a league or a federation. Schuman thought that the

adoption of the Constitution had decided that issue and that the Civil War "merely" determined whether the states had the right to secede.⁹

The focus of the debate between Schuman and Wright was what should be the model for world organization. The Constitution had established a federal government which could enact and enforce laws which governed the individual, and without that basic relationship as the premise of its Charter, Schuman believed, correctly, that it was improper to speak of the United Nations as a federation. As to the potential of the United Nations as an instrument of world organization, Schuman saw clearly that it would be limited to the context of a "stable and enduring concert of power among the Great Powers." This concert of powers was the *sine qua non* for peace. With such a concert, declared Schuman, "all sorts of things are possible. If we do not get it, then we shall merely repeat the old cycle on a larger scale."¹⁰

For Schuman the central truth of the post-war world was that political power persisted in the form of "disparate national sovereignties."¹¹ There would be, he predicted, no world state following WWII, no world federation, and no world order based on a universal associations of sovereign equals, for such an association could "neither succeed nor endure."¹² What would continue to dictate international relations would be "power politics," but with a new twist, for WWII had altered considerably the distribution of power. Schuman saw a world of three super-powers by 1946: the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. And they held the potential to rule the world in concert or to make the world a "vast arena of

rivalry and conflict."¹³ His only error here was in extending super-power status to the U.K.

Because this distribution of power was reality, any plans for effective world organization must reflect that reality. This was precisely what the proposed Charter of the United Nations failed to do. Schuman condemned as impractical the idea that the majority of the members of the Security Council were to be lesser powers (the voting procedure was still under consideration at the time Schuman wrote this so he could not assess the Big Five veto) and saw in it the potential to become little more than a new League of Nations. Only the Big Three acting in concert could maintain peace, for either they acted together or there would be no effective action, and Schuman feared that, given the zealous devotion to the principle of sovereign equality, the super-powers would be unable to develop a directorate within the new organization and hence lose interest in it.¹⁴ And in order for the U.S. to be a reliable and effective partner in such an alliance, Schuman clung to the Wilsonian demand that executive powers be strong and unfettered in foreign policy matters, for congressional debate had proven costly in the past.

Schuman's vision here was succinct. In calling for a concert of powers, a Grand Alliance, he recognized the *de facto* nature of the distribution of power in the world; he realized that despite the most compelling rhetoric and theory of sovereign equality, those who wielded great power were unlikely to accept limitations upon it unless such limitations served immediate interests; and he knew that peace could be procured if the three (read: two) super-powers could "accept reciprocally" the requirements

each deemed necessary to its security as the *sine qua non* of future collaboration. Without such an alliance, nothing durable could come from the Dumbarton Oaks proposals or the United Nations.¹⁵

Such was the nature of Schuman's vision that his apostasy was in fact a reaffirmation of the original Wilsonian vision. Wilson, too, had seen the need for a concert of powers in 1919. His work in Europe, his emphasis on the Big Five in the Security Council of the League, his commitment to free trade and the open door, all required the cooperative effort of the great powers. Both Wilson and Schuman recognized that the potential of any world organization would be limited to the degree to which the great powers cooperated.

Although Schuman and Wilson may be said to have been in agreement, this was not the case between Schuman and Wright. Their conflicting interpretations of the potential of the U.N. defined their perception and approach to world organization. To Schuman, Wright's gradualism was a source of misapplied trust of the elites, of an inability to go beyond traditional approaches to world organization. Schuman condemned as well in his letter the inability of James T. Shotwell and Clark Eichelberger to see beyond a league, which was a thinly veiled attack on Wright, who had worked so closely with those men in the CSOP.

On the other hand, Wright saw in Schuman's position a close adherence to power politics, something Wright abhorred and sought to eliminate from international relations.¹⁶ Surprisingly, so did Schuman, but he was willing to accept and work within the structural framework of *realpolitik*. Wright placed Schuman in the category of a *machtpolitiker* and although

he labelled Schuman's work as among the best in the *genre*, along with Hans Morgenthau, it was evident that he fundamentally disagreed with his former student's emphasis.¹⁷

Perhaps most notable was the key area of agreement in this exchange: the emphasis on the need for individuals to have standing under international law. The implication of this need was not lost on either man and it was central to their understanding of what was necessary to create an effective world organization. Both saw in the U.S. constitution a model for federalism predicated on the power of the federal government to act on the individual, not just upon the member states. They agreed as well on the need for a strong executive.

Schuman continued his effort to reach the largest possible audience, maintained an aggressive speaking schedule, and published articles in a variety of journals. Included in this array of articles was one entitled "Toward The World State" in the *Scientific Monthly*. Here, Schuman referred to Walter Bagehot, the great interpreter of the British constitution, and his hope that scientific inquiry could resolve human problems. Schuman observed that the English historian's "prescience" had been "fully vindicated," but he cautioned that science offered two prospects: a "golden age of plenty" or the immolation of modern civilization.¹⁸ Here he shared the limited perspective of so many of his peers when they considered the use of nuclear weapons: it was all or nothing and few considered the possibility of limited use of nuclear weapons.¹⁹

In order to reduce the possibility of nuclear immolation, Schuman declared, the Western state system would have to abandon anarchy for meaningful world organization. When the separate parts of a community claim prerogatives which only international law can limit, then they will be limited "only insofar as habit, expediency, good faith, or force may dictate obedience," for international law was comprised of only those customs and contracts which sovereigns found acceptable to observe. And in extreme situations any such restraints would "yield to the imperatives of survival."²⁰

Schuman provided a syllogism to explain what must be done: unrestrained national sovereignty was the basis of international anarchy; international anarchy bred power politics; power politics bred war. Therefore, war can best be prevented by abolishing power politics, and power politics can be abolished only when effective world government replaces unlimited national sovereignty and the anarchy which accompanies it.²¹

But what defined effective world government? Schuman first listed what would not work. International government could not be achieved through contracted obligation between collective entities which clung to the concept of sovereign equality, nor could covenants among sovereignties to keep the peace through collective coercion produce it; rather, "an organized authority . . . superior . . . to any other authority in the community" was the presupposition of any such government. Such organized authority would have to maintain a "decisive preponderance" or monopoly of armed power. And that government would act upon

individuals rather than solely upon the component nations or states. "Legislation, administration, and adjudication," wrote Schuman, "are prerequisites of all government capable of governing. To talk of government in terms of arrangements falling short of these essentials is to indulge . . . in an exercise in humor, hypocrisy, or cynicism."²²

How to achieve such a world government? Peace by conquest was, said Schuman, impossible in the atomic age. That left peace by choice, and the only effective choice would be to create a world federation empowered to act on individuals as well as on member states. At the time there were many advocates (Clarence Streit of the World Federalists was perhaps the most widely known) who wanted a union of democracies to provide the seed for a wider federal organization. But Schuman opposed an exclusive union of democracies as the Bolsheviks were likely to construe such a union as anti-Soviet, not pro world government.²³

Instead, Schuman looked to the U.N. to step beyond the limitations of its Charter. Although as a league of sovereignties it did not fit Schuman's definition of a government, Schuman argued that it had the tools to maintain the peace and provide the nurturing environment which might lead to voluntary federalization. He argued that the veto in the Security Council was a means of assuring peace because peace could only be maintained as long as the great powers were in basic agreement.²⁴ This was a much different assessment of the veto than Quincy Wright had offered.

The Security Council, Schuman continued, must be granted "legislative power in the field of atomic energy" because such power was essential to

building a federated world. He opposed conferring upon the General Assembly control over atomic energy because that body clung so tenaciously to the concept of sovereign equality, to an idea of participatory democracy falsely transposed to the relations of states. Democracy, he observed, assumed the equality of individual persons, not states. It was because of the continued obeisance to the concept of sovereign equality that he also opposed the Truman-King-Attlee Plan, for he saw no way in a world of fully sovereign states to ensure the peaceful use of atomic energy. Instead, he condoned the Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy of 16 March 1946, which proposed that an Atomic Development Authority under direction of the Security Council own and operate all uranium mines and the means to make it fissionable, and hoped it would become official U.S. and U.N. policy.²⁵

Schuman concluded his article on a somewhat gloomy note. Although the structure of the world federation could evolve from existing institutions, only those with great faith in providence or human rationality could believe any such thing likely in 1946, or even the near future. Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, David Lloyd George, and Winston Churchill had been beacons of hope in the past but Schuman doubted that any such inspired leadership would come in the peacetime world.²⁶

The cause for Schuman's pessimism was the growing rift between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Long a missing element in Wright's assessment of world organization, this had for some time been something that Schuman saw as having major implications for an effective world

organization. And, as a long-time apologist for the Soviets, he was anxious to combat the resurgent (reflexive?) anti-communism in the United States to which he had fallen victim. He believed that the future would lead to either a convergence of the two competing systems or the ultimate confrontation between them, and he sought vigorously to promote the former.

In his article "Designs For Democracy," Schuman asserted that only through Anglo-American-Soviet cooperation could civilization survive the atomic age. To achieve such cooperation Schuman believed it was essential to develop mutual tolerance and a "synthesis of opposites" which would ultimately lead to a "global pattern for community life" universally recognized as conducive of democratic values. Such tolerance and synthesis could only be achieved through a trenchant reconsideration of ideological and institutional differences between the two world systems.²⁷

Schuman observed that the Soviet system was not a political democracy because sovereignty was vested not in the people, but in a party which monopolized power, although he could not let such a criticism pass without praising the democratic achievements of the Soviet economic and social order.²⁸ He cautioned, though, that a system of political equals perpetuated an illusion if its members were not equal and free as producers and consumers. Schuman asserted that liberalism had created "contradictions between political ideals and social realities," and that to address these contradictions and to fulfill the promise of democracy a system must guarantee economic and social opportunity for the masses to an extent greater than had ever before been attained.

It was in this sense that he believed the Soviet system had achieved greater success than the Western democracies. The Soviet people lived in a society premised on equal and free access to "opportunities to secure differential quantities of income and deference on the basis not of property or privilege but of individual capacity." The Soviets had achieved the ultimate meritocracy. While the Atlantic world had attained the political half of democracy, the economic half had been more completely realized in the U.S.S.R. and remained relatively absent in the western democracies.²⁹

This represents the recurring Wilsonian legacy in the ideology of all three scholars this dissertation considers, for it is the rhetoric of the open door, although here it is applied to the individual. Individual capacity would determine the share of a marketplace which regulations did not impede. And the rhetoric applied as well to the political marketplace, the marketplace of power. "Democracy," said Schuman, "is government by talk in an open market for talkers [and] presupposes the rationality of man. It assumes that informed and relevant talk will prevail over ignorant and distracting talk."³⁰ Such was their faith in the power of the hidden hand, of reason as the ultimate regulator of human affairs, that it infused even Schuman, the most openly critical of Wilson among the three.

The mechanism for convergence and realization of both elements of democracy would be, in Shuman's estimation, the state. Both systems, one predicated on state control of the economy, the other on state-regulated capitalism, had already experienced significant convergence in the recent past and were therefore not irreconcilable. If enlightened leaders and

publics in the U.S., the U.K., and the S.U. realized this, Schuman predicted a "progressively democratized" Soviet socialism and a "progressively socialized" western democracy.³¹

Of course, a signal problem in the development of mutual trust between the two systems in order to ensure a peaceful world was the perception each had of the other's intent. Both governments pandered to one-dimensional interpretations of complex issues. Schuman believed this was particularly true of those in the West who labelled legitimate Soviet security interests as indicators of Soviet expansionism. The Soviet people had suffered horribly in the two world wars, not to mention the costs of a convulsive civil war and allied intervention. This, when coupled with Stalin's program of forced collectivization and industrialization, made the Soviet people desperate for peace and security, and their foreign policy, wrote Schuman, should be understood as a reflection of those desires. Their fear of further bloodshed and of foreign invasion led to diplomatic intractability, but did not represent a desire to rule the world.³²

Contributing further to Soviet fears was the trend Schuman saw in developing regional systems of security. Schuman believed that regional defense programs as they had evolved after the war created dissension between the super-powers and weakened the U.N. They also contained the potential to encourage escalated tensions and action-reaction responses to critical situations rather than reasoned solutions.³³ Schuman called for a renewal of the "spirit of Yalta" to restore trust between the two systems and observed that the Soviets had enforced their Yalta agreements until the U.S. and the U.K. had begun to back out of theirs.³⁴

It was this type of understanding that was essential to a peaceful system of international politics. Western rhetoric of the sovereign equality of weak states with powerful ones rang false to Soviet perceptions of their own, as well as Western, security needs. Look, for instance, to U.S. relations with Latin America and the Monroe Doctrine. What was needed if the world was to be spared from some sort of Machiavellian partition of the globe and from the hypocrisy of sovereign theory versus practice was a new conception of the world order, the abolition of traditional power politics and the establishment of an effective government of the community of nations. And it was incumbent upon the U.S. to lead the way to an empowered U.N. for it did not have, in Schuman's estimation, the cultural *impedimenta* to prevent its assumption of such a role.³⁵ Schuman advocated the adoption of the Baruch Plan (and blasted Gromyko's plan to outlaw atomic weapons) as a starting point to an effective U.N., for it would contribute to a limited world government which would exercise global sovereignty in the field of atomic energy.³⁶

Schuman believed that Henry A. Wallace represented the best hope for the policies essential to world peace. It was with great misgiving that he wrote to Roxanna Wells, his agent, of Wallace's dismissal from the Truman administration in September 1946. It was "very bad news," he wrote, "for you, for me, for America, and for the world."³⁷ Wallace's dismissal was confirmation of Schuman's worst fears on two levels: if it was the beginning of a "red" bashing reaction, then his ability to reach a large audience on the lecture circuit could be reduced; and, the possibility of an effective U.N. was greatly reduced, too. Both intuitions were to come true.

With the announcement of the "Truman Doctrine" in the spring of 1947, Schuman perceived the institutionalization of a bipolar world: it was evident, he believed, in both the rhetoric and in the actions of the Truman administration. Schuman believed that the doctrine had little to do with the Soviet Union or with the preservation of democracy; instead, he saw it as a means to achieve partisan political goals. It was, he said, a "perfect formula for reelecting Truman . . . and for preventing or curing the next depression by a domestic and foreign policy program painfully reminiscent" of the Fascist regimes of the thirties.³⁸

Denna Fleming had arrived at similar conclusions about the crucial role Soviet-American relations would play in the coming world order. Although Fleming's interest in the Soviet Union did not bear the acute and strident accents of Schuman's, it was an interest born of the insights into Soviet political behavior he developed as an aide to Bernard Baruch. As well, his revisionism was in part a result of his loathing of the policy elite, a loathing perhaps furthered by the rejection of his frequent attempts to join it.

Fleming, who had supported Truman in his 1948 presidential campaign, began to question the official dogma of the Cold War and in the process found himself in the unlikely position of being an advocate for a realist's interpretation of Soviet foreign policy. After all, Fleming was the man Baruch recommended to Truman, after the influential industrialist had presented the president with a position paper Fleming had drafted in expectation of Soviet behavior on the international scene, as "the man I told you about who knows more about international relations than anyone

else I know."³⁹ Baruch was unlikely to offer such praise to a Soviet sympathizer.

Fleming's original interpretation of Soviet intentions was based on mistrust of both the Soviet political system and its foreign policy. But by 1944, Fleming began to interpret Soviet actions and U.S. intentions differently. He was pleased with the position of compromise Secretary of State James F. Byrnes assumed with the Soviets at the Moscow Conference in 1946 because Fleming believed Allied actions had forced some of the Soviet actions the West held to be so obnoxious.⁴⁰ He observed that the actions of other sovereignties had driven the Bolsheviks to create "a totalitarian state with an all powerful police force suppressing civil liberties," an observation which applied to the very origins of Bolshevik totalitarianism, to the Allied intervention of 1918, and to 1945 post-war U.S. policy.⁴¹ He shared this interpretation with Schuman and it brought them into professional contact.

Fleming began a study of the Cold War in 1947 which would culminate in his trend-setting work *The Cold War and Its Origins* published in 1961.⁴² In this two-volume work, Fleming set the stage for the revisionist critique of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Through an exhaustive examination of the public record, newspapers, and journalistic accounts, sources political scientists considered essential to the formation of public opinion, Fleming created a compelling indictment of the media, of U.S. policy, and of policymakers. Yet his methodology would be subjected to severe criticism, even from those scholars of the left who hailed the work as a milestone in

the revisionist interpretation of the origins of the cold war, for its dependency on secondary literature.

And in what was the continued dilemma of the Wilsonians, Fleming advocated a strong executive, yet railed against the results of unfettered executive policy like the prosecution of the Cold War. All three men, Wright, Fleming and Schuman, were priests in the cult of the strongest of executives, Franklin Roosevelt. Yet both Schuman and Fleming would suffer from the growth of the imperial presidency. They self-righteously condemned the administrations at whose hands they suffered, yet their protestations were somewhat disingenuous when levelled at the executive branch which they had for so long sought to strengthen. Still, it is difficult not to sympathize with them when one reviews their treatment at the hands of the Congress and other bureaucracies, agencies which often acted with the tacit approval of the executive branch.

Fleming approved of the Wilsonian concept of a strong executive but, rather than explain its need in terms of utility as Schuman and Wright had, Fleming's advocacy was articulated in the rhetoric of a populist. Writing in response to the two-term presidential amendment in 1947, Fleming declared that it was an "expression of distrust in the people themselves" because they had elected Roosevelt repeatedly against the advice of "social and economic leaders [who] wanted to get rid of him."⁴³

To bolster his assessment, Fleming applied the logic of historical syllogism: "I can find" he wrote, in reference to critics' charges that unlimited terms might lead to a dictatorship, "no historical example of any leader of an established democracy [who founded] a dictatorship out of a

long tenure of office." Therefore, because there was no historical example in a democracy, and because the U.S. was a democracy, dictatorship cannot, or is unlikely, to happen.⁴⁴ Why, he asked, distrust the American people?

One wonders if he felt that way while the vast majority of the American people supported the cold war and the series of repressive domestic and sweeping foreign policies implemented against its critics? Although Fleming opposed the Bricker amendment, whose limits on Presidential power to make executive agreements he thought would seriously jeopardize the flexibility of U.S. conduct of foreign affairs, he also opposed the Formosa Resolution which sought to increase that flexibility.⁴⁵ During the Quemoy and Matsu crisis of 1955, the Congress passed the Formosa Joint Resolution, which broadened the responses of the President to the dynamic situation. Fleming perceived it as a blank check to authorize the President to go to war.⁴⁶

That the particular president whose power the resolution was to enhance was a Republican whose qualifications Fleming severely questioned seems to have influenced this *volte face*. He had attacked Eisenhower in 1952 as the candidate of a liberation philosophy likely to involve the U.S. in W.W.III, he attacked what he perceived to be Ike's willingness to cave-in under pressure, he attacked John Foster Dulles as the steward of foreign policy, and he attacked Nixon's ability to lead. Fleming concluded then that Adlai Stevenson, with Averell Harriman as Secretary of State, would be the better choice for world peace.⁴⁷ He later attacked Eisenhower's faith in tactical nuclear weapons, which Fleming claimed were not accurate enough to be limited to strictly military targets. In

general, Fleming questioned the president's judgment.⁴⁸ It would appear that certain presidents, in Fleming's estimation, required fetters where others would be unbound.

Fleming hoped, though, that the Republicans would change the nation's attitude toward the Cold War. He called for U.S. policymakers to reexamine their assumptions about the cold war, especially that of the communist intention to conquer the world. Instead of a policy whose operative assumption was an inevitable armed confrontation, Fleming said the U.S. should depend on the merits of its economic and political institutions rather than engage in containment and counterrevolution as the basis of its policy.⁴⁹ This was a "beacon on a hill" ideology for the twentieth century.

The U.S., he asserted, should expand its economy without war, but maintain a credible deterrent while continuing to seek ways to disarm; it should move toward greater freedom rather than toward fascism. And he called on the Republicans to lead the way to peaceful coexistence⁵⁰ As a first step in this process, Fleming urged U.S. leaders to rescind their support to the Nationalist forces on Formosa, for he wrote that no great power could "continue to tolerate bombing and blockading by a small native faction backed by a foreign power." He observed as well a trend among the nonaligned states to attack both sides in the cold war. Although logic dictated coexistence, Fleming thought emotional factors might prevent logic's victory. In order to avoid such a defeat, he called on the Republicans to seek cooperation with the Soviets through the structure of the U.N.⁵¹

It was in the service of the Democrats, though, under a former Roosevelt adviser who served the Truman administration, that Fleming found his first chance to influence executive policy. Bernard Baruch's task for the executive branch was to provide a blue-print for the internationalization of atomic energy, and he brought Fleming to his service once again, yet another indicator of Fleming's influence. In a confidential memo to Baruch, dated 13 May 1946 and entitled "Relations Between The Big Three," Fleming offered his prescriptions for the maladies which afflicted international relations. He began with a flat denunciation of the provocative nature of U.S. policy to station B-29 aircraft in Germany. Such craft, he asserted, were not necessary to the defense of the U.S. occupation zone and, as the delivery vehicle for the atomic bomb, sent a thinly-veiled message to the Soviet Union.

Fleming warned, too, that in the event of war between the Soviets and the West the U.S., even if victorious, would face monumental resistance from within its own territory and from the factions of Europeans who would fight on the side of the Soviets.⁵² After a victory, one which would likely result in the annihilation of what little industrial capacity remained in Europe, the U.S. would have to occupy a Russia where U.S. atomic weapons had delivered incredible destruction. Fleming questioned the feasibility of seven-percent of the world's population seeking to govern the rest, but that question was based upon an assumption of the character of the occupation, not upon a concrete model.⁵³

Given the nature of his audience, Fleming's next conclusion had great potential to influence: he observed that the destruction which another war

would bring would likely create an environment in which democratic capitalism could not survive. Using historical syllogism, Fleming observed that after W.W.I Russia fell to the Bolsheviks because of the "destruction of the material base of the old regime." After W.W.II, he continued, the West experienced "an extension of communism and socialism over the whole of Europe, Great Britain included." The U.S. must expect, therefore, that the "terrible ravages of another war would make it still more unlikely that our way of life could be restored in Europe."⁵⁴

So the question to be put was "how can the U.S. avoid war with the Soviet Union and continue to serve and protect U.S. interests?" According to Fleming, the U.S. must first refrain from serving the purposes of British imperialism. It was the British and their addiction to balance of power politics, something Fleming held to be "instinctive" to them, which caused the development of tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. There were, he maintained naively, no other causes for American-Russian conflict.⁵⁵ And Fleming discounted the possibility that the Russians would have proceeded to gain complete control over their sphere and attempted to expand it without British provocation. Although that would be "natural," given that they believed in their system as much as we believed in ours, Fleming observed that the "evidence is by no means complete that they have either the intention or the ability to communize all of Eastern Europe."⁵⁶

The second element of his answer to the question of how best to maintain peace was to insist upon "fair" solutions to the problems the powers faced. The first of these was the disposition of the Ruhr. Fleming

declared the French to be "eternally right" in their demand that the great industrial heartland of Germany be forever removed from German control. It was Fleming's belief that for as long as the Germans held the Ruhr they would dream of revenge so the dream must be put to an end. Of course what Fleming missed in his analysis was the equally great potential for irredentism on the part of a Germany deprived of its industrial base or, for that matter, the concept of self-determination, but that was a concept which Wilson and his followers applied discriminately.

In the same synapse, Fleming called for Trieste to be awarded to the Yugoslavs in order to resolve the second problem. The discontinuity of thought here is vast, for while Fleming recognized that if the Yugoslavs did not receive Trieste they would never rest, he failed to apply the same principle to the Italian state or to the Germans in the case of the Ruhr. Fleming readily acknowledged that the majority of Trieste citizens considered themselves Italians. As such, the potential for a future case of *Italia irredenta* was great. There was also the hypocrisy that as a Wilsonian internationalist Fleming had constantly advocated the idea of self-determination, yet here he sacrificed consistency to expediency. The alternative he proposed to Yugoslav control was to create a "genuine international" authority over Trieste, but here he failed to mention specifics or to learn from previous attempts at internationalizing cities with disputed national loyalties.⁵⁷

The third problem Fleming identified concerned Russia's access to the seas, and his argument here was more compelling. First, he correctly observed that Russia was the world's greatest riparian power and as such

had a legal right to secure access to the seas. Given Soviet strength, if it was not granted access it would wait for the opportune moment to "seize *exclusive* possession of these exits to the sea. So did [the U.S.] when others controlled the mouth of the Mississippi."⁵⁸ And he concluded that the U.S. would do so again if it were in the situation the Soviets were in in 1946. Consequently, he sought "real internationalization" of the Turkish straits, the Skagerak, the Kiel Canal, the Suez Canal, and Gibraltar.⁵⁹ Noticeably absent, though, is any mention of the Panama Canal: presumably Fleming was not interested in internationalizing all such inter-oceanic, inter-sea canals. Noticeably present is a willingness to bend law and principles to meet the exigencies of power.

As to the direct task of Baruch, the internationalization of atomic energy technology, Fleming again provided few details but demonstrated an inclination to be sympathetic to the Soviet perspective of world events. The Russians, he said, were a proud people and the fact that the U.S. had first developed atomic energy was a source of wounded pride, especially when, as an ally, they expected to share in the secret.⁶⁰ More concretely, though, he examined the impact of the U.S. monopoly of atomic energy upon the Soviet sense of national security.

It had been the belief of the Soviet people and their leaders that they would emerge from the war on a "footing of relative equality with the Western world," a footing which provided them with an assurance of safety against a repetition of the atrocities they had suffered at the hands of the *Wermacht*. That sense of security had been shattered in a single moment over Hiroshima, an event which placed them again in a position of

inferiority and insecurity. The only defense left to them in these altered circumstances was to hold the territory they presently controlled, perhaps reach out for more, and attempt to unlock the secret of the atom themselves.⁶¹ He then called upon the commission to address the problems of atomic energy control, but did not afford a specific plan to implement international control.

Certain of Fleming's values are clearly revealed here. Although he professed to be a champion of self-determination, he was willing to sacrifice that right when expedient. Although he professed to be a champion of a government of laws, not men, he was willing on the international scale to allow power to be the ultimate arbiter, not the law. His willingness to sacrifice the destiny of all the central European peoples to the needs of Russian security demonstrates the ease with which he engaged in power politics. Flexibility of principle in the attainment of a greater good is often a virtue, but the means employed to achieve that good may sometimes invalidate it.

There were two footnotes to the 13 May 1946 memo to Baruch. Fleming enclosed an assessment of the "iron curtain," and an assessment of the state of public opinion in the U.S. In an attempt to characterize that curtain as more porous than ferrous, Fleming cited a *New York Herald Tribune* report of 11 May 1946 on the Leipzig Fair. The inferences he drew from the report support the charges throughout his career that he uncritically accepted sources to support his *a priori* conclusions.⁶²

Fleming noted that the report indicated that Germans from throughout the four zones had flocked to the fair, where they found allied flags in

abundance and full freedom of movement. They also found better and more plentiful food than that which was to be had in the other allied zones. There was as well a 'remarkably orderly city administration,' one which had brought 'considerable economic progress.' All of this, the report continued, and no evidence of Soviet coaching!

Fleming asserted that unemployment in the Soviet zone was far below that of the other allied zones; indeed, there appeared to be a labor *shortage*. Factories were busy churning out goods, 60% of which went to the Soviet Union, a not inequitable arrangement given that the Russians supplied most of the raw materials. Relations were such that the Germans of the Soviet occupation zone looked forward to an early end to reparations, knew that the Western horror stories of Soviet occupation were untrue, and to the last man, woman, and child, "All Germans in the Russian zone believe that the continued division of Germany is due to the British and the Americans."⁶³

Fleming dismissed the possibility that the Soviets were intent upon providing the best possible picture of life in their zone because there was no evidence of their prompting the events. That would hardly surprise a critical observer: the Soviets might easily have been in the background holding hostages to ensure appropriate behavior. It certainly would not have been out of character for Stalin, and his tactics were well known.⁶⁴ As for the appearance of a labor shortage, the Russians had drafted German laborers to work in the Soviet Union. For Fleming to accept such sweeping generalizations as "all" Germans blamed the West for continued division of their country, or that "all" incidents of Soviet atrocities were untrue,

betrays in him either gross professional incompetence, an unjustified naivete, or a hidden agenda. The first two are most plausible. That after reading this Baruch could recommend Fleming to Truman as the "wisest man" he knew about Soviet affairs is an indictment of the financier's judgment as well.

The second addenda was a two-page letter dated 15 May 1946. In it, Fleming informed Baruch that he had momentarily doubted his representation of world events as being so direly urgent, and that as a consequence he had reconsidered the factors which had led him to such an eschatalogical conclusion. Fleming remained convinced that his original assessment was correct. He asserted that the armed forces of the U.S. were preparing for what they thought was an "inevitable" war with the Soviet Union, and said that he and others had discovered evidence of this. That any military maintains contingency plans for war seemed to have been lost on him: what did he think was the target of Red Army war games? There were as well, he asserted, forces within the fields of politics, religion, and economics who feared the Soviet system and desired its destruction. Men like Churchill, Vandenberg, Byrnes, Connally, and Dulles gave these forces voice, as did the press, which Fleming said "daily does its best to increase fear and suspicion and hostility toward Russia."⁶⁵

His conclusion was that the U.S. public was being conditioned to accept the inevitability of another war; how he arrived at the conclusion demonstrated again his loose methodology. Fleming referred to four successive National Opinion Research Center surveys which asked the question 'Do you expect the United States to fight in another war within the

next 25 years?,' but he cited only three of the summaries. These, he noted, demonstrated an increasing pessimism that war was possible. In March 1945, 36% answered "yes," in September 1945, 44% said "yes," and now, in May 1946, fully 68% said "yes," they believed the U.S. would fight another war in the next 25 years.

What Fleming deduced from this was that 2/3 of U.S. citizens had "surrendered, partially at least, to the inevitability of a final war with Russia."⁶⁶ Of course nowhere in the question is there any reference to the Soviet Union or even to Russia and nowhere is the possible war in which the U.S. might engage characterized as a "final" war. Such loose interpretation of evidence led in this case to some questionable conclusions.

Fleming shared Schuman's disillusionment over the U.N.'s few accomplishments and found much the same causes to blame for the failures. Fleming believed that the potential for continued cooperation between the U.S. and the S.U. was shattered after the first use of the nuclear bomb which "completely transformed" their relative power relationship. A strong Anglo-American diplomatic campaign in the Balkans and the complete deadlock in the London Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945 followed the introduction of the atomic age. The resultant antagonisms, thought Fleming, led the U.N. to be "a battleground between giant governments unable to make peace."⁶⁷ This was precisely what Schuman had predicted in the absence of a strong alliance between the major powers and Fleming perceived its results: stalemate in the U.N.

Although Fleming blamed both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. for the failure of the U.N. to organize an effective peace, his criticisms of the U.S. were much harsher. He observed that the Soviets successfully led the General Assembly to condemn U.S. propaganda as too inflammatory in a resolution of 17 November 1947 which he thought validated charges that the U.S. had engaged in "warmongering." He also noted that U.S. policy toward the Berlin crisis had allowed the U.N. to assume "a mediating personality" but that it was ineffectual. And, he asserted, when the U.S. feared Soviet involvement in the enforcement of U.N. resolutions, it blocked them.⁶⁸

Fleming condemned U.S. policy as hypocritical when it could support U.N. membership for Franco's repressive regime in Spain but oppose membership for the People's Republic of China because it was a dictatorship. And although he believed intervention in Korea was legally justifiable, he perceived a growing reflexiveness in the U.S. response to "totalitarian" aggression. "No principle," he wrote, "is more fixed in the American mind than that appeasement of totalitarian aggression does not pay."⁶⁹ That concept, he argued, led to the tragic mistake of crossing the 38th parallel, and of branding the Peoples Republic of China an aggressor, an act which prolonged the war.⁷⁰ He had perceived the indelible mark of the "Munich Syndrome" upon U.S. policymakers.

As well, Fleming feared that U.S. policy in Europe might allow the Eastern world to dominate civilization. In a letter to a former student, Ching-ling Chao, Fleming declared that current U.S. policy threatened to create a "greater disaster" in Europe, one which will destroy Western

civilization I have said repeatedly that if this happens the Orientals, whom we cannot destroy, are likely to inherit the earth."⁷¹

Together with the total lack of sensitivity for his audience, who was, after all, Oriental, Fleming demonstrated a sort of monolithic approach to the concept of race whose assumptions were without substantiation. Of course, if the West could destroy itself, it could destroy the East. This escaped him. It was a visceral racial concept of the ability of Orientals to breed which must have informed Fleming's opinion here. As well, he assumed that Orientals, and people of color in general, would act in unison to achieve shared goals.⁷² Did the experience of W.W.I.I. and the Japanese treatment of other Orientals in their co-prosperity sphere support such a concept? Did Orientals even think of one-another as members of some over-arching group? The answer to these questions was negative, and would also be negative when asked of any other race.

Another of Fleming's fears was that the U.N. might become an organization to protect the "free" world from the "totalitarian" threat. He saw value in the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 3 November 1950, but he also recognized that the U.N. General Assembly did not possess sufficient means to enforce its resolutions. And, like Schuman, he believed that the veto power created unanimity of purpose, for the veto mechanism made the U.N. "an instrument of conciliation and compromise rather than one of coercion."⁷³ He concluded that to assume that the U.S.S.R. alone had prevented the success of the U.N. would assure its collapse. The U.N. was, wrote Fleming, "our only hope of averting a permanently divided world, with the odds heavily in favor of a final struggle for world domination

between the two sides." And he found little solace in having "the law always on our side" if the result was the destruction of the world.⁷⁴

By 1951, Fleming was convinced that the real threat to U.S. security was not the Soviet Union, but those who made declarations to this effect within the U.S., a message Schuman had broadcast for several years. Fleming found particularly offensive efforts like those by the editors of *Colliers* to incite passions when a more reasoned discourse would better serve the cause of peace. *Collier's* had enlisted the talents of many influential journalists, commentators, and analysts to write an issue length scenario of "Russia's Defeat and Occupation, 1952-1960," replete with details of nuclear devastation in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and a cover depiction of a member of the U.S. Military Police with his bayonet thrust at a map of the U.S.S.R.

Fleming warned that the effect of one type of propaganda on the other was symbiotic, that *Collier's* "feeds the Soviet propaganda machine." And he asked his readers to consider the following syllogistic relationship: that because out of W.W.I the West encountered communism in Russia, out of W.W.II it encountered communism in China, what would be the odds that W.W.III would spread democratic capitalism?⁷⁵ American values, he observed, could only be preserved through the "energetic pursuit" of peace and prevention of war, both of which seemed to entail in Fleming's mind a neo-isolationism. But the methods U.S. policymakers had adopted to fight the Cold War were threatening to destroy the values which they sought to save.⁷⁶

Fleming believed there were three likely alternative endings to the Cold War: a stable balance of power; a Soviet initiated preventive war; or a U.S. initiated war of liberation.⁷⁷ None was correct. Again, his prognosis was based on historic syllogism: in bipolar political systems the hegemons always confronted one another in a fight to the death. Fleming observed that "if the history of the past has any clear lessons" the world was headed toward "a war to the death between two giant powers . . . fighting with atomic missiles and gigantic V-2 rockets."⁷⁸

In what was clearly a rejection of the global scope of U.S. foreign policy, Fleming called for the U.S. to disengage. Although he did not say so in explicit terms, this was a rejection of the Wilsonian policy of universalism, a policy Fleming would later condemn as the "disastrous decision" for globalism.⁷⁹ It must be remembered that Wilson's call for universalism was made before the formation of the League of Nations; in fact, before Wilson was committed to such an organization. In the absence of an effective world organization the basic means to accomplish Wilsonian universalism was unilateral action. This is an element of Wilson's thinking that both Fleming and Wright denied, or at least failed to take into account. In Wright's view, isolationism had killed the League of Nations, global imperialism had nearly killed the U.N., and few people understood that internationalism was the corrective to both. What both failed to realize was the fact that Wilson envisioned a global U.S. presence with or without internationalism.⁸⁰

Fleming assured the reader that U.S. attempts to "surround" the U.S.S.R. were provocative and could lead to war. He observed as well that the policy

of universalism had put the U.S. into association with some strange fellows, notably Franco, and thus compromised U.S. values.⁸¹ And he asserted that because the U.S. had "prospered phenomenally" in the past two wars its people and leaders might be more inclined to see another war in positive terms than the Russians, or the Europeans, or the Asians, all of whom had suffered so horribly from the last two wars.⁸²

Fleming continued his critique with an attack on Dean Acheson's seven-point plan for coexistence. It was a plan, noted Fleming, which could only be achieved through armed conflict, for the U.S.S.R. would not abandon Eastern Europe without resort to arms, an estimation Schuman shared. Acheson's policy to negotiate only after the U.S. achieved a dominant and superior position was, for Fleming, disingenuous in that dominant and superior powers do not negotiate, they dictate.⁸³ U.S. officials, he wrote, should stop seeing their Soviet counterparts in such starkly evil terms as it made compromise that much more difficult.⁸⁴ And he criticized the growing trend toward subversive warfare aimed at countries with which the U.S. was not at war.⁸⁵

In conclusion, he voiced his fear that such "officially sanctioned" articles as the one in *Collier's* were designed solely to provoke. Fleming believed that it was representative of a flaw in the American character: the belief that compromise was unacceptable and that the world could not exist "half slave and half free."⁸⁶ He took hope in the knowledge that both sides knew neither could decisively defeat the other, knowledge which might prevent the arms race from running its natural course. But to hedge his bet he called on the Allies (whom, he asserted, believed the U.S. to be a

greater threat to peace than the Soviets) to deny the U.S. use of their air bases.⁸⁷ Without such a change in course, Fleming believed that only 2-3 years remained before the inevitable explosion, one that would destroy democracy. Unlike Quincy Wright, he was not optimistic about the possibilities of peaceful coexistence between two hostile ideologies.

Following a visit with Fleming at Vanderbilt, Wright asked Fleming to produce an article based on twenty-five assumptions that Fleming attributed to U.S. policy as it developed from 1945-1952.⁸⁸ In "How Can We Secure Dependable Allies?," Fleming provided a litany of how the U.S. bludgeoned countries into alliances with it following WWII and the outbreak of the Cold War. Fleming believed this was partly the reason for allied breaks with U.S. attempts to push policies in the U.N. regarding new members and NATO command of UN forces in 1951. He reiterated his belief that most allied states and their peoples believed that the U.S.S.R. was not as great a threat as the U.S. portrayed it to be; that most U.S. allies believed its huge expenditures on arms and insistence that they follow suit was unproductive and reduced standards of living; and that U.S. "rashness and impatience are driving [the allies] rapidly toward a world war which will destroy them, whatever it does to [the US] and the Soviets."⁸⁹

His prescriptions were to moderate the arms race; to negotiate settlements as we go and not wait on the policy of sufficient strength; to promote independent action on the part of Kremlin satellites--it was an "illusion," he wrote to believe Moscow could control the vast Chinese people; to accelerate economic aid to the allies and depressed peoples through the U.N.; to substitute pro-democracy for anticommunism in the

ideological conflict; to strive to avoid war; and to provide the U.N. with sufficient moral authority to "alleviate and regulate the stresses and strains in an ever changing world."⁹⁰ What Fleming did not state were the means for providing the U.N. with sufficient moral force, nor did he mention the necessary material force to effect such goals. In short, he provided only homilies.

And what was illusory for the Soviets was equally so for the U.S. Fleming, as did Schuman, opposed the emphasis on regionalism as it evolved in the post-war world. The U.S. had engaged in what Fleming called "pactomania" in an effort to ally all the world's "free" nations with it, many of whose leaders were as odious as those of the Soviet Union. Fleming believed this effort was self-defeating and would strain the U.S. beyond its limits to lead. The U.S., he warned, should accept and act upon its full share of responsibility in the world, but no more. It was Fleming's desire to live in a world which accepted many diverse creeds, systems and cultures.⁹¹ Although not a return to isolationism, this is an assertion that the U.S. should not continue the course of Wilsonian universalism, a policy which could not tolerate creeds unsafe to democracy.

All, though, was not doom and gloom in Fleming's scenario. He saw cause to hope in that the U.S.S.R. was evolving inexorably toward, if not democracy, then a system more palatable to the U.S. This theme pervades his work from approximately 1953 to the end of his life. Fleming observed that the Soviet system had evolved into a bureaucratic state capitalism not too far removed from that in the West and that the law of diversity dictated that Mao's communism would differ from Stalin's.⁹²

Fleming adopted a one-dimensional interpretation of convergency theory, for although he asserted the Soviets gradually adopted parts of the Western system, rarely did he state that the reverse corollary applied.⁹³ Fleming claimed that as Communist societies advanced, the people demanded and received more both materially and intellectually, and that as the world progressed, competition between socialism and capitalism would result in the "modification of each."⁹⁴ Fleming as well attacked the notion of monolithic communism and observed that Khrushchev had rapidly modified the soviet system toward "freer institutions."⁹⁵ Fleming urged U.S. policymakers to bear in mind what he referred to as "the greatest law of life on earth, that every social system is in constant evolution." The implication, of course, was that the communist system would change and progress. There would be, he thought, "many communisms, all changing and adapting . . . and some of them evolving into forms distinctly more acceptable to us."⁹⁶

The decade of the fifties was a period of declining influence for the political scientist at Vanderbilt. Although he still published articles and offered some of the most popular courses on campus, he was fast becoming an anachronism in his department.⁹⁷ In recognition of his accomplishments, though, Chancellor Harvie Branscomb appointed Fleming Vanderbilt's first research professor. This award provided status and research opportunities, but it also created tension between the new chair of the department of Political Science, Avery Leiserson, and Fleming.

Leiserson scheduled Fleming to a nine hour teaching load for the academic year 1954/1955 without consulting Fleming: the chair posted the schedule on the chalkboard during an April 1954 meeting which Fleming did not attend. Official policy was that research professors were only required to teach six hours per academic year, and Fleming justifiably opposed what he saw as an attempt to undermine the principles of the research professorship.⁹⁸

Paul Conkin, in his history of Vanderbilt, *Gone With the Ivy*, identified Fleming as "an old Wilsonian who . . . dreamed of a new world order tied to collective security," but also described Fleming after his appointment to the research professorship as "a complaining obstructionist" who maintained "an almost fawning relationship" with Branscomb. Conkin provides no citation for the evidence he used as the basis of such a subjective analysis, and offers no examination of the above situation, but this characterization of Fleming sets the stage for Conkin to defend some of Branscomb's later actions toward the professor.⁹⁹ Perhaps Fleming was an obstructionist; the same could be said of his idol, Woodrow Wilson. But it seems more likely that Fleming, like Wilson, was a man possessed of supreme confidence in his sense of mission. So that rather than acquiesce to men of lesser principle but more power, he fought for his values.

In addition to his stand for principle with Leiserson, Fleming also applied the same determination on a smaller scale. When Fleming was apprised of the Adam Hat Company's decision to withdraw sponsorship from Drew Pearson's radio show after Senator McCarthy had called on the public to register their objections to the company, the professor fired off three

letters: one to Pearson in which he praised the journalist for his dedication to exposing the more present danger of fascism in the United States over the alleged danger of communism; another to Charles V. Molesworth, president of the hat company, in which he expressed his regret that he would no longer purchase their hats, for they were good hats, but that he could not countenance such "supine retreat" toward the threat of fascism; and a final one to the American Broadcasting Company.¹⁰⁰ This was a man who, on several occasions, took the time and the effort to apply his principles.¹⁰¹

Because of Fleming's outspoken criticism of the new U.S. empire and his efforts to provide a more balanced picture of the Soviet perspective of world affairs, he came under public and private attack from McCarthyites and other hyper-patriots. After all, he had been arguing since the close of WWII that the Soviet system was not the antithesis of Western society; that its emphasis on education and an increased standard of living for its citizens would serve to liberalize that system and make it more palatable to the rest of the world; and that its security needs were legitimate in the face of Western encirclement and other provocative measures.¹⁰² He had already been removed from one medium because his views were not politically correct--radio station WSM in 1947--and he would face renewed pressure to conform or be ousted. But his trial at the hands of conformists would come in the next decade.

While Fleming was bearing the ignominy of the fifties, Fred Schuman became increasingly a martyr to the cause of peaceful-coexistence. Schuman spent much time and effort proselytizing on behalf of the U.N.

and on behalf of what he deemed to be a more responsible U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. His activities were not limited to his extensive speaking schedule, which the Roxanna Wells Lecture Bureau of 342 Madison Avenue continued to book during the 1940s: he was involved with a wide variety of public and private organizations as well. Among the groups he served were the National Citizens Political Action Committee, whose membership included Orson Welles, Freda Kirchwey, and Gifford Pinchot; the National War College; the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc., whose sponsors included Charles Chaplin, Rev. Adam Clayton Powell, Aaron Copland, Albert Einstein, Moss Hart, Lillian Hellman, Helen Keller, Eugene O'Neill, Claude Pepper, and Paul Robeson; the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, and the American Committee of Protection of Foreign Born. And he campaigned for and wrote the foreign policy plank of Henry Wallace's Progressive Party in 1948.

As with his activities in the 1930s, his association with groups which some public and private figures thought to be "communist fronts" caused him much grief and brought him to the attention of Senator Joseph McCarthy. McCarthy charged Schuman with being a fellow traveller, and relied heavily upon the charges which the Dies Committee had levelled in 1943. McCarthy erred, not uncharacteristically, in identifying Schuman as a State Department employee, when in fact he had been an employee of the Federal Communications Commission.

Robert Griffith, in *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate*, provided a partial explanation of McCarthy's tactics: Schuman had

once lectured to Foreign Service officers at an orientation program. Griffith characterized Schuman as an "ardent left-wing activist" who was not subversive "in any recognized meaning of that term."¹⁰³

Schuman did not plan to testify before the sub-committee as he had already been absolved of the same charges before the Dies Committee.¹⁰⁴ Instead, he wrote to Edward Morgan, Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee Investigating the State Department, Committee on Foreign Affairs, and referred him to certain press releases and to the testimony of Senator Clinton P. Anderson in the *Congressional Record* of 27 March 1950, which quoted Anderson saying "If you were to sit down with Schuman for five or six hours, Joe [McCarthy], and talk to him, you would be convinced of his loyalty and intelligence. I think he's a fine American." Schuman concluded that he shared Secretary of State Dean Acheson's public appraisal of the motives and morals of Senator McCarthy. Schuman was not called on to testify.¹⁰⁵

It is not unlikely, too, that his active service on behalf of the communist-tainted Progressive Party campaign of 1948 caught "Tail-gunner" Joe's attention. Schuman had immediate access to Henry A. Wallace, who frequently sought his opinions and advice. The best record of Schuman's activities during the campaign is contained in Curtis MacDougall's three volume work *Gideon's Army*. In this book, MacDougall refers to Schuman's reputation as a prophet of world events as they transpired in the thirties, and to a diary Schuman kept along with 2,500 words of notes and comments about the events in Philadelphia during the Progressive Party convention.¹⁰⁶

Schuman's was the voice of reason and of biting wit among the many chants of extremism at Philadelphia. In a moment of reflection on Truman and Dewey, the major party candidates, Schuman observed pointedly that 'the only businessman and capitalist currently running for President of the United States' was Henry Wallace. To buttress this, he noted that neither Truman nor Dewey had ever met a payroll, had ever run a successful business, or had accrued any capital through their business efforts. The irony was that Wallace, who had accomplished all those things, was lampooned as Utopian, impractical, and a Communist stooge. It was this latter image which took hold of the imaginations of many Americans.

The Communist Party of America had "infiltrated" the Progressive Party and, along with non-communist socialists, had contributed to what some considered to be the radicalization of its platform.¹⁰⁷ Among these radical planks was the nationalization of most industry, a policy which Schuman "strongly opposed" from his position on the drafting subcommittee.¹⁰⁸ Schuman gave speeches in which he recommended a gradualist approach toward nationalization, which, he argued, should be accomplished on an individual industry-wide basis according to the merits. Much to Schuman's dismay, the radical proponents of nationalization carried the day.¹⁰⁹

Schuman was most influential in the creation of the foreign policy plank of the Progressive campaign, which he wrote and defended at the convention. That plank contained the nucleus of Schuman's prescriptions for world order and an endorsement of world government. The opening line declared that enduring world peace could be had only through world law, because anarchy in international relations during the atomic age

threatened to destroy not only Western civilization, but all humanity.

There was, wrote Schuman, but one alternative to the then current system of sovereign states and the wars which it brought: the establishment of a world federal legislature which could create and enforce law upon individuals as well as nation states.

The powers of that legislature would be "limited but adequate" to defend the "general welfare of all mankind."¹¹⁰ Schuman continued by suggesting that the United Nations could be the basis of "peace through government" if the unity of purpose of the Great Powers was restored. "Since the death of Franklin Roosevelt," he observed, "this principle has been betrayed to a degree which not only paralyzes the United Nations but threatens the world with another war in which there can be no victors and few survivors."¹¹¹

There was little debate over these passages of the platform, but what followed caused Wallace some uneasiness. Schuman blamed the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. equally for the current state of affairs between them, and the growing tensions in the world. He declared that U.S. bipartisan policymakers had sacrificed the nation's interests to "monopolistic profits" and military power, and that the Soviet leaders had sacrificed peace to national aggrandizement and power politics. Vice-presidential candidate Glen Taylor vigorously opposed the inclusion of such a statement in that he believed responsibility for the Cold War was exclusively the result of U.S. policies. The wording was changed to read "Responsibility for ending the tragic prospect of war is a joint responsibility of the Soviet Union and the United States," and the amendment was adopted.¹¹²

Although potentially embarrassing, Schuman's connections and policy recommendations did not prevent the armed forces colleges from seeking to engage him to speak to their students. In a series of letters between Brigadier General T. H. Landon, Deputy Commandant, U.S. Army War College, and Schuman, the army displayed a determined effort to provide its students with diverse opinions.

In response to the original invitation to speak, Schuman felt obliged to warn the commandant before he committed himself to Schuman's appearance, that he tended to "share the views of Henry A. Wallace," and that he opposed the Truman Doctrine, was "extremely skeptical" of the Marshall Plan, and had "little sympathy with U.S. diplomatic pressure on behalf of 'democracy' in Eastern Europe."¹¹³ In order to spare the War College any possible embarrassment, Schuman suggested a "safe" alternate speaker, but noted he would be more than willing to accept the invitation if the general thought it best.

The general's response was revealing. He thanked Schuman for his "candid" remarks, then proceeded to explain the purpose of the War College in inviting him. The college, he wrote, made an "honest effort" to present varying points of view to its students. Schuman's views were known to the college administration and served as one of the key elements in their extension of an invitation to participate. As well, the administration believed Schuman had established a reputation of being able to defend his views. The general concluded with the observation that Schuman was invited *because of his views, because of his knowledge of Soviet-American*

relations, and *because* of his ability to express himself in "understandable" terms.¹¹⁴

Schuman continued to be a sought-after participant among the various service related colleges and to enjoy invitations to the War College, even after he had gone on record in opposition to the Truman policies of peacetime conscription, universal military training, and increased appropriations for the military.¹¹⁵ Schuman believed that, contrary to the proclamations of Truman and Acheson, that U.S. policy would do little to contain Communism; instead, he thought U.S. policy would serve the purposes of the enemy, disintegrate the democratic traditions of the U.S., and transform the free enterprise system into a "militarist economy."¹¹⁶ It is to the military's credit that it sought such diverse opinions.

This experience, though, was the exception, not the rule. By the end of the decade, the ghosts of 1932, 1943, and some of more recent creation, haunted Schuman. An article entitled "The Devil and Jimmy Byrnes," which was a long review of Byrnes' *Speaking Frankly*, caused him much difficulty. One professor from Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa, wrote to tell him of the embarrassment caused to him and his students when a known "fellow traveller" distributed the article, published by *Soviet Russia Today* which the professor identified as a "communist front publication," at a United Nations Conference held at Drake. Wrote the irate professor: "We have used your text on *International Politics* for quite awhile We also have made liberal use of your more recent books on *American Soviet-Relations* but I will find it difficult to further use your materials unless

you can explain or denounce the use of your material at this time by agencies which we consider dangerous to our safety."¹¹⁷

Even more difficult following the "furor" over this article was his relationship with Dr. James Phinney Baxter III, president of Williams College, and the trustees. George Sokolsky took Schuman's article to task in his column for the *New York Evening Post*, citing a few passages out of context and thus seeking to provoke readers. Schuman received more than one letter from Williams College alumni who opposed his position, the most moderate of which suggested that he seek psychiatric treatment.¹¹⁸ The trustees of the college seriously considered relieving Schuman of his duties.¹¹⁹

In answer to his critics, Schuman cited his first amendment rights and attempted to demonstrate the bankruptcy of U.S. policy. In a letter to the *New York Sun*, Schuman provided a disclaimer for the College while insisting that its students, faculty, and administration recognized his right to express his opinions. He then attacked the Truman administration and declared that he, Schuman, had been more consistently opposed to the extension of Soviet power and communism than had Sokolsky. Schuman asserted that the actual result of Truman administration policies had been to promote communism throughout the world. And aware of that result, of what Schuman called the "failure of the Byrnes-Bevin program, the debacle of the Truman Doctrine, and the impending bankruptcy of the Marshall Plan," the men who called the shots now advocated war as the means to eliminate the "Red Menace."¹²⁰

Perhaps more importantly to his defense, he demonstrated that nowhere in his speech did he mention his affiliation with Williams College, which had been one of Sokolsky's principle charges. This revelation prompted one alumnus who disagreed with Schuman's views to write Sokolsky and chastise him for putting Schuman "in a false light in this regard," and to apologize to both Schuman and Baxter.¹²¹

In yet another public address, Schuman found himself once again the focus of criticism on and off campus. Schuman's remarks at the Cultural and Scientific Convention for World Peace held in New York in March, 1949, brought him to the attention of the right-wing press, and *Time* magazine published an article entitled "Tumult at the Waldorf," which characterized Schuman's comments as those of a fellow-traveller.¹²² And once again he was at odds with the Williams trustees over whether he had absolved the college from sharing his views.

In his remarks to the conferees, Schuman repeated his earlier charge that both superpowers shared responsibility for the Cold War. *Time* characterized this as a "very tentative" suggestion. When Schuman noted that some in the U.S. wanted war with Russia, he insisted that they were "few in number and without influence." *Time* did not report that phrase. Schuman did, though, accept the blanket statement that no one in the Soviet Union wanted war. And when a Mr. Fedayeev declared that war was the product of capitalist conspiracies, *Time* reported that Schuman agreed completely. Schuman contended that he had said that war was the inevitable consequence of "international anarchy, power politics, and mutual fear and suspicion," not just capitalist conspiracies.¹²³

The speech came to the attention of the Williams College trustees, some of whom demanded Schuman's resignation. In a letter to President Baxter, Schuman admitted his negligence in not absolving the college from responsibility for his remarks and apologized for the fact that the printed program and the press releases both identified him as a professor at Williams. But he went on to say that "no one in his right mind ever supposes that I am speaking for the College."¹²⁴ Baxter must have agreed, for Schuman remained with the College. But he would be tested again, and very shortly.

That test came at the hands of William Loeb, publisher of the *Manchester Union*. Loeb's reputation as a red-baiting, radical conservative is well-established. Loeb wrote an unsolicited letter to President Baxter on 16 October 1950 to which was appended a 21 page report purporting to detail Schuman's connections to organized communism in the U.S. The basis of the report was the Dies Committee hearings, a book by Eugene Lyon entitled *The Red Decade*, and Schuman's own work, *Soviet Politics: At Home and Abroad*.¹²⁵

In due course, Schuman responded with a seven page letter to Baxter which sought to refute in detail the charges against him. He noted the spurious nature of the Dilling charges in the 1930s, that he had been cleared of the Dies charges, and that his affiliation with agencies branded as "communist organizations" had been with the likes of Franklin Roosevelt, Henry Stimson, and many others. As well, he demonstrated that he had taken strong stands against Soviet actions in the past, including a public appeal for U.S. aid to Finland against the U.S.S.R. in the 10 December

1939 *New York Times*; that he had urged public support of the U.S. and the U.N. in Korea to check Communist aggression in the 29 June 1950 *North Adams Transcript* and the 30 June 1950 *Berkshire Evening Eagle*; and that the excerpts from his book were taken out of context and that one could find in the same book many references to the failings of the Soviet Union in domestic and foreign policies.¹²⁶

Perhaps as the result of the continued harassment he received, Schuman exercised greater caution with regards to the organizations with which he associated himself. His relationship with the Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born serves as an example. He lent his name to this and other organizations which he thought awakened the public to the interests of internationalism. In his letter to President Baxter, Schuman attempted to defend himself and his relationship to the Committee. Schuman observed that he was then and had been for many years a member of the committee and insisted that it was not and never had been a "communist front" organization, nor had the Communist Party U.S.A. sponsored it. The Dies Committee had labeled it a subversive organization in 1940, explained Schuman, because it had successfully opposed a series of anti-alien bills which Martin Dies, Josef Starnes, and Senator Reynolds had sponsored. Schuman noted that members and sponsors included Harry Elmer Barnes and Ernest Hemingway (two names not likely to garner support for the "un"subversive nature of the committee) and that President Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, Harold Ickes, Justice Frank Murphy, Fiorello LaGuardia, and many other popular officials had sent public messages of

support to the Committee's fourth annual conference in 1940.¹²⁷ This was, of course, innocence by association!

But what the committee had been in 1940 and what it was in 1950 differed greatly, or so Schuman discovered. In a letter of 25 June 1951, Schuman removed himself from membership in the organization and his reasons for doing so are revealing. Schuman expressed "reluctance and regret" in taking such action as he had spent much time and effort defending the committee from charges that it was a communist front organization. And, Schuman insisted, he remained convinced that when he defended it, it was not a communist front organization. But that had now changed as the result of a propaganda pamphlet he had received from Prague which contained passages of an address which the co-chairman, the reverend John W. Darr, Jr., delivered at the 21-26 February Berlin meeting of the World Council of Peace.¹²⁸

Schuman observed that he was not pulling his membership because of the public embrace and endorsement of that organization for the "fantastically false Communist version of the Korean War and of American Foreign Policy." His motives were "of a different order." Wrote Schuman, "I have never knowingly belonged to or sponsored, and I do not now choose to belong to or sponsor, any organization whose leaders or officers adopt the Communist position on public questions in any context in which that position is demonstrably at variance with established facts."¹²⁹

Schuman's response to a request to speak to a Friends Service Committee on the state of the society and bipartisan foreign policy revealed both his views on bipartisanship and his new caution as to where and to whom he

would speak. He wrote to Russ Johnson that "We are no longer living in a free society. We shall not retain such freedoms as we have left or recover any of those we have already lost until and unless the present bipartisan foreign and defense policy of our government, all but unanimously endorsed by press, pulpit, and people, is drastically revised." Schuman then requested the background of other participating groups in the 24-25 October 1952 meeting so that he might unwelcome association and future embarrassment.¹³⁰ Johnson assuaged Schuman's fears and he accepted the invitation.¹³¹

This long relationship with causes which many labelled as communist fronts cost Schuman not only in terms of the headaches of being constantly required to defend himself to the College, but it hit him squarely in the pocketbook, too.¹³² His longtime agent, Roxanna Wells, put the problem poignantly. They both believed that Schuman's identification with radical causes now drastically reduced invitations for lectures, and she shared with him a story which revealed the pervasiveness of the red scare. She had recently sold a musical trio which performed operalogues. After negotiations, the chairwoman of the group with which she was dealing asked her whether or not all three of the musicians were "pure and have no 'red' record, interests or affiliations." This person went on to warn Wells that she should exercise great care in who she booked in order not to incriminate herself. Wells closed with: "I'll do my best for you. Let's both pray that Scott Nearing is wrong when he says 'it will get worse before it gets better.'"¹³³

Just eight months later she wrote Schuman and reluctantly agreed to his request that he be released from his contract with her agency. She reiterated her belief that he should be heard as much as possible but noted that none of the liberals were getting bookings and observed that she had been unable to secure even one engagement for Schuman that year. She assured him that even though he was released, she would continue to mention his name and seek to find him speaking dates.¹³⁴

Schuman faced problems with his long-time publisher, Alfred A. Knopf, as well during this period. His new book, *The Commonwealth of Man*, would prove to be Schuman's favorite and his publisher's nightmare. Knopf assigned an editor to correct what Alfred Knopf called "grave editorial problems" which required a change from the "old Twilight-of-the-Gods kind of point of view." Schuman was incensed. It was the first time that an editor had been assigned such a task for any of his books. He wrote the man whose task it was to "change the God's point of view," Philip Vaudrin, and told him in no uncertain terms what could be done with his labor. The book, wrote Schuman, was "not the perfect book on world government. It is merely the best book written on the subject thus far."¹³⁵ Knopf dropped Vaudrin and assigned V. O. Keys as editor. The book was published, but to mixed reviews.

There was at least one note of optimism for Schuman. Carey McWilliams, editorial director for *The Nation*, continued to seek Schuman's contributions to his magazine. From 1954 to 1957, McWilliams asked Schuman for full length as well as review articles, and his articles became a regular feature in that magazine. McWilliams referred to Schuman as

"one of this country's authentic prophets," and the author used the opportunity to articulate new prophecies.¹³⁶

His correspondence with McWilliams reveals much of Schuman's thought. He wrote the editor that he had come to view the Cold War as "a splendid thing" to "be perpetuated indefinitely." This tongue-in-cheek belief resulted from Schuman's embrace of Lawrence Dennis's thesis that the Cold War was the "chief means of maintaining full employment and full production in the American economy." Schuman wrote that the Cold War had "become in large part, for the U.S.A., a kind of glorified W.P.A.--i.e., a scheme of public spending to maintain full employment and full production. Unless we are bright enough to find a substitute, our prospects are rather dismal."¹³⁷ He observed, too, his support of the Toynbee thesis that "the Cold War represented a major spiritual challenge on both sides" and registered his doubt that the Supreme Court would have ruled as it did on segregation in *Brown v. the Board of Education* in the "absence of the Cold War."¹³⁸ In a domestic context, then, the Cold War served, at least in one instance, to liberate suppressed peoples.

One letter between the two men dated 23 December 1955 provides an insight to Schuman's priorities for Soviet-American relations. McWilliams asked Schuman to provide a list of questions to be asked the editors of *Pravda*, a list in which Schuman defined his agenda for superpowers. Schuman's first question asked whether the Soviet Union would accept the reunification of Germany on the basis of permanent nonalignment and permanent disarmament or severely limited arms. The second asked if the Soviet Union would accept Eisenhower's proposal for "reciprocal aerial

inspection, coupled with local checkpoint control of strategic centers" if the U.S. would pledge not to use atomic weapons in a first strike. The third asked if the Soviets would cooperate in a joint investment venture for the underdeveloped areas of the world. The fourth asked if further democratization in the wake of the revelations of the XXth Party Congress could be expected to include "genuine mass participation" and "multiple candidacies." In the end, Schuman requested a contemporary explanation from Soviet ideologists of the concepts for a classless society, economic communism, and the withering away of the state.¹³⁹

The productive relationship with McWilliams proved the exception, not the rule, to Schuman's experiences in the fifties. To add to his difficulties, yet another incarnation of the Dilling charges plagued Schuman. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in his book *The Politics of Upheaval*, identified Schuman as a supporter of the Foster and Ford Communist Party ticket in the 1932 presidential election.¹⁴⁰ Schuman wrote a letter which detailed his exculpation from such charges in both the Illinois Senate and the U.S. Senate, and requested that Schlesinger renounce his error.¹⁴¹ Schlesinger responded by phone and letter to assure Schuman that the error would be corrected, sent to him two dozen errata statements, and offered further assistance if the implication that Schuman was a communist cost him any employment.¹⁴²

Despite his personal tribulations, Schuman began to read the end of the Cold War in the international events which followed the Korean Conflict. Writing to Quincy Wright in 1959, Schuman noted that "A few weeks ago I discovered in an old file an article in *The Nation* of June 20, 1953,

forecasting the coming end of the Cold War. Modesty forbids me to reveal the author." He continued that his "forecast was a bit premature, but not inaccurate," and that with the death of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower was "free to do what he probably would have done in 1955 except for his heart attack." Schuman concluded that he was "quite hopeful."¹⁴³

What were the bases this Twentieth Century Nostradamus used for this premature prognosis? Schuman observed in "Cold War's End" that the problems of power politics between sovereignties could be dealt with by fighting or bargaining, nothing else. And although, according to Schuman, a few people in the U.S. called for meaningful negotiations, including Denna Fleming, George F. Kennan, Hans J. Morgenthau, and James Warburg, U.S. skepticism about negotiating prevailed, paralleled by the "Byzantine obstructionism of Stalinist diplomacy." Both sides had long "regarded diplomacy as a trap."¹⁴⁴ Schuman believed, though, that no one could achieve victory through fighting, a conclusion which he said everyone, "whether sober with responsibility or drunk with power," shared (presumably because it is rational). Therefore, he reasoned, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must eventually negotiate.¹⁴⁵

Preliminary to such negotiations, he called on the U.S. to repudiate the Wilsonian basis for diplomatic recognition and accept the People's Republic of China as a member of the international community. He called on both sides to negotiate the steps necessary for a unified, neutral Germany, and said that for now they must work to maintain the balance of power in a sovereign system of states.¹⁴⁶ Such negotiations could, he predicted, lead the way to an era of peace and perhaps "a reformation of a strengthened

United Nations in the direction of limited world government."¹⁴⁷ Much of his optimism that the Cold War would end in negotiation was based on his belief WWII was unlikely because neither side could convince itself that it had the "decisive margin of superiority" necessary for victory in the nuclear age.¹⁴⁸

Still more cause for optimism was the death of Stalin and the new leadership which emerged in the Soviet Union. Schuman perceived the 11 May 1955 Moscow proposal to withdraw foreign troops from Germany, the imminent retreat of Soviet troops from Austria, and the Soviet concession on international inspection and controls as harbingers of peace. He continued to assert that there would be no WWII and noted that his accurate predictions in the past had been based on a "sober analysis of power politics, global strategy, and the present and prospective balance of forces in a divided world."

Schuman referred again to the assumptions found in his article "The Coming End of the Cold War," which presumed rational leaders on both sides of the conflict, and stated that reality would force negotiation¹⁴⁹ Those negotiations would follow one of two patterns: a reaffirmation of the *status quo* with an intensified arms race and further confrontations on the periphery; or, disengagement along the periphery, followed by a *modus vivendi* with a neutral zone between the U.S. and Soviet spheres. In order to cover all the bases, though, to hedge his bet, he provided that a combination of the above would be possible in that different choices might be made for different areas¹⁵⁰ Germany would be an example of a

combination of the two: it could either be unified as a neutral state or can remain forever divided--Schuman foresaw no third option.¹⁵¹

The question of what to do with Germany troubled Schuman. As early as 1953 he had declared that reunification under Western terms was something to which the Soviet Union could "never consent."¹⁵² He feared U.S. plans to rearm Germany, in that he thought they were based on the false assumption that the West faced an imminent threat of attack from the Soviet Union.¹⁵³ Rearmament would likely lead to Warsaw Pact efforts to ensure that East Germany equaled or exceeded West Germany's military capacity, and the resultant arms race could jeopardize the global balance.¹⁵⁴ Schuman wanted a unified but neutralized Germany. This, of course, placed him at odds with Wright's belief that neutrality was a legal fossil. A rearmed, unified Germany allied with the West, Schuman declared, was a "political impossibility."¹⁵⁵ He concluded that the influence of U.S. allies and the logic of the alternatives he presented would lead the U.S. to disengage.¹⁵⁶ He believed as well that the new leaders of the U.S.S.R., Khrushchev and Bulganin, along with U.S. President Eisenhower understood that collective security and a peaceful world order would be impossible in the absence of a concert of the great powers.¹⁵⁷

Schuman acknowledged Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the XXth Party Congress, but claimed that it was too early for a "definitive re-assessment" of the deceased tyrant. Schuman compared Stalin's accomplishments favorably to those of Ivan IV and Peter I, but observed that their costs "constitutes a judgment, most lamentable, on the Russian community itself. Those incapable of self-government, if they would avoid

anarchy, must submit to an autocrat." Stalinism fulfilled Russia's need to modernize and was, thought Schuman, a "non-repetitive . . . phenomenon."¹⁵⁸ The new Russia was not one of Potemkin villages; rather, it was a great industrial civilization which could effectively address its needs and was "here to stay."

These conclusions were found in a series of travelogues entitled "Russia Revisited," written for the *Nation*, in which Schuman generally played champion for the cause of Soviet progressivism.¹⁵⁹ Collectively they were little more than a travel guide and some awestruck observations of the great strides Moscow had made since his previous visits in 1928 and 1933. He did observe, in almost an apologetic tone, that Soviet devotion to the corpses of Lenin and Stalin indicated the universal social need for "Miracle, Mystery, and authority," a need he identified for a world society as well.¹⁶⁰ And although he concluded that "Soviet society . . . is a far more unequal society than American society . . . in the current distribution of income," he observed that Soviet citizens were better off than they had ever been and that the Soviet Union was a nation which would continue to grow and prosper.¹⁶¹

The collapse of the Soviet Union just 35 years in the future made a mockery of this prediction. As with any "successful" prophet, people rarely remember the failed predictions or the methods used to arrive at them. Schuman had claimed that politics was the art of the possible, but what he should have said was that despite his efforts to make political science a predictive discipline, it rarely seemed to narrow the possible to the probable or the actual in terms of predicting the future.

Schuman failed to apply criticisms he levelled readily against U.S. dependency upon a militarized economy to the Soviet Union. Instead, he declared that the promise of change in the U.S.S.R. of 1956, the year of the XXth Party Congress and the abnegation of Stalinism, bode well for all peoples. And he continued to place faith in the process of convergency, in the dynamic of reciprocal stimulation each system had upon the other.¹⁶² He would be remarkably silent about the Soviet invasion of Hungary that year. His only reference to it is contained in a letter to George Brodsky, Schuman's cartographer, in which Schuman tried to justify Soviet actions in the context of U.S. actions of a similar nature in Guatemala in 1954.¹⁶³

In preparation for his trip to the Soviet Union for this series, Schuman wrote to a Mr. Solomatin of the Soviet Embassy to request a visa. In this letter, Schuman indicated that *Pravda's* critical review of his book *Soviet Politics; At Home and Abroad*, "was based upon a misunderstanding of my book." Schuman insisted that American reviewers had criticized the book severely for its sympathetic interpretation of the U.S.S.R. He concluded with the hope that such a misunderstanding would not "prevent my obtaining a visa."¹⁶⁴

Such obsequiousness did not always serve his purposes. In 1948 he had declared that the Communist press had denounced his book *Soviet Politics* "as being anti-Marxist, which it is."¹⁶⁵ And he provided a similar interpretation when he was the Edward Douglass White Lecturer on Citizenship at Louisiana State University in March, 1961. In the published account of his lectures, he told his audience that he had "contributed a good deal" to the literature which condemned Marxism as a failed philosophy.

Evidently to support his assertion that he was an independent scholar and not the fellow-traveller so many thought he was, he went on to observe that this was the reason *Pravda* had, in its 23 October 1953 issue, declared him to be a "tool of Wall Street," a "warmonger," and an "imperialist."¹⁶⁶ Schuman could tailor his past to fit the audience.

Still, he did criticize the Soviet leadership for what he perceived to be the abandonment of the egalitarian agenda of 1917. The impact of the creation of a new elite during Stalin's 1930s *embourgeoisement* program had, thought Schuman, created "a sharply hierarchical structure" of slaves, collective farmers and unskilled laborers, and the "highly privileged new elite" no longer find it useful to credit egalitarian ideals.¹⁶⁷ In order for the new elite to survive at home, Schuman thought it must relax austerity there and avoid military conflict abroad. Such a policy was possible under the conditions of a global balance of power which the Cold War had produced. Within such a balance, war between the great powers was unlikely; consequently, coexistence was both possible and, wrote Schuman, inevitable. The possibility was greatly enhanced by the fact that the U.S.S.R. would gradually evolve toward a socialist democracy.¹⁶⁸

Convergency theory, as we have seen, influenced Schuman throughout his career. He observed that he had "long suspected that the end result of Soviet communism would be an approximation to the ideal social order as defined by spokesmen of American capitalism, and that the America of days to come would somewhat resemble to the objective observer, the Marxist-Leninist vision of the 'classless society' and the 'cooperative commonwealth.'¹⁶⁹ By the mid-1950s he believed that the U.S. and the

U.S.S.R. and their peoples experienced problems common to industrialized super-powers. Because of this, he thought it likely that the Communist-Capitalist division of the world would not dictate future political divisions.¹⁷⁰ The important division in the future, he observed, would likely be a North-South division, industrial versus underdeveloped. This could prove to be a compelling reason for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to pursue a joint program designed to benefit the third world.¹⁷¹

And Schuman still believed that the U.N., an association of sovereignties, could be the catalyst for such cooperation between the superpowers, although as such it could not be a world government. But the U.N. had encouraged "detente" and survived the efforts of both sides of the Cold War to politicize it. The U.N. Charter, unlike the League of Nations Covenant, recognized that collective security, which Schuman read as the coercion of states by states, "was a formula not for peace but for war unless the Great Powers are unanimously in concert and disposed to cooperate for common purposes."¹⁷²

In an address delivered at Washington and Lee University, 14 February 1956, Denna Fleming assessed ten years of collective security and arrived at similar conclusions. As usual, he praised Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Cordell Hull as visionaries, but observed that in 1945, the allies did "merely what should have been done in 1920." They had created another league which retained many of the strengths and flaws of the old one. What was needed in 1945 was a "real advance toward the organization of a world community, but by this time there was no community."¹⁷³ The U.N. could

not discipline either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. and the "chance to organize the world which we lost in 1920 had not been regained." 174

He declared the Geneva Summit of July 1955, a summit which led the U.S. to declare publicly its opposition to atomic war and renounce the policy of liberation, a success even though Eisenhower and Nixon retained a recalcitrant posture afterwards.¹⁷⁵ But he observed that U.S. support of colonial and feudal regimes propelled "most of the Asian-Arab world away from us and into neutralism." This led to the U.N. vote of 14 December 1955, which admitted 16 new states over heavy U.S. opposition and was, noted Fleming, a great defeat for U.S. diplomacy and U.S. efforts to lead the U.N.

The big governments, he observed, had learned little about collective security and regarded the U.N. as a "tool for their own purposes," one "just as expendable as the League was." To counter this, he called for the U.S. to support the U.N. in efforts to aid underdeveloped countries or its leadership would be rejected just as it had been on the vote for universality of membership. The U.N., he concluded, would not have the power to enforce peace, but it would be a forum where 'the organized opinion of mankind,' a force he believed the great powers could not disregard in the atomic age, could find expression.¹⁷⁶

Fleming's conclusions were based largely on his negative assessment of U.S. domestic and foreign policies since 1917. In Fleming's view, U.S. policymakers had failed to maintain the balance of power, failed to suppress Bolshevism, failed to maintain isolationism, failed to appease the dictators, failed to contain communism, failed to roll-back communism, and

failed to limit the demands the military made on the U.S. economy and the consequent impact this had on personal freedom.¹⁷⁷

These failed policies all indicated to Fleming the need to negotiate from mutual recognition of legitimate regional defense interests: Eastern Europe was, according to Fleming's logic, a legitimate defense zone for the U.S.S.R. as was Western Europe for the U.S. and Eastern Asia for China. The former Axis powers of Japan and Germany, he stated, must come to terms with both East and West or they might serve as the nucleus of a future conflict. No one sphere could dictate terms to the other two, a situation which demanded that the cooperative nature of the U.N. be developed. To facilitate that goal, the U.N., Fleming insisted, should be moved from the U.S., and an U.N.R.R.A. type program for the underdeveloped world should be designed and funded.

Fleming declared that the nations of the world must welcome diversity and evolution and promote freedom of trade as well as civil liberties, especially in the already free world where McCarthyism had taken hold. In what was his most telling observation, he declared that the creation of deterrent strength was "indispensable" in an international system of anarchy: there must be, he wrote, "arms sufficient to deter our opponents from any attempt at world conquest, and vice-versa."¹⁷⁸ Here again is a demonstration of his commitment to balance of power politics.

Somewhat incongruously, given his calls for disengagement, Fleming also feared a resurgent isolationism in the U.S. The immediate evidence for this fear was public opposition to a treaty concerning race relations and human rights in the U.N. This indicated to Fleming that it would be

difficult for the U.S. to engage a "[r]esponsible, long-sighted leadership of the noncommunist world" because only the U.S. feared "the comparatively feeble efforts of the United Nations to establish some common standards of human rights."¹⁷⁹

Fleming continued to express this fear during the fifties, but as usual, his message was mixed. He thought that what he perceived as the failure of containment would generate pressure for a Fortress America. The pressure of the Communist bloc against the "ring of containment"; the desire of U.S. allies to distance themselves from the Cold War and "our erratic leadership"; and the "costs of global containment" would all feed the demand for isolationism. He criticized what he labelled as the "mad U.S. rush" to join alliances after W.W.I.I., but he did not oppose alliances *per se*. He would note, though, the irony of a country which had rejected the League as an entangling alliance yet now had so many alliances it was difficult to keep track of them.¹⁸⁰

He also claimed that U.S. suppression of the United Kingdom and France during the Suez Crisis "turned loose long-term impulses toward unification and neutralism in Western Europe. In that context, he wrote that the U.S. must repair relations or face imposed isolation."¹⁸¹ Yet his other remedies included a call for the U.S. to withdraw from most of its "nearly 900 overseas bases" and a reiteration of those outlined in "The Failure of Western Policies" and "How Can We Secure Dependable Allies?"¹⁸² In order to accomplish this, he called for the U.N. to become a "permanent place for negotiation, co-operation, and for getting the world's work done" and warned that "peace will be precarious until a functioning world

community is organized."¹⁸³ But nowhere did he indicate how it was to do this.

The publication of *The Cold War and Its Origins* provided the medium for Fleming's criticism of U.S. foreign policy in which he provided analyses of the fifteen years which followed the end of WWII. Because the United States failed to accept the lessons of the Second World War, its policies reacted to rather than created the dynamics of world politics; that Franklin Roosevelt was a leader who really understood Soviet politics; that Harry Truman was confused and therefore botched relations with the Communist world; that the U.S. must retake the initiative for positive, not negative goals; and that the people of the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. wanted what U.S. citizens wanted--peace, a better standard of living, and more personal freedom.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, the U.S., he believed, must purge itself of a series of false assumptions in order to change the direction of its foreign policy. It must eliminate the idea that Communism is poised to conquer the world; the notion that Communism is little different from fascism, if not worse; the domino theory; and the idea that rapid and constant economic growth is essential to maintain U.S. values.¹⁸⁵

Fleming insisted that to move beyond the Cold War, the U.S. must account for the trend of counter-encirclement and growing Soviet arms: U.S. encirclement of the Soviet Union had "generated the very power we feared."¹⁸⁶ Containment was based on the faulty interpretation of a Soviet ideology of world revolution which excluded from the "defensive category any action that the Soviet Union or China could take."¹⁸⁷ This also contributed to the fear of appeasement, which Fleming claimed was a false

analogy, for the U.S.S.R. and Nazi Germany were, he observed, very different.¹⁸⁸

Fleming concluded that neither the Soviets nor the Americans perceived war as in their interest. This was based on his understanding of convergency. "The Communists," he declared, "give two hostages to fortune which must be redeemed: universal education and the promise of a higher standard of living. This was fully evident, say by 1928, and it is the reason why no war to the death with Communism was or is necessary. These two solvents change the character of the Communist societies as they advance. As people have more, materially and intellectually, they demand and receive more."¹⁸⁹

For Fleming and Schuman, competition between socialism and capitalism would result in the "modification of each."¹⁹⁰ If the U.N. could facilitate this, that would be all to the good. But the focus of their scholarship and prescriptions had long ago moved away from international law and internationalism. Coexistence between the super-powers and the power politics of that relationship was their only logic for the present and the near future. Coexistence was the road to progress, the road to new frontiers.

Notes

¹ Frederick L. Schuman (hereon FS) , "The Dilemma of the Peace-Seekers," *American Political Science Review*, 36 (February 1945), 16.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 27. Schuman cited Samuel Grafton in the *New York Post*, 23 November 1943.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 17. Saddam Hussein recognized the same principle in 1991.

⁷ FS to Quincy Wright (hereon QW) 20 April 1945, QW Collection, Bx 23, add 1, Department of Special Collections, The Joseph Regenstein Library, The University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*; FS. "Dilemma of the Peace-Seekers, 26.

¹¹ FS, "The Dilemma of the Peace-Seekers," 25.

¹² *Ibid.*, 24.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 29-30.

¹⁶ QW, Document, "The U.N. and the Organization of Peace," 11 November 1942, Bx 5, fol 14; Henry Luce to QW, 22 September 1943, Bx 19, fol 6.

¹⁷ QW to Edwin Smeeth, 13 August 1934, Bx 18, fol 12; QW to Carey B. Joynt, 15 January 1963, Bx 4, add 1, fol J(2).

¹⁸ FS, "Toward The World State," *Scientific Monthly* 63 (July 1946), 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

- 20 *Ibid.*, 7.
- 21 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 22 *Ibid.*
- 23 *Ibid.*, 11.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 12.
- 25 *Ibid.*, 13-16.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 19.
- 27 FS, "Designs For Democracy," *Current History* , 9 (December 1945), 497.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 498.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 499-500.
- 30 *Ibid.*, 497.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 501-502.
- 32 FS, "A Diagnosis of the Big Three Problem," *New York Times Magazine* (30 June 1946), 6, 43.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 43.
- 34 *Ibid.*, 44.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 44-45.
- 36 *Ibid.*, 45.
- 37 FS to Roxanna Wells, 20 September 1946.
- 38 FS to Dexter Perkins, 23 April 1947.
- 39 Bernard Baruch to Harry S Truman, 21 April 1945, Denna Fleming Collection, Bx 2.
- 40 DF to James F. Byrnes, 3 January 1946, Bx 4.

41 DF, "After Victory What?," *Virginia Quarterly Review* 21 (October 1945), 601-605.

42 DF to Benjamin Mandel, Research Director, Internal Security Subcommittee, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 7 April 1962, in response to allegations in Mandel to DF, 30 March 1962, that the book was the product of research grants provided by communist sympathizers and their institutions: DF, *The Cold War and Its Origins*, (New York, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961).

43 DF, "Presidential Two-Term Amendment," *Vital Speeches* 13 (15 July 1947), 606.

44 *Ibid.*

45 On opposition to the Bricker amendment, see DF, "The Failure of Western Policies," *Annals Am Acad* 288 (July 1953), 46.

46 DF, "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa Strait," *Western Political Quarterly* 9 (September 1956), 537.

47 DF, "Does Eisenhower Mean War?," *The Nation* 175 (25 October 1952), 375-377.

48 DF, "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa Strait," 539-540.

49 DF, "Ways to Coexist," *The Nation* 179 (27 November 1954), 458.

50 *Ibid.*, 459-460.

51 *Ibid.*, 457-460.

52 DF to Baruch, 13 May 1946, 1.

53 *Ibid.*, 2.

54 *Ibid.*

55 *Ibid.*, 3. Fleming's *anglophobia* set him apart from Wilson, Wright and Schuman. As well, his reading of history was myopic in that he failed to see the conflict of interests between imperial Russia and the U.S. as far back as the eighteenth century.

56 *Ibid.*, 3-4.

57 *Ibid.*, 5. See, for instance, Danzig.

58 *Ibid.*, 5-6.

59 *Ibid.*, 6.

60 *Ibid.*, 7.

61 *Ibid.*

62 See the criticisms of his dissertation in chapter two and those later levelled against his scholarship in *The Cold War and its Origins*.

63 Document entitled "Footnote on the Iron Curtain," DF Collection.

64 Western scholars of the day had ample evidence from defectors and other sources about the use of hostages in the Great Purge trials.

65 DF to Baruch, 15 May 1946, 1.

66 *Ibid.*, 2.

67 DF, "The United States in the United Nations," *Annals Am Acad* 278 (November 1951), 73.

68 *Ibid.*, 74-75.

69 *Ibid.*, 75.

70 *Ibid.*, 76-78.

71 DF to Chao, 6 December 1950, 1. Fleming counsels Chao in the letter as to how to behave now that he is in China and expresses great concern for his well-being as well as "profound respect" for his culture.

72 In his article "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa Strait," *Western Political Quarterly* 9 (September 1956), 545, Fleming referred to the Bandung Declaration in response to the brinkmanship of Dulles as a meeting of "twenty-nine colored nations at Bandung in Indonesia--all have-nots, anticolonial, and highly allergic to atomic war."

73 DF, "The United States in the United Nations," 80-81.

74 *Ibid.*, 82.

75 DF, "Collier's Wins World War III," *The Nation* 173 (10 November 1951), 394.

76 *Ibid.*, 395.

77 DF, "What Follows the Arms Race?," *Journal of Politics* 14 (May 1952), 203. Fleming was a past president of the Southern Political Science Association which published this journal.

78 *Ibid.*

79 DF to *New York Times*, 11 January 1969.

80 QW to DF, 22 November 1963 (copy). Wright observed that he had just heard of Kennedy's assassination when he finished writing the letter.

81 DF, "What Follows the Arms Race?," 206. Fleming would ask rhetorically in 1971: "Also, is there a reactionary regime in the world that we have not tried to prop up or been cozy with, when the world is not moving their way?" DF to Edwin S. Gardner, 29 May 1971.

82 DF, "What Follows the Arms Race?," 209-210.

83 *Ibid.*, 221.

84 *ibid.*, 213-214.

85 *Ibid.*, 216

86 *Ibid.*, 219.

87 *Ibid.*, 221.

88 QW to DF, 21 May 1952.

89 DF, "How Can We Secure Dependable Allies?," *Annals Am Acad* 283 (September 1952), 15.

90 *Ibid.*, 18-21.

91 DF to Mr. Schreiner, 11 February 1957, 1.

92 DF, "The Failure of Western Policies," *Annals Am Acad* 288 (July 1953), 46. Fleming notes evolutionary progress in communist countries in "Can Pax American Succeed?," *Annals Am Acad* 360 (July 1965), 137; and in "Is Containment Moral?," *Annals Am Acad* 362 (November 1965), 24.

93 In the "Sunday Evening" 1945 memo to Baruch, Fleming wrote that he did not "anticipate that the two systems would merge, but that they were both evolving and that there was no reason that the two should be irreconcilable. DF to Baruch, 1945, 3. See also DF to Baruch, 13 May 1946, 6.

94 DF to Baruch, 8 May 1945, 2; DF, "Beyond the Cold War," *Annals Am Acad* 324 (July 1959), 124-125.

95 DF, "The Broken Dialogue on Foreign Affairs," *Annals Am Acad* 344 (November 1962), 135-137.

96 These general ideas are first found in the Fleming papers in an undated essay entitled "Is Communism 'Just As Bad As Fascism'?", 3; DF, "The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War," *Annals Am Acad* 366 (July 1966), 136; See also DF to Mr. Schreiner, 11 February 1957, 1.

97 Paul Conkin, *Gone With the Ivy*, 509.

98 DF to Dean Leonard Beach, 1 April 1954, 1-2; DF to Dean Leonard Beach, 13 April 1954, 1-3.

99 *Ibid.*, 510. I spoke with Conkin and with Branscomb, who was in his nineties and still active, in 1988. Both refused to discuss the characterization of Fleming as an obstructionist--Conkin said he dealt with it in his book; Branscomb said his dealings with Fleming, including the incident at South Florida which will be examined below, had been fully explained in that work, too.

100 DF to Drew Pearson, 23 December 1950; DF to Charles Molesworth, 27 December 1950; DF to Edward J. Noble, 27 December 1950.

101 It is probably appropriate to remind the reader again of the fact that the staff at Vanderbilt Library Collections thought Fleming's papers were "sanitized." Fleming was prone to self-praise, as is evident in his insistence that everyone know that the Italian publisher of *Cold War*, G. Feltrinelli, published Boris Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*. DF to Norman Cousins, 31 October 1962; DF to the Editor *AHR*. Also, Barton Bernstein informed me of letters from Fleming to Baruch in the Baruch Collection at Princeton which demonstrate an obsequiousness on Fleming's part not evident in his own collection. I have not been able to verify this.

102 DF to Mr. Schreiner, 11 February 1957, 1.

103 Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate*, (Rochelle Park, N.J.: Hayden Book Co., 1970), 71-72.

104 FS to Major General O. A. Anderson, U.S.A.F., Commandant, Air War College, 15 March 1950.

105 FS to Morgan, 9 May 1950, Bx 14; Schuman referred to 14 March and 28 March 1950 press releases of the Senator.

106 Curtis MacDougall, *Gideon's Army, v. II: The Decision and the Organization* (New York, N.Y.: Marzani and Munzell, 1965), 557. These notes and the diary are not among the collected Schuman documents at the University of Wyoming.

107 See MacDougall, volume I, 248; vol. II, 539.

108 MacDougall, vol. II, 539; 549. Others on the drafting committee included Martin Popper, Louis Adamic, Eslanda Robeson, and Dr. Joseph Johnson.

109 *Ibid.*, 558-559.

110 *Ibid.*, 564.

111 *Ibid.*

112 *Ibid.*, 566; 570.

113 FS to Brigadier General T. H. Landon, Deputy Commandant, the National War College, 21 August 1947.

114 Landon to FS, 25 August 1947.

115 Schuman accepted another engagement at the National War College for 13 October 1949 at the request of Rear Admiral George C. Dyer, Deputy Commandant, FS to Dyer, 8 September 1949; still another for 2-3 April 1950 at the Air War College at the invitation Major General O. A. Anderson, Commandant, FS to Anderson, 15 March 1950.

116 FS to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 19 March 1948.

117 Professor James B. Holtzclaw, Chairman, Department of Political Science, Drake University, to FS, 17 March 1948.

118 Fred Lee to FS, 1 March 1948.

119 Unsigned letter to the Office of the President, Williams College, 22 March 1948.

- 120 FS to the Editor of the *New York Sun*, 19 March 1948.
- 121 James Rich to James Phinney Baxter, 26 March 1948.
- 122 "Tumult at the Waldorf," *Time* (4 April 1949), 23.
- 123 FS to the Editor, *The North Adams Transcript* (29 March 1949), 2.
- 124 FS to Baxter, 10 June 1949.
- 125 Dies Committee hearings; Eugene Lyon, *The Red Decade*; FS, *Soviet Politics: At Home and Abroad*, (New York, N.Y.: A. A. Knopf, 1946).
- 126 FS to Baxter, 20 October 1950, 1-7.
- 127 FS to Baxter, 20 October 1950, 3-4.
- 128 FS to John W. Darr, Jr., 25 June 1951, 1.
- 129 *Ibid.*, 2.
- 130 FS to Russ Johnson, Friends Service Committee, 16 August 1952, Bx 15.
- 131 Johnson to FS, 25 August 1952; FS to Johnson, 10 September 1952.
- 132 Schuman's royalties from McGraw-Hill, publisher of his text book, reveal a precipitous decline during the height of the red scare. From an all-time high in 1949 of \$7, 440.99, they dropped in 1950 to \$5,191.45, to \$2,946.15 in 1951, to \$2,057.05 in 1952. After a brief resurgence in 1953 (which coincided with *Pravda's* denunciation of his book) and 1954, they continued to decline until 1958, the lowest point being 1957 when he received only \$1,547.80. From 1958 to 1961 when he saw an increase to \$5,035.77, but from then until 1969 his fortunes declined again. Undated document entitled "Royalties received from McGraw-Hill," FS Collection.
- 133 Wells to FS, 11 April 1952.
- 134 Wells to FS, 15 December 1952. There are few records of any speaking engagements for the rest of the decade. One, though, entitled "Why WWII Will Never Be Fought," was at the University of Iowa on 31 March 1953 at the invitation of Vernon Van Dyke and Professor Arnold Rogow of the Political Science Department. Rogow to FS, 14 February 1953; FS to Rogow, 16 March 1953; FS to Charlotte Sander, 11 March 1953, Bx 15.
- 135 FS to Philip Vaudrin, 21 January 1952.

136 For the remark on being an authentic prophet, see McWilliams to FS, 27 July 1955; for his requests for articles see McWilliams to FS 10 September 1954; FS to McWilliams, 20 September 1954; FS to McWilliams, 23 December 1955; McWilliams to FS, 27 July 1955.

137 FS to Lily, Don, and Bette, 24 January 1959, Bx 16.

138 FS to McWilliams, 7 February 1955, Bx 15.

139 FS to McWilliams, 23 December 1955, Box 15.

140 Schuman referred to 165 of Arthur Schlesinger's *Politics of Upheaval* in FS to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 5 October 1960, 1.

141 *Ibid.*, 2.

142 FS to Schlesinger, 17 October 1960; Schlesinger to FS, 24 October 1960. Schuman believed that he had lost a summer appointment for 1961 as a result of the book. See FS to Schlesinger, 17 October, 1960. Also, see a letter from Noam Chomsky to DF in which Chomsky chastises Schlesinger for sloppy quoting practices. Chomsky to DF, 17 June 1969.

143 FS to QW, 10 November 1959, Bx 23, add 1.

144 FS, "Cold War's End," *The Nation* 176 (20 June 1953), 518.

145 Schuman identified himself with Hans Morgenthau's interpretation. In a letter to Howard DeVoe, Schuman said his general approach to world problems "could be called a power politics-national interest-balance-of-power approach, comparable in many respects to that of Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan." FS to Howard DeVoe, 6 February 1953, Bx 15.

146 FS, "Cold War's End," 519.

147 *Ibid.*, 520.

148 FS, "The Paradoxes of Dr. Toynbee," *Nation* 179 (6 November 1954), 406.

149 FS, "New Outlook For Peace," *Nation* 180 (21 May 1955), 435.

150 *Ibid.*, 436.

151 *Ibid.*, 437; FS, "The Soviet Union and German Rearmament," *Ann Am Acad* 312 (July 1957), 77-83.

152 FS to the *Ottawa Citizen* (16 November 1953).

153 FS, "The Soviet Union and German Rearmament," 78.

154 *Ibid.*, 80.

155 *Ibid.*, 83. For more on Schuman's views regarding Germany, see "Cold War's End," *Nation* 176 (20 June 1953), 518-20; "Diplomacy and Anti-Communism," *Nation* 178 (27 February 1954), 180; "Furor Teutonicus," *Nation* 179 n(18 September 1954), 233-34; "The Tortured German Psyche," *Nation* 180 (8 January 1955), 34-5; "Moral Insight Into Power," *Nation* 182 (21 January 1956), 53-54; "Germany: New Myths for Old," *Nation* 182 (28 April 1956), 365-66; "Unquiet Flows the Elbe," *Nation* 185 (14 September 1957), 133-34; and "The Impasse of Disarmament," *Current History* 41 (November 1961), 267-72; 299.

156 FS, "New Outlook for Peace," 437.

157 FS to the Editor, *New York Times*, 10 December 1955.

158 FS, "Russia Revisited: IV. Heirs to the Despot," *Nation* 183 (11 August 1956), 120.

159 FS, "Russia Revisited: I. Moscow: Symbol of Change," *Nation* 183 (14 July 1956), 51-53; "Russia Revisited: II. Miracle at Stalingrad," *Nation* 183 (28 July 1956), 80-81; "Russia Revisited: III. Ivan's Take-Home Pay," *Nation* 183 (4 August 1956), 99-101; "Russia Revisited: IV. Heirs to the Despot," *Nation* 183 (11 August 1956), 119-121.

160 FS, "Russia Revisited: I. Moscow: Symbol of Change," *Nation* 183 (14 July 1956), 53.

161 FS, "Russia Revisited: III. Ivan's Take-Home Pay," *Nation* 183 (4 August 1956), 100.

162 FS, "Russia Revisited: IV. Heirs to the Despot," 120.

163 FS to George Brodsky, 5 November 1956.

164 FS to Solomatin, 8 December 1955, Bx 15.

165 FS to James P. Rich, 10 March 1948.

166 FS, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), 40.

167 FS, "The Dialectic of Co-existence," *Current History* 30 (January 1956), 35.

168 *Ibid.*, 36.

169 FS, "Moral Insight Into Power," *Nation* 182 (21 January 1956), 54.

170 FS, "How Many Worlds?," *New Republic* 138 (3 February 1958), 13.

171 *Ibid.*, 14. For more on convergency, see FS, "Designs For Democracy," *Current History* 9 (December 1945), 497-502; "The Geographic Setting," *Current History* 25 (August 1953), 76-80;

172 FS, "U.N.: The First Decade," *Nation* 181(30 July; 10 Sep 1955), 98.

173 DF, "Woodrow Wilson and Collective Security Today," *Journal of Politics* 18 (November 1956), 617.

174 *Ibid.*, 618.

175 *Ibid.*, 619-620.

176 *Ibid.*, 619-623.

177 DF, "The Failure of Western Policies," *Annals Am Acad* 288 (July 1953), 36-41.

178 *Ibid.*, 45. For more on his views of McCarthy, see DF, "Are We Moving Toward Fascism?," *Journal of Politics* 16 (February 1954), 39-75. Thomas Bledsoe of A. A. Knopf wrote to Fleming on 26 April 1954 that "Are We Moving Toward Fascism?" was the best written and best documented expression of such opinions he had seen.

179 DF. "The Failure of Western Policies," 46.

180 DF, "Needed: A Purge of Obsessions," *The Nation* 188 (21 February 1959), 163.

181 DF, "Are We Moving Toward Fortress America?," *Annals Am Acad* 312 (July 1957), 14; 19.

182 *Ibid.*, 17.

183 *Ibid.*, 20.

184 DF, "A Diplomacy for Free Men," *The Nation* 186 (3 May 1958), 384-386.

185 DF, "Needed: A Purge of Obsessions," *The Nation* 188 (21 February 1959), 164-165; DF, "Beyond the Cold War," 118

186 DF, "Beyond the Cold War," 115.

187 *Ibid.*, 117.

188 *Ibid.*, 118-119.

189 *Ibid.*, 124.

190 *Ibid.*, 125. See any of the numerous references to Schuman and convergency.

CHAPTER VII
THE FRUSTRATION OF INTERNATIONALISM

Interpretations of Fleming, Schuman and Wright influenced a significant shift academic and public perceptions as to the directions U.S. foreign policy ought to assume. Two indices of this shift are the publication of William Appleman Williams's book *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* and the "Port Huron Statement" of the Students for a Democratic Society.¹ Both rigorously attacked the traditions of U.S. policy and its impact on democracy in the U.S. and abroad. Both would influence the course of the 1960s. To a large extent, both drew on the legacy of the three political scientists examined here.

Williams was and remains one of the most influential of the twentieth century historians. His works provoked a sustained critique of U.S. policy in the face of what William J. Fulbright described as the arrogance of American power. Williams was a neo-isolationist who decried the effects of Wilsonian internationalism on the democratic roots of the American heritage. His most familiar themes are those described in *Tragedy* and *Empire As A Way Of Life*, in which he criticized the drive to empire of the founders of the U.S. and the impact of the open door on U.S. values.

One of the most lasting criticisms of Williams has been levelled against his methodology. Because he was a scholar who rarely cited his sources, it is difficult to say that any one person influenced his work. The evidence is ample, though, not only in his previously mentioned books, but in *The U.S.*

and Russian Relations Since 1917, that Williams owed a debt at least to Fleming, and likely to Schuman, and even if he never read any of their works, his scholarship brought their interpretations to a new and broader audience.

His ministrations to the evils of U.S. policy are nearly identical to those of Schuman and Fleming. He called for a disengagement of U.S. troops and a re-investment in the infrastructure of the U.S. A close examination of motives was essential to ensure that U.S. foreign policy did not corrupt U.S. values of honesty, democracy, and individual liberty at home, and a more critical appraisal of the assumptions behind the Cold War were the point from which to start. These were the lessons of Schuman and Fleming throughout the forties and the fifties. Both decried a foreign policy whose impact on domestic liberties they likened to that of the fascists.²

Although interest in *Tragedy* was immediate, according to Bradford Perkins, it was not pervasive until several years after its publication in 1959.³ And growing interest in it coincided with the growing interest in Fleming's interpretations in the *Cold War and Its Origins*. Fleming, too, was by this time a neo-isolationist whose prescriptions rarely included calls for a more powerful U.N. and concentrated instead upon a reduction of the global U.S. presence.⁴

The Port Huron Statement and the movement it represented was, in my opinion, predicated on the ideas which Schuman and Fleming had advocated. These men had influenced a generation of students, especially Schuman, whose textbook was in its fifth and sixth editions in the 1950s. And the growing popularity of their interpretation of the Cold War and

condemnation of its effects on democracy and capitalism in liberal and radical circles is obvious.

Some students, too, were determined to influence the course of their nation's policy, and they sought mentors among those whose works suited their interests. Among those of Schuman's students who attained positions of influence were Stuart Auerbach of the *Washington Post* and Jeb Stuart Magruder of Watergate notoriety; of Fleming's the best known is Lamar Alexander, former governor of Tennessee and George Bush's Secretary of Education; of Wright's, Schuman was one of the most influential.

There was a sense among these three men and those they influenced that world politics were entering a new phase with the new decade. It was not just Jack Kennedy who saw a New Frontier, but Quincy Wright, Frederick Schuman, and Denna Fleming. Wright found hope in the progress of the U.N.; Schuman found hope in the spirit of Geneva and the upcoming summit between Eisenhower and Khrushchev; Fleming in the publication and acclaim of a book which represented twelve years of research. Generally, their hopes, like those of the New Frontier, would meet with at best limited success, at worst dismal failure.

For Fleming, the decade of the 1950's had been one of dismal failure in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. prestige and power had declined in relative terms, and for this he placed much of the blame on Eisenhower. Fleming did not hold Eisenhower accountable for all of the mistakes, but observed that most of his policies, like the effort to restrain the military budget, were really not successful.⁵ "The plain fact," wrote Fleming, was that "we are over-committed and over-extended, and we have been for many years." And

although Fleming stated that Ike had averted war, he had failed to make peace. His instincts were right, said Fleming, but the President "lacked the ability to execute his policy."⁶

Fleming saw little hope to be had from the U.N., whose growth he believed the Cold War had "retarded." He still entreated his readers and students to empower the U.N., yet Fleming never demonstrated practical means for them to do it.⁷ He characterized the U.N. as "a battleground of the Cold War from the day of its first meeting . . . until its 1965 General Assembly adjourned in impotence."⁸

Other victims of the Cold War included both liberals and conservatives in the U.S. for, in Fleming's estimation, they both fell prey to the false notion of monolithic communism.⁹ The result, he wrote, was a lamentable decline of critical dialogue, for as a result of cold war ideology and enforced conformity, there existed little difference between liberals and conservatives.¹⁰ Bipartisan foreign policy had led both factions to accept the notion that military might could deter social revolution, in Fleming's view a costly and false assumption. He believed containment was "beyond our resources, as the inexorable drain of our world military commitments on the dollar daily testifies." Containment was, he would write, "the great immorality of the post war world."¹¹

Conservatives and liberals ignored as well the evidence that under Khrushchev's leadership, the Soviet system had experienced conversion "in the direction of freer institutions." There had been, Fleming asserted, evolutionary progress within communist countries.¹² The U.S., he wrote one year later, had forgotten "the greatest law of life on earth, that every

social system is in constant evolution" and that "there will be many communisms, all changing and adapting . . . and some of them evolving into forms distinctly more acceptable to us."¹³ Fleming counseled a course that would draw the nations together into regional unions "on the way to a world community."¹⁴ This was a much different message on regional unions than his earlier estimate of them as the result of "pactomania."

A last victim of the Cold War was the concept of neutrality. Fleming did not share Quincy Wright's long-held belief that neutrality was no longer a legally recognized status nor a possible one under international law. Even if Wright were correct, Fleming would have held that the right to remain neutral proceeded from a higher law. Fleming declared that the U.S. claim that non-alignment was immoral demanded an assessment of the moral character of U.S. policy, a policy which could as easily be characterized as immoral rather than moral. U.S. containment policy and congressional blank checks to wage war had led to squanderous defense appropriations and violations of U.N. and O.A.S. Charters, all of which Fleming interpreted as immoral.¹⁵

He also argued that the moral tone of U.S. policy did not provide for flexibility. It was, he wrote, ironic that the U.S. fought in WWI to preserve neutral rights, yet now declared there were no such things as neutral rights in the moral dilemma the world confronted. Fleming observed wryly that every state had a "right to stay neutral in a power-ideological struggle, if it can. By being involved it may be destroyed and, as one of my students remarked: 'Survival is very moral.'"¹⁶

Fleming's determination to continue to voice opposition to official policies led him to seek an extension of his career at Vanderbilt, where he had requested permission to continue teaching beyond the mandatory retirement age of 68. This was not an action without precedent and, given his achievements, recognition, and status, he was a well-qualified candidate for such consideration. But his request came at the time of the publication of *The Cold War and its Origins*, and partisan political views rather than critical analysis frequently determined the response to this book. Such seemed to be the case with Vanderbilt administrators.

Scholars who subscribed to a leftist perspective almost unanimously hailed the book as a much needed corrective to orthodox U.S. interpretations of the Cold War. Harry Elmer Barnes praised Fleming's revisionist work on the Cold War and said that "you are one of the American historians whom I would like to survive for a long time"; Frederick Schuman greeted the book and its author by noting that "Your voice is truly eloquent and commanding by virtue of meticulous scholarship, brilliant analysis, and fascinating presentation;" Quincy Wright, to whom Fleming sent copies of the *Cold War*, wrote that "you have provided clear evidence of the folly of our country after WWII . . . and have done a great service to understanding the needs of the world"; and others responded similarly.¹⁷ Although this was glowing testimony in some circles, it was evidence of heresy in others.

Fleming directed much of his energy to responding to his critics and seeking support for his *opus*: Schuman was one of the first to whom he turned. Schuman had sent Fleming a glowing testimonial upon receipt of a

courtesy copy of *The Cold War*. His praise was, as indicated above, hyperbolic: "a massive, magnificent, and altogether superb work," and "may your truly great work receive the attention and the market it deserves."¹⁸ Schuman would recommend to the readers of his book *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect* that for further information they read Fleming's "monumental and definitive" book which would remain the "best account in print of the follies and frustrations" of the Cold War.¹⁹ No wonder that Fleming requested of Carey McWilliams, editor of *The Nation*, that Schuman be allowed to respond to the book's critics in the pages of that liberal magazine.²⁰ Fleming also enlisted the support of William Shirer who, although he distanced himself from the interpretation of the book, wrote the publisher that it "ought to be widely read and pondered in this country."²¹

Vanderbilt's rejection of Fleming's request for a retirement waiver coincided with the publication of this revisionist standard. The work met with considerable approval within the Vanderbilt community. At the time of Fleming's exit from Vanderbilt, Lamar Alexander, editor of the *Vanderbilt Hustler* and former Fleming student, hailed Fleming the teacher as always "provocative and stimulating" and declared that Fleming's interpretation of the Cold War "deserved consideration."²² Still, R. R. Purdy, Vice-Chancellor of Vanderbilt, wrote Fleming that only if extraordinary or emergency circumstances existed was extension beyond the age of 68 considered.²³ Fleming's retirement would be effective 30 June 1961. This process seemed at odds, or so Fleming thought, with the facts surrounding the extension of certain other faculty members.

The fact that Fleming's salary of \$8,000 in 1960, which was well below the next year's average of \$10,785, indicated, too, that the administration's treatment of him was not entirely equitable.²⁴ After all, he was a scholar who, aside from publishing many books and articles, had been vice-president of the American Political Science Association, president of the Southern Political Science Association, member of the board of directors of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, lecturer at Cambridge University, lecturer at the Indian School of International Studies in New Delhi, a member of the Executive Council of the American Association of University Professors, and a member of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton.²⁵

Although the link between the publishing of his revisionist work and the University's treatment of his extension request is tenuous, the acts of Chancellor Branscomb in regard to Fleming's pursuit of future employment add to the weight of circumstantial evidence which suggests that Fleming was attacked for his views about the Cold War, despite Paul Conkin's interpretation of the events. After Fleming was recommended for acceptance as a member of the faculty at the University of South Florida, Branscomb attacked the former Vanderbilt professor in a letter to a locally renowned red-baiter, Mrs. Mary Low Weaver of Orlando, Florida, who could be relied upon to cause Fleming trouble.

In what was an obvious reference to the book and its author's allegiances, Branscomb announced that although he did not think Fleming was or ever had been a Communist, "he is an individual who has gone sour over the years, and has lost his perspective and his balance of judgment." And Vanderbilt would not defend its professor emeritus from "criticisms"

that he brought upon himself. The Chancellor concluded by informing Mrs. Weaver that "Professor Fleming was retired a year ago in spite of his request for continuation. You will be interested to know that he is transferring this next fall to Tampa, Florida, where he will teach in some institution there."²⁶

Branscomb would later tell Fleming that the letter to Weaver was "one of many which I wrote during my administration defending you against being a Communist or a Communist sympathizer, and protecting your right to express your views."²⁷ This would be roughly equivalent to the Grand Inquisitor telling Galileo that his house arrest and proscription from teaching were the result of the church's concern for his well-being and civil liberties. Branscomb's letter to Weaver was a blatant attempt to sabotage Fleming, and it worked: University of South Florida President, John Allen, succumbed to the pressures of the Florida Coalition of Patriotic Societies, and to the remarks of Chancellor Branscomb, and refused to submit Fleming's contract for final approval.²⁸ Allen wrote Fleming that "Dean Cooper negotiated with you in good faith in the light of information we had at that time . . . On June 26th the new information came to me which indicated that you were retired from the Vanderbilt faculty a year ago despite your request to continue in active service. For this reason . . . the Board will not be making the appointment that we had anticipated earlier."²⁹

Yet another person and institution found Fleming's book and the views represented therein interesting as well: Benjamin Mandel, the Research Director of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the United States Senate

Committee on the Judiciary wrote Fleming to inquire where the funding for his research originated. Mandel observed that he was aware of a "very laudatory review" of *The Cold War* which appeared in *World Marxist Review*, "the official international Communist magazine." This was, of course, guilt by association, a standard tactic of those who sought to ensure that reasons of state took precedence over individual liberty. The committee had been "informed" that the book was the "result of a grant" and it was most interested that Fleming provide them with the "full information" as to the source of the grant; the terms and conditions of the grant; and the amount.³⁰ Fleming replied that the book was not the result of a grant or grants.³¹

Fleming devoted much of his time for the next five years seeking satisfaction from the University of South Florida over its denial of his teaching contract. He wrote anyone who could influence the situation and engaged the American Association of University Professors in his efforts to prevent such a situation from occurring again.³² Fleming wanted the personal censure of Chancellor Branscomb, but this the A.A.U.P. was either unwilling or without jurisdiction to do. Instead, South Florida was put under censure. The situation was not resolved to Fleming's satisfaction until November 1967, when he was received at the University for a four-day series of lectures.³³ The A.A.U.P. removed its censure from the University of South Florida on 26 April 1968.³⁴

While this pursuit consumed much of his time, Fleming maintained a busy teaching schedule after his retirement from Vanderbilt. He taught at the University of Arizona, California State College in Los Angeles, Portland

State College, and Simon Fraser University in British Columbia, Canada,³⁵ As well, he made numerous appearances on various campuses to lecture and delivered an address to the World Conference on Vietnam in Stockholm Sweden.³⁶ Fleming had become a vocal critic of U.S. policy in Vietnam, a policy he had opposed since 1965.

Fleming admired John Kennedy and saw in his policies the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Fleming was somewhat skeptical about Kennedy at first and questioned his assumptions that a nation must negotiate from strength and the need to increase defense spending, as well as his position on the potential "loss" of West Berlin (Fleming believed a new status for the city should be negotiated along the lines of Khrushchev's proposals).³⁷ And he at one time bemoaned the fact that Kennedy was not "a leader in the FDR tradition" and was "more interested in 'winning' the Cold War than in ending it constructively."³⁸

Still, Fleming came to believe that Kennedy was prepared to disengage the U.S. from its involvement in Vietnam. Generally, he thought Kennedy could lead the U.S. in making peace. How far this was from reality is still a subject of debate as many saw Kennedy as the consummate Cold Warrior while still others saw in him the man of peace as portrayed in Oliver Stone's movie *JFK*. Fleming could easily have inspired Stone's interpretation, for he claimed that in his last months, Kennedy provided "magnificent leadership" directed toward ending the cold war, a trend Fleming said President Johnson furthered.³⁹ Fleming came to believe that Kennedy was a peacemaker who had joined Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt in a trinity who had done what they could to save the world.⁴⁰

Fleming did not agree with Kennedy on Berlin and the German question, issues which reveal some of the discontinuity of his interpretations. West Berlin could only be preserved as an outpost of Western Power, he wrote, if the unification of Germany occurred quickly. But there was not the "slightest reason to suppose" that the Soviets nor the West would allow unification.⁴¹ This was partially because Fleming refused to apply the principle of self-determination to the Germans out of what can only be described as a desire for retribution for what they had done. The Germans were divided because of their actions, "a fact which in the foreseeable future nothing . . . could alter."⁴² Not only were the Germans unworthy of self-determination, but Fleming denied them the logic of his doctrine of evolutionary social change.

He concluded that the U.S. must withdraw from its liberation promises, promises which did much damage in the Hungarian rebellion of 1956, and promote peace in Eastern Europe. How the U.S. was to do that was left to the imagination, and he made no comment on the Soviet promises of support to wars of liberation which had the same effect as the Dulles policy he condemned.⁴³ He was almost always willing to sacrifice the legitimate wants, needs, and desires of the people of central and eastern Europe to the security needs of the Soviets.

In his continuing critique of Wilsonian universalism, Fleming declared that the U.S. had overcompensated for isolationism when it tried to assume responsibility for nearly "everything everywhere in the world." He called the Truman Doctrine, whose intent he believed was to forbid "any violent social change anywhere," the "rashest and most sweeping commitment

ever made by any government at any time," and the decision to cross the 38th parallel "the greatest single foreign policy mistake in our history," a label he used to reserve for the decision to stay out of the League of Nations.⁴⁴ He believed that the costs of containment, both materially and morally, were beyond the ability of the U.S. to pay.

U.S. policy in Vietnam, thought Fleming, was the product of the mistakes made in other applications of containment policy. Fleming said that the facts were that Vietnam would not be divided were it not for the U.S.; that most Vietcong were disaffected southerners, not North Vietnamese, nor even communists; that the war was a patriotic war of independence; that the assumptions of airpower in Korea did not bring victory, that they stood similar chances in Vietnam, and threatened to heal Sino-Soviet rift and to align the non-aligned against the U.S.; and, incorrectly, that there was little potential for rivalry between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. over who would lead the North (but he did observe Vietnam's historical distrust of the Chinese).⁴⁵

He asked, "why was the U.S. in Vietnam?" If the answer was that it was to provide freedom, he observed that freedom is relative: the Vietnamese, he asserted, wanted freedom from foreign control, especially white foreign control, from war, and from poverty more than the political freedoms we value. He denied the validity of the strategic resource argument and said that the domino theory was bankrupt. What the U.S. could do was to decide whether the reunion of the two Vietnams, which Fleming saw as inevitable, would be done gradually and by agreement, or by revolution and war.⁴⁶

Fleming concluded that Vietnam historically was beyond the U.S. defense perimeter and was not essential to the U.S. national interest: in fact, the present policy contravened it. President Johnson and other leaders were advised to pay attention to the domestic implications of a continued war. Fleming believed that the greatest U.S. investment in Vietnam by 1965 was prestige, and that was in jeopardy. The U.S. must recognize, he urged, that its gamble in Vietnam had failed. Instability was rampant in South Vietnam; the U.S. had failed to learn and apply principles of anti-guerrilla warfare; the U.S. had worked against the will of the Vietnamese people; and there remained no moral resources in South Vietnam. He was astonished that some policymakers still clung to the doctrine of "the manageable mess."⁴⁷ As he later noted, the "little yellow men in the jungle" had defeated the gigantic U.S. military machine.⁴⁸

This was a realist's interpretation of the faults of U.S. policy. Nowhere are the paeans to ideals and moral principles one would expect from a Wilsonian of the traditional mold. What is there is a sober account of the costs and likely benefits of U.S. policy in Vietnam, and the ledger did not justify future expenditures. What is there is the basis of many of the later critiques of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

What is there as well is a recurring, although subtle, theme of race and ethnicity within Western scholarship. That is the idea that people of color are not so concerned with abstract political freedoms, with ideals, as they are with feeding themselves or with buying peace and stability at any price. It would seem in this scholarship that only hungry European people have been willing to fight for freedoms; hungry people of color fight for

food. This assumption is, of course, patently absurd. As M. S. Arnoni, a colleague of both Fleming and Schuman, suggested, racism is "a fine wine that lingers on, inarticulate, but there."⁴⁹

Fleming lambasted U.S. policy toward China and the U.N. as well. Fleming admonished his readers that this could very well be the "last chance to organize all the governments and peoples . . . into one group, the United Nations, [to establish] law and order and cooperation among them, in the atomic age." The U.S. could not, Fleming thought, much longer prevent China from assuming its natural role in Asia, nor could the U.S. much longer prevent close diplomatic and trade relations between Japan and China. He feared the costs of a vast limited war in Vietnam and its potential to enlarge, so he called for a U.N. sponsored peace conference.⁵⁰

His assessment of U.S. China policy was based on a realist's interpretation as well. He noted that the U.S. "used to love the Chinese, when they were ragged, docile heathens, the subjects of our devoted missionary efforts." But now that they possessed the will to fight they were no longer worthy of that love and affection. The Russians, too, had experienced such a transformation and were seen as equally wicked, but, wrote Fleming, once they attained power sufficient to destroy the U.S., negotiations were undertaken to begin the end of the Cold War.

Thus, he reasoned, when China gained "the power to destroy us she will take control of the fringe of East Asia and leave it to us to convert a local war into a world holocaust." The choice was clear: either destroy China or make peace. Fleming opted for the latter. And he called on the U.S. to

begin the peace process by permitting China to be represented in the United Nations "before the other members seat her anyway."⁵¹

Fleming feared as well that U.S. policies were bordering on the genocidal and that they had jeopardized U.S. relations with the rest of the underdeveloped world.⁵² He invoked the image of a "huge white man" beating "the small colored boy" into submission.⁵³ He claimed that U.S. economic imperialism threatened its relations with Europe, too. Fleming wrote that the Europeans wanted to unite east and west into a grand new order to reassert themselves economically, and that the U.S. would do well to heed Charles DeGaulle when he warned that U.S. policymakers assumed their nation was vested with supreme and universal responsibilities and were unwilling to listen to their allies. This effort to unilaterally enforce a *Pax Americana* would lead to nuclear proliferation to prevent the U.S. from imposing its will.⁵⁴

It was in his speech to the Stockholm International Conference for Disarmament and Peace, 6 July 1967, that Fleming refined his interpretation of U.S. policy in Vietnam and anticipated the emphasis of scholars who later examined that debacle as well as synthesized some outstanding criticisms of the day. Fleming now attributed U.S. policy partially to the manifest destiny complex, which he identified as a euphemism for U.S. imperialism. He continued to condemn U.S. unilateralism and the containment of China as beyond U.S. means and illogical. He insisted that monolithic communism was a false assumption, an assertion he had made in earlier, because the "the law of social

evolution is inexorable" and therefore no two Marxist countries were likely to evolve the same form of communism.⁵⁵

He also attacked U.S. policy from within the context of international law. There was, he observed, no nation of South Vietnam--the war was a civil war within a war for national independence. Therefore, it was the duty of other powers to remain outside the conflict. Any escalation of military pressure under the assumption that the reds would yield was in vain as a result, for the Vietnamese were fighting for their nation.⁵⁶

He incorporated Fulbright's rhetoric in his attack on President Johnson who Fleming now characterized as a man of false pride and arrogance. As for Arthur Schlesinger's theory of U.S. involvement as being "step by little step," Fleming declared that it had merit, but that it must be viewed in the context of Dulles, containment, monolithic communism, and the domino theory. Fleming concluded that the Johnson administration had "shamed and disgraced" the U.S. and referred to Senator George McGovern as "clear-sighted" and "courageous."⁵⁷

His prescription to avoid "a succession of Vietnams and rapid national decline" included a warning against the military-industrial complex and the following steps: stop U.S. efforts to control Vietnam; negotiate with the National Liberation Front (which Fleming incorrectly identified as the "Viet Cong"); accept U.N. supervised elections in Vietnam; recognize the results of those elections and the right of the resulting government to make its own arrangements for re-unification; accept a strong U.N. presence during the transitional period; renounce its "mission to enforce a world *Pax Americana*"; recognize that capitalism can advance without

world-wide intervention to suppress social discontent or revolt--in other words, renounce the Truman Doctrine; deal rationally with China; and focus its efforts on organizing the world for peace and united action. As of February 1968, the month of the then much misinterpreted North Vietnamese Tet Offensive, Fleming believed that U.S. leaders did not know how to escape "the bloody Asian quagmire."⁵⁸

Again, these were criticisms that many realist scholars, including Hans Morgenthau, had levelled against U.S. policy. And they were consistent with criticisms Fleming had levelled against U.S. policy throughout the previous twenty years. But whereas some scholars limited their criticisms to the journals of academia, Fleming sought ways to extricate those whom U.S. policy most immediately affected: those whose local draft boards had classified them 1A.

In a letter to a former student identified only as Henry, Fleming counseled him to take preparations for the event that he were to be called up for service. He advised him to contact the American Friends Service Committee and to consider the possibility of a conscientious objector deferment. Although Fleming noted the possibility that this status might handicap Henry in certain circles later in life, he observed that the "main thing is to have a later life."⁵⁹

Fleming also turned into something of an environmentalist during the sixties. An excellent example of his commitment to constructive use of resources (or of his closeness to a penny) was the fact that he still drove a 1941 Chevrolet coup in 1972, by which time it had over 200,000 miles!⁶⁰ Perhaps more indicative of his concerns was his observation in 1970 that

U.S. pursuit of a flawed foreign policy had bankrupted the homefront. Internal disintegration had concerned Fleming since the beginning of the Cold War, and he now saw what he believed to be the rapid decline of the U.S. It was a process he believed to be "far along" by 1970: over-urbanization was threatening to destroy the cities; autos and their smog were destroying the air; short-sighted leaders would not fund a national railway system capable of relieving the impact of the auto; decent housing was scarce; courts and prisons were crowded to overflowing and in desperate need of reform; the educational system was run-down; provisions must be made to ensure family incomes and employment; racial tensions threatened national unity; all at a time when the government could spend the funds necessary to conduct 47,000 sorties over Laos in one month!⁶¹

Fleming observed in 1966 that the U.S. had spent nearly 1 trillion dollars since WWII, expenditures which jeopardized the U.S. economy in that they were generally of a non-productive, military type when they could have been spent on social programs at home and abroad. The U.S. public had submitted to the militarism and conformism which it had fought and anticommunism in foreign policy had opened the door to McCarthyism and John Birch tactics at home which diverted the nation from its needs. Fleming concluded that the population explosion would diminish scarce natural resources, that automation would steal from man "his reason for being," and that science had ensured the capacity for universal destruction rather than the promise of salvation. The nations must "unite to save the

world," he declared, and, he asked, what better structure for such a union than the U.N.⁶²

Although Fleming generally sang the praises of progress in both theory and practice, much of what progress is all about scared him. He did not grasp the fact that progress entails victimization as well as empowerment; that always, the benefit of progress to the majority was had at the expense of an uncertain minority, or vice-versa. And he seemed unaware that his prescriptions for social change could only be funded through the taxes raised from the industries and the individuals whose pollution he railed against.

Many of his writings in the sixties demonstrate as well his debt to progressivism and explain his uncertain balancing act between internationalism and simple nationalism. For whenever the two clashed in his writings, nationalism almost always prevailed. Despite his frequent cries for limited sovereignty, for international cooperation, and for responsible foreign policy, when it came to the check, Fleming was unwilling for the U.S. to pay the bill. Material profit and loss concepts dominated his assessment of the national interest. There was little of the long-run in his prescriptions and an unwillingness to take harsh measures essential to the creation of a meaningful world government. Much of Fleming's scholarship and advocacy was a contradiction in terms.

The last public action by Fleming which this study will consider was his testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs which he gave on 7 June 1971. Other witnesses that day included Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Adam

Ulam, and William Appleman Williams. Fleming's invitation to testify demonstrated the status his *The Cold War and Its Origins* had brought him.

His testimony included the by now well-recognized litaney of the revisionist critique of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Fleming repeated the narrative of Russia's great contribution to W.W.I and how they experienced losses which staggered those of the U.S.; of the Allied Intervention and its impact on the Russian people and on the development within the Bolshevik party of authoritarianism (no mention that the Bolshevik party had long been subject to authoritarian rule and strict discipline); of the heroic Soviet resistance to Hitler's war machine from 1941-1945 (no mention of the Nazi-Soviet Pact); of the calculated decision of the Allies to withhold a second front while the Soviets bled (little credence lent to the fact that this was arguably a correct military decision whose design was not to bleed the Soviets); of the accelerated development of the atomic bomb to deny Soviet entry into the Pacific War (nothing but anecdotal evidence for this assertion); of the enlightened leadership of Franklin Roosevelt in regard to post-war U.S.-Soviet relations and Truman's sudden change of in the doctrine of his name; and of the tragic waste of U.S. resources over the next two decades trying to contain the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, two countries which during the same period fed, clothed, employed, educated, treated and housed all their people (again, he offered no evidence for such claims on the part of the two Communist societies).⁶³ By comparison, the testimony of William A. Williams, a dean of the revisionists, sounded mainstream.

The response of the other panelists, one of whom referred to Fleming as a "wonderful evangelist," revealed much of the problem with Fleming's scholarship and approach to international relations.⁶⁴ Adam Ulam, in a prepared statement submitted to the committee, referred to Fleming's work as "a collection of clippings from newspapers, of excerpts from speeches by Congressmen, from various works suspicious of Western policy, etc., all strung together by his soliloquizing about America's over-commitment," and that with such methodology one could prove anything.⁶⁵

Schlesinger pointed to a discrepancy in Fleming's logic already noted in this text. Said Schlesinger: "As an old Wilsonian, does not Mr. Fleming believe in self-determination in Eastern Europe? . . . he accepts rather quickly the contention that the Soviet Union had the absolute right to do anything it wanted to do in Eastern Europe . . . for the security of Soviet Russia."⁶⁶ Fleming's response to this charge was pure Machiavelli.

First, he applied a loose analogy to lend credence to his violation of the right to self-determination. He asked the listeners to entertain three hypothetical Mexican invasions of the U.S. within 35 years which saw Chicago, Minneapolis, "all over," devastated. If the U.S. then attained the power to make a settlement, would it accept principle as the basis of the peace, or the needs of security as the last three invasions dictated them?⁶⁷ Fleming concluded that the answer was obvious; so, too, was his willingness to make principle the servant of power. Again, this demonstrates the ease with which Fleming bent his principles, an attribute not commonly associated with a "fuzzy-headed liberal."

More importantly, Fleming was unwilling to apply the same loose principles to the U.S. Although willing to grant a sphere of influence to the Soviets and to allow them to determine the types of governments within that sphere, the same did not hold true of the Americans. Fleming repeatedly condemned the U.S. for following policies in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Latin America in general which he condoned on the part of the Soviets in Eastern Europe. There is nothing in his testimony about the Soviet repression of liberty in Poland, Hungary, the Democratic Republic of Germany, or Czechoslovakia, but bitter attacks on U.S. policy in its sphere.⁶⁸ This double standard opened his objectivity to question.

Fleming lived until 3 September 1980 and remained active. But by the time of his death, his interpretations were outdated. His scholarship on the Cold war was, by modern standards, ancient. Since his research began, seven presidents had held office who exercised different approaches to the Communist world (twenty years had transpired since it was published); the Soviet Union had begun to display the signs of an empire in decline, especially in Afghanistan, and many of Fleming's assumptions about the "good life" of the Soviet citizens had been proven false; and the U.S., although held hostage by a fundamentalist Moslem state, had continued to survive despite the most dire predictions of the sociologists, the environmentalists, and the political scientists (among others).

Fleming's influence was not so much in the accuracy of his scholarship, nor in the positions of influence he held, but in the timely nature of his work on the Cold War and in his advocacy of world organization. If nothing else, his interpretation of the Cold War led some people to question

official interpretations and caused those who defended Cold War policy to re-examine it. And, of course, his longevity was a factor, too. Here was a man who lived to be nearly ninety and who had a twenty-year career after his official retirement. He was a leader in two causes during his life when most humans lead none and those who would lead, lead one.

Frederick Schuman, too, opened the decade of the sixties with the publication of an influential book. Based upon a series of lectures he delivered at Louisiana State University, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect* would be Schuman's *denouement*. Schuman was by this time convinced of his capabilities as a prophet, a circumstance he rarely let anyone forget, and he used the lectures to broadcast his forecast of the future.

Schuman addressed several of his old themes as they appeared in *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, *International Politics*, and *Soviet Politics: At Home and Abroad*. These included the impact of Byzantine, Roman, and Mongol culture on the Russian psyche; the influence of Tsarist imperial policies on the Bolsheviks (Stalin, Schuman believed, was an inevitable part of the Russian historical process); the role that geography had played in opening Russia to invasion; the progressive nature of the Soviet state and its "flourishing" planned economy; and the convergence of the U.S. and Soviet socio-economic systems.⁶⁹ His major theme, though, was that those who interpreted the threat from the Soviets as a military one had missed the mark; indeed, they were "deluded."⁷⁰

The real threat, claimed Schuman, lay in the fulfillment of the Marxist dream. Schuman accepted as a given that the Soviet state would achieve a

"level of prosperity at which there will be a superabundance of all goods and services." After they attained that point of economic development, Schuman believed that all housing would be free, all (or nearly all) direct taxes would be abolished, and most necessities, like bread, would be provided to the citizen free. The semantics Schuman employed in the creation of these predictions allowed him great flexibility in order to claim accuracy. "Likely," "quite possible," "even probable," "in the shorter run, which may prove very long," and other qualifiers were used frequently to the effect of fence-riding, when one could climb off the fence after the fact on the side of accuracy.⁷¹

The Schuman interpretation is familiar to the reader, but he revealed as well in this last publication two of the important themes of this dissertation. First, he demonstrated again his dependency upon historical syllogism as a process of prediction. Schuman observed that according to Aristotle and Euclid "things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. This proposition is of impeccable validity in mathematics. But I fear it is of most questionable validity in politics and in other human affairs."⁷² Aware of the failings of such a method, he was unaware that he employed it.

Here Schuman was enmeshed in an irony of truly Greek proportions. Schuman believed that the historical record revealed that when Russians initiated preventive wars, they were defeated; when others initiate preventive wars against Russia, the others are defeated. These were constants within the equation. Therefore, Schuman concluded that Soviet

leaders (whom he invariably regarded as sane men), reading the same record and responding to the same logic, would not initiate war.⁷³

Soviet leaders, Schuman was convinced, believed that the Marxist analysis of capitalism was false. They had learned, he said, that communism's future was based on the hope that would spring from its successful care for the health, wealth, and happiness of its citizens. This was the rationale behind Stalin's "Socialism in One Country" reincarnated! They, too, had learned that war and acts of war did not effectively serve national policy--but this was before Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and Korean Air Lines Flight 007--and that they were committed to effective international law and a "workable form of world government."⁷⁴ So much for accurate predictions.

A second theme which emerges from these lectures is the emphasis many scholars placed on reason as the consonant factor among human relations. He observed that Marxists, democrats, and liberals alike assumed that humans lived by reason alone. This, wrote Schuman, was not the case. "Human beings live," he wrote, "in terms of their hopes and their fears, their loyalties, their aspirations, their ambitions," etc. People were not interested in logical demonstrations that their beliefs were false. But if one could assess these variables properly, thought Schuman, one could arrive at a "reasonable" expectation of future behavior, although such an expectation would not be final or definitive.⁷⁵

This was an explicit recognition of the limits of political "science." Schuman made no claims to ultimate proofs, no claims to empirically demonstrable truths. What he claimed was that reasonable humans could

expect other reasonable humans to act and react under certain stimuli as they would. It does not require a giant intellect to arrive at such a conclusion. Nor does it require an entire discipline devoted to the counting of key words in articles, speeches, and the like, to arrive at conclusions regarding the aspirations of other people. What is required to offer the public a reasonably accurate assessment of future behavior is an understanding of history and of human emotions.

Even with these requirements met, though, the odds of accurate predictions were about fifty percent. And much of the basis of the reputation of recognized prophets like Schuman was the result of predictions of events which could take only one of two courses: wars are either won or lost, they either start or they do not, so that even the most uninformed individual stood a chance of predicting events with accuracy. And one rarely heard of the failed predictions on the part of the informed.⁷⁶

Schuman's hopes for the Kennedy administration were not so much positive hopes, but negative ones. The U-2 disaster left Schuman fulminating about U.S. duplicity and guilelessness. He took the Eisenhower administration to the woodshed and chastised it with his rules for the practice of diplomacy: that diplomacy cannot be practiced "unless all parties abide by the rules of international law" and established practice; that "governments engaged in diplomacy must never tell lies in public if there is the slightest possibility that another government may have proof that your lie is a lie"; that "governments and chiefs of state must never acknowledge official responsibility for espionage agents" who have been

caught; that when caught in violation of international law, "governments always express regrets and tender apologies to other governments"; and, as one who believed Eisenhower to be a hands-off president, that "no useful diplomatic relations are ever possible with the head of a government who does not know what his own subordinates are doing and who is not master of his household."⁷⁷ How could anyone do any worse than this?

Not only that, but Schuman feared that the Cold War had taken such a central economic role in the nation that to end it would require a painful period of withdrawal. The Cold War had become, thought Schuman, "a kind of glorified W.P.A.--i.e., a scheme of public spending to maintain full employment and full production. Unless we are bright enough to find a substitute, our prospects are rather dismal."⁷⁸

Any hopes he might have entertained for the new administration were dashed in the aftermath of the Berlin Crisis and the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Schuman wrote to Wright and expressed his conviction that his old mentor must be as much disturbed over the "Cuban fiasco of April" as was Schuman. After all of his high hopes for the Kennedy administration, he found this "almost incredible." He declared the Berlin war scare to be nearly "the most shameless piece of fakery that any Administration has ever perpetrated," and concluded that its only purpose was to enrich "the Pentagon, the armament industry, and the stock market." To survive, Schuman believed the U.S. must return leaders with the vision of Franklin Roosevelt, and so far the Kennedy administration had displayed few signs of the wisdom of FDR.⁷⁹ Schuman suspected that the U.S. had now passed

"beyond the point of any return toward a totally militarized economy and a 'Garrison state.'"⁸⁰ So much for the end of the Cold War!

Perhaps because of this conviction, some of the last articles Schuman published concerned disarmament and renewed the immediate self-interest thesis of the Nye Committee.⁸¹ According to Schuman, international law under world government was essential to real disarmament. He resurrected the arguments of Norman Angell at length to remind those who read it that if we had only listened life might be different.⁸² He insisted that the Soviets were sincere in pursuit of disarmament while the West, especially the U.S., was not. In part this was due to his naive assertion that the Soviets did not sell arms for private profit.⁸³ Technology, he claimed, had made U.S. insistence on fail-safe inspection/verification impossible so that reason and trust must prevail if disarmament was to succeed. There were, he stated, no provisions for inspection in what he considered to have been the successful Washington Accords of 1921-22, so why were they necessary now?⁸⁴

U.S. policy in Vietnam seemed to justify his thesis that the arms merchants and the Pentagon dictated the nation's interest. Schuman objected to U.S. policy because he thought it immoral, illegal, and against the national interest. He was a vocal critic from the beginning to the end of the conflict. And like Fleming, his attacks on violations of international law were limited to those which the U.S. perpetrated. In response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1968 Schuman wrote an unpublished letter to the *Oregonian* which served as a vehicle to condemn

U.S. policy, with only one line devoted to the "Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia."⁸⁵

His first public criticisms of U.S. policy in Vietnam came in 1965. In fact, he later claimed to have predicted the course of the Vietnam war on 22 February 1965 in a lecture at Williams.⁸⁶ Schuman supported Senator Wayne Morse in his "lonely struggle against the folly of the Johnson-Goldwater policy in Vietnam," a policy based largely on the false recommendations of the Central Intelligence Agency.⁸⁷ Schuman held U.S. policymakers responsible for the repudiation of their promises to respect the 1954 Geneva Accords, accords which if followed would have maintained the peace in South East Asia.

Schuman interpreted the accords to provide for the "neutralization and non-alignment of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, with the latter country to be reunited by free elections in 1956." The U.S. then vetoed that prospect and established a "neo-colonial U.S. protectorate and military bastion in South Vietnam" for purposes still unclear. And although Schuman stated that in a world of international anarchy the fact that this policy was illegal was moot, still, one could point to violations of the U.N. Charter and many other multilateral accords. The way out, Schuman asserted, was to reconvene the Geneva Conference and reaffirm the neutralization and non-alignment of the countries in question.⁸⁸

Schuman and Fleming concurred in their estimation of the status of neutrality in the modern world. Schuman maintained in 1962 that neutrality was not immoral but instead was "highly desirable as a contribution to peace." He cited the Austrian Treaty of 1955 and the

Antarctica Treaty of 1959 as examples of the success of neutralization. In its effort to subvert the Geneva Accords and the neutralization of Vietnam, Washington policymakers found themselves tied to a "corrupt and discredited regime."⁸⁹

And although much of Schuman's criticism was levelled against the government, he spread the blame to the people. After all, the U.S. was a democracy and the people must share responsibility for the actions of their government. Schuman believed that the American people, like all other people, were obsessed with nationalism. Or, as the man Schuman, Fleming and Wright praised as the world's greatest historian, Arnold Toynbee put it, they were obsessed with a "false and maleficent religion." As a consequence, they were willing to accept "any amount of regimentation in the name of 'national defense'" as long as public spending on armaments meant continued profits for private industry and high wages for members of the trade unions employed in their manufacture.⁹⁰

Schuman, too, feared the possibility of drawing the People's Republic of China into the Vietnam conflict. This fear led him to another false prophecy: that the course was already set for China to enter the war. In a letter to M. S. Arnoni, publisher of a letter called *the Minority of One* and author of a pamphlet on the crisis in the Middle East for which Fleming wrote the introduction, Schuman insisted that the "leading power-holders in the military-industrial complex ruling the country in the name of LBJ & Co. are consciously or unconsciously, wittingly or unwittingly, bent on war with China. I doubt whether anyone or anything can deflect them from

this course of insanity."⁹¹ This prediction was based on intuition at best and was not substantiated with fact. It also proved to be incorrect.

The duty of the citizen under these circumstances was to expose the government's false assumptions, propaganda, and lies. Schuman said that the facts were clear and available to those who would take the trouble to inform themselves. Falsehoods, he declared, do not become truth due to constant repetition from sources of authority.⁹² And, he hinted direly that the consequences of continued escalation in Vietnam could be a third world war, a phenomenon he had long thought improbable.⁹³

There were some measures he would not take in opposition to the war. M. S. Arnoni requested his signature on a document which called for the leaders of the Soviet Union to take "whatever action necessary for an effective defense of Vietnam." Not only was Schuman unwilling to sign such a document, but he vigorously protested the logic which led to its consideration. Schuman's opposition to U.S. policy in Vietnam was, he wrote, based largely upon the fact that it was unilateral and in violation of international law. He did not, he insisted, want to follow the example of Washington and try to impose his views upon other countries; instead, he urged Arnoni and followers to counsel Americans as to the follies of the power-holders in Washington.⁹⁴

Schuman's determination to expose U.S. policy for what he thought it was led him to brand Lyndon Johnson a "mass murderer." This comment led him into conflict once again with William Loeb of the *Manchester Union*. Loeb declared that academic freedom did not "include the right to use the college campus to assault the President of the United States in any

such outrageous fashion as to call him a mass murder." In Schuman's defense, David A. Lyle, senior editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, wrote to Loeb simply that "You are entirely wrong." Academic freedom carried with it the obligation to make public the convictions of one's beliefs and anyone who did not for fear of reprisals from men like Loeb was "faithless to the heritage which permits you and me to disagree."⁹⁵

The publicity which surrounded this event convinced Schuman that the time was right for a career move. Schuman wrote to Howard Dean of Portland State University of his intent to accept a tenured position.⁹⁶ This occurred just eleven days after the "open letter" controversy. Schuman wrote to President Sawyer of Williams College and requested that details of his resignation/retirement be worked out.⁹⁷ Sawyers, who had not been supportive of the public nature of Schuman's criticisms of the government, granted Schuman leave for the academic year 1968-1969, after which Schuman would be allowed to retire. Schuman joined Portland State, a facility which recruited well-known scholars of the left, with immediate tenure as full professor in September 1968.

From the West coast, Schuman continued his active protest against the war. And, somewhat out of character for Schuman and many other critics, he provided an alternative to U.S. policy in Vietnam that was at once simple and easy to implement: "Get out." Schuman said the only Americans with reason to be in Vietnam were those engaged in business, diplomacy, or tourism. The path to a negotiated withdrawal was clear: accept the Hanoi government and the National Liberation Front as competent negotiators and allow for adequate face-saving devices for the Johnson administration

or the one to follow. If this course was not followed, he predicted, "then all Americans will be driven out of Asia, at whatever horrible cost, within the next few years. If you doubt my forecast, read the headlines two years hence."⁹⁸

Whether or not Schuman believed that events proved his prediction true, the fact remains that he continued to try to alter the circumstances of U.S. policy toward Vietnam. He was a sponsor of the Peace Act Advisory Council and supported the anti-war group "Another Mother for Peace."⁹⁹ Schuman wrote a pamphlet for the group which they published entitled "Why a Department of Peace?" The idea behind a department of peace was that it would not be connected with the manufacturers of military hardware and would not be subject to the military's influence, therefore it would be more likely to advocate peace. Schuman donated the proceeds and hoped for the best, but he was bitterly disappointed when the "Mothers" began an old-style lobbying campaign which included donations to Congresspeople who they thought would support them. Schuman wrote: "In all probability there will never be a Department of Peace for the simple reason that nobody can make any money out of it. Every man has his price. Every woman, too. This is the prevailing assumption of Another Mother for Peace. It is probably true."¹⁰⁰

Schuman's efforts to spread peace were given added vigor in that he believed the violence at home was a corollary to the violence in Vietnam. He perceived the illegal, violent actions of some college and university students in terms of a response to the international lawless violence which the government of the U.S. perpetrated in Vietnam. Lawlessness and

violence, he stated, were contagious, and the young followed the example of their elders. And they rebelled not only against U.S. policy in Vietnam, but against "a deep-seated American racism . . . against the draft and [against] the progressive militarization of America at the hands of the 'military-industrial complex,' against which President Eisenhower warned in vain in his Farewell Address."¹⁰¹

By 1969, Schuman's frustration with the world situation was such that he wrote Wright that "No end is in sight for the wars in Vietnam and the Middle East. And I often get the impression that the policymakers in Moscow behave as stupidly and destructively as those in Washington.

Quintilla prudentia regitur orbis!"¹⁰² One wonders where the sane Soviet policymakers of his 1967 letter to Arnoni went? But although his frustrations ran deep, he turned to the leadership of the then senator and soon to be presidential candidate George S. McGovern.

Schuman commented extensively on the McGovern candidacy in a letter to Curtis MacDougal in August 1972. He then referred to McGovern as a "sad case," and observed that he had supported him from the beginning, but that he had "killed the dream." First there was the Eagleton affair (Schuman's son Karl had long suffered from psychosis until his suicide in 1962 and Schuman believed contemporary views of mental illness were "medieval") which devastated McGovern's credibility. There were also the facts that Sargent Shriver had long supported "Vietnamization"; and that McGovern's opposition to Vietnam policy had been inconsistent. McGovern, wrote Schuman, was beginning his role as a national leader as Woodrow Wilson had ended his: tragically. Schuman closed with the hope

that his "crystal ball" would be wrong for once, although he had earlier mentioned how it was "invariably correct," but that he believed that Nixon would be re-elected in November. Although proven correct, it was not a very difficult prediction in August of 1972.¹⁰³

Schuman retired from his position at Portland due to health issues. He had had kidney problems for most of his adult life and had one removed in 1969; in 1971 he had spinal surgery and contracted pneumonia, suffered a pulmonary embolism, and underwent temporary tachycardia. He retired that year. His health continued to decline and he died in 1976.

He wrote nothing in his last years about the close of the Vietnam war, nothing about the negotiations which led to it, and nothing about the United Nations. And although he did not live to see the end of the Cold war, nor the reunification of Germany, he likely died believing that he had indeed been a prophet of unusual accuracy, a conclusion that a full account of his predictions would not support. Schuman's influence was in the controversial nature of his interpretation of U.S. policies, an interpretation which afforded him a much larger audience than if he had subscribed to conventional standards.

What was missing in the agenda of Schuman and Fleming during the sixties was the prominent emphasis on the U.N. as a means to world organization and peace. The Cold War, with its global and domestic impact, consumed them. Quincy Wright, though, remained focused on internationalism in the sixties. As seen previously, his analyses of Vietnam, of Cuba, of the Middle East, of China, of nearly all the major global events, were centered upon their impact on world organization.

Any investigation of Schuman would be incomplete without some conclusion as to whether or not he was a "fellow-traveller." First, it is very difficult to apply labels to any individual for they are notoriously inadequate to their task. After all, exactly what was a "fellow-traveller"? Did he or she receive directions from Moscow? If that was the case, Schuman likely did not fit the bill. Did they accept blindly all policies of the Kremlin? Again, if this were the case Schuman did not fit the description. Did they accept much of the Communist party line uncritically? This comes closer to the niche Schuman filled, for on the major issues he was always in line with Moscow.

Although Schuman would likely have described himself as a critical analyst of Soviet policy, his sympathy for that policy all too often was arrived at without applying the rigorous tests he applied to Western policies. In a discussion of Arab-Israeli tensions, Schuman observed that perhaps Arnold Toynbee had a valid point when he claimed that the "Arabs, in embracing fanatical nationalism, don't know any better and therefore, by implication, are to be forgiven, but that the Jews, by virtue of their spiritual heritage, should know better than to embrace fanatical nationalism."¹⁰⁴ If one substitutes Russian and American for Arab and Jew one arrives at the Schuman formula for judging U.S.-Soviet relations. It was a formula that led to egregious errors.

Wright died in 1970 at age 80. Schuman eulogized him as having "contributed more than anyone else of our generation to the cause of human sanity and human survival."¹⁰⁵ Among Wright's last letters was one written to George Ball in which is contained Wright's summary of the

state of world organization in 1970. He concluded that the U.S. had turned to unilateral interventionism in an effort to halt the spread of communism while the Soviets had not abandoned their belief that universal communism was the key to permanent peace. And, he observed, the communists used propaganda, infiltration, and intervention to achieve their goals despite their rhetoric of peaceful coexistence and non-export of revolution or counter-revolution. The responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the people, for he wrote that the peoples and governments of the world, especially those of the super-powers, had neither understood nor pursued the policy of internationalism.

What was required for internationalism to be a success, he continued, was a stable balance of power. But that balance, he insisted, must be "more ideological, economic, political, and legal than military." What the world needed was peace, but peace could not be had through maintenance of a balance of terror or mutual deterrence. Instead, peace must be had through education, arms control, disarmament, and an empowered U.N. through the limitation of national sovereignty in an interdependent world. "Perhaps," hoped Wright, "the young, the small states and the third world can help but I am not very optimistic."¹⁰⁶

Notes

- ¹ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, (New York, N.Y.: W. W. Norton, 1959, 1962, 1972); "The Port Huron Statement," as cited in Jim Miller's *Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago*, (New York, N. Y: Simon and Schuster, 1987).
- ² For two examples, see Schuman to Dexter Perkins, 23 April 1947 and Fleming "Ways to Coexist," *The Nation* 179 (27 November 1954), 459.
- ³ Bradford Perkins, "'The Tragedy of American Diplomacy': Twenty-Five Years After." In Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 313-314.
- ⁴ Fleming's isolationism will be described more thoroughly below.
- ⁵ DF, "Eisenhower's Quest For Peace: An Eight Year Appraisal," *The Nation* 191 (31 December 1960), 521-522.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 524.
- ⁷ DF, "The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War," *Annals Am Acad* 366 (July 1966), 136; "Is Containment Moral?," *Annals Am Acad* 362 (November 1965), 26-27.
- ⁸ DF, "Is Containment Moral?," *Annals Am Acad* 362 (November 1965), 23.
- ⁹ DF, "The Broken Dialogue on Foreign Affairs," *Annals Am Acad* 344 (November 1962), 135-137.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 129.
- ¹¹ DF, "Is Containment Moral?," 26.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, 24.
- ¹³ DF, "The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War," *Annals Am Acad* 366 (July 1966), 136.
- ¹⁴ DF, "The Broken Dialogue on Foreign Affairs," 136-139.
- ¹⁵ DF, "Is Containment Moral?," 24-25.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 19-21.
- ¹⁷ Harry Elmer Barnes to DF, 1 August 1959 in reference to an abstract of *Cold War* in *Annals*; FLS to DF, 28 November 1961, (copy); QW to DF, 22

November 1963; Herbert L. Matthews, *New York Times*, to DF, 11 August 1961; Piritim A. Sorokin, director Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism, to DF, 12 January 1962; FS to DF, 15 February 1962, refers to Schuman's possession of "glowing letters of appreciation" for *The Cold War* from Clyde Miller of Columbia and Harvey Goldberg of Ohio State; many other favorable reviews are extant.

18 FS to DF, 28 November 1961(copy).

19 FS, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), xiv.

20 DF to McWilliams, 1 December 1961, 2.

21 DF to Shirer, 2 April 1962; Shirer to Doubleday Publishers, 4 March 1965 (copy)

22 *The Vanderbilt Hustler*, 3 November 1961, 2.

23 R. R. Purdy to DF, 6 January 1961.

24 Bransomb to DF, 28 May 1960; Paul Conkin, *Gone With The Ivy*, 476.

25 George W. Stocking to Dean Russell M. Cooper, University of South Florida, 5 July 1962 (copy).

26 Branscomb to Mrs. Mary Low Weaver, 11 June 1962 (copy).

27 Branscomb to Fleming, 14 December 1963.

28 Sam Smith, Assistant Professor of History, University of South Florida and Vanderbilt Ph.D., to Harvie Branscomb, 6 August 1962 (copy). See also Felix C. Robb, President, George Peabody College for Teachers, Nashville, to DF, 18 December 1963, for effect of the Branscomb letter to Weaver.

29 John S. Allen, president, University of South Florida, to DF, 21 July 1962.

30 Benjamin Mandel to DF, 30 March 1962.

31 DF to Mandel, 7 April 1962.

32 Mark Hawes, Chief Counsel, to DF, 27 July 1962; George Stocking to DF, 5 July 1962; DF to Prof. Neal Houghton, 24 May 1963; Joan Sutherland, Vanderbilt Registrar to DF, 27 May 1963; DF to William McLeod, attorney, 30 November 1963; Felix C. Robb to DF, 18 December 1963; A.A.U.P. to DF, 18 and 27 December 1963; DF to Winston Ehrmann, A.A.U.P., 20 December 1963; DF to

Winston Ehrmann, 10 January 1964; Russell Cooper, Dean, University of South Florida, to DF, 22 January 1965; DF to Winston Ehrmann, 24 May 1965; A.A.U.P. to DF, 16 February 1966; DF to Winston Ehrmann, 24 February 1966; A.A.U.P. to DF, 28 November 1967; DF to Rob Elder, *Nashville Tennessean*, 30 December 1967; Tom Truss, AAUP, to DF, 7 May 1968; A.A.U.P. to DF 15 May 1968; DF to Lamar Alexander, 28 July 1969.

33 John S. Allen invited DF to lecture at the University of South Florida for an honorarium of \$1,000.00 and travel expenses. Allen to DF, 22 June 1967; DF to Bertram H. Davis, General Secretary, A.A.U.P., 12 November 1967.

34 Tom Truss, A.A.U.P., to DF, 7 May 1968.

35 See document entitled "Data Concerning D.F. Fleming," document entitled "Dr. Fleming's Four Years In the West"(the allusion to his being in the wilderness after serving the cause of justice is inescapable), and DF to David Johns, 25 April 1970, 2.

36 DF to E. E. Weaver, 10 August 1967.

37 DF, "Eisenhower's Quest For Peace: An Eight Year Appraisal," *The Nation* 191 (31 December 1960), 524-525.

38 DF to William Moore, 4 February 1963, Box 4.

39 DF, "What is Our Role in East Asia?," *Western Political Quarterly* 18 (March 1965), 74.

40 DF, "The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War," *Annals Am Acad* 366 (July 1966), 137.

41 DF, "The Future of West Berlin," *W Pol Q* 14 (March 1961), 43.

42 *Ibid.*, 43-44.

43 *Ibid.*, 48.

44 On the Truman doctrine as an attempt to prevent violent social change, see DF "Can Pax American Succeed?," *Annals Am Acad* 360 (July 1965), 131; "What is Our Role in East Asia?," 73-75.

45 DF, "What is Our Role in East Asia?," 77-80. For more on the false assumptions of airpower, see "A Year End Letter From The D.F. Flemings, 1969"; "A Year End Letter From The D.F. Flemings, 1970," 2. On the threat to unite the Soviets and Chinese, see "Is Containment Moral?," *Annals Am Acad* 362 (November 1965), 23.

46 DF, "What is Our Role in East Asia?," 79-80; on white foreign control, 83.

47 *Ibid.*, 81-82.

48 U.S. Congress, Hearing on the Cold War: Origins and Developments, 92nd Congress, 7 June 1971, 15.

49 M. S. Arnoni to FS, 9 May 1968

50 DF, "What is Our Role in East Asia?," 84-86.

51 *Ibid.*, 80-81. For more on China, see DF, "Can We Escape From Containing China?" *W Pol Q* 24 (March 1971), 163-77; see, too, DF "Is Containment Moral?," *Annals Am Acad* 362 (November 1965), 21.

52 DF, "Can Pax American Succeed?," *Annals Am Acad* 360 (July 1965), 131.

53 DF, "Is Containment Moral?," *Annals Am Acad* 362 (November 1965), 23-24.

54 DF, "Can Pax American Succeed?," 133-134.

55 DF, "Vietnam and After." *W Pol Q* 21 (March 1968), 141-143. This article was taken directly from his speech to the conference. On monolithic communism, see DF, "The Broken Dialogue on Foreign Affairs," *Annals Am Acad* 344 (November 1962), 128-40. He attacked notion of monolithic communism and noted that even if it was monolithic it certainly had not been successful in terms of converts, 135-137. Of course, the astute would argue that this was the result of successful containment.

56 In "The Broken Dialogue on Foreign Affairs," 136, Fleming wrote that "Military might cannot deter social revolution."

57 DF, "Vietnam and After." 143-147.

58 *Ibid.*, 148-151. On the theme of national decline, see DF to Senator Albert Gore, Sr., 12 March 1968; DF to Frank McGee, 18 March 1968; numerous end-of-the-year letters.

59 DF to Henry, 24 October 1967.

60 DF to Frank and Helen Dingman, 1 December 1972.

61 "A Year End Letter From The D.F. Flemings, 1970," 2.

62 DF, "The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War," *Annals Am Acad* 366 (July 1966), 131-37.

63 U.S. Congress, Hearing on the Cold War: Origins and Developments, 92nd Congress, 7 June 1971, 11-15.

64 *Ibid.*, 40.

65 *Ibid.*, 24. In characterizing William A. Williams' revisionism on the same page, Ulam wrote that unlike Fleming, Williams was a historian and therefore "a man who has respect for the facts."

66 *Ibid.*, 27.

67 *Ibid.*, 29.

68 *Ibid.* On the Soviet right to determine the types of government within its sphere, see 29; condemnations of U.S. policy in Latin America appear on 30 and 37.

69 Frederick Schuman, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), 14-30; 54-58; 62-63. For more on convergency, see FS to *Chicago Tribune*, 17 September 1964, Bx 17.

70 *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*, xiv-xv; FS to Ralph Renzi, 27 October 1959.

71 FS, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*, 61-62.

72 *Ibid.*, 35.

73 *Ibid.*, 19-20. As to their sanity, see FS to M. S. Arnoni, 23 March 1967.

74 *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*, 92-93.

75 *Ibid.*, 41-42.

76 Schuman remained convinced of his accuracy as a prophet to the end. In a letter to a Williams College alumnus, Schuman declared that a well-informed alumnus would know that Schuman's predictions, judgments, and analyses over his 32 year career at Williams had been "invariably correct." FS to Durand Hall, 9 July 1968, 2.

77 FS, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*, 90-91. Although published in 1962, the lectures were given in March 1961.

- 78 FS to Lily, Don, and Bette, 24 January 1959, Bx 16.
- 79 FS to the Editor of *the Eagle*, 15 March 1962, 2.
- 80 FS to QW, 2 August 1961, Bx 23, addenda 1.
- 81 FS, "The Impasse of Disarmament," *Current History* 41 (November 1961), 267-72; 299; FS, "The Wasted Decades: 1899-1939," *Current History* 46 (June 1964), 326-330; FS to *the Nation*, 22 April 1966; FS to Jerry Martin, 11 August 1972, 3.
- 82 FS, "The Impasse of Disarmament," *Current History* 41 (November 1961), 267-268.
- 83 FS, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*, 73.
- 84 FS, "The Impasse of Disarmament," 270-72; "The Wasted Decades: 1899-1939," 326-330.
- 85 FS to the *Oregonian*, 23 September 1968,
- 86 FS to Durand Hall, 9 July 1968, 2. Schuman wrote that the same lecture was delivered at San Diego State that summer and was published. I have not been able to find it.
- 87 Open Letter to *the Oregonian*, 27 July 1965, 1.
- 88 *Ibid.*, 2.
- 89 FS, *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect*, 93-94; 97.
- 90 FS to *the Nation*, 28 April 1966.
- 91 FS to Arnoni, 18 August 1966, Bx 18.
- 92 FS to the *Berkshire Eagle*, 9 March 1967.
- 93 *Ibid.*, ; FS to the *Berkshire Eagle*, 23 March 1967.
- 94 FS to Arnoni, 23 March 1967.
- 95 David A. Lyle to William Loeb, 6 October 1967, 1.
- 96 FS to Howard Dean, Portland State Political Science Department, 14 October 1967, Bx 18.

- 97 FS to President Sawyer, Williams College, 2 December 1967.
- 98 FS to Durand Hall, 9 July 1968.
- 99 See appendix for a list of the other sponsors of the Peace Act Advisory Council.
- 100 Dorothy Jones to FS, 17 April 1969; FS to Dorothy Jones, 28 April 1969.
- 101 FS to *The Oregonian*, 28 April 1969, Bx 19.
- 102 FS to QW, 2 December 69, Bx 23, add 1.
- 103 MacDougal to FS, 19 July 1972; FS to MacDougal, 15 August 1972, 1-3. James Reston, who received a copy of the letter, concurred with Schuman's estimate of McGovern, Reston to FS, 19 September 1972.
- 104 FS to Arnoni, 2 May 1968, 2.
- 105 FS to Louise Wright, 21 October 1970.
- 106 QW to George Ball, 1-2.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Sheila Fitzpatrick wrote that the Bolsheviki in 1917 faced a significant disadvantage in that "they were obliged by their theory to work not for the coming revolution, but for the revolution after next." It is an observation which applies equally to these three internationalists. Their revolution was not the organization of the nations into a system of collective security, but the development of a world public opinion which would sustain the creation of a world government. As in the case of the Bolsheviki, their revolution could not be produced without force, for logic and reason alone were insufficient to convince the people of the merits of the new system.¹

Although Fleming, Schuman, and Wright recognized the need for symbols and shibboleths to unite diverse cultures behind a world organization, a sort of supranationalism, they could not find the means to ignite the spirit of the people. It was obvious to them that the diversity of the world's cultures posed a severe problem to anyone who sought to bring order to their inter-relations through international organization, whether in the form of a league or a limited world government. But they depended too much upon logic and reason to persuade the public, a dependence which severely limited the appeal of their model for world organization.

They valued reason as the ultimate arbiter of things human and it blinded them to its manifold interpretations. The dual nature of reason allowed one group of men to contemplate changes and to see them as an

obvious benefit to humankind while at the same time others could interpret the same changes as a means to perpetuate an imperialistic, culturally value-laden system of exploitation. And still others could interpret those changes in any number of ways. Scholarly dependence upon reason as the interpretive matrix of history and political science was, at least in the works of these three men, ill-founded.²

Despite this obstacle, or perhaps because they did not recognize it, Fleming, Schuman, and Wright remained convinced of the potential of reason to gel public opinion around the need for international organization. But they came more and more to speak to a limited audience. Wright made an effort to reach an audience traditionally considered outside the academic pale when he sought to rally unions around the issue of international organization, but it was a limited venture, one that met with very little, if any success.³ Wright's most frequent channels were academic journals and scholarly publications whose length and style would find few friends among the general public. Schuman's efforts as the foreign policy tsar of the Progressive party in 1948 might be considered an effort to reach the common people, but the composition of that party's rank and file was such that, rather than entice those who needed conversion, it may instead have alienated them to the cause. As for his prolific speaking career, the fact that he spoke only to paying audiences tempers the impact he may have had on those who needed to be persuaded to the cause of internationalism. Fleming's audience when on the air at WSM in Nashville was likely the most diverse, but after he was removed from the airwaves, his audience, too, became more homogenous.

Their efforts to place voluntary limits on national sovereignty were a casualty of their dependence on reason as well. In theory it must have appealed to a sense of justice in the opinion of many people, but when applied to an individual's own nation at the expense of national honor or national interest, justice was often relegated to a secondary position. Wright had correctly estimated the trend of U.S. public opinion at the conclusion of World War II when he observed that while there was an immediate rise in support for international organization which would require limitations on sovereignty, it would be quick to wane when contrasted to the public in terms of national interest. Never were these three scholars able to convince either the public or the officials who served it to take the necessary step to world government.

They were more successful, though, in their understanding and pursuit of Kropotkin's Corollary as it applied to the arena of international relations. Until such time as someone convinced the world of the necessity of limitations upon sovereignty, these men saw the value of balance of power politics, despite their frequent attacks upon it. Mutual cooperation and aid were the critical elements to survival in the atomic age, and each man, as we have seen, sought to give meaning to Franklin Roosevelt's vision of the U.N. as a means to secure the cooperation of the great powers.

Even Wright, who continued to view the United Nations as an effective agent of international law long after Fleming and Schuman had tempered their hopes for the international organization, realized that maintenance of the balance was the key to world peace until a government of laws was imposed on the nation states. Fleming and Schuman observed very early

that the U.N. had not lived up to their expectations and consequently it was virtually deleted from their analyses. They, too, emphasized the role of the balance of power. And they also feared that without a regeneration of civil liberties within the United States and without a regenerated U.S. economy the temptation for the U.S. to act unilaterally would outweigh the potential rewards of adherence to an effective international system.

They met with greater success in increasing the status of their discipline. Wright's interpretations of international law continued to be sought throughout his career. Congress sought him as an expert witness on several occasions; the leaders of foreign schools called upon him to teach; the guilds of his profession called upon him to serve and to lead; his theories and methods, especially those he developed with regard to the potential to measure public opinion, guided the course of much of political science; and both private and public monies came to his disposal to further his research.

Fleming had organized the movement to make political science a department separate from history at Vanderbilt University; he was named the first research professor at the same university, a significant personal achievement as well as a recognition of the standing of his discipline; and he provoked an entire scholarly generation to reconsider the causes of the Cold War. Schuman, too, contributed to the growth of international politics, most significantly through the continued publication of his text and his many other popular writings.

But what about their efforts to organize the world around the maxims of Wilsonian internationalism? These men remained dedicated to the main

predicate of Wilsonian internationalism--the concept of law as the agent for an orderly and progress-oriented world system. And their shared ideal was virtuous: a world at peace, with opportunities for peaceful change, with governments responsive to theirs and other peoples' interests, a world where a united community would meet and defeat aggression. But as with so many other well-intentioned ideologies, Wilsonian internationalism had its share of inconsistencies and victims, many of which were the result of three concepts which are integral to it: power politics, race, and the "open door."

Critics have frequently attacked Wilson's policies and ideology as idealistic, asynchronous, and outside the interests of the U.S., a characterization attached to his followers as well. This view of Wilson the idealist is well established in both the public mind and academic scholarship. So much so that Wilson admirer Arthur Link saw fit to answer such criticism with his interpretation of Wilson's "higher realism," an interpretation which is still dependent upon the assumption that what Wilson advocated was idealistic. Even Frederick L. Schuman, a dedicated Wilsonian internationalist, wrote that extreme idealists followed Wilson, as "apostles of 'crusades for freedom,' holy wars against sin, and high-minded adventurers to vindicate righteousness." Realists, he concluded, were "disciples of national interest, respect for allies, toleration of foreign devils, horse-trading with potential foes, and acknowledgment that America, unlike God, is not omnipotent."⁴

Those who describe Wilson's system as an idealistic one provide a one-dimensional view of his practices and those of other internationalists who

refined his model to establish world order. Upon closer analysis, theirs was as practical as any so-called "realist" approach to the problems of international organization. And, as with so many other labels, the attempt to pigeon-hole Wilson and his followers as idealists is inadequate, for elements of both realism and idealism are to be found in his policies and those of his followers.

Wilson's generation of policymakers had, especially after the Spanish-American War, found the taste of international power politics tantalizing, had tried it, and either could not, or would not, quit.⁵ From the Hague to Portsmouth to Algeciras to WWI they accepted the powerful role which both their nation's industry and a weakened Europe provided. Wilson articulated the new direction for his nation in a 1916 speech to the League to Enforce Peace, one charged with many of the traditional estimates of that nation's character, while at the same time laying to rest other traditions which he believed no longer served the national interest. On this stage, Wilson shared with the public his recognition that U.S. interests were now universal, and that the responsibilities of the nation would now include ensuring a peaceful, stable world political system.

In estimation of the impact of the then current European war on U.S. interests, Wilson said that the nation's rights had "been profoundly affected." No longer could the citizens of the U.S. consider themselves "mere disconnected lookers-on." They were, he insisted, "participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world." The interests of all nations were theirs, for what affected mankind was inevitably their affair, too.⁶ Wilson mantled this universalism in the rhetoric of moral mission as

well as self-interest, but fundamental to the accomplishment of both was his willingness to engage in power politics in an effort to eliminate it as the basis of the international system, and his conviction that the U.S. could succeed where other nations had failed.

Wilson's racial beliefs, which were deeply ingrained in his Southern upbringing, his religion, and his politics, influenced his domestic and international outlooks.⁷ This belief in racial/political superiority is demonstrated and well-documented in Wilson's policies toward Mexico and Latin America, toward Asia, toward "backward" peoples in his plan for mandates, and in his general response to revolutionary movements.⁸ Wilson's plans for mandated territories demonstrate the impact of racial thinking on the Wilsonian design for world organization, and provide an insight as to the difficulties the plan encountered.

In Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant the language of race and paternalism is inescapable. The author determined that many of the former colonies and territories of the *defeated* powers were "inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" and that as a consequence of that status those peoples should come under the "tutelage" of more "advanced nations" who would accept such a role as a "sacred trust."

What is more, Wilson recognized different stages of development among the peoples of the former colonies and territories, and those stages coincided with the skin color of the majority of the occupants. Mostly white, the former colonies of the Turkish empire were recognized as the most advanced and hence could be "provisionally recognized" as

independent states and would be allowed to exercise a great deal of self-government. Central Africa, though, which was predominantly black, was at a stage of development determined to be so rudimentary that the Mandatory power would be responsible for civil administration and the maintenance of public order. Those peoples who occupied Southwest Africa and the South Pacific islands were so backward, it was asserted, that they would best be served if their territories were incorporated directly as "integral portions" of the Mandatory.⁹

That any of these people might take exception to such characterizations of themselves either escaped Wilson and his followers, or was sacrificed to a greater good, as when Japanese efforts to elicit a statement of racial equality in the League Covenant were defeated to ensure the cooperation of Great Britain and France in the development of the League. These actions provided fertile ground for the growth of discontent among those who opposed the new world order. And they hindered the credibility of a movement which emphasized universal human rights.

The racial beliefs of Fleming, Schuman, and Wright influenced their theories as well, and they were little different from the majority of U.S. citizens, whether they were African-American, Native American, Asian-American, or Euro-American. These Wilsonians promoted a system that accepted as one of its principle tenets the notion that some peoples were not ready for, indeed some may never be capable of, self-government. Wright in particular subscribed to the belief that certain groups required further guidance before they could take their position as equals.

Wright shared his thoughts about the qualifications of women to enter politics in a letter to Edward Bernays, an early theorist of modern propaganda, and they epitomize his views toward other groups who were traditionally viewed to be beyond the pale of politics. Wright believed that "equality of opportunity in business, professions and politics should be guaranteed for women," but held as well to the belief that "biological and functional differences of men and women will . . . mean that the proportion of women in politics, in government, in the professions and in business will be much less than that of men. Such functional differentiation, however, should be the result of inclination and not of any legal discrimination."¹⁰ In this belief, he reflected the public sentiment of the majority of his fellow Americans: women were to be outside politics. So, too, were the backward peoples of the world until such time as the modern nations determined otherwise.

Significant evidence has been presented to suggest that these men thought of themselves as champions of the oppressed and as advocates of equality. Indeed, they fought vigorously for the inclusion of a statement of universal rights in the U.N. Charter. Yet it is ironic that the policies they devised to address the problems of world organization and peace, especially that of universal human rights, fell short of the mark. All supported the mandate system, all believed that "backward" peoples valued freedom less than food, all held women to be inferior to men, and all valued the political and social culture of European ethnic groups as superior to others.

Power politics was essential to the accomplishment of their ends, and the elasticity with which they applied the principle of self-determination

demonstrates their willingness to use the means of power politics. Wright urged those who questioned such an interpretation to consider Wilson's observation that "the peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of political jurisdictional boundary."¹¹ In many respects Wilsonian internationalism in practice was a politics of expediency in the service of a greater end. Central to this recognition of the facts was their adherence to the balance of power as the essential means of providing peace in an anarchical system of nation states.

A third essential element of the Wilsonian international model, one based on a progressive democracy strapped to the practice of power politics and to the paradigm of racial hierarchy, was the "open door." In order for democracy to function best, its advocates believed that an "open door" system of trade must be sustained throughout the world. The evidence is abundant that U.S. policymakers from John Hay to George Bush have believed that the "open door" would enable the U.S. to maintain its pre-eminent position in the new pattern of global wealth distribution.

Generally, Americans were convinced that in an open and unfettered world market their ingenuity and unmatched productivity would lead them, and their institutions, to dominate any market they chose. That a conflict existed between protectionist practices at home and "open door" rhetoric for the rest of the world is obvious, but for U.S. policymakers "open door" did not imply free trade between the metropolises, but rather, equal access to markets, so the apparent contradiction was moot. Americans believed they were the best entrepreneurs and that the world was their walnut to crack.

The "open door" theme is one of the most consistent themes in the writings of the political scientists considered in this work.¹²

Again, it was in the Wilsonian design for post-war international order that the belief in the "open door" is best demonstrated. In the "Fourteen Points" Speech, the third point was for the "removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an *equality of trade conditions* among all the nations consenting to peace and associating themselves for its maintenance."¹³ This was further enshrined, although not in such specific language, in the League Covenant. Members were required to subscribe to "open, just, and honourable relations between nations" in the preamble.¹⁴ And in Article 22, explicit "open door" language was employed to describe access to the mandated territories. The mandatory power was required to assure "equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League."¹⁵ Finally, in Article 23, section (e), the members were pledged to "make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League."¹⁶

Wilson's fate and that of his League of Nations are well-known. But the context within which he developed the idea of a league demands renewed analysis. Motives are more often complex than simple. For those who believed that democracy would triumph in an open forum of ideas, the League was an ideal ground for democracy to prevail. It might be appropriate, then, not to see the League of Nations as just a response to World War I, to the organized peace movement, to Wilson's "idealism," and to the general clamor for a way to maintain peace. Instead, one could view

Wilsonian internationalism and the creation of the League as a development in the expression of the desire for the United States and its institutions to mold the world. And one can interpret the efforts of Fleming, Schuman, and Wright in a similar way.

As with so many theories pertaining to organization, when put into practice they rarely, if ever, work according to plan, and it is likely that the plans of Fleming, Schuman, and Wright, if ever put into practice, would find the same result. This was especially true of the plans which the Committee to Study the Organization of Peace proposed. There were many elements of their prescriptions which were paradoxical, ironic, and filled with the potential to create as much harm as good.

Among the most profound of the paradoxes was their faith in technology as the agent of progress. In fact, technology has all the components of Shiva, creator and destroyer. To test a medical metaphor, they proposed to cure the disease with the disease, certainly a proven possibility in the human body but not in the body *politik*. They believed, though, that science was superior to its own failures.

Even though the establishment of an effective world government served no immediate self-interest for the great (or for that matter lesser) powers; even though there was no preeminent power capable of establishing universal government; and even though there were few symbols around which to rally the people of the world to support it; still, the U.N. was as good a vehicle for world cooperation as any. In fact, it was the only structure likely to provide grounds for cooperation between the powers. Upon this, all three scholars agreed. Fleming and Schuman

believed, too, that the veto was the essential element to the United Nations' effectiveness, for it ensured unanimity of purpose, without which any U.N. action stood little chance of success.

Another important element of their theories is the close relationship between their agenda and that of the organized peace movement in the U.S. Disarmament, judicial arbitration of disputes, and the idea that democracies, with appropriate limits upon the masses, would find aggressive war outside their interests, were important assumptions of all three scholars. History provides at best a mixed conclusion as to the value of these assumptions, but these men held to the belief that they provided the best chance for peace in the modern world.

Characteristic as well of their works was a missing element in their analyses: an articulate examination of the divisive forces within domestic politics and prescriptions for their alleviation. If, as they believed, the elements of social life that contribute to cohesion could be transposed to a world organization, it is at least reasonable to assume that the phenomena that contribute to calamity and disunity might transpose, too.

Wright devoted great effort to addressing the causes of war between groups, but lent very little effort to the analysis of conflict within one group.¹⁷ His remedy for economic or civil problems that confronted individuals was to afford them standing within the international legal system. Fleming blamed most conflict within his own society on institutional organization and believed that the adoption of a parliamentary system would be sufficient to ensure that democracy would prevail. His examination of the economic woes of individuals and groups

was tied to a traditional progressive condemnation of monopolies and business moguls.¹⁸ Schuman offered an examination of class and economic conflict within a society, but it was brief and provided no program of reform. At his best, he declared that there would be no basis for world organization until the maldistribution of income within societies and between societies was addressed, but left unanswered the means to do so.¹⁹

A further obstruction to their programs was their uncritical acceptance of the shrinking world paradigm. Their frontier was limited to their grasp of the impact of science and technology on the human experience. They did not apprehend its corollary of a greatly expanded human frontier as a result of the shrinking of space and time. Indeed, the world's peoples were closer in time and distance, thus reducing the physical world, but science and technology also opened up vast new horizons in communications, in exploration, in finance, in warfare, and in politics. Expansion was and is as important a dynamic factor as reduction in the "shrinking world" model. This fact undermines their sense of urgency.

They failed to recognize, as Herbert Marcuse and others did in the 1960s, the spread of a nearly universal culture. Although Marcuse decried its sapping effect on the people, such a culture has the potential to bring the people of the world together under a system of values, both material and social, that could, over the course of time, serve to provide the basis of an informed opinion which supported world government. Even today, commentators recognize the potential for a "global nation" and herald the victory of the case for world government, a victory made possible in large

part from the cosmopolitan culture a "shrinking" world created.²⁰

Whether or not that potential will be realized is still undetermined.

What Fleming, Schuman, and Wright saw as necessary to ensure an organized future was a world civilization that would underscore the similarities between national and ethnic groups rather than the differences. Unordered progress had already, although serendipitously, accomplished much of the work necessary to bring about a world civilization--progress through order could accomplish ten-fold. The material wants of the world's peoples were becoming more uniform, and the potential existed for a more standardized system of values and mores.

But until that time arrived, these men accepted the necessity of limited conflict between groups. Quincy Wright declared that conflict was essential to the preservation of the League, for without disputes to settle, there would be little need for the international power it represented. In fact, he wrote that the League needed conflict, "highly dramatic conflict" in order to sustain world interest in what it sought to do.²¹ They desired to impose order and prescriptions on the means and ends to be employed and sought through conflict. International law and world organization would provide the structure for the future, not the immediate resolution of present conflicts.

One of the reasons they feared the shrinking world was the advent of nuclear weapons. They accepted the conclusion that any nuclear exchange would escalate to the point of apocalypse. This was based upon their unerring devotion to historical syllogism as a means of predicting the future. They saw warfare as the inevitable conclusion of all arms races,

thus denying their faith in human reason and their predictive accuracy. They did not foresee limited or nonuse of nuclear weapons because of the limitations of their conceptual framework. Their organic metaphor of an international jungle of anarchy in which war was the state of nature was incomplete as it failed to accommodate the equal dependence of natural selection upon mutual aid and cooperation. And because a bipolar image of the world dominated their thought for so long they were late to recognize the power of non-Westernized nations in nuclear diplomacy.

All three shared Hobbes' basic assumption that without government its objects, which in the model of international relations were the nation-states, would find themselves in constant war or in constant fear of war. Again, here is an assumption that humans do not necessarily behave rationally, yet they were determined that reason and logic could bring them to do so. If, however, the realization of world government were to develop along the lines these men suggested, the nations would form a compact, not because they were compelled to in order to save themselves from the state of nature, but because they found government to be a mutually advantageous means of assuring the greatest good to the greatest number. Thus entertained, world government would be created and the limitations on national sovereignty, which the three men had long sought but had no means to compel, would be accomplished. But experience and nationalism stood as constant barriers against such an accomplishment.

Another shared belief of Fleming, Schuman, and Wright was the idea that convergence would govern the evolution of the Soviet and U.S. systems. This theory appealed to those who desired a peaceful world, for

they always assumed that the outcome of convergency would be the triumph of the best of both systems. Yet there was little to substantiate their hope. Brezhnev and Kosygin eliminated the reforms of Khrushchev and belligerent regional politicians prevented political racial equality in the U.S. Or perhaps the two systems were already more alike than anyone realized: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Vietnam, and Cuba all served to demonstrate the similar response of two superpowers to domestic and foreign crises. Domestic economies were sacrificed to the needs of the state, i.e., hyper-inflated defense spending at the expense of the citizenry; old-time politicians who were out of touch with the people continued to make policy; imperial presidencies undermined legislative and judicial restraints on abuse of power; apathetic publics which did little to protest policy ; and the list continues.

What, then, of the current claim that a "new world order" has somehow arisen from the ashes of the Cold War? The answer must be, as it was after World War I and World War II, that there is no new world order. Strength of arms is still the key to the resolution of disputes which exceed the mundane between nations. Armed minorities still find it necessary to fight for their freedom; armed majorities still engage in the suppression of peoples based upon "ethnic cleansing," or upon religious or political ideological disputes. There is no world government.

What there is is a cabal of industrial powers whose wills and interests determine that the *status quo* must be maintained. Even when the *status quo* is indelibly altered, as was the case with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was no international law which provided for such change.

Until there are provisions for regulated peaceful change which a world authority can enforce, there will be no new world order. On this assumption, Fleming, Schuman, and Wright were absolutely correct. Until such time as the legitimate demands of the Kurds, or of the black majority in South Africa, or of the southern nations in relation to the industrial north, can be met through legislative initiative, until an international law with the force to coerce its objects governs such relationships, the world order, such that it is, remains subject to the whim of its strongest members.

And to the overwhelming force of nationalism. This force is the most important agent of change to occur in the last three hundred years. It has consumed the world, enervating Wilson's League of Nations and destroying world empires. Until a force which appeals to the imagination and passions of people can supplant their provincial identification with nation states and turn them on to the idea of global identity, no system of law as we know it will establish the means for peaceful international change.

As to the methodology of these men, it represented the bankruptcy of political "science" theory, for never did they or any other political scientist accurately predict the outbreak of hostilities on anything but a macro level of generalization, with the possible exception of Schuman. These three political scientists spoke and wrote of power, but usually in the most abstract of references. All of their predictions could have been, and likely were, made by people who exercised basic common sense.

As demonstrated, these political scientists believed that their discipline was indeed a science not unlike the natural sciences, one that could repeatedly demonstrate truths with predictable accuracy, and they tried to

persuade the public and the government of this. But the object of their "science"--power--is difficult to define: subject to intuitive, emotional, and sometimes rational definition, power is not entirely predictable. The belief that power relations between states and peoples were subject to comprehensive predictive analysis proved undemonstrable, idealistic, and bankrupt.

But political scientists did persuade the government, which sought their talents in time of war and in time of peace, that their services were valuable. And the public generally tolerated the claims made in behalf of a "science" of politics.²² This contributed to an exaggeration of the importance of political scientists and their discipline. Indeed, that faith resulted in the bankruptcy of political science, a bankruptcy some believe continues unchecked. Christopher Thorne, writing in *Border Crossings: Studies in International History*, expressed the continued criticism of political scientists in his characterization of their attempts to devise general theories. Thorne wrote that these attempts are "divorced from the complexities provided by historical evidence; riding high into a quasi-theological stratosphere; delivered in an unlovely tongue; in some cases accompanied by seemingly super-rational exercises in mathematics whose complexity, it transpired, formed the basis for conclusions regarding political processes that were remarkable only for their banality."²³ Although Thorne was writing about a later generation of political scientists, his characterization is appropriate for the founders of political science.

Although these political theorists emphasized the "scientific" nature of their discipline, there was little of science about it. Wright's "equation" which he claimed could predict the escalation of violence was never successfully applied to anything but *ex post facto* circumstances. Schuman believed in a science of politics, but he never provided a methodology for it, and what he practiced could best be described as the "art" of politics. And Fleming bridled at the fact that Gordon Craig recognized his work for what it was: a subjective analysis of facts culled from sources the author thought valuable. In reference to Fleming's *The Origins and Legacies of World War I*, Craig said plainly that "this work cannot be taken seriously as a scientific investigation." It was a warning which applied to all the works of all three men, and likely to Craig's own work.²⁴

Much of this emphasis on the "scientific" nature of their discipline stemmed from a sense of inadequacy in comparison to the natural sciences. The only thing vaguely scientific in their methodology was their dependence on the mistake-laden conclusions of the Aristotelian model of the syllogism. Seeking a formula to predict human behavior brought them to practice contemporary alchemy. When scholars of social studies allow the goals of the natural sciences to bind them in their pursuit of knowledge, they risk the credibility of what they can provide, and there is great merit to that without the requirement that it somehow yield the predictive results of science.

The study of politics is not the only discipline to have suffered from this sense of inadequacy. Historian Allan Megill has demonstrated the continued impact of the desire to provide social studies with the status of

science with his insistence that the formula $(AH) \times (CS) = k$ can reveal a constant between the interaction of the variables of "action," "happening," "character," and "setting." And he cites Wallace Martin and Gerard Genette as the progenitors of his formula, so he is not alone. As with Wright's formula, though, there are no objective means to define the nature of the variables, so that only Megill can be informed as to their exact nature; the rest of us, he condescends, are either traditionalists or "uninformed."²⁵

There is, too, the core problem of the practice of political "science" or the "science" of history: to what standards do we hold predictions? Six months? A year? Two years? A decade? Half-a-century? And how do we justify the creation of new or refined policies based upon predictions to which no standards are applied? And, of course, there is the problem of the missed predictions of the last five years. Where were the political scientists who foresaw the collapse of the Warsaw bloc? Or the rapid reunification of Germany? The collapse of the Soviet Union? The impact of fundamentalist Islam? What, then, is the value of political "science" as it was then, and still is, practiced?

The role of critic is an easier one than that of creator. These men engaged in an act of creation; they were devoted to a cause which in their minds would serve world peace. There are few higher motives. But in their pursuit of that goal, perhaps they failed to recognize their own limits, an act which in itself is a strength. Perhaps we would all have been better served had these men lowered their sights. They seem to have forgotten that if all the practitioners of history and political studies can do is to teach critical analysis and occasionally predict certain future events in very

general terms, that is still very good. Far worse would be to mislead themselves and other people to believe that the future can be predicted on the basis of "scientific" formulas and that only the experts have the knowledge to do so. The self-serving nature of these efforts to perpetuate their positions is not unique to academics, but it is an effort which conflicts with their mission and is used to justify the pursuit of an equation whose result is repeatedly demonstrated, an equation which does not exist.

Cicero wrote that history, and he might well have included political science, "is the witness of the time, the torch of truth, the life of memory, the teacher of life, the messenger of antiquity." What we are left to ask is: does it need to be anything more?

Notes

¹ Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1932* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 23.

² James W. Gibson provides a masterful exposition of the failure of reason as a guide for the expectations one group has for the behavior of another in response to the application of policy in his examination of U. S. involvement in Vietnam entitled *The Perfect War: The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988).

³ See QW Document, 10 June 1942, Box 5, folder 14. In a pamphlet entitled "Prepare for Victory," Wright observed that American labor "must take increasing interest in post-war problems and effective leadership in building a constructive public opinion." He asked the unions receiving this pamphlet to discuss the postwar world and to write the Midwest office of the CSOP for programs for discussion, but there is no indication of a response among his papers.

⁴ Frederick L. Schuman, "Formulas for Foreign Policy," *Nation* 180 (19 March 1955), 241-42.

⁵ The term "power politics" is a redundancy in that politics, no matter what the level, is about the social division of power, hence all politics is "power politics." Still, it is a term many of the individuals considered here chose to employ so it is used throughout this dissertation.

⁶ Woodrow Wilson, *Address to the League to Enforce Peace*, Washington, D.C., 27 May 1916, *Public Papers*, IV, 184-188. As cited in E. David Cronon *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson* (New York, N.Y.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), 419.

⁷ As David Cronon observed in *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson*, "[t]he New Freedom was for whites only." Wilson and his deputies, many of them Southerners, oversaw the cutback of the number and level of federal jobs open to blacks and "adopted a policy of racial segregation in federal employment." Cronon, 231.

⁸ Wilson shared in the general *zeitgeist* about race. Wilson declared for the national policy of exclusion as early as 1912. He based his views on the belief that the oriental peoples were unassimilable. "We cannot," he wrote, "make a homogenous population out of people who do not blend with the Caucasian race Oriental coolness will give us another race problem to solve, and surely we have had our lessons." Cronon, 232. As well, Wilson prevented the inclusion of a statement of racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant which further demonstrates his ideas on race, ideas that he levelled on an international as well as a domestic plane.

9 "The Covenant of the League of Nations," as found in Ruhl Jacob Bartlett, *The Record of American Diplomacy*, (New York, N.Y.: A. A. Knopf), 468-469.

10 QW to Edward Bernays, 5 March 1946, Bx 19, fol 9.

11 QW, "The Munich Settlement and International Law," *Am J Int'l L*, 33 (1939), 30.

12 For Wilson, see "A Door of Friendship and Mutual Advantage," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1920), 170-171; Wilson to William Jennings Bryan, 14 April 1915, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1939-1940), II, 416-417: as cited in Cronon, 270-274.

13 "The Fourteen Points," *The Record of American Diplomacy*, 460.

14 "League of Nations Covenant," *The Record of American Diplomacy*, 461.

15 *Ibid.*, 469.

16 *Ibid.*

17 See Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, (Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1964).

18 *Supra*, 92, footnotes 34 and 35.

19 *Supra*, 159, footnote 107.

20 Strobe Talbott, "The Birth of the Global Nation," *Time*, 140, (20 July 1992), 70-71.

21 Quincy Wright, "Is The League The Road To Peace?," *Political Quarterly* (London, 1934), 92-106.

22 *Supra*, 37; 148; 321.

23 Christopher Thorne, *Border Crossings: Studies in International History* (Oxford, 1988), 7.

24 DF to the Editor, *The New York Times Book Review*, 11 January 1969, 1.

25 Allan Megill, "Recounting the Past: 'Description,' Explanation, and Narrative in Historiography," *AHR*, 94 (June 1989), 645.

APPENDIX A

THE PROJECT ON THE CAUSES OF WAR

In 1927 the Social Science Research Committee at the University of Chicago initiated a project on the causes of war with the writer [Quincy Wright] as director. Thirty studies had been carried out in connection with this project and several have been, or will be, published. Those published to date include books by Frederick L. Schuman on *War and Diplomacy in the French Republic* and by Harold D. Lasswell on *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*. The latter made use of several unpublished studies dealing with the psychology of war. Summaries of four of these have been published in journals--Philip Davidson, "Whig Propagandists of the American Revolution," Hazel C. Benjamin, "Official Propaganda and the French Press during the Franco-Prussian War," Schuyler Foster, "How America became Belligerent: A Quantitative Study of War News, 1914-1917," James T. Russell and Quincy Wright, "National Attitudes in the Far Eastern Controversy." Books by Tatsuji Takeuchi on *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* and by Eugene Staley on *The Political Problem of International Private Investment* are in process of publication. Four of Mr. Staley's preliminary studies for the latter have been published in journals. . . .

APPENDIX B
CSOP MEMBERSHIP

March 14, 1940

Members of the
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace

<p>James T. Shotwell, chairman Allen D. Albert Henry A. Atkinson Frank Aydelotte Dana Convers Backus Clarence E. Berdahl Donald C. Blaisdell Frank G. Boudreau Esther Cuakin Brunauer Lyman Bryson Arthur Rowland Burnstan Kenneth Colgrove Mrs. Harvey N. Davis Francis Deak Monroe Deutsch Marshall Dimock Allen W. Dulles John Foster Dulles Clyde Eagleton Lucius R. Eastman Clark M. Eichelberger Brooks Emeny Charles G. Fenwick Frederick V. Field Edgar J. Fisher Denna F. Fleming Margeret Forsyth Benjamin Gerig Harry D. Gideonse Virginia Gildersleeve Carter Goodrich Frank P. Graham Roger S. Greene</p>	<p>Anne Hartwell Johnston A. Drummond Jones Walter Kotschnig Thomas W. Lamont Owen Lattimore Walter H. C. Laves Waldo Leland Katherine Lenroot Max Lerner Frank Lorimer William P. Maddox Frederick C. McKee William P. Merrill Spencer Miller, Jr. Philip C. Nash William Allan Neilson Oscar Newfang G. Bernard Noble Frederick Osborn Ernest Minor Patterson Daniel A. Poling Leland Rex Robinson John A. Ryan Josephine Schain Frederick Schuman Walter R. Sharp Smith Simpson Preston Slosson Eugene Staley Waldo Stephens Clarence Streit Charles P. Taft Clifton M. Utley</p>
--	--

Henry I. Harriman
H. Livingston Hartley
Emily Hickman
Ursula Hubbard
Samuel Guy Inman
Oscar I. Janowsky
Philip C. Jessup
Alvin Johnson

Sarah Wambaugh
Edith Ware
Robert Watt
William Allen White
Ernest H. Wilkins
Richard Wood
Quincy Wright

APPENDIX C

CSOP DRAFT PLAN FOR WORLD ORGANIZATION

V. UNIVERSAL ORGANIZATION

22. A universal organization of the nations must necessarily be supported by internal public opinion since it cannot be supported by external menaces. Thus the problem of such an organization is different from that of any state or federation, the members of which have always been, to some extent, driven to union by the fear of invasion. In order to command this support, a universal organization must be highly adaptable: it must allow for variations according to the traditions and needs of each region.

To establish the necessary universal principles and institutions all states should be invited to become parties to a pact which, in addition, should be incorporated in each national constitution thus rendering its terms at the same time international obligations between states and obligations of individuals and governments within the states. The following obligations are suggested for incorporation in this pact:

- a. To define certain human rights protecting life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness as binding international obligations.
- b. To renounce the use of armed force as an instrument of national policy, and to agree not to seek the settlement of international disputes except by peaceful means.
- c. To acknowledge the concern of international law in economic and military legislations with external effect, to accept responsibility for an abusive exercise of the powers of governments in this regard to the injury of other states or their nationals, and to negotiate general treaties prohibiting injurious types of armament and commercial regulation.

d. To submit to and to abide by the decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice in all international legal disputes.

e. To observe interim measures such as armistice, injunctions upon preparations for war, or suspension of injurious economic restriction proposed by the World Council in case of military, political or economic acts of governments initiating or threatening hostilities.

f. To treat as an aggressor any government found by the Council to be engaged in hostilities as a result of its violation of such interim measures. Such treatment implies that the aggressor government shall gain no advantages, legal, political or economic from its resort to violence; that the state victim of aggression shall be deprived of no advantages, legal, political or economic; and that the aggressor government shall be deemed to have violated not only international law but the law of its own state. States are therefore obliged after an aggression has been determined not to recognize the fruits of aggression, to embargo arms and war supplies to aggressor governments, and to withdraw recognition from such governments.

g. To establish and support:

(1) A World Assembly consisting of representatives of every considerable population with a distinctive public opinion, including not only nations but perhaps also regional organizations and world-wide functional organizations.

(2) A world Council consisting of representatives of the great powers and of the important political regions of the world.

(3) A World Secretariat to study world problems and to administer the decisions of the Assembly and Council.

h. To provide the World Council and the World Assembly with practical procedures to facilitate agreement on the subjects referred to in paragraphs a, c; to recommend on all important international problems

laid before them; and to supervise regional organizations and functional international organizations in the fields of labor, commerce, social problems, transit, communications, health, colonies, etc.

VI. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Regional organizations might be formed by groups of states with consent of the world assembly for promoting the security and advancement of the region. Among such regions might be Europe, the Danubian area, the Near East, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, the Americas and Far East. The constituent members of a regional organizations might differ for different purposes.

a. Each of these regions should develop its own institutions in its own way, each should have primary responsibility for maintaining order and facilitating political changes within the region subject always to the competence of the universal organization in matters covered by the universal Covenant.

b. The European region might be organized as a federation with a central executive authority commanding adequate police power to suppress revolts against its constitution by factions or governments within the region, a central legislative authority, representing the populations and the states, with power extending to commerce and social reform, and a deliberate procedure of constitutional amendment for modifying the political jurisdiction of states.

c. The disruption of the Hapsburg Empire as a result of the World War disorganized the economic life and security of the Danubian area, and made the states vulnerable to attack by their powerful neighbors, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union, without the security of a buffer state position and long historic existence enjoyed by Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Scandinavia and other small European states. The reestablishment of a federation of the Danubian area within the general European federation

may be desirable. While the limits of such a federation, both in areas and in powers, would depend on the development of political circumstances, the inclusion of a restored Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria, as well as Hungary, Yugoslavia and Rumania, might be desirable thus providing a great power, part Slavic and part Germanic, contributing with Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain to the European Union, and maintaining sympathetic connections with the Soviet and Near Eastern regions.

d. The Near Eastern region, though mainly Moslem and mainly fragmented from the Ottoman Empire, is now disunited and continues a scene of great power rivalries. The Balkans (Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania); the Moslem states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt), the Lebanon, Palestine, and the European Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, U.S.S.R., and Germany) have territorial or historic interests, and interest in the Suez Canal. Any regional organization would have to give some representation to all of these states.

e. The Soviet Union constitutes a region in close proximity to those of Great Britain, Europe, the Near East and the Far East, but with internal problems of its own.

f. The British Empire constitutes an historic political grouping, but scarcely a region, with interests in the European, American, Near Eastern and Far Eastern regions and in close proximity to the Soviet Union.

g. The American region might be organized according to the principles of the Pan-American Treaties admitting, however, Canada and giving some voice to the countries with colonial responsibilities in the area--Great Britain, France and the Netherlands

h. The Far Eastern region might be organized according to the principles of the Washington Conference Treaty as modified, however, to admit a larger voice in the affairs of this region to states with home territories in

the area, especially Japan, Chian, Siam and India, and a lesser voice to states with colonial responsibilities in the area, as the Soviet Union, the United States, France, Great Britain, Netherlands and Portugal. The medley of territorial servitudes and protectorates qualifying the domain of several Far Eastern states should be gradually modified so as to give each of these states sovereignty within its own domain, subject only to general international obligations, and obligations of the federal constitution of the region.

VII. FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION

25. Within the framework of the political institutions enumerated, functional international institutions might be established dealing with problems of health and nutrition, commerce and raw materials, transit and communication, labor, colonies and social problems. These already exist in some measure in the technical organizations of the League of Nations, the International Labor Organization and further development is proposed by the Bruce Report.

26. Each of these functional organizations might be adapted to give appropriate representation to the groups in the world most interested, as well as to the nations, as has been done in the constitution of the International Labor Organization.

a. An economic organization dealing with the problems of commerce, raw materials and markets is particularly important and should be developed with such competence as to assure a moderate freedom of trade and access to raw materials on equal terms for all nations. It might advise the World ASsembly with respect to legislation under Article 16 (d) and in some cases facilitate special regional arrangements on economic matters.

b. An organization for dealing with colonies and undeveloped areas might be established, strengthening and extending the principles of the mandates system. The organization should have sovereignty of the areas,

powers of transferring the mandatory, of inspection on the spot and of undertaking the administration of any area itself if deemed desirable. Direct international administration of all of the present mandated territories, or at least of the Central African territory might be undertaken at once. It should enforce the principles of equal commercial opportunity, participation by all peoples in the administration and technical services, utilization of all revenues of the area for the benefit of its population, nonuse of natives in military services except for police of the area, prohibition of naval and military bases, of slavery and of other abuses of native rights, and eventual emancipation to independent status when certain criteria have been achieved.

APPENDIX D
PEACE ACT ADVISORY COUNCIL

PEACE ACT ADVISORY COUNCIL

3 June 70

SPONSORS

Kenneth Boulding - Professor in the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado

Norman Cousins - President of the World Association of World Federalists

Jerome D. Frank - Professor in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Science at Johns Hopkins University

Arthur J. Goldberg - Former Ambassador to the United Nations

Ernest Gruening - Former United States Senator

Seymour Halpern - -United States Representative

Vance Hartke - United States Senator

Mark O. Hatfield - United States Senator

Theodore Hesburgh - President of Notre Dame University

Roger Hilsman - Professor of Government at Columbia University

Townsend Hoopes - Former Undersecretary of the United States Air Force

Arthur Larson - Director of the Rule of Law Research Center at Duke University

Harold D. Lasswell - Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University

Pual Moore, Jr. - Bishop Coadjutor of the Diocese of New York

Hans Morganthau - Director of the Center for Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago

Henry S. Reuss - United States Representative

Frederick L. Schuman - Professor of Political Science at Portland State University

Gordon Sherman - President of Midas International Corporation

David M. Shoup - Former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps

Gloria Steinem - Writer for New York Magazine

Jerome Weisner - Provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Harold Willens - President of the Business Men's Education Fund

Herbert F. York - Dean of Graduate Studies at the University of California

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